



O izradi strategije

Jean Dufourcq

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Predrag Jureković

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Scenarios and Capability Planning: Creation of Scenarios as a Tool for Predicting the Future Operating Environment

Libor Frank and Josef Procházka

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Marko Zečević, Mladen Pahernik i Hrvoje Hešter



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Predgovor

Strategos – vojni predvodnik ili general u antičkoj Grčkoj. Već sam naziv ovog znanstvenog časopisa odaje njegovu namjeru, ali i težinu dodijeljenog mu zadatka u ambicioznom projektu izgradnje Hrvatskog vojnog učilišta „Dr. Franjo Tuđman“ u visokoobrazovnu i znanstveno istraživačku ustanovu, koja će stvarati i odgajati buduće vojne zapovjednike i generale Republike Hrvatske.

Ovakav je projekt koliko ambiciozan, toliko i potreban Republici Hrvatskoj u nastavku izgradnje Oružanih snaga, koje su bile i ostale jamac i zaštitnik suvereniteta, neovisnosti i teritorijalne cjelovitosti. Trajni su temelj naših Oružanih snaga iskustva i slavna prošlost iz Domovinskog rata, a dinamično i promjenjivo sigurnosno okružje zahtijeva stalno učenje, usavršavanje i usvajanje novih znanja i sposobnosti od svakog pripadnika Oružanih snaga, od vojnika do generala.

Izazovi i prijetnje pred nama su brojni, raznovrsni i često teško previdivi. U takvom okružju upravo je posebna odgovornost na vojno obrazovnim i znanstveno istraživačkim ustanovama. One moraju biti predvodnikom prepoznavanja novih izazova, generatorom inovativnosti u iznalaženju novih načina suočavanja s tim izazovima i nositeljem uvođenja takvih novina u obrazovni sustav Oružanih snaga u trajnom i neprekidnom procesu njihove transformacije.

Razborit vojni zapovjednik nikada se neće zadovoljiti postignutim položajem svojih snaga u bitci. Uvijek će ga nastojati unaprijediti i povećati vlastitu prednost. Isto tako, u miru nikada neće biti zadovoljan postignutim sposobnostima, nego će stalno tragati za načinima njihovog dalnjeg unapređivanja i potrebom njihove prilagodbe.

Razvoj spoznaje o nužnosti i načinima prilagodbe zahtijeva slobodu razmišljanja, mogućnost izražavanja i izlazak iz ustaljenih i ponekad krutih obrazaca promišljanja. Časopis poput Strategosa pruža pogodan okvir za razvoj takve slobode mišljenja i

izražavanja, te razmjene i sučeljavanja stavova, ideja i vizija. Upravo ga stoga ocjenjujem izrazito vrijednim doprinosom združenim naporima u izgradnji još boljih i spremnijih Oružanih snaga, koje će biti jamac naše sigurnosti i izvor našeg ponosa.

Čestitam Hrvatskom vojnom učilištu i njegovom zapovjedniku, cjelokupnom uredništvu i suradnicima promociju prvoga broja znanstvenog časopisa Strategos te se radujem mnogim njegovim sljedećim izdanjima.

*Predsjednica Republike i
vrhovna zapovjednica Oružanih snaga Republike Hrvatske*



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "K. Grabar-Kitarović".

Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović

Riječ urednika

Poštovane čitateljice i čitatelji,

Čast mi je i zadovoljstvo predstaviti Vam prvi broj znanstvenog časopisa „Strategos“ Hrvatskog vojnog učilišta „Dr. Franjo Tuđman“. Pokretanje ovog znanstvenog časopisa potaknuto je potrebom stvaranja okvira koji će omogućiti sustavno praćenje i analizu širokog spektra tema u znanstvenom polju vojno-obrambene i sigurnosno-obavještajne znanosti i umijeće.

Razvoj znanstvene misli u navedenom polju je značajan upravo zbog činjenice da sustav nacionalne sigurnosti svake zemlje, pa tako i Republike Hrvatske, treba znanstveno promišljanje o svim njegovim sastavnicama, uključujući i obrambenu. Činjenica je da i drugi znanstveni časopisi u Republici Hrvatskoj djelomično zahvaćaju ovo znanstveno polje. Međutim, postoji cijeli niz tema, a posebno tema u području istraživanja iz domene vojnih znanosti koje do sada nisu adekvatno zastupljene u hrvatskoj znanstvenoj i stručnoj periodici.

U mnogim suvremenim vojnim organizacijama postoje slične znanstvene publikacije kroz koje njihovi pripadnici - časnici i civilno osoblje (eksperti i znanstvenici), ali i donositelji odluka u području obrane - objavljaju i izmjenjuju ideje i perspektive o razvoju vojnih strategija, doktrina, transformacije, sposobnosti, vojne organizacije, novih tehnologija i niza drugih tema. Očekujemo da „Strategos“ značajno doprinese vođenju stručno i znanstveno utemeljenih rasprava i promišljanja o obrambenim i sigurnosnim pitanjima u Republici Hrvatskoj, a time i stvaranju budućih sigurnosnih i obrambenih politika kao i razvoju strateške misli.

Istovremeno, naš znanstveni časopis će nastojati dati svoj doprinos i boljem informiranju hrvatske javnosti o obrambenim i sigurnosnim pitanjima, te dalnjem razvoju sustava nacionalne sigurnosti Republike Hrvatske.

U ovom broju „Strategos“ se bavi pitanjem izrade strategije, političke i sigurnosne perspektive jugoistočne Europe nakon Brexita, vojno-pomorskom moći, kreiranjem scenarija i instrumentima za predviđanje budućeg operacijskog okružja. Jedna od tema ovog broja je i prostorna analiza utjecaja geoloških čimbenika na provedbu desantne operacije kod Galipolja 1915. godine. „Strategos“ donosi i prikaze nekoliko knjiga o pomorskoj moći kao i jezični osvrt na značenje pojma strategija.

*Glavni urednik
brg dr. sc. Jugoslav Jozić*

O izradi strategije¹

Jean Dufourcq

Promatrači (pa među njima i *La Vigie*) redovito promišljaju o strategijama vjerujući da zamjećuju obrise njihova postojanja.

Što je neka odluka? Znači li ona i postojanje prethodno ustanovaljene strategije? Je li tu ipak prije riječ o nekoj besmislenoj situaciji, nepovezanosti, ili ta odluka najavljuje neku promjenu? Nadalje, tko razvija, tko odlučuje, a tko je taj koji stavlja u funkciju te strategije za koje vjerujemo da zamjećujemo njihove učinke? Tko, naime, stvara strategiju? To su dakle prava pitanja, naizgled teorijska, koja je potrebno analizirati kako bismo „razumjeli to što mislimo da razumijemo”.

Razmislimo stoga o riječi „strategija” koja se posvuda zlorabi, a ponajprije to činimo i mi sami.

Strukturalno promjenjive strategije

Jedna je od najčešćih hipoteza da svaka odluka proizlazi iz neke strategije. Prepostavljamo da ta strategija ima svoj slijed i logičan kontinuitet. Analitičar izrađuje strategiju, donositelj odluka je potvrđuje te je provodi ili nalaže njezinu provedbu, a zatim promatra njezine učinke kako bi je dopunio. Međutim, taj proces u praksi i ne izgleda uvijek baš tako.

S jedne strane, svaka situacija koja zahtijeva donošenje neke odluke ne nalazi se nužno unutar prethodno osmišljene strategije. Takva bi strategija morala obuhvatiti sve, dok je polje mogućeg bezgranično. Dakle, svaka je strategija

¹ Ovaj članak izvorno je objavljen na internetskim stranicama publikacije *La Vigie* (broj 34.) 20. siječnja 2016. godine pod nazivom *Produire la stratégie*. S francuskoga preveli: mag Jelena Puškarić i brg dr. sc. Jugoslav Jozić

nužno zadana. Odluka koja se donosi, donosi se često u hitnim situacijama te je plod nužne reakcije na trenutačne okolnosti, a ne primjena već postojeće strategije.

S druge, pak, strane, bila ta odluka dijelom strategijskog okvira ili ne, ona će svakako imati više učinaka: promijenit će okružje (što u biti i jest cilj svake strategije) u pozitivnom ili negativnom smislu, što će, pak, imati povratne učinke i na početni strategijski okvir. Donositelj odluke mogao bi tada unijeti promjene u strategijski ciklus, ponovno ga pokrenuti ili ga potvrditi. Takva eksperimentalna dinamika pokazuje da nijedna strategija ne može biti „fiksna”. Međutim, jedna od zamjerki koje se često upućuju na račun strategije tiče se upravo elemenata nepovezanosti i odstupanja za koje vjerujemo da primjećujemo u odnosu na glavnu ideju koja bi trebala biti dugoročno valjana. To upravo znači zaboraviti da, ako strategija ima za cilj dugoročno izražavati nečiju volju, ona tada ne može biti nepromjenjiva: strategija neprestano trpi protuudare te samim time prepostavlja postojanje permanentnog rekonstrukcijskog ciklusa koji je u suprotnosti s planiranim dugoročnošću njezine primjene.

Primjeniti strategiju

Naše razmišljanje polazi od događaja za koji se prepostavlja da razotkriva postojanje neke strategije. „Napraviti” strategiju, proizvesti je, značilo bi najprije tu strategiju osmisiliti i nakon toga primijeniti. No, pitanje provedbe nije jednostavno: ono podrazumijeva da između odluke i provedbe postoji jedna fina usklađenost gdje svaki podređeni točno primjenjuje strateške opcije donositelja odluke. Takva vrsta koherentnosti rijetko se postiže, a da ne govorimo o kvaliteti provedbe traženih djelovanja. Tu nailazimo na strukturalni prostor „trenja”, koje je kao pojam različit od „trenja” što ga nalazimo kod Clausewitza, a koje nastaje kao plod neizvjesnosti prilikom sukoba neprijatelja. U našem slučaju, pa i bez prisutnosti neprijatelja, postoji trenje prirođeno samoj strategiji, trenje između misli i djelovanja.

Osim toga, postoji i pretpostavka da se u sklopu svake strategije nalazi i dio koji je tajan, barem na razini namjera. Ne može sve biti razotkriveno jer bi

se time osujetili očekivani učinci, na protivnika ili na sami tijek događaja. Tako ni brojne tvrtke ne objavljaju svoj strateški plan (ili pak ako to čine, onda to rade tek u glavnim crtama) upravo zato da ne pobude pozornost konkurenčije. Postojanje te tajne komponente strategije, a koja se tiče strateških opcija, posljedično može dovesti do toga da podređenima, koji ih u praksi provode, konačni cilj tih opcija ostane nepoznat. Podređeni mogu, dakle, pogrešno protumačiti strateške opcije, što opet može dovesti do značajnih odstupanja u provedbi.

Stoga, tumačiti događaje kao pokazatelje postojanja prethodno izrađene strategije znači ne prepoznati element neizvjesnosti koji postoji između procesa izrade strategije i njezine primjene. To se prečesto zaboravlja. Možemo, stoga, zaključiti da je, unatoč odstupanju, i samo stvaranje strategije izvor problema.

Osmisliti strategiju

Prisjetimo se uobičajenih, od strane većine prihvaćenih, definicija: strateg je osoba koja procjenjuje načine djelovanja, u općem smislu, političke potrebe i namjere u odnosu na materijalna sredstva. Clausewitz ili Corbett, Gallois ili Van Creveld su stratezi. Primijetimo da, ako su Clausewitz ili Gallois i bili vojnici, dakle praktičari, nije svaki praktičar odmah i strateg jer ta djelatnost podrazumijeva osobiti intelektualni napor podosta različit od vojnog umijeća. Strateg razvija sustav razmišljanja, sposobnost koja ga razlikuje od onoga koji, pak, razrađuje i odobrava stratešku odluku. Često razlikujemo dvije kategorije stratega: vojnog stratega (strateg u pravome smislu te riječi s obzirom na to da je on taj koji u konačnici „vodi vojsku“; on je i jamac učinkovitosti) i političkog stratega, onoga koji definira političke učinke (on je jamac legitimnosti djelovanja), ali ostavlja vojnom zapovjedniku brigu o odabiru opcije djelovanja na terenu. Rijetke su osobe sposobne obavljati obje ove aktivnosti.

Riječ „strateg“ stavili smo u gramatičku jedninu. Ako strateg zaista sam i donosi odluku, on je većinu vremena okružen specijalistima koji mu u tome pomažu. Ta uloga tradicionalno pripada stožerima (ili njihovim

ekvivalentima u političkom okružju). Mogli bismo ovdje teoretizirati o mehanizmima donošenja odluke; humanističke znanosti i strateške studije dale su zaista vrijedne doprinose tom bitnom pojmu, pojmu donošenja individualne ili „kolektivne” odluke. Spomenimo te mehanizme tek ukratko kako bismo primijetili da oni sami mogu unijeti odstupanja u već prihvaćene opcije: kako bi pomirio oprečna stajališta, donositelj odluke može napraviti loš izbor. Strategiju čine jasnom precizno definirani i po prioritetu poredani ciljevi kao i prioriteti koji se nameću cjelokupnoj strateškoj vertikali. Samo u slučaju ignoriranja temeljnog principa svake strategije koji govori da „sve mora biti podređeno glavnom cilju”, strategija se ponekad rasprši na slabo ili nikako međusobno povezane zadaće.

Strateški proces

Uobičajeno, strateški proces opisujemo kao međusobnu povezanost ciljeva, načina i sredstava. Zapravo, najprije bi trebali biti definirani ciljevi koji se nastoje postići, zatim se identificiraju načini njihova dostizanja kako bi se mobilizirali za to potrebni resursi. Ostavimo sada malo po strani svaki od ovih zasebnih procesa kako bismo proučili valjanost strateškog slijeda.

Taj slijed možemo zasigurno pratiti prilikom vojnih operacija u kojima inicijalna direktiva definira „krajnje željeno stanje”. To omogućava timu za planiranje primjenu metode i predlaganje načina djelovanja koji u sebi objedinjuju „načine” (linije operacija) i sredstva (snage i raspoloživa logistička sredstva). U tom je slučaju trojac ciljevi-načini-sredstva relevantan. Valja primijetiti kako se spomenuti slijed primjenjuje naročito u okviru zadane operacije ograničene u vremenu i prostoru kao i svom funkcionalnom okviru (uporaba oružane sile). Istaknimo također i zajedničku metodu, koju koriste svi sudionici, i donositelj odluke i stožer zadužen za analizu te stožer zadužen za provedbu. Taj zajednički jezik, svim sudionicima dostupna znanja i informacije, temelj su učinkovitosti. Ne uspijeva nužno svaki plan jer, kako kaže uzrečica: „plan je prva žrtva rata”. Međutim, svaki plan omogućava da se stvori pregled mogućnosti, izbjegnu iznenađenja, priopće zajednički ciljevi i da se na taj način riješi veliki broj nesuglasica. Ako plan i ne jamči pobjedu, bez njega je poraz zajamčen.

Strategija obrane

Stvari su manje jasne kada govorimo o strategiji obrane. U Francuskoj već dugo postoji instrument pod nazivom *Loi de programmation militaire* (LPM)², koji se još od šezdesetih godina prošlog stoljeća donosi svakih pet godina, no čija je primjena, općenito govoreći, nepravilna. U početku je tu bilo riječi o „strategijama sredstava”, koje su usmjerene ponajprije resursima koje treba mobilizirati, a da strateški ciljevi ili načini njihova ostvarenja nisu bili jasno određeni. Jasno, prisjetit ćemo se uredbe iz 1959. ili pak uvodnih tekstova svakoga od donesenih LPM-ova: tome je nedostajao jedan instrument koji bi bio međukorak, a to su bile Bijele knjige.

Prva Bijela knjiga usvojena je 1972. godine nakon desetljeća rasprave o temeljnim opcijama odvraćanja. Taj je dokument definirao nuklearano pitanje. Dotad se tek uvijek konstatiralo i ponavljalno kako je Francuska stekla nuklearno oružje i kako je razvila istinsku strategiju sredstava prije nego što je postavljeno pitanje o načinima djelovanja. Logičan niz ciljevi-načini-sredstva nije se do kraja slijedio. Cilj, pak, Bijelih knjiga koje su donesene nakon 1972. godine bio je manje jasno određen.

Tekst Bijele knjige iz 1994. bio je reakcija na geopolitičke potrese izazvane padom Berlinskoga zida; dokument iz 2008. godine za glavne teme ima obranu i sigurnost, dok se, pak, dokument iz 2013. godine bavi svime time. No, svaki je put intervenirao birokratski sustav uključujući u proces sve više i više sudionika koji su trebali postići dogovor, barem načelni.

Možemo zaključiti da, kakvi god da su bili zaključci Bijelih knjiga, daleko je najvažniji dokument bio LPM kao provedbeni dokument kojim se nastojalo povezati sredstva s uvijek nedovoljnim financijskim resursima. Ako su cilj i načini provedbe kronološki prethodili izboru sredstava, ipak su sredstva određivala relativnu težinu svake od sastavnica strateškog procesa.

Postoji, dakle, i određena logika koja to objašnjava: političko djelovanje najčešće se odvija kroz dodjeljivanje resursa države. Strategija obrane države ne postoji odvojeno već je dio opće strategije (a ne politike, što valja

² U Republici Hrvatskoj to je Dugoročni plan razvoja (DPR) OS RH (opaska prevoditelja)

razlikovati) koja uključuje ne samo ministarstvo obrane već i druge čimbenike nacionalne obrane (gospodarstvo, diplomaciju, unutarnje poslove).

Proces opće strategije

Ako strategija obrane i slijedi jasno određene procese, to se ne može reći za opću strategiju. Posljednja u nizu Bijelih knjiga o francuskoj vanjskoj politici posebni je naglasak stavila na organizaciju ministarstva. Prema uvriježenoj praksi promatrači već tradicionalno svake godine krajem kolovoza pozorno prate „govor veleposlanicima“ Predsjednika Francuske Republike nadajući se kako će iz toga govora nazrijeti glavne smjernice ili eventualne promjene. No, predstavlja li jedan javni godišnji govor politiku jedne zemlje? On je može djelomično otkriti, no to je njezin tek nesavršeni izraz. U knjizi *Ratovi predsjednika*³ nalazimo opise iz kojih je razvidno kako su strateške opcije aktualnog Predsjednika Republike u velikom dijelu bile donesene pod pritiskom događaja: bilo da je riječ o intervenciji u Maliju ili o promjeni vojne prisutnosti u Siriji nakon atentata koji su se dogodili 2015. godine. Predsjednik Republike odluku donosi unutar uskog kruga suradnika (neposredno okružje, najbliži ministri). Ona kroz vrijeme i utjecaj događaja doživjava promjene.

Nakon atentata izvedenih u siječnju 2015. godine, pristupilo se prvoj reviziji LPM-a. Pariški napadi u studenome iste godine doveli su do dublje analize toga dokumenta te se prionulo njegovom korjenitom restrukturiranju. Rezultate tih procesa još čekamo. Bolja koherentnost dogodit će se s donošenjem sljedeće Bijele knjige.

Međunarodna strategija

Ako se čini kako je teško u praksi povezati ciljeve, načine i sredstva na nacionalnoj razini, koliko li je to onda još teže na međunarodnoj razini. To je posebno slučaj u multilateralnom kontekstu.

³ D'Allonnes, D. R. (2015) *Les Guerres du président*. Paris, Le Seuil.

Zajednička strategija Europske unije datira iz 2003. godine. Taj strateški dokument, tek neznatno izmijenjen 2008. godine, ne odaje dojam istinske strategije. Dokument oscilira između velikih principa vanjske politike i deklaracije namjera bez stvarne aktivne politike. Ciljevi se čine neprecizni, načini njihove provedbe nejasni, sredstva neodređena. Čini se kako se odluke vezane uz organizam Zajedničke obrambene i sigurnosne politike Europske unije donose od slučaja do slučaja kao odgovor na događaje, referirajući se naknadno na tekst temeljnog dokumenta više u smislu opravdavanja tih odluka. No, i takvo ponašanje nije bez pozitivnog učinka suprotno onomu što se često može čuti. Tako se čini da vojni angažman na afričkom rogu s tri povezane misije, jednom na moru te dvjema na kopnu, donosi rezultate. Isto su tako događaji vezani uz migrantsku krizu i zbivanja na Sredozemlju doveli do usvajanja odluke o provođenju misije *Sofia* ili do osmišljavanja misije *Triton*. Europa, čini se, na taj način želi dati prednost međunarodnim pregovorima na visokoj razini (kao što je to bio slučaj s pregovorima s Iranom oko iranskoga nuklearnoga programa ili, pak, COP 21⁴) ostavljajući pritom važno mjesto velikim akterima kao što su Njemačka, Francuska i Velika Britanija. Kada je riječ o konkretnim mjerama i djelovanjima, EU daje veću prednost neposrednim zajedničkim interesima koji potiču na djelovanje od provedbe neke strategije. Strategija EU-a ostaje vrlo općenita kako bi se prilagodila pojedinim odlukama: s druge pak strane, ta se strategija ne čini kao temelj za donošenje odluka.

Sve je to djelomice i posljedica prirode EU-a koja ima samo neke opće nadležnosti i u konačnici malo nadležnosti na području obrane, koje ostaju u okviru međudržavnih odnosa, prostoru susreta njihovih suvereniteta. Stvari bi mogle biti jasnije u NATO savezu, koji je više posvećen vojnim pitanjima i zajedničkoj obrani.

NATO savez je od kraja hladnoga rata usvojio više strateških koncepata (1991., 1999. i 2010.). Posljednji koncept jasno određuje tri misije NATO saveza: zajednička obrana (Članak 5), upravljanje krizama (operacije) i kooperativna sigurnost (s različitim pojedinačnim partnerima ili međunarodnim organizacijama). Ciljevi i opći okvir djelovanja izneseni su

⁴ UN okvirna konvencija ujedinjenih naroda o klimatskim promjenama 2015.

s određenom općom koherentnošću. Svaki sastanak na vrhu čelnika država i vlada članica (a koji se održava otprilike svakih 18 mjeseci) prilika je da se preciziraju načini provedbe i sredstva. Taj se proces stoga čini usustavljenijim i uvjerljivijim, tim više što je nadopunjeno dogovorenim procesima, kao što je, primjerice, Proces obrambenog planiranja NATO saveza koji, pak, propituje sredstva i ciljeve svakog saveznika u odnosu na zajedničke ambicije.

No ipak smo još daleko od realizacije želenoga. Ako je, npr., zaključak sastanka na vrhu zemalja članica NATO saveza održanog u Walesu kao cilj potvrdio izdvajanje 2 % BDP-a za obranu, tek pet ili šest članica Saveza realno i ostvaruju taj cilj. Da stvar bude još gora, u mjesecima koji su uslijedili, dvije države članice (Velika Britanija i Belgija) odlučile su smanjiti ta ulaganja. Razlog tomu je to što je NATO i dalje klasična međunarodna organizacija podređena samo pravilima međudržavnih odnosa. Svaka od zemalja članica ostaje suverena u donošenju odluka, unatoč slici koja u Francuskoj prevladava o NATO savezu kao organizaciji u rukama Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Unutar NATO-a nema kvalificirane većine! Svatko ostaje gospodarom „u svojoj kući“ i u konačnici donosi odluke u funkciji svojih nacionalnih interesa, dakle, i u funkciji vlastite strategije.

U stvarnosti, EU i NATO danas se suočavaju s istom temeljnom poteškoćom: perspektivom dezintegracije. Nekoć ih je ujedinjavala ista prijetnja, dok su danas Europski razjedinjeni različitim percepcijama prijetnje. Jedni vide samo „ruskog medvjeda“, drugi barbarske džihadiste gušeći se pod pritiskom migranata. U tome leži poteškoća uspostavljanja zajedničke strategije: osim toga, potrebno je složiti se oko ciljeva. Prije definiranja ciljeva nužno je imati isto viđenje strateškog problema. Tu leži glavna prepreka definiranja međunarodne strategije, svatko vidi u prvom redu vlastitu situaciju, svoje prioritete i svoje vlastite interese!

Koalicije voljnih

Stoga bolje razumijemo zašto više od desetljeća vrijedi pravilo uspostavljanja koalicija volja i onih sposobnih za sudjelovanje. Donald Rumsfeld je 2001. godine izjavio: „Misija čini koaliciju“. Neumoljivo pravilo interesa i dalje postoji. Čak i NATO savez služi tek kao okvir za promjenjive koalicije

u kojima svaka od članica sama odlučuje o svojem (ne)sudjelovanju, kao, primjerice, u slučaju operacije u Libiji u kojoj je sudjelovala tek polovica saveznika.

Uzmimo kao primjer francusku strategiju u Siriji: Francuska aktivno sudjeluje u vojnoj koaliciji pod vodstvom Sjedinjenih Američkih Država politički podupirući Saudijsku Arabiju koja je u međuvremenu uspostavila zasebnu koaliciju, istodobno koordinirajući svoje akcije s Rusima, koji su, pak, članovi jedne druge koalicije. S francuskog gledišta, ovdje nije riječ ni o kakvoj nekoherennosti, već o brizi za promicanje francuskih interesa. Ako uzmemo u obzir činjenicu da je francuski strateški cilj definiran (ili, priznajmo to, gotovo definiran), riječ je o nastojanju da se Francuska uskladi sa svojim partnerima od kojih svaki ima vlastite strateške ciljeve. Ne postoje zajednički koraci nego tek želja da, tamo gdje je to moguće, svatko pronađe sredstva za dalju provedbu međusobno povezanih akcija. Drugim riječima, ta je multilateralna koordinacija sve drugo, samo ne zajednički osmišljena strategija: u najboljem je slučaju tu riječ o traženju načina (nikako i ciljeva!) kako bi se moglo zajednički djelovati tamo gdje je to moguće.

Strategija sredstava

Kad je riječ o strategiji sredstava, ona je još manje zajednička: tu vrlo često nije riječ toliko o tome da se pripreme sredstva u potpori prethodno izrađene strategije već o procjeni ekonomске dimenzije. Svatko ponajprije tu misli na vlastitu industrijsku politiku jer je industrija naoružanja jedan od posljednjih sektora gdje industrija zaista može biti u potpunosti neovisna. Ne trebaju, stoga, čuditi sintagme poput „pravednog povrata“ koje su odraz želje svake strane da ostvari povrat svojih investicija, pa i više od toga. Zaista smo daleko od zajedništva koje bi omogućilo integraciju različitih čimbenika te veću učinkovitost. Upravo suprotno, gomilanje aktera – a prema tome i potreba – usložnjavaju projekte koji pak, sukladno tome, postaju skuplji: paradoks je samo prividan jer takva suradnja zapravo skriva oštru konkurenčiju.

Čudite li se sada ako kažemo da izraditi strategiju znači jako se udaljiti od povezanosti ciljeva-načina-sredstava?

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Political and Security Perspectives for South East Europe after the Brexit Vote

Predrag Jureković

Abstract

In South East Europe, and specifically in the Western Balkan region, the unfinished processes of regional consolidation have been heavily influenced by the European Union's (EU) integration and conditionality policies. The United Kingdom's (UK) planned withdrawal from the EU, in principle, can have different effects on the EU's own further development. The magnitude of the EU's ability to adapt positively to this challenging situation and the level of resistance by member states against the idea of re-nationalisation will be decisive factors for the specific scenario that will occur after Brexit is implemented. The analysed EU scenarios 'dynamic re-launch', 'risky stalemate' and 'existential crisis' differ significantly in regard to the EU's further ability to stimulate the political actors in South East Europe so as to identify common interests and find compromises with long-lasting positive effects for the region's development.

Keywords:

EU, Brexit, South East Europe, impact, consolidation process, scenarios

Sažetak

Nedovršeni procesi regionalne konsolidacije u jugoistočnoj Evropi, prije svega na zapadnom Balkanu, pod snažnim su utjecajem politike integracije i uvjetovanja Europske Unije (EU). Planirani izlazak Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (UK) iz EU,

načelno, može imati različite utjecaje na daljnji razvoj EU-a. Razmjer sposobnosti EU-a za uspješnu prilagodbu ovoj izazovnoj situaciji i razini otpora zemalja članica ideji re-nacionalizaciji bit će odlučujući faktori za određeni scenarij, koji će nastupiti nakon implementacije Brexit-a. Analizirani scenariji EU-a "dinamičko ponovno pokretanje", "rizični zastoj" i "egzistencijalna kriza" bitno bi se razlikovali, u odnosu na daljnju sposobnost EU-a da stimulira političke čimbenike jugoistočne Europe na identifikaciju zajedničkih interesa i iznalaženje kompromisa s dugoročnim pozitivnim učincima na regionalni razvoj.

Ključne riječi:

EU, Brexit, Jugoistočna Europa, utjecaj, konsolidacijski procesi, scenariji

Introduction

For those generations born after World War II, the European integration process has been a guarantor for constant democratic development, respect for human rights and prosperous economic cooperation. Various crises that have affected the Western world in general and Europe in particular during the last ten years have made many people uncertain about their future. These have included the global economic crisis, the huge fiscal crisis in Greece, the European Union's (EU) challenges in developing a common migration and refugee policy as well as the global rise of terrorist attacks. The consequences in many countries have been the strengthening of anti-globalisation, anti-establishment and right-wing populist parties and movements, which have promised their growing number of voters a return of an era through re-nationalisation. While on the world's political stage Donald Trump's 'surprising' victory in the US elections, in November 2016, became a symbolic turning point, the EU received its alarming signal already five months earlier, in June at the so-called Brexit referendum. Yet, it is still unclear what the future political, economic and security costs of the planned British withdrawal from the EU will be, but undoubtedly, there will not be much time left for the Union to adapt itself to these new circumstances.

This article is focused on the following question: how will the possible changes in the EU after the implementation of Brexit influence the unfinished

peace and consolidation processes in South East Europe, which in the last 17 years have been essentially dependent upon constructive and pro-active EU policies? The renowned British journal ‘The Economist’ predicted in an analysis, issued in late October 2016 and dedicated to this topic, that a return to a violent conflict in South East Europe is unlikely, despite ‘plentiful sources of political and social instability’. This source further stated that ‘the political and economic fallout from the Brexit vote will, on balance, be neutral’ (The Economist, 2016a). This is certainly a possible scenario and perhaps the most likely one, but different EU scenarios, as a consequence of Brexit, could have a different impact on regional consolidation in South East Europe. Consequently, the method, which is applied in this article, starts with an analysis of what the main scenarios for EU’s post-Brexit development could look like. This part is followed by a stocktaking of the current transition process in South East Europe in the next chapter. Finally, in the last chapter, the different EU scenarios are discussed in the context of their possible effects on South East Europe.

Three Scenarios regarding the Post-Brexit EU Future

At the time of writing this article (in October/ November 2016), some of the key variables for the upcoming Brexit were still unclear. Amongst them were in particular the questions of when, specifically, the British government will officially inform the EU about leaving the Union and whether the United Kingdom (UK) and the EU will agree on a process that will result in a ‘soft Brexit’. This would firstly enable the UK to preserve privileged access to the EU’s internal market, following the existing arrangements of Switzerland and Norway with Brussels. Moreover, such a ‘soft Brexit’ would guarantee the free movement of people from the 27 EU members to the UK (The Economist, 2016b: p.11). The unfavourable alternative to this less painful divorce would be a ‘hard Brexit’ that would sever most of the previous ties and could politically and economically harm both sides much more. For example, for England, this could lead to serious political problems with Northern Ireland and Scotland, where the majority of citizens voted in favour of the UK’s EU membership (Die Presse, 2016: p.4). Even though

the UK government hesitated to officially submit the formal application for its withdrawal from the EU in the first months after the referendum, Prime Minister Theresa May stressed that 'Brexit means Brexit' (Hosp, 2016: p.3). The introduction of negotiations into the UK's withdrawal from the EU in the first half of 2017 therefore seemed to be much more likely than a political turnaround of the UK government that would ignore the referendum results.

The UK's most likely withdrawal from the EU in a medium-term period has provoked many discussions all over Europe on how this could impact the EU's further development. The discussed scenarios will be summarised below. However, it must be stressed that Brexit cannot be measured as an isolated factor that impacts further EU developments. In this regard, it is one of the key factors apart from the EU's and her (remaining) member states' ability to find the right response to the financial crisis and economic challenges, 'EU fatigue' and the return of nationalistic and anti-democratic policies.

Scenario 1: 'Dynamic Re-launch'

In this (best case) scenario, Brexit would be used by the EU institutions to re-launch the EU integration project and to re-gain 'the hearts and minds' of the EU citizens. Key member states, such as Germany, France and Italy, would be strongly engaged to find common EU positions to deal with the challenges of an institutional re-setting, migration and Euro crises. A majority of the other EU member states would support these reforms. With this serious engagement of constructive and cooperative European political leaders to re-strengthen the common European agenda, the rise of nationalistic parties in EU member states would be stopped, and, in turn, the erosion of liberal democratic values. In the opinion of the Harvard economist, Dani Rodrik, such a re-launch scenario would demand the deepening of political integration within the EU to the level of economic integration (Wipperfürth, 2016: p.11). The new spirit of internal EU cooperation would become evident also in the field of security cooperation. Thus, the priorities described in 'A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy' would be dealt with by concrete joint EU action plans. These would be directed in

particular against threats that concern all EU citizens, such as, ‘terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity’ (European Union Global Strategy, 2016: p.9). A stronger EU would enhance its efforts to contribute to the collective security of Europe. Hence, it would work closely together with its international partners, in particular NATO. As currently foreseen in the EU’s Global Strategy, the EU would cooperate substantially with the candidate countries from South East Europe to strengthen their resilience (European Union Global Strategy, 2016: p.9).

Scenario 2: ‘Risky Stalemate’

Currently, a development that will lead to scenario 1 is not perceived as a realistic option by many observers. Most of the EU insiders, for example, the former Austrian and EU diplomat, Stefan Lehne, expect that the coming years in the EU’s development will be characterised by a further ‘muddling through’. In this scenario, the institutional framework of the EU would remain, in principle, functional but without further steps for deeper integration. Moreover, there would be no consensus inside the EU to adopt the necessary reforms to respond appropriately and in a united way to the abovementioned political, economic and security challenges. Anti-European and xenophobic political parties would further gain ground among the electorate. These nationalistic forces would not be able to destabilise the EU framework in the medium term, but would be strong enough to turn the traditional pro-European centre-left and centre-right parties into EU-sceptics (Kopeinig, 2016: p.7). In such a stalemate scenario, the Europeans would further dissociate from the ‘European idea’. Other relevant international actors, such as, Russia, given their geopolitical interests, would have an easy game to play the EU members states off against each other. Without serious pro-European countermeasures by key EU actors, a development into a more negative scenario, which will be described subsequently, would be possible.

Scenario 3: 'Existential Crisis'

In such a worst case scenario, the EU's institutional framework would become evidently dysfunctional. In most of the member states, extreme euro-sceptic parties would come to power. Moreover, the Brexit virus would spread all over the EU. Nationalistic policies that dominate political life would impede any constructive European solutions. The symptoms of political and economic crises would be so strongly manifested that even the biggest EU supporters would turn away from the European integration project in its previous form and focus on more national(istic) positions. Decisive rifts between EU member states would lead to new geostrategic partnerships. European countries would either strengthen their relations with the United States (US) or build up closer relations with Russia. The 'Westerners' among the European states would try to preserve a rump EU. A similar re-composing and fragmentation could happen also inside NATO. Overall, Europe would face an uncertain future. Even bilateral conflicts that seemed to be settled by European integration could, after a number of decades, turn into a serious political or even security problem.

Intra-State, Bilateral and Regional Relations in South East Europe - A Stocktaking in Late 2016

South East Europe-or, more concretely, the group of six countries labelled by the EU as 'the Western Balkans'¹-at first glance did not seem to be very alarmed by the results of the British EU referendum. The reason for this may lie in the political self-occupation that still characterises this post-war region in Europe. Indeed, the consolidation of cooperative neighbourhood relations is still a half-finished business in South East Europe. The legacy of the wars during the 1990s still represents a huge political and psychological barrier for achieving full normalisation of relations. Unsolved bilateral questions range from open border issues, legal disputes concerning suspected war criminals to minority issues. Instead of pragmatic and cooperative solutions these issues

¹ Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia

and disputes have, very often, seen nationalistic reactions in the concerned countries (Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, 2015). Beyond the various bilateral problems, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo are still regarded as fragile states by the EU and NATO. This explains the ongoing presence of peace-keeping troops (EUFOR and KFOR) there and the western intent to keep executive mandates (in Bosnia and Herzegovina's case, against the Russian intention), in order to be prepared for 'all eventualities'. On the one hand, the outbreak of new wars in South East Europe in and outside the region—under the current political circumstances—is not seen as very likely or would even be excluded by observers as a possible scenario. On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that the general trust in the self-sustainability of the peace and consolidation processes in South East Europe is very low.

The intra-regional relations generally have suffered from a lack of trust. In the last twenty years, several political attempts have been made to push the reconciliation process forward—for example, as seen in the political efforts made by the former Croat and Serbian Presidents Ivo Josipović and Boris Tadić (Pavelic, 2012). Such attempts have been certainly useful and helpful in improving the political atmosphere for a short period, but they could not permanently replace the nationalistic paradigm via a stable cooperative framework. Nationalism has remained an often-used political tool for politicians in South East Europe, in particular during times of crisis.

The deterioration of Croat-Serb relations during the migrant crisis in the summer of 2015 was an illustrative example of this pattern. As a consequence of the questionable decision of the then-Croat government to close the borders temporarily to lorries coming from Serbia, the yellow press and even some of the leading politicians in the neighbouring country compared Croatia's behaviour with that of the fascist Ustaša state, which existed in Croatia during the Second World War (slobodna-bosna.ba, 2015). Political tensions between the two countries have continued after the easing of the migrant influx. This is because of the different political narratives surrounding the wars in the 1990s and legal problems connected with the prosecution of alleged war criminals.

Surveys show how easily citizens can be influenced by a nationalistic political climate and how negative stereotypes of former ‘enemy groups’ continue to persist. A survey that was published by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the European Movement Serbia, in October 2015, revealed, for example, that 52 percent of the interviewed persons in Serbia had neither a positive nor negative opinion of Albanians from Albania, 22 percent a mainly negative opinion and 11 percent a very negative opinion about their neighbours. Compared with this, 7 percent had a mainly positive and only 1 percent a very positive opinion about Albania’s population. 7 percent of the interviewed persons had no specific opinion on this issue (European Movement Serbia/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015: p.16). In another survey published in the same year by the Albanian Institute for International Studies and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 42.5 percent of the interviewed citizens from Albania described the relations between Albanian and Serbian citizens as ‘normal’, 27.5 percent as ‘bad’ and 7.2 percent as ‘very bad’. On the other hand, 13.8 percent of the interviewed persons described the mutual relations as ‘good’ and 2.6 percent as ‘very good’. Among the interviewed persons, 6.5 percent had no specific opinion on this issue (Cela, 2015: p.17).

Unlike Croatia and Serbia, Albania and Serbia did not fight a war against each other during the 1990s, but the ‘Kosovo issue’ has impeded their relationship. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the interviewed persons were still impacted by the nationalistic incidents that followed a soccer match in Belgrade in October 2014 (Cela, 2015: p.5). Since regional relations are still politically fragile in South East Europe, theories of conspiracy and accusations of destabilisation can easily influence political developments. Among the incidents that caused political alarm in the second half of 2016 were, for example, the detention of a suspected ‘Croat’ spy in Serbia (Petrović, 2016), the prevention of a presumed coup in Montenegro during the parliamentary elections that was supposedly supported by a former Serbian Gendarmerie commander (Đurić, 2016), and a foiled assassination attempt against the Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić or his brother (Danas Online, 2016).

Due to the inconsistency local ownership in South East Europe has shown in regard to political normalisation of regional relations and reconciliation,

EU's role for regional consolidation from the perspective of late 2016 remains essential. Despite the sceptical attitudes towards the EU, which in the meantime are even present among EU members, and various crises that the EU has been experiencing since 2008, the South East European candidate and aspiring countries keep EU membership as their most important, or one of their most important, strategic goals. More political realism can be seen on the side of the political leaders in South East Europe compared to earlier phases of EU enlargement. By now, there is high awareness among them that the process of becoming an EU member will be a medium- to long-term venture. It is emphasised by regional politicians that implementing the EU's democratic, legal and other standards is as essential as the future membership in this organisation². Although such announcements have become part of the expected mainstream rhetoric in recent times, they maintain, in principle, the EU's opportunity pro-actively to influence consolidation issues in South East Europe through-somewhat limited-conditionality policies.

This is supported also by the fact that, in the candidate countries, a relative majority of the citizens—though there is a downward trend—still declare themselves in favour of EU membership. Thus, according to a Eurobarometer survey from May 2016, in Serbia, 37 percent have a fairly or very positive attitude towards the EU, 24 percent a fairly or very negative attitude. In Macedonia, 56 percent have a generally positive opinion about the EU, while 14 percent have a negative one. Similar results came from Montenegro: 55 percent have a fairly or very positive attitude towards the EU, in contrast to 13 percent with a negative attitude. In Albania, 72 percent think favourably about the EU and only 4 percent in a fairly or very negative way. In Croatia, which has been an EU member since July 2013, 37 percent perceive the EU in a positive way, in contrast to 19 percent, who have a negative opinion (European Commission, 2016). According to a poll from 2015, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina—which among the South East European countries draw most of the attention from the EU and NATO due to their complex internal challenges and neighbourhood relations—differentiate noticeably with

² During their discussion at the Belgrade Security Forum on 13 October 2016, this was stressed for example by the Prime Ministers of Albania and Serbia, Edi Rama and Aleksandar Vučić.

regards to their citizens' EU attitudes. Thus, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose State Presidency officially made in February 2016 an application to become an EU candidate country,-which Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia already are-there is little enthusiasm. According to this survey, only 30 percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina's citizens have a positive attitude towards the EU, while 26 percent have a negative opinion. In contrast to that, 89 percent of the Kosovar citizens think positively about the EU, despite the fact that, within the region, their country is furthest away from EU membership. Only 2 percent of the Kosovars have a negative attitude towards the EU (Regional Cooperation Council, 2015: p.45).

In terms of an assumed or actual 'enlargement fatigue' within the EU, the so-called 'Berlin Process' is an important signal for the South East European candidate countries that their efforts to be integrated in the EU will be supported further by the Union. Initiated by Germany in 2014, its main goal has been to provide a complementary process to EU integration that will foster a 'closer regional cooperation in view of achieving sustainable economic growth, full-fledged market democracy, and reconciliation' (Lilyanova, 2016: p.2). In three summits that took place so far in Berlin (2014), Vienna (2015) and Paris (2016), particular projects were addressed, which should support the reduction of unemployment-above all among young people-, the creation of an 'Energy Community' in South East Europe and the connectivity agenda in regard to investments. Under the IPA II, the EU Commission has provided up to € 1 billion for connectivity investments and technical assistance, especially for transport links and infrastructural projects. Other focal points have been, so far, the fostering of youth cooperation and civil society as well as addressing bilateral disputes in South East Europe. In this latter context, the political representatives of the six Western Balkan countries signed a declaration at the Vienna summit on solving bilateral border, political and minority disputes. Further, they committed themselves to not block their neighbours on their path towards EU membership (Lilyanova, 2016: pp.3-7).

Without calling into question the possible beneficial impact of the Berlin Process on the regional relations in South East Europe, it should be noted that some key challenges, which are connected with regional consolidation,

will demand regional and international efforts that reach far beyond. This is particularly still the case with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The aim of Bosnia and Herzegovina to catch up soon with the other EU candidates is seriously impeded by the current attempts of the leadership of the Republika Srpska to undermine the common state, in order to achieve separatist objectives (The Economist, 2016c). Croat politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina still talk about the politically ‘disadvantaged position’, in which the Croat population would be in this country, compared to the other two constituent peoples, the Bosniaks and Serbs (Krešić, 2016). In turn, the Bosniak politicians are blamed by the Croat and, even more, by the Serb side for striving towards a centralised state that would endanger the national identity of these two national communities. Different interplays between domestic and external actors additionally complicate the consolidation of this state. While the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina rely on Zagreb, Brussels and (somewhat less) on Washington, politicians from Republika Srpska seek, in particular, support from Belgrade and Moscow. Russia’s role during the Putin era in the context of South East Europe has turned from a constructive partner of the West, at the beginning of the stabilisation process, into a political actor that has openly supported nationalists among Serb politicians and has counteracted further enlargement of NATO and, more recently, the EU (Sarajlić-Maglić, 2015). Bosniak politicians share with the Croat side the goal of integrating into the EU and—unlike Serb politicians—into NATO. However, there is also an increasing influence from Turkey, which has become more suspicious since President Recep Tayyip Erdogan started to increase restrictive policies in his own country (Wölfl, 2016). It seems that under these complex internal and external conditions the path to EU integration is one of the rare goals, which connects the present leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact underlines also from this angle the necessity of preserving an EU that is effective and able to act pro-actively.

The EU’s pro-active role is at least equally necessary in case of the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Priština/Prishtina. Although negotiations about the solution to the daily problems of Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo have been taking place since 2011—supplemented by a political dialogue that started two years later—mistrust still seems to be large between the two

political sides, and also between the two national communities in general. From the Kosovo-Albanian perspective, the Serbian government 'abuses' the dialogue, in order to create their national community within Kosovo as a state within the state, following the example of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, for the Serbian government, Kosovo still is an autonomous part of Serbia. The recognition of Kosovo as an independent state for Belgrade remains a completely excluded option. This stance again mobilises nationalist forces among the Kosovo-Albanians, who, like the nationalist party Vetëvendosje, have demanded an immediate stop to the technical and political dialogue with the Serbian government and who have already shown their readiness to use violence to underline this demand (Jureković, 2015: pp.7, 10).

Compared with the current global hot-spots like Syria or Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in recent years have become peaceful places. But due to the abovementioned antagonisms, the EU and NATO do not trust this kind of unsatisfying stability in both countries. That is the reason why operations and missions with executive mandates like the EU military operation EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the NATO PfP military presence through KFOR in Kosovo, or the EU Rule of Law mission in this country have been prolonged several times. This kind of 'security net' could become unnecessary only when the EU, but also NATO enlargement, will be successfully finished in the Western Balkans—provided that both organisations will pass through these ongoing, dynamic global and European changes relatively unscathed. Until then, it will be essential for the South East European countries to achieve progress in regard to the targeted democratic, legal and economic standards and to develop recognisable future perspectives for youth. If this does not happen, the fuses of smaller powder kegs—outside Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo—could ignite again. This applies above all to Macedonia's not fully consolidated interethnic relations and the political polarisation in that country (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty: 2016 a). The latter point is also currently evident in Montenegro, which has generally performed well so far in its EU and NATO integration process, but whose citizens are relatively divided with regards to geopolitical and identity issues (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 2016b). Constructive

regional relations and economic investments would be the best guarantees to secure good relations between the Serbian state and its Albanian minority in the Preševo Valley as well as with the Bosniak community in the Sandžak region. Both ethnic communities have a close relationship with their ‘mother countries’ Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Apart from conflicting national or political issues, South East Europe-like other parts of Europe too-has been increasingly challenged by extremist forms of Islamism. Intensified measures that have been introduced by law enforcement agencies in South East Europe from 2015 have almost stopped the inflow of foreign fighters that seek to join the terrorist organisation ‘Islamic State’. Until then, almost 800 Balkan Islamists, in particular from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and the Sandžak, went to the Middle East (Wither, 2016: p.51). Although the majority of the Muslims in the Western Balkans practice tolerant forms of Islam, the risk of having an intensified inflow of young people to extremist Salafi movements should not be underestimated. International support for increasing Bosnia-Herzegovina’s and Kosovo’s state functionality as well as substantial contributions to the economic improvement of the whole region could be useful counter-strategies.

The Post-Brexit Scenarios and the Western Balkan Context

As described before, in the author’s view, the EU’s own future will have an essential impact on the way South East Europe, specifically, how the Western Balkan countries, will deal with the unfinished tasks in their semi-consolidated relations. Therefore, it seems obvious to look back at the three Post-Brexit scenarios, which were analysed at the beginning, and to reflect briefly about what each scenario could mean for the presently still fragile political, social and economic setting in South East Europe.

The best case, a ‘**dynamic re-launch**’ of the EU that would start even before the UK definitely leaves the Union, would first of all-most likely-guarantee that the enlargement process will continue in South East Europe. It can be assumed that the EU Commission, in such a scenario, would again strengthen its engagement in the accession process as well as with those regional and

bilateral issues in South East Europe, which could further impede progress of the candidate and aspiring countries. In a re-launch scenario, the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy would be upgraded. Therefore, the EU would be very keen on proving that it is a credible actor in the international arena. Viewed in this light, to support South East Europe substantially in finishing its consolidation would be a basic prerequisite for the EU. This would mean, for example, to transform the presently unfrank technical and political dialogue between Belgrade and Priština/Prishtina into a transparent political process that would lead to: (a) the signing of a basic treaty aimed at achieving full normalisation of political, social and economic relations between Serbia and Kosovo and (b) giving security guarantees to the Serb community in Kosovo as well as to Kosovo in regard to its relationship with Serbia.

In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, such a pro-active EU policy would be characterised by clear language when addressing those politicians who have stuck to manipulative policies and have, by doing so, stifled real progress in this country since 2006. If there are no other means left, the EU should not shrink from imposing financial and economic sanctions against such obstructive individuals. On the other hand, in such a dynamic re-launch scenario, the extension of beneficial means would dominate. This would mean, for instance, that the 'Berlin Process' would develop a large pulling-effect for Foreign Direct Investments, so that there would be little margin for nationalist policies, and much more for constructive ideas and cooperation. Fostering standards of liberal democracy in the whole region would again become a core issue for the EU, after a period in which these values—as a consequence of the pressure of the extreme political right within the EU—has been put into the background.

For the political leaders in South East Europe, the EU's re-launch option would mean that the time of hidden political agendas is definitely finished and that only a frank, transparent and cooperative attitude leads to progress in the whole region. Most of the political leaders would internalise this political attitude. Thus, the consolidation process, including regional reconciliation, would improve and the implementation of 'EU standards' would become a part of Realpolitik. Under such positive conditions, the next

candidate countries from South East Europe—Montenegro most likely being the first—would become an EU member between 2021 and 2025.

A ‘**risky stalemate**’ scenario, compared to the previous one, would certainly make a difference for South East Europe in that EU integration would further lose momentum. Thus, the EU’s conditionality policies would become increasingly a toothless tiger with a decreasing impact on regional consolidation. In a political EU environment, in which nationalistic movements and populist parties would be successful in constantly increasing their electoral support, manipulative and authoritarian policies would continue to flourish in South East Europe as well. The problem fields that were analysed in the chapter on regional stocktaking would neither be necessarily further exacerbated nor even escalate, but there would be little stimuli for constructive and cooperative solutions. South East Europe somehow would be kept imprisoned in its own political and economic stagnation, without having a promising perspective. As a consequence of absent EU investments, the lack of legal security for investors—due to missing reforms—and insufficient regional cooperation, economic growth in South East Europe would come to a standstill between 1 and 3 percent. This would be too little for successfully fighting the high unemployment, in particular among youth. As a result, frustrated voters would prefer populist messages from nationalistic parties that again would not do any good to regional consolidation.

Due to the EU’s weakness, the geopolitical splitting within South East Europe would proceed, by sharpening different spheres of influence that gravitate either towards Ankara, Brussels, Moscow or Washington. Since the political interests of these centres would in some cases differentiate largely, these geopolitical divisions would further harm regional cooperation in South East Europe. In a scenario of ‘risky stalemate’, nationalistic hidden agendas—for example, in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo—would remain a potential risk. Additionally, there would be an alarming move of young Muslims to intolerant and extremist Salafi groups (Ilić, 2016). Thus, the security net through peace support operations of the EU and NATO would be maintained—however, without any clear perspective for an exit strategy. Since in such a scenario intra-state polarisation in some of the candidate

countries—for instance in Macedonia and Montenegro—would continue to exist in parallel to the enlargement fatigue within the EU member states, the accession of a new member in a medium-term perspective would seem very unlikely.

While in a ‘risky stalemate scenario’ there is still an opportunity for positive change in the EU itself, and also in South East Europe, the worst-case **scenario of ‘existential crisis’** could partly destabilise the Western Balkans. In a situation in which the EU is about to implode as a political and economic association, the main priority of the ‘rump EU’ would be to consolidate itself—there would be no political energy left to deal pro-actively with South East Europe. Such a constellation would be the ideal scenario for some of the authoritarian and nationalist regional politicians, who could push radical rhetoric and policies without any international sanctions. In fact, their destructive policies would have become ‘the mainstream’ also in the disintegrating EU. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, separatist Serbian politicians would most likely introduce the formal separation of Republika Srpska, which could provoke incalculable reactions from the Bosniak side. This would replace their previous preference for a state concept, in which citizenship is emphasised, by a rigid Islamic identity. As a consequence, also within the Croat community, serious doubts could arise concerning the viability of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic state and there could be aspirations to integrate the Croat majority parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Republic of Croatia. The latter, as well as Serbia, would be—at least politically—heavily involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s existential crisis with an uncertain outcome. The probability of a violent development in such a worst-case scenario would depend on whether there would still be international peace-keeping troops deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A similar escalating situation in a ‘scenario of existential crisis’ would develop in relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The bilateral dialogue, as a result of a lack of EU mediation, would be stopped. Previous agreements would lose any significance. The Serb community, north of the river Ibar, would again be totally separated from the rest of Kosovo. Attacks on Serbs in the Albanian majority territories would significantly increase. In case of a missing NATO peace-keeping presence, Serbia would threaten the Kosovo government with

military intervention. As collateral damage resulting from the deterioration of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, the inter-ethnic tensions in southern Serbia, in the Preševo Valley as well as in Sandžak, would rise dangerously. Likewise, in Macedonia, the longstanding fragile inter-ethnic coexistence would be dramatically challenged by the fact that one of the rare common political interests of Albanians and Macedonians, namely the goal of becoming a member of the EU and NATO, would have no chance to be implemented. Finally, it could be assumed that also in Montenegro, as a result of the ‘existential crisis scenario’, political conflicts along different identity lines, in particular between the supporters of Montenegrin state sovereignty on the one hand, and the supporters of a state-reunion with Serbia on the other hand, would considerably increase. As a whole, South East Europe in the scenario of ‘existential crisis’ would pass through various dangerous political crises that could also include violent confrontations.

Conclusion

As this analysis tried to convey, the different pathways, which can be taken by the EU and its member states following the planned Brexit can influence in a positive or in a negative manner reform processes and regional consolidation policies in South East Europe. The analysed scenarios – ‘dynamic re-launch’, ‘risky stalemate’ and ‘existential crisis’ – would, in very different ways, stimulate the political actors in South East Europe to identify common interests and to find compromises with long-lasting positive effects for the region’s development.

In a scenario of ‘dynamic re-launch’ it would be most likely that progress could be achieved in the open intra-state, bilateral and regional issues through a re-strengthening of the EU’s integration and conditionality policies. Compared with this, the scenario of ‘risky stalemate’ would exclude any substantial progress in improving regional relations and would include the risk of serious nationalistic setbacks. In the worst case scenario-labelled the EU’s ‘existential crisis’ – South East Europe would enter a phase of dangerous instability, in which EU’s peace-building model for the Western Balkans would erode.

As this analysis has established, the EU still plays an essential role in the Western Balkans in supporting democratization efforts and the normalization of regional relations that could otherwise slide into new dangerous conflicts. This fact should give a boost to those political forces inside the EU institutions and among EU member states which, regardless of the current crises, remain committed to the idea of European integration and cooperation. On the other hand, the political decision-makers in the Western Balkans have to increase their awareness that, particularly in times marked by great uncertainties on the global and European level, constructive and – in the best case – good neighbourly relations help to keep the waters calm.

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On Naval Power¹

Milan N. Vego

Abstract

Naval power played an extremely important and often vital role in the lives of many maritime nations. This is not going to change in the future. Its influence is felt both in time of peace and in time of war. Naval power is one of the key factors in deterring a strong opponent from going to war. In case of war, naval power is a prerequisite for successful conduct of operations on land. And the final outcome of a war is invariably on land; it is there where the humans live. Naval power also plays a critical role across the spectrum of operations short of war.

The range of threats in the maritime domain is broad. The conventional threats in peacetime include claims of the riparian states in regard to the boundaries of the economic exclusion zone (EEZ) and activities there, the extent of the territorial waters and the rights of innocent passage, and illicit fishing.

Navy and coast guards can be employed in routine activities in peacetime, operations short of war, low-intensity conflict, and high-intensity conventional war. Today and for the immediate future, naval forces will be predominantly employed in carrying out multiple and diverse missions in what are arbitrarily called "operations short of war." However, a navy, no matter how strong, cannot carry out all the missions alone but needs to proceed in combination with other elements of naval power, such as a coast guard.

Naval power will continue to play a critical and perhaps vital role in protecting and preserving a nation's interests at sea. This will especially be the case for countries such as the United States, Great Britain, Japan, the People's Republic of China, and

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others whose prosperity and economic wellbeing depend on the free and uninterrupted use of the sea. Naval power is undoubtedly a powerful tool in support of foreign policy, military or theater strategy, and various peace operations. It is an integral part of homeland security. In concert with other sources of the country's military and nonmilitary power, naval power has a large role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale hostilities. Finally, in the case of a regional or global conflict, forces on land cannot ultimately succeed without secure use of the sea. Obtaining, maintaining, and exercising control of the oceans are objectives that cannot be accomplished without a strong and effective naval power.

Key words:

naval power, operations short of war, homeland security, foreign policy, support of foreign policy, combating maritime terrorism, combating piracy, counter-insurgency, coercive naval diplomacy, crisis prevention, crisis management, peace operations, irregular warfare, high-intensity conventional war, sea control, obtaining sea control, maintaining sea control, exercising sea control, sea denial, disputing sea control, basing/deployment control, major naval operations, naval tactical actions

Sažetak

Vojno-pomorska moć igrala je vrlo važnu i često vitalnu ulogu za pomorske države. To se neće mijenjati ni u budućnosti. Njen utjecaj osjeća se i u vrijeme mira i u vrijeme rata. Pomorska moć jedan je od ključnih čimbenika u odvraćanju snažnog protivnika od ulaska u rat. U slučaju rata, vojno-pomorska moć preduvjet je za uspješnu provedbu operacija na kopnu. Krajnji ishod rata postiže se, nepromijenjeno, na kopnu, ondje gdje ljudi žive. Vojno-pomorske operacije, isto tako, imaju kritičnu ulogu u cijelom spektru neratnih operacija.

Raspon prijetnji je u pomorskoj domeni širok. Konvencionalne prijetnje u vrijeme mira uključuju i zahtjeve država uz more, vezane za granice zaštićenog ekološko-ribolovnog pojasa, granice teritorijalnih voda, prava neškodljivog prolaska i nezakonitog ribolova. Ratne mornarice i obalna straža mogu biti angažirane na rutinskim aktivnostima u doba mira, neratnim operacijama, sukobima niskog intenziteta i konvencionalnom ratu visokog intenziteta.

Danas i u skoroj budućnosti, vojno-pomorske snage bit će dominantno angažirane u višestrukim i različitim misijama u operacijama koje se arbitrarno nazivaju „neratne operacije”. Međutim, ratna mornarica, bez obzira na jačinu, ne može realizirati sve misije sama nego mora djelovati zajednički s drugim instrumentima vojno-pomorske moći, kao što je obalna straža.

Vojno-pomorska moć nastaviti će igrati kritičnu i vjerojatno ključnu ulogu u zaštiti i očuvanju državnih interesa na moru. To će osobito biti slučaj s državama kao što su Sjedinjene Američke Države, Velika Britanija, Japan i Kina, kao i druge čiji prosperitet i ekonomsko blagostanje ovise o slobodnom i neometanom korištenju mora. Vojno-pomorska moć je, bez sumnje, snažan alat u potpori vanjske politike, državne vojne strategije ili strategije vojnog djelovanja u određenom prostoru, kao i različitih vojnih operacija. Ona je sastavni dio domovinske sigurnosti. U suglasju s drugim izvorima državne vojne i nevojne moći, vojno-pomorska moć igra veliku ulogu u odvraćanju izbjivanja neprijateljstava velikih razmijera. Napokon, u slučaju regionalnog ili globalnog sukoba, kopnene snage ne mogu ostvariti konačnu pobjedu bez sigurne uporabe mora. Stjecanje, održavanje i provedba nadzora nad oceanima, ciljevi su koji se ne mogu postići bez snažne i učinkovite vojno-pomorske moći.

Ključne riječi:

vojno-pomorska moć, neratne operacije, domovinska sigurnost, vanjska politika, potpora vanjskoj politici, borba protiv pomorskog terorizma, borba protiv piratstva, protupobunjeničke operacije, vojno-pomorska diplomacija prisile, prevencija kriza, krizno upravljanje, mirnodopske operacije, neregularni rat, konvencionalni rat visokoga intenziteta, nadzor mora, stjecanje nadzora mora, održavanje nadzora mora, provedba nadzora mora, uskraćivanje korištenja mora, osporavanje nadzora mora, vladanje prostorom baziranja/rasporeda, glavne vojno-pomorske operacije, vojno-pomorske taktičke akcije

Introduction

All too often, the terms naval power and sea power are used interchangeably. But naval power, properly understood, refers to a direct and indirect source of military power at sea. Obviously, the main components of a naval power are the navy, coast guard, and marines/naval infantry and their shore

establishment. The term sea power (coined in 1849) originally referred to a nation having a formidable naval strength. Today, this term's meaning is much broader; it now describes the entirety of the use of the sea by a nation. Specifically, a sea (or maritime) power comprises political, diplomatic, economic, and military aspects of sea use².

Naval power played an extremely important and often vital role in the lives of many maritime nations. This is not going to change in the future. Its influence is felt both in time of peace and in time of war. Naval power is one of the key factors in deterring a strong opponent from going to war. In case of war, naval power is a prerequisite for successful conduct of operations on land. And the final outcome of a war is invariably on land; it is there where the humans live. Naval power also plays a critical role across the spectrum of operations short of war. This aspect of naval power is not always sufficiently well-known or explained well.

The Threat

The range of threats in the maritime domain is broad. The conventional threats in peacetime include claims of the riparian states in regard to the boundaries of the economic exclusion zone (EEZ) and activities there, the extent of the territorial waters and the rights of innocent passage, and illicit fishing. Conventional threats include irregular warfare such as insurgencies and the possibility of a high-intensity war in various parts of the world, such as the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, Korean Peninsula, or Taiwan Strait. In addition, unconventional threats in the maritime domain have dramatically increased in diversity and intensity since the early 1990s. They include transnational maritime terrorism and criminal networks involved in illicit trafficking in narcotics, humans, and weapons. Piracy is a growing problem in some parts of the world, particularly in Southeast Asia and off the east and west coasts

² Specifically, a sea power encompasses naval power plus all the nonmilitary aspects of the use of the sea, particularly merchant marine, ports/harbors, fisheries, shipyards/ship repair facilities and all maritime-related industries, oil/gas exploration, and marine-related scientific research (for example, oceanographic research, hydrographic survey, and marine biology).

of Africa. The combination of transnational maritime terrorism and piracy can seriously disrupt the flow of international commerce. The potential impact of such threats on world peace and the global economy is enormous (Department of the Navy, 2006:p.9). There is also a growing danger to ports/bases and coastal facilities/installations from ballistic missiles fired by a rogue state or even transnational terrorist groups.

The threat to port security has increased significantly in the past few decades due to the proliferation of platforms and weapons that can be used against ships and port facilities/installations. Uninterrupted maritime trade is one of the most critical factors for the prosperity of nations. The problem of security against terrorist attack is especially acute at ports located near strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Gibraltar, Suez Canal, and Panama Canal. Large ports are especially vulnerable to various hostile acts because of the difficulties in providing full, around-the-clock protection. Currently, the greatest threat to the security of major ports is from terrorists, operating individually or in groups.

Navy's Responsibilities

Navies and coast guards can be employed in routine activities in peacetime, operations short of war, and high-intensity conventional war (see table 1). Today and for the immediate future, naval forces will be predominantly employed in performing multiple and diverse missions in what are arbitrarily called “operations short of war.” However, a navy, no matter how strong, cannot carry out all the missions alone but needs to proceed in combination with other elements of naval power, such as a coast guard.

In some cases, the coast guard is an integral part of the navy; in other cases, the two are separate. Optimally, a coast guard should be used primarily for maritime policing (or constabulary) duties in peacetime and for carrying out some combat missions in operations short of war and in a high-intensity conventional conflict. In the littorals, the air force and army might be employed jointly with naval forces.

Figure 1: SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT AT SEA

		HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICT		
PEACETIME		LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT	HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/DISASTER RELIEF (HA/DR)	CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT
<u>ROUTINE ACTIVITIES</u>				
Enforcing Maritime Border Laws & Customs		SUPPORT OF FOREIGN POLICY		
Vessel Traffic Service			• Cooperative Naval Diplomacy	• Obtaining & Maintaining Sea Control
Search & Rescue			• Coercive Naval Diplomacy	• Exercising Sea Control
Salvage			• Crisis Prevention/Management	• Sea Denial
Ordnance Disposal		SUPPORT OF MILITARY THEATER STRATEGY		• Choke Point Control/Denial
Hydrographic Survey			• Goodwill Activities	• Basins/Deployment Area Control
Oceanographic Research			• Refugee Assistance	• Destroying/Weakening the Enemy's Military-Economic Potential at Sea
<u>HOMELAND SECURITY</u>			• Evacuation of Noncombatants (NEO)	• Defense & Protection of Friendly Military-Economic Potential at Sea
Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)		ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TREATIES		
Port Security			• Freedom of Navigation/Overflight	
Protection of Critical Installations/Facilities on the Coast			• Territorial Waters/EEZ	• Support of Insurgency
Counter Narcotics (Drugs)			• Maritime Boundaries	• Support of Counterinsurgency (COIN)
Counter Illegal Immigration		COMBATING MARITIME TERRORISM		
Counter Smuggling of Conventional Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)			• Anti-Terrorism	• Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
Environmental Protection			• Counter-Terrorism	• Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO)
<u>PROTECTION OF THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS</u>			• Expanded Peacekeeping Operations/Peace Enforcement Operations (PKO/PEO)	• Peace-Making
Protection of Shipping				• Peace-Building (PB)
Fishery Protection				
Protection of Offshore Oil/Gas Installations				
Protection of Seabed Mineral Deposits				

A navy also has to interact and work closely with other elements of the country's sea power - specifically, the merchant marine, shipbuilding industries, ocean technology enterprises, and deep-sea mining agencies. Additionally, navies need to cooperate closely with many government agencies. This, in turn, requires smooth and effective interagency cooperation. Additionally, naval forces and coast guards need to work with a large number of nongovernmental organizations and private volunteer organizations ashore.

Operations in Peacetime

The navies perform diverse missions in peacetime ranging from routine activities and homeland security to protection of the country's economic interests at sea, enforcement of maritime treaties, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). In general, routine duties include maritime border laws/customs enforcement, vessel traffic control, hydrographic surveys, oceanographic research, salvage, search and rescue, ordnance disposal, and marine pollution control. For the most part, these tasks are the responsibility of the coast guard, with naval forces employed in a supporting role.

The threats to homeland security from across the sea are increasing in both scope and lethality. Specifically, these threats include ballistic missiles, maritime terrorism, cross-border illegal immigration, illicit trafficking in narcotics, humans, and weapons, and maritime pollution.

The threat of ballistic missiles against ports/airfields and coastal installations/facilities can be countered by creating sea based ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, as the U.S. Navy is doing. BMD systems detect and destroy enemy aircraft and missiles by physically and electronically attacking bases, launch sites, and associated command and control systems. As part of homeland security, they are intended to provide defense against ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of their flight (Department of the Navy, 2006:p.22). Maritime terrorism has emerged as a formidable threat to both civilian and naval vessels. Large commercial ships are easy targets for determined

terrorists, and the value of these vessels and cargoes makes them attractive to both regional terrorist groups and international organizations that desire to disrupt the economic lifelines of the industrial world. Compounding the threat is the use of commercial vessels by criminals who are often allied with terrorists. Ports/anchorages and critical coastal facilities/installations are potentially exposed to attacks by terrorists. Security of ports encompasses a series of related actions and measures regarding safety of incoming ships and their cargo during transit on the high seas, through the 200-nautical-mile (nm) EEZ, in the territorial sea (usually the 12-nm zone offshore), and in ports and their approaches. Hence, in a physical sense, three zones of maritime security exist: the international zone (foreign countries, high seas), the border/coastal zone (territorial sea plus EEZ), and the domestic zone (territorial sea plus ports and their approaches). International law fully applies in the international zone, while the country's jurisdiction is exercised over all vessels, facilities, and port security in the domestic and border/coastal zones.

Coast guards are largely responsible for protection of their countries' EEZs. This broad task includes monitoring and surveillance of the fisheries, maritime safety, marine pollution reporting, and protection of marine mineral deposits and gas/oil deposits and installations. The navies are primarily responsible for protecting friendly commercial shipping outside of the EEZ.

A state or territory ruled or controlled by a radical regime and situated close to maritime trade chokepoints might attempt to harass shipping, requiring the response of naval forces. Protection of shipping requires coordinated employment of surface, air, and subsurface forces, as well as a suitable command organization both ashore and afloat. In general, protection of shipping should envisage preemptive or retaliatory strikes or raids against selected targets at sea or ashore. A major operation in protection of shipping would require the execution of a variety of missions to protect merchant vessels from unlawful attack in international waters. This can be accomplished through, among other things, the escort of merchant ships (sometimes of individual ships, for a specific purpose), coastal sea control, harbor defense, and mine countermeasures

Blue water navies such as the U.S. Navy are sometimes involved in disputes with riparian states regarding the rights of innocent passage through international straits, or in contesting these states' excessive claims regarding the extent of territorial waters.

This requires the use of naval forces to ensure freedom of navigation and overflight. Normally, a riparian state may exercise jurisdiction and control within its territorial seas; international law, however, establishes the right of innocent passage of ships of other nations through a state's territorial waters.

Passage is considered innocent as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal nation. In addition, freedom of navigation through international airspace for aircraft is a well-established principle of international law. Threats to air-craft through extension of airspace control zones beyond international norms, whether by nations or groups, can be expected to result in use of force acceptable under international law to rectify the situation.

Navies are currently extensively employed in enforcing international treaties that prohibit illicit trafficking in weapons and humans. Smuggling and trafficking in humans have increased worldwide in recent years. The problem is exacerbated by the ever increasing involvement of criminal gangs in such trade. Among other things, the smuggling of migrants by organized crime groups disrupts the established immigration policies of destination countries. It also involves human rights abuses; such trafficking is slavery in all but name. If a ship is engaged in this activity, it loses its right of innocent passage. In December 2000, the United Nations (UN) convention against organized crime was also related to the protocol to prevent, suppress, and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children. This protocol generally justifies interdiction of commercial vessels on counter-trafficking grounds. It also encourages information sharing, interdiction training, and the development of tighter legislative authority to interdict and enforce documentary requirements on shipping (Knights, 2006:p.23).

Piracy has posed a threat to all nations for as long as people have sailed the oceans. The international community has branded piracy as hostile to the human race and treats it as one of the few crimes over which universal

jurisdiction applies. Piracy is punishable by all nations wherever the perpetrators are found and without regard to where the offense occurred. It remains a serious threat to international commerce and safety and is on the increase in many parts of the world, but particularly in the waters of Southeast Asia and Africa. In Southeast Asia, commercial ships are especially vulnerable to piracy due to narrow waterways and countless small islands.

Navies are often involved in nonmilitary actions, such as providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and engaging in goodwill activities. The first broad task includes such actions as emergency medical assistance, large-scale evacuation of civilian populations, noncombatant evacuation, and refugee assistance. Emergency medical assistance often includes transporting civilians in need of medical help from or to relatively remote locations.

Operations Short of War

The navies are also employed for conducting missions that very often require threat of or using a lethal force in the situations short of high-intensity conventional war. In one definition, *operations short of war* are described as the use or threatened use of military capabilities in combination with other sources of national power short of high-intensity conventional war. These operations include the threats of use or actual use of military forces in support of foreign policy, military (and/or theater) strategy, combating piracy, combating maritime terrorism insurgency and counter-insurgency (COIN), and peace operations. Navies are an ideal tool for providing *support of foreign policy*. Their main advantages are flexibility, mobility, and political symbolism. Naval forces have diverse capabilities that can be quickly tailored to the situation at hand. They are also largely self-sufficient and do not require extensive land support. Naval forces can be employed in support of the country's diplomatic initiatives in peacetime and time of crisis, or for naval diplomacy actions aimed to create a favorable general and military image abroad, establish one's rights in areas of interest, reassure allies and other friendly countries, influence the behavior of other governments, threaten seaborne interdiction, and, finally, threaten the use of lethal force.

Deployment of naval forces during times of tension or crisis to back up diplomacy and thereby pose an unstated but clear threat is an example of naval diplomacy, which can also help in coalition building.

Navies are generally much more effective than armies or air forces in terms of their international acceptability and capacity to make the desired impact. They can be used symbolically to send a message to a specific government. When a stronger message is required, naval diplomacy can take the form of employment of carefully tailored forces with a credible offensive capability, signaling that a much more capable force will follow, or it can give encouragement to a friendly country by providing reinforcement. The threat of the use of limited offensive action or coercion might be designed to deter a possible aggressor or to compel him to comply with a diplomatic demarche or resolution.

Naval forces are one of the most effective and flexible tools in applying coercive diplomacy (popularly called gunboat diplomacy), which is the use or threat of limited naval force aimed at securing advantage or averting loss, either in furtherance of an international dispute or against foreign nationals within the territory or jurisdiction of their own state. Coercive diplomacy is conducted both in peacetime and during operations short of war. Methods used are “show the flag,” retaliatory raids, rescue operations, or direct attack to achieve a specific military objective. Visits of warships to foreign ports are one of the most common methods of showing the flag. The aim of such visits can range from demonstrating continuing interest in the area to showing resolve in support of a friendly state against threats by a neighboring state. The ships then act as ambassadors. Normally, the main purpose of such visits is to make a favorable impression on the local populace. The degree to which a show of force can be introduced depends on the political message to be communicated.

Sometimes it can be carried out as a warning to leaders or hostile states. At other times, a show of force by ships can act as a sign of reassurance and a token of support. For example, the United States sent a powerful signal of support to Turkey and Greece by sending the battleship USS Missouri (BB-63) for a visit to Istanbul and Piraeus in April 1946. This was followed by a

visit of the aircraft carrier USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV-42) to Greece in September of the same year. Both countries were under enormous pressure from the aggressive policies of Moscow. The Soviets strongly supported the Greek communists in their civil war and issued demands to Turkey to grant a naval base in the Dodecanese Islands and joint control of the Turkish Straits (Berend, 1996:p.34; Knight, 1975:p.451).

However, in some cases, a show of force has failed to achieve its intended objectives. For example, the employment of three U.S. aircraft carriers in the Sea of Japan after the intelligence ship USS Pueblo (AGER-2) with its 83 crew members was captured off *Wōnsan* in January 1968 apparently did not offer a great advantage to the United States in subsequent negotiations (Mobley, 2003: pp. 117-118). During the Third Taiwan Crisis (1995-1996), the Chinese conducted series of missile firings and exercises off the coast of Taiwan. However, that show of force only hardened the Taiwanese posture and forced the United States to deploy carrier groups into the Taiwan Strait in March 1996.

Naval forces can be used in *conflict prevention/management*. Conflict prevention includes diverse military activities conducted either unilaterally or collectively under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and aimed at either preventing escalation of disputes into armed conflict or facilitating resolution of armed violence. These actions range from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployment of naval forces. For example, the main purpose of the forward presence of U.S. naval forces in the western Pacific, Arabian Sea, Persian (Arabian) Gulf, and Mediterranean is to prevent the outbreak of large-scale hostilities that might affect the national interests of the United States and its allies or friends. Naval forces deployed in forward areas should be of sufficient size and combat power to defeat opposing forces quickly and decisively.

Under the UN Charter, conflict prevention should be conducted with strict impartiality because all sides in a dispute have to agree to involve other countries as mediators. Naval forces can be deployed in the proximity of a country where hostilities threaten to break out. Aircraft carrier groups and amphibious task forces in particular have a greater chance of success

in disputes among nation-states than in ethnic conflict or civil war. To be effective, such a deployment should be accompanied by a clear willingness on the part of the international community to use overwhelming force if necessary. Otherwise, the preventive deployment of naval forces, regardless of size and capability, will rarely produce the desired effect.

Blue water navies play a critical role in providing *support to national and military (or theater) strategy* as a part of nuclear and/or conventional deterrence. Credible nuclear deterrence is based on adequate capability and the certitude that one nation can and will inflict unacceptable losses on an enemy who uses nuclear weapons first. Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are the most survivable component of the country's nuclear forces triad. During the Cold War, these submarines conducted extensive patrols in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, in readiness to fire their sea-launched ballistic missiles. Sea based nuclear deterrent forces continue to have an important role in the nuclear deterrence posture of the United States, the Russian Federation, Britain, France, and the People's Republic of China.

The use or threatened use of conventional forces is a critical element in conventional deterrence. Naval forces are highly suitable for conventional deterrence because of their high mobility and combat power. For a blue water navy, the main method of exercising conventional deterrence is the forward deployment of its striking forces. Among other things, forward deployed forces can considerably enhance a nation's influence and prestige in a given sea area. Presence can greatly help coalition-building, enhance stability, and deter hostile actions against one's interests. It also provides an initial crisis-response capability.

Routine forward presence includes permanently based naval forces overseas and periodic deployment of naval forces in the case of crises, port visits, and participation in bilateral and multilateral training exercises. For example, deployment of powerful U.S. carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups in a certain region, such as the eastern Mediterranean or western Pacific, can send a powerful signal to enemies and friends alike in a crisis. It could prevent the outbreak of conflict, shape the security environment, and serve as a basis for regional peace and stability.

The ability to deploy sea based air and missile defenses forward contributes to force self-protection, assured access, and the defense of other forward deployed forces. Forward deployed U.S. naval forces can provide protection against air and missile threats over a large area of a given maritime theater. Also, by engaging enemy ballistic missiles in the boost and midcourse stages of flight, homeland security is greatly enhanced.

Forward naval presence also creates prerequisites for obtaining and then maintaining sea control in certain parts of a maritime theater. A blue water navy should deploy sufficiently strong and combat-ready forces in the area of potential conflict. These forces should be concentrated in such numbers as to be capable of quickly achieving superiority over the potential opponent at sea. A coastal navy or a major navy operating within the confines of a narrow sea normally cannot obtain sea control without naval forces operating from a secure base of operations. In practical terms, this means that the degree of basing/deployment area control must ensure full protection of forces from all types of threats.

Navies are extensively used in carrying out diverse tasks as part of security cooperation in a given maritime theater. Security cooperation in general is aimed to build defense relationships with international partners, promote cultural awareness and regional understanding, and enhance strategic access. Cooperative activities include assisting host nations in freeing or protecting their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency; assisting in training; combating illegal activities along their coastlines; and protecting economic infrastructure (Department of the Navy, 2006:p.18).

Navies are also extensively employed in *combating piracy* in certain parts of the world's ocean. Piracy is a form of illegal belligerence. It is not identical to coastal raiding, unarmed theft from ships, maritime terrorism, and maritime aspects of insurgency. It was traditionally universally condemned both in customary international law and in treaty commitments. Piracy has been characterized in the past as *hostis humani generis* – the enemy of the human race. In general, the quickest and most decisive method of combating piracy would be to plan and execute a major naval/joint operation. Such an operation should not include only employment of one's naval forces

but also forces of other services. Land-based aircraft can be employed for maritime reconnaissance/surveillance and for attacking pirate bases and facilities/installations ashore. Special operations teams can be used for diverse tasks ashore ranging from reconnaissance/surveillance to attack on pirate command posts, eliminating pirate leaders, and freeing hostages and captured ships. A small but highly mobile ground force can be used for raids against the pirate bases and basing areas. The actions of all forces taking part in a major counterpiracy operation must be conducted within the same operational framework; otherwise, they would result in a waste of sorely needed time and resources.

Combating maritime terrorism cannot be considered in isolation of the struggle against terrorism in general. Hence, it is only one, and not necessarily the most important task in the employment of one's naval forces in operations short of war. In many cases, coast guard (or border guard) would be employed in conducting counter-terrorist missions within the country's territorial waters. Not only maritime forces, but whenever possible forces of other sister services should be employed in countering maritime terrorism, this is especially the case in the littorals. Countering maritime terrorism is not a problem of a single country no matter how powerful it is, but of the international community as a whole. Hence, cooperation of many navies should be ensured through bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Navies can be employed to carry out diverse tasks in *support of an insurgency/counterinsurgency*. Missions include blockading the coast to prevent an influx of fighters and material to the insurgents; attacking insurgent concentrations in their operating areas or sanctuaries by using surface combatants and carrier-based aircraft; providing gunfire support to friendly troops ashore; and providing close air support, transport of friendly troops and material, and reconnaissance/surveillance. For example, from 1965 to 1970, the U.S. Navy conducted a blockade of South Vietnam's 1,200-mile coastline in an effort to stop fighters and supplies from flowing by sea from North Vietnam to South Vietnam (Operation Market Time). As part of that effort, Operation Sea Dragon aimed to intercept and destroy the Vietcong's waterborne logistics craft. The Navy's riverine forces conducted Operations Game Warden and Sea Lord.

Naval forces are most extensively used in *support of peace operations*, which are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. These actions are conducted in conjunction with diplomacy as necessary to negotiate a truce and resolve a conflict. They may be initiated in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after the end of the hostilities.

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are the principal types of peace operations. Peacekeeping operations are designed to contain, moderate, or terminate hostilities between or within states, using international or impartial military forces and civilians to complement political conflict-resolution efforts and restore and maintain peace. These actions take place after the sides in a conflict agree to cease hostilities; impartial observers are normally sent to verify the implementation of the ceasefire or to monitor the separation of forces.

Peace-enforcement operations involve diverse tasks as authorized by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The objective is to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions that have been adopted to maintain or restore peace or order. The tasks of peace enforcement include implementation of sanctions, establishment and supervision of exclusion zones, intervention to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerents. The aim is to establish an environment for a truce or ceasefire. In contrast to peacekeeping operations, peace-enforcement operations do not require the consent of the warring factions involved in a conflict. When used for peace enforcement, naval forces should have at least limited power projection capabilities and be ready to engage in combat.

Naval forces may also be involved in expanded peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. These operations are larger than peacekeeping operations and can involve over 20,000 personnel. The consent of the sides in the conflict is usually nominal, incomplete, or nonexistent. These operations include more assertive mandates and rules of engagement, including the use of force under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Binnendijk, 1996:p.135). Expanded peacekeeping/peace-enforcement operations are conducted with strictly limited objectives, such as protecting safe-flight or

no-fly zones or relief deliveries. If too intrusive, the operations are likely to draw multinational forces into open hostilities; the naval forces would then have to be either pulled out or committed to full-scale combat (Binnendijk, 1996:p.138).

The principal *methods of combat employment of naval forces in operations short of war* are major and minor tactical actions. Major naval operations are planned and conducted only in exceptional circumstances. One's naval forces are largely employed as part of the sea and/or air exclusion zone and maritime intercept operations (MIOs). Exclusion zones can be established in the air, at sea, or on land to prevent the transit of oil or other cargo and weapons.

An exclusion zone is usually imposed by the United Nations or some other international body, but it may also be established by individual countries. Exclusion zones can be authorized by UN Security Council resolution and offer a means of simplifying sea control through the promulgation of an intention to maintain sea denial to cover a specific area. In diplomatic terms, they are a way of enhancing coercive action by declaring a resolve to use combat if necessary. To be credible, they must be enforceable, and the rights and security of third parties need to be ensured. Maritime intercept operations are usually conducted as part of the enforcement of sanctions by an international body such as the UN or some regional body. The political objective is usually to compel a country or group of countries to conform to the demands of the initiating body. They include coercive measures aimed to interdict the movement of designated items into or out of a nation or a specific sea area. MIOs can also be applied by a major naval power or group of powers to prevent maritime terrorism or illicit trafficking in narcotics, humans, and weapons. Normally, these operations require the employment of both surface and air forces (Boyce, 1999:p.26). For example, UN-mandated MIOs were conducted against Iraq by the U.S. Navy and its coalition partners between August 1990 and March 1993.

High-intensity Conventional War

Navies will play a major role in providing direct and/or indirect support to ground forces in the case of a regional or global conflict. War at sea has almost never taken place alone but has been conducted in conjunction with war on land and, in the modern era, in the air. The objectives of naval warfare have been an integral part of war's objectives. These, in turn, are accomplished by the employment of all the services of a country's armed forces. In contrast to war on land, the objectives in war at sea are almost generally physical in character.

The main objective for a stronger side is to obtain sea control in the whole theater or a major part of it, while the weaker side would try to deny that control. After desired degree of sea control is obtained, it must be maintained. In operational terms, this phase equates to consolidation of strategic or operational success. Exercising sea control is the ultimate purpose of the struggle for sea control by a stronger side at sea. In operational terms, it equates to exploitation of the strategic or operational success. Obtaining/maintaining and exercising control are not clearly delineated in terms of the factors of space and time. In practice, a stronger side would start to exercise control while the efforts to obtain and maintain sea control are still under way. Sometimes, methods for obtaining and exercising sea control are applied simultaneously, as in the case of naval/commercial blockade.

The concept of sea control is at the same time both simple and complicated. In its simplest definition sea control can be described as *one's ability to use a given part of the sea/ocean and associated air (space) for military and nonmilitary purposes and deny the same to the enemy in time of open hostilities*. However, this definition does not reflect that sea control exists in various states and degrees. Sea control implies sufficient and extensive control of a major part of a given maritime theater. It does not mean that all hostile ships, submarines, or aircraft are unable to operate. It only means that the enemy does not have significant capabilities to interfere seriously with one's use of the sea for military and nonmilitary purposes. An ocean or sea area may be considered under control when one's naval/air forces can operate freely and conduct seaborne traffic while the enemy cannot do the same except

at considerable risk. Control of a specific sea/ocean area ensures one's naval forces exercise that control. At the same time, the weaker opponent is forced to contest control by conducting sporadic actions of limited duration (Cutts, 1938:pp.8, 4-5). In a typical narrow sea if a stronger side obtained sea control, the weaker side could make that control increasingly difficult and ultimately obtain control for itself. Even in the areas where a stronger side at sea possesses a substantial degree of control of the surface and subsurface, the weaker side can still operate under certain conditions provided that it enjoys air superiority (Poeschel, 1982:p.42). Sea control is obtained primarily by the employment of maritime forces in the form of major naval operations. In the littorals, these operations will be joint or combined – that is, not only naval forces but also combat arms/branches of other services will take part.

In strategic terms, obtaining or losing sea control on the open ocean would normally have an indirect effect on the war situation on land. This effect is far more direct and immediate in enclosed or marginal seas, where in many cases the loss of sea control can lead to the collapse of one's front on land and thereby considerably affect the outcome of the war. The opposite is also true: obtaining or losing sea control in a marginal sea or enclosed seas is considerably influenced by the course of events in the war on land (Poeschel, 1982:p.41). In contrast to the open ocean, sea control in a typical narrow sea usually cannot be obtained and then maintained without the closest cooperation among all the services. Even when the navy is the principal force, it should be directly or indirectly supported by the other services. Very often, naval forces would have a relatively higher degree of independence in carrying out tasks to obtain sea control (Poeschel, 1982:p.41, 45).

Sea control is inextricably linked with armed struggle at sea. In other words, one does not possess control of the sea by virtue of having forces deployed in the proximity of the area of potential conflict or crisis in peacetime. In peacetime, any navy, regardless of its size or combat strength, has almost unlimited access to any sea area. Forward presence is conducted with full respect for international treaties and conventions and without violating the territorial waters of other countries. Yet this does not in any way preclude starting the struggle for sea control in peacetime because preconditions must be created to quickly attain sea control after the start of hostilities (Poeschel,

1982:p.44). By obtaining sea control, the stronger side would create favorable conditions for carrying out other important tasks at sea.

Sea control and disputed (or contested) sea control can be strategic, operational, and tactical in scale. Strategic sea control pertains to the entire maritime theater, while control of a major part of a maritime theater represents operational sea control. Tactical control refers to control of a maritime combat sector or zone but sometimes can encompass a maritime area of operations. However, in practical terms, the focus should invariably be on strategic or operational sea control or disputed control, not tactical sea control.

Sea control can encompass control of the surface, subsurface, and airspace or of any combination of these three physical media. In the era of sail, command of the sea was limited to command of the surface. After the advent of the submarine and aircraft, the two other dimensions emerged. The degree of overall control of a given sea area depends on the degree of control of each of the three dimensions (Poeschel, 1982:p.42). However, experience shows that, during war between two strong opponents at sea, it is not possible to obtain or maintain control of all three physical media to the same degree or for extended times.

Because of the rather large differences in the size of the physical environment and the proximity of the continental landmass, there is a considerable difference between obtaining sea control on the open ocean and in the littorals. Obtaining sea control in the littorals is highly dependent on the ability to obtain air superiority. Because of the ever-increasing range, endurance, and speed of modern aircraft, ever-larger ocean areas are becoming the areas of employment for both naval forces and land-based aircraft. Today, no part of the littoral is beyond the reach of land-based attack aircraft. Land- or carrier-based aircraft play an extraordinary role in obtaining sea control in the littorals. Without air superiority, sea control simply cannot be obtained. Depending on capabilities, naval forces can take part in the struggle for air superiority. Yet they are not the main means of accomplishing that objective, especially in the sea areas within effective range of land-based aircraft. If one side at sea possesses air superiority, it can be very difficult for the other side

to use some aspects of sea control for its own purposes. Air superiority over a given ocean area can compensate for those aspects of sea control that naval forces failed to obtain. Nevertheless, for all its value, air superiority cannot replace control of the surface and subsurface (Poeschel, 1982:p.43).

In general, sea control cannot be expressed in quantitative terms or various metrics (as the U.S. Navy is trying to do); it can be recognized only in its effects. Sea control is always relative in spatial terms. It pertains to the specific part of the theater in which a certain degree of control must be obtained. Sea control is also relative in terms of the factor of time. It is also relative in terms of the factor of force. The relatively strong enemy always has the ability to dispute the sea control obtained by the stronger side (Poeschel, 1982:p.80).

Exercising sea control is the ultimate purpose of the struggle for sea control by a stronger side at sea. In generic terms, the main methods in exercising sea control are defense/protection of friendly and destruction of the enemy's maritime trade, amphibious landings on the opposed shore, destruction/neutralization of the enemy forces and facilities/installations in the coastal area, and providing support to friendly ground forces in their offensive (or defensive) operations on the coast.

Disputed (or contested) sea control is usually the principal objective of a weaker but relatively strong navy in the initial phase of a war at sea. When command is in dispute, the general conditions might give a stable or unstable equilibrium. Then the power of neither side preponderates to any appreciable extent. It may also be that the command lies with the opponent (Corbett, 1918:p.91). The objective then can be strategic, encompassing the entire theater, or operational, when control is disputed in a major part of the theater.

Disputed sea control exists when the opposing sides possess roughly equal capabilities and opportunities to obtain sea control in a theater as a whole (or in one of its parts) and there is neither significant change in the ratio of forces nor a change of the initiative to either side (Poeschel, 1982:p.71). Once disputed control is obtained, the initially weaker side can possibly try to obtain sea control of its own. Denying the use of the sea to an opponent has often been regarded as the opposite of sea control, but this is an oversimplification. If

a weaker side denies control of the sea to a stronger opponent, this does not mean that it necessarily obtains control itself (Simpson, 1977:p.xix.). Sea control and sea denial are often complementary objectives. For example, sea denial may be conducted to help secure use of the sea, either in the same geographical area or elsewhere. A fleet operating in one or more enclosed or marginal seas might opt for, or be forced by circumstances to accomplish, a combination of objectives—general sea control in the enclosed sea theater, and contested control in a semi-enclosed sea or parts of the adjacent oceans.

Disputed sea control often occurs in the initial phase of a war and is characterized by an almost-continuous struggle for control of certain ocean areas. Once control is obtained, however, it is usually not maintained for a long period, but may be lost from time to time and then regained. In coastal or offshore waters, sea control by a stronger fleet can be disputed even if the major part of a weaker fleet is destroyed.

When control is in dispute, both sides usually operate at high risk because their strength is approximately in balance. One side usually controls one or more parts of a given theater, while its opponent controls the remaining part. Each side's control of a specific sea area is usually limited in time. In the littorals, however, contesting sea control is primarily carried out by submarines, small surface combatants, coastal missile/gun batteries, land-based aircraft, and mines. In general, naval forces can carry out operations aimed to secure control of the sea areas, operations in areas not under command, and operations in the sea areas under command (Turner, 1938: p.8).

A unique feature of the struggle for sea control in the narrow seas is control of the straits/narrows or *chokepoint control*. The objective for a weaker side, then, is just the opposite: chokepoint control denial. In either case, but particularly for a weaker side, this objective would normally require the highest degree of cooperation among naval forces and the combat arms of other services.

The sea's exits are critically important for control of the movements of naval forces and military/commercial shipping. They also often serve as the highways for large-scale invasions. Control of a strait/narrows or several straits can cut off or isolate enemy forces in an adjacent theater of war. The

loss of control of an important chokepoint on whose shores a land campaign is in progress is often fraught with danger for naval forces. For a major navy, general sea control is hardly possible without establishing not only control on the open ocean but also direct or indirect control of several critical passages of vital importance to the world's maritime trade, or by obtaining control of a given narrow sea.

Another operational objective for both the stronger and weaker sides at sea is to establish and maintain *basing/deployment area control* for their naval forces and aircraft, thereby creating prerequisites for planning, preparing, and executing naval/joint major operations. Without securing control of a basing and deployment area first, it is difficult if not impossible to prepare and execute major naval/joint operations and naval tactical actions. This objective is especially critical for naval forces operating in a typical narrow sea. Optimally, control of basing and deployment areas should be established and maintained in peacetime. It is an integral part of the theater-wide or operational protections. The operational commander should be solely responsible for ensuring sufficient degree of basing/deployment area control.

The principal elements of basing/deployment area control are coastal reconnaissance/surveillance, airspace control/air defense, missile defense, anti-combat craft defense, anti-submarine defense, defensive mining, offensive and defensive mine counter-measures, defense of naval bases/ports and airfields, defense of the coast, defense and protection against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), defense and protection of information systems, defense against terrorist acts, and cover and concealment. Basing/deployment area control is accomplished through the series of tactical actions at sea, subsurface, air, and land. The operational objective is accomplished over time.

Control of basing/deployment area must be maintained and if possible expanded during a war. The physical scope of this control depends on the degree of sea control obtained in a given sea or ocean area. Without sea control, one cannot maintain control of basing/deployment areas. At the same time, actions to obtain sea control are far easier if forces operate from

secure basing and deployment areas. This, of course, does not preclude obtaining sea control in an area where control of basing and deployment areas does not exist. This is especially true in the operations of naval forces in enemy-controlled sea areas. Then the basing and deployment area is gradually extended by establishing new bases and facilities on the conquered territories (Poeschel, 1982:p.74).

Conclusion

As in the past, naval power will continue to play a critical and perhaps vital role in protecting and preserving a nation's interests at sea. This will especially be the case for countries such as the United States, Great Britain, Japan, the People's Republic of China, and others whose prosperity and economic wellbeing depend on the free and uninterrupted use of the sea. Naval power is undoubtedly a powerful tool in support of foreign policy, military or theater strategy, and various peace operations. It is an integral part of homeland security. In concert with other sources of the country's military and nonmilitary power, naval power has a large role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale hostilities. Finally, in the case of a regional or global conflict, forces on land cannot ultimately succeed without secure use of the sea. Obtaining, maintaining, and exercising control of the oceans are objectives that cannot be accomplished without a strong and effective naval power.

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Scenarios and Capability Planning: Creation of Scenarios as a Tool for Predicting the Future Operating Environment

Libor Frank and Josef Procházka

Abstract

The goal of the present paper is to introduce the audience to selected methods (especially future scenario-based method) and their usability in predicting future developments of a security and operating environment. Furthermore, this paper highlights the place of these methods in the process of capability planning and creation of a security and defence policy of the state. This paper explores the possibilities, practical applications, risks and limitations of using the selected methods in predicting the future development of a security and operating environment.

Key words:

Security environment, method, scenario, capability planning

Sažetak

Cilj ovoga članka je upoznati čitatelje s odabranim metodama (posebno budućih metoda, baziranih na scenarijima), njihovom uporabljivošću u prognoziranju budućeg razvoja sigurnosnog i operativnog okružja, kao i ukazivanjem na njihovo mjesto u procesu planiranja sposobnosti i stvaranju sigurnosne i obrambene politike države. Članak razmatra mogućnosti, praktične primjene, rizike i ograničenja korištenja odabranih metoda u predviđanju budućeg razvoja sigurnosnog i operativnog okružja.

Ključne riječi:

Sigurnosno okružje, metode, scenarij, planiranje sposobnosti

Introduction

Security policy is the most general and all-embracing programme of the state in the field of security and defence as well as protecting national interests. In order for the state's security policy to be successful, i.e., maintaining or strengthening the position of the state, it must maintain its objectivity and rational nature. The state's security policy should be the most rational (the most reasonable) policy of the state, because, in case of its failure, the existence of the state is threatened. It is a paradox, however, that in everyday practice, this perfectly reasonable policy of the state is built upon the background of irrational inputs, permanent lack of information and subjective factors. When designing and implementing the security policy, the need for the most comprehensive and objective information and inputs into the decision-making process leads to the analysis not only of the present situation, but also the future development of a security environment.

The Role of Methods of Analysis and Prediction of the Security Environment in the Process of Creating a Security and Defence Policy

Analysis and prediction of a security and operating environment and the resulting security threats and risks are an essential source of information for decision making in the field of security and defence policy. Basic outputs of such analysis and prediction include:

- identification of the threat;
- evaluation of risk (as in the scale of the threat) in relation to the protected value (reference object) or in relation to the risks of other threats;
- risk assessment, or deciding whether the risk is acceptable.

High quality analysis and prediction of development of security and operating environment and the resulting security threats and risks is, in an optimal case, a prerequisite for selecting and deciding on the creation of appropriate security (counter-) measures, continuous improvement and raising the level of safety including improvement in capability development. It also aids in reducing potential losses and damages resulting from the effects of realised threats (see, e.g., Parsons, 2001: p.105). However, when making conclusions about the predictions, one should always take into account the limiting factors:

- probability of fulfilling the prediction decreases depending on the availability of information (the more distant the prediction is in terms of the future, the less probable it is);
- it is impossible to rule out unexpected and unpredictable events that can make the prediction worthless ('black swans');
- conclusions of even the best analysis and prediction have no chance of being used when implementing a security policy, if this is significantly influenced by other partial factors and interests.

Basic Characteristics of Plausible Qualitative Methods

Because there are many ways and methods that can be applied when analysing the development of a security and operating environment, selection of appropriate methods is very important. The approach must be appropriate for the situation, objectives and context in which the analysis is conducted. Each approach and each method of risk assessment has its advantages and its shortcomings. Selecting the appropriate approach and appropriate method are dependent on the purpose of the performed evaluation, nature of the available data, availability of funds, and often also socio-political context.

Although the major obstacle in analysing and predicting the evolution of a security and operating environment and the resulting security threats, risks and missions of military is generally the lack of data and information, or lack of ability to select relevant and valid information, it is also important to select appropriate methods and analytic procedures. According to Grasseová-Motyčková (2016: p.33), in principle, two general types of methods are

used in analysing and predicting security threats – qualitative methods and quantitative methods.

Qualitative methods are applicable in cases where there are no “hard data” available or the analysed problems are too complex, interrelated and difficult to describe using the quantified data. Basic procedures used in qualitative methods are based on experience, reasoning and expert opinions. This is a typical feature of a qualitative approach to research, which is not based on reliable, objective and complete data, and permanently applicable laws, but rather on experience and subjective intuition of experts. Qualitative procedures are either exploratory or normative. Exploratory methods are based on information about the past and the present, and apply heuristic approaches towards the future (often by studying possible scenarios or alternatives futures), so that the resulting forecast answers the questions: what could the next development be and what events or phenomena may occur in the future? On the contrary, normative forecast starts with future targets (e.g., ensuring a certain degree of protection for specific values), and returns back from this future starting point to the present, identifying what resources and technologies are necessary to attain these targets and what constraints must be eliminated. This approach, however, is a minority approach not only in the Czech Republic but also in general (see, e.g., Frank, 2015: p.282).

According to Ritz (2001), typical qualitative methods of analysis and prediction of security threats and risks and impact of future evolutions in the operating environment or technological trends include the so-called naive extrapolation (naive extrapolation starts from the simplified assumption that the future development and status of the risk is actually a simple extension of the results of the present situation), consensus forecasts, the Delphi panel (or the Delphi method), analogy or historical analogy (prediction uses historical knowledge and based on the findings of identical elements and features between the already known and the researched phenomenon, it assumes a similar mechanism of development in the future by comparison of the two).

Major advantages of qualitative methods include mainly the possibility of selection and aggregation of large amounts of information and its

transformation into attractive and understandable scenarios or alternative futures. Their disadvantage lies in the lack of a system of measurements and evaluation of analyses and predictions, and especially high influence of subjective evaluations by experts. Qualitative methods are particularly suitable for long-term predictions of a security and operating environment, or identification of threat or capability requirements.

Classification and Characteristics of Plausible Quantitative Methods

Unlike qualitative methods, quantitative methods of analysis and prediction of security threats and risks have the advantage of minimising subjective influences by using objective "hard data", often involving statistical and mathematical methods, modelling, etc. Quantitative methods can be divided into two groups:

- methods based on monitoring time series, and
- econometric or causal methods.

Prediction models based on time series studies analyse the chronological sequences of observations of each variable (e.g., demographic or economic data), and are based on the assumption that the study of past values and their development over time can predict future values of the analysed variables. Causal models or econometric forecasts derive values of the predicted (dependent) variables from the behaviour of other (independent) variables. The aim of causal models is to express the relationships between independent variables through a mathematical formula in order to determine the predicted values of the dependent variable (e.g., estimate of consumption of strategic raw materials based on analysis and prediction of economic growth, technological innovation, estimated amount of resources, etc.).

A frequently used quantitative method in the field of analysis and prediction of the security environment and the resulting security threats and risks (especially for demographic and economic development) is the method of extrapolation, which is based on extending the observed development series. The initial presumption is that the process will evolve in the same

direction or with the same intensity in the future. The relatively high value of extrapolation can be expected if we manage to formulate laws of development of the forecasted phenomenon or process, for example, through the development curve (line for linear development, such as growth, cyclical curve for recurring phenomena, exponential curve, etc.) and collect a sufficient amount of quantifiable data.

Quantitative methods and approaches are advantageous in their relative objectivity of outputs from the analysis and prediction, as the subjective element of the evaluators is eliminated. However, the demand of these methods lies particularly in the need for long-term, accurate and extensive data collection. Their use is suitable for short- or medium-term predictions, but increasing the time horizon of prediction decreases their accuracy and information value (for details see, e.g., Stojar, 2011: pp.257-258).

Potential Use of Qualitative Methods

There are two critical areas where qualitative methods may provide considerable contribution. First is the assessment of policy options and second is the identification of capability requirements. The most suitable methods for these two tasks are: (1) alternative futures assessment and (2) scenarios development.

Alternative futures assessment

Alternative futures methodological framework (AFMF) as a tool for assessment of strategic environment evolution is one of the outcomes of the institutional research project Strategic Alternatives for Armed Forces Development (STRATAL) which has been conducted by the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies in 2016. The AFMF provides an effective analytical method for assessing the potential development of a strategic environment in support of future policy formulation and strategic level decision making in the face of growing complexity and uncertainty. Its relevance has already been proven in several instances, e.g., Future Policy Survey in Netherlands or Future Army Capability Assessment in Canada.

In this regard, the AFMF might also be understood as a process for systematic and rigorous assessment of the ever evolving strategic landscape including military technology in which political masters formulate their vision and defence policy objectives and top military leadership designs the most relevant military strategy in order to fulfil these political expectations. It offers a sound methodological framework for strategists, defence planners and other stakeholders involved in strategic level decision making and planning in the area of national defence provision. Its main objective is to assist decision makers and strategic planners in addressing uncertainty and complexity when predicting the strategic environment and assessing its implications. It also could help in understanding the impact of technology on developing credible military capabilities in a long-term time span. This long-term time span deals with the configuration of Future Armed Forces 15 to 30 years in the future. This time span allows for prudent reengineering of existing and planned defence posture, command and force structure and capabilities while taking into consideration both opportunities and challenges stemming from the external environment including military technology advancements.

Based on alternative futures, decision makers and planners can formulate more flexible policies that ensure their organisations have the required agility to compete in whichever future, even one that is different from the futures envisaged. It will also help them to anticipate changes and prepare the organisation for dealing with future challenges as well as taking advantage of emerging opportunities. (Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre, 2014:pp.9-12).

The AFMF is built on a process embracing the following 10 steps: (1) identification of key focus areas and potential drivers of their change, trends and shocks; (2) environmental scanning; (3) determination of uncertainties and their polarities; (4) ranking uncertainties; (5) development of alternate future framework; (6) writing alternative futures; (7) communicating and validating outcomes; (8) identifying and assessing military implications; (9) identifying signs – indicators; and (10) monitoring results – assessing implementation and updating if required. (Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre, 2015:pp.23-24). Key focus areas are critical for investigating plausible

defence policy and military strategy options. They may embrace politics, economics, social dimensions, science and technology, environment, legal domain, security, human domain and military (NATO, 2015:pp.70-75). Key change drivers are variables that have the potential to change the future in a significant way but are not very predictable as they are themselves dependent on several factors, e.g., oil price.

Environment scanning must ensure undirected viewing (peripheral vision – to see and think outside the box), conditioned viewing (trends and early warnings about emerging issues), identification of the organisation's main features and assessment of its impact (identification and presentation of secondary and tertiary consequences of trends and events).

Ranking uncertainties and their polarities indicate opportunities and threats stemming from the external environment. The following is a set of examples for consideration: (1) impact of age and demographics on military force composition (ageing population and population growth and younger societies); (2) energy security (surpluses vs. deficiencies); (3) exponential technology growth (development and innovation accepted vs. opposed). We can apply the impact and uncertainty matrix. This entails assessment of the future importance of key change drivers to the decision arena and the degree of uncertainty that exists about future outcomes and an impact each force will have in shaping the future of the key decision factors and how important it will be in determining the differences among the alternative futures that are developed.

Alternate futures framework is created by selecting two trends, such as those with critical uncertainties, in the form of a simple 2x2 matrix with these trends as the axes. An illustrative example (see Figure 1) demonstrates that the alternative futures are defined by whether trend one moves to high transparency or low transparency, and whether at the same time trend two moves to uncontrolled access to technology or regulated access to technology.

As a result, we have a simple cross of alternative futures. Each of the four quadrants represents a distinct alternative, as the outcome of combining either/or options of the selected trends. The alternative futures (policies) will be named, further elaborated and their impact will be assessed. The following

process entails more detailed and structured planning, implementation, monitoring of outcomes and if needed the process might be updated.




Figure 1 – Alternative Future Cross

Development of alternative futures is a growing international discipline designed to critically examine the difficulties associated with making decisions with long-term future consequences in conditions of uncertainty (Chermack, 2011:pp.136-142). It provides a methodological framework through which these challenges can be handled and their negative impact on decision making reasonably mitigated (Plausible Futures Newsletter, 2007).

Scenarios development

Scenarios mentioned above are used for identification and verification of capability requirements, in particular. Scenarios depict the main features of the environment in which the armed forces will be employed to execute military missions.

Table 1. Best Practices Scenarios Design Methodology for Capability Planning

Strategic Analysis ↓	Security Environment – Security Challenges and Risks Operational Environment and Application of Military Power Technology Politics, Economics, Demography and Environment
Political Guidance ↓	Strategic Assumptions Strategic and Security Interests (State, International Organisation) Political Ambitions Multinational Obligations Resources
Mission Type ↓	Collective Defence (Article 5 Ops) Air Defence, Cyber Defence Crisis Response Operations (multinational effort) Operation under National Command Crisis Response Operations (national effort)
Generic Scenario ↓	Infrastructure Enemy Political and Military End State Strategic Objectives and Effects Operational Objectives and Effects Key Tasks = Capability Requirements
Specific Scenario I	Geography Specific operational conditions including enemy
Specific Scenario II	Geography Specific operational conditions including enemy

Resource: Outcome of Research Project STRATAL. Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies of Defence University in Brno (The Czech Republic).

Scenarios also reflect operational concepts in the sense of doctrinal use of armed forces. Furthermore, they offer a possibility to identify and quantify required capabilities in a volatile, difficult to predict, complex, permanently

and dynamically changing operating environment, and reduce the level of uncertainty and associated risks. In this regard, scenarios are significant analytical and supporting tools of defence planning with high added value. Correct application of scenarios allows for defining a set of required capabilities necessary for success in potential future conflicts. Also, Davis (2002) has written that scenarios enable long-term planning of capabilities development and optimisation as a platform for qualified and well-informed decisions at the strategic level for the armed forces' character, structure and size with regard to the ambitions and international commitments of the country.

Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies of Defence University in Brno (Czech Republic) conducted research examining the methodology for scenarios design in order to facilitate identification of capability requirements and rigorous validation of existing and planned capabilities. Depicted in the Table 1 is the best practice methodology derived from the assessment of several models (e.g. NATO, EU, Germany, UK, NL and US; see also, Kříž, 2015: p.117; Ministry of Defence Netherlands, 2010).

Methodology entails analysis of strategic environments, political guidance and type of operation. Based on that, a generic scenario is developed comprising political and military end state allowing for the mission to be subject to task decomposition. Identified tasks define the functional capability requirement needs. According to Procházka et al. (2016: p.46), for validation purposes generic scenarios are placed in a specific geographical location allowing for assessment of capability requirements against specific operational characteristics and concrete enemy.

Conclusion

High quality analysis and prediction of a security and operating environment and its potential implications for policy formulation and capability development is an ongoing and ever more refined process. Its aim is not an accurate description of reality at a future date, but the choice of the most probable development options based on today's information. It draws

attention to important factors, events or constraints that will be important in the future and helps achieve more precise targeting, higher efficiency and lower costs of security and defence policy. Additionally, alternative futures assessment and scenarios development provide a suitable analytical framework for identification of policy options and capability requirements under increasing levels of uncertainty and complexity in the external environment. The described methodological frameworks were developed by the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies and customised for a well-informed and evidence-based decision-making process at the strategic level within the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic.

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Prostorna analiza utjecaja geografskih i geoloških čimbenika na provedbu desantne operacije kod Galipolja 1915. godine

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Sažetak

Tijekom 1915. godine britansko-francuske snage na poluotoku Galipolu poduzele su vrlo riskantnu desantnu vojnu operaciju čiji je cilj bio omogućiti britansko-francuskoj mornarici ulazak u Mramorno more, zauzeti Carigrad i time prisiliti Osmansko Carstvo na izlazak iz rata. Cilj je ovog rada temeljem prostornih analiza unutar GIS-a prikazati utjecaj vojno-geografskih i geoloških čimbenika na tijek i ishod vojne operacije na poluotoku Galipolu. Zbog nepovoljnog utjecaja zemljишta na dinamiku iskrcavanja, pokret postrojba i brzo formiranje dubine mostobrana te logističku potporu i utvrđivanje na dostignutim crtama, britansko-francuske postrojbe imale su gubitak raspoloživa borbenog potencijala. S druge strane, turske su postrojbe bile na dominantnim i dobro utvrđenim položajima na povoljnoj geološkoj podlozi za utvrđivanje, a zaštitni faktor reljefa i cestovne komunikacije između ključnog zemljишta koje su držale turske snage i dubina turskog teritorija omogućivao je prikriven i brz dolazak i razvoj pričuvnih turskih snaga te brzu i dostačnu logističku potporu.

Ključne riječi:

ključno zemljишte, GIS analiza, vojna geografija, vojna geologija, Galipolje

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Abstract

During the 1915 British-French forces have taken very risky amphibious military operation at the Gallipoli peninsula. They intend to allow British and French navy to enter the Sea of Marmara and occupy Constantinople, thus forcing the Ottoman Empire to come out of the war. The aim of this paper is to represent with GIS tools military geographic and geological factors that have had an influence on the direction and outcome of military operations on the peninsula of Gallipoli. Due to the unfavorable influence of terrain on the dynamics of landings, the movement of troops and rapid formation of proper bridgehead depth, logistic support and entrenchment of achieved lines, the British-French forces had a loss of available combat potential. On the other hand Turkish troops were in the dominant and well-entrenched positions on favorable geological ground. Protective factors of relief and road communications between key terrain held by Turkish forces and depth of Turkish territory provided an opportunity for hidden and quick access and development of reserve Turkish forces, as well as rapid and adequate logistic support.

Key words:

key terrain, GIS analysis, military geography, military geology, Gallipoli

Uvod

Povijesni okvir i strateški kontekst operacije. Tijekom 1915. godine Britanci su u suradnji s Francuzima na poluotoku Galipolu poduzeli vrlo riskantnu desantnu vojnu operaciju čiji je cilj bio omogućiti britansko-francuskoj mornarici ulazak u Mramorno more i zauzimanje Carigrada (Istanbula) te time prisiliti Osmansko Carstvo na izlazak iz rata. Drugi je cilj bio povezivanje sila Antante, odnosno Ruskog Carstva u području Crnog mora te britanskih i francuskih snaga na Sredozemlju. Godine 1915. rat je ušao u drugu godinu, a ruska je vojska bila u nezavidnoj situaciji. Materijalno stanje ruske vojske bilo je vrlo loše jer nije bilo dovoljno vojne opreme i naoružanja, hrane, odjeće i ostalih nužnih sredstava pa su pojedine postrojbe upućivane na bojišnicu bez oružja i vojne opreme (Ogorec, 2011). Zauzimanjem Carigrada bila bi

uspostavljena najkraća i najsigurnija veza s Rusijom, kojoj je bila potrebna pomoć u naoružanju i vojnoj opremi. Od desanta na Galipolje i zauzimanja Carigrada britanski i francuski vojni stratezi i političko vodstvo obiju država očekivalo je dalekosežne političke i strateške rezultate jer bi vezanjem turskih snaga za obranu Dardanela olakšalo Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu obranu Sueskog kanala i Egipta. Istodobno bi se ohrabrilo države poput Rumunske za ulazak u rat na strani sila Antante i obeshrabrilo Bugarsku za ulazak u rat na strani sila Osovine (Horvat, 1967). U isto vrijeme, porazom Osmanskog Carstva rasteretilo bi se Kavkasko bojište, što bi omogućilo Rusiji povećavanje snaga angažiranih protiv Njemačke na Istočnom ratištu (Ogorec, 2011). Nakon što je Osmansko Carstvo u Balkanskim ratovima imalo značajne teritorijalne gubitke i toliko je vojno i gospodarski oslabilo da su ga prozvali „bolesnikom na Bosporu”, nije se očekivalo da bi turska vojska mogla pružiti učinkovit odgovor združenim britansko-francuskim snagama.

Cilj, pristup i metode rada. Početni koncept operacije imao je težište na mornarici kao glavnoj snazi koja je trebala imati glavnu ulogu u osvajanju Carigrada. Međutim, uspješnim zaprečivanjem Dardanela podmorskim minskim poljima koja su branile obalne utvrde i mobilne topničke bitnice, kopnena komponenta britansko-francuskih snaga dobiva težišnu ulogu u pomorskom desantu na Galipolje, a mornarica daje vatrenu potporu. Vojna operacija na Galipolju 1915. godine ima mornaričku i kopnenu komponentu. Fokus ovog rada je analiza geografskih i geoloških čimbenika koji su utjecali na uporabu kopnenih snaga te na tijek i ishod desantnog segmenta operacije na europskom dijelu tjesnaca Dardanela i poluotoka Galipolja.

Do sada je publiciran niz knjiga koje iznose iskustva britanskih časnika koji su sudjelovali u vojnoj operaciji osvajanja Galipolja kao što je knjiga general-bojnika Callwella (1919) u kojoj se navode pripreme i tijek same operacije, a spominje se i utjecaj zemljишta na provedbu vojne operacije. Od povijesnih izvora koji opisuju događaje na Galipolju vrijedan je doprinos knjiga ratnog dopisnika Nevinsona (1919), koji je izvještavao za list „*Daily Chronicle*” o tijeku kampanje za kontrolu Dardanela. Isto tako, vrijedan doprinos analizi bojnog polja na Galipolju dali su geolozi Peter Doyle i Matthew R. Bennett

(2002), koji su objavili rad „*Terrain and the Galipoli Campaign*”, u kojem obrađuju geomorfologiju i geologiju poluotoka Galipolje u kontekstu tijeka bitke za Galipolje 1915. godine. Navedeni autori klasificirali su zemljište poluotoka Galipolja na pet kategorija s aspekta geologije, geomorfologije, hidrogeologije i vegetacije, ali ne analiziraju zemljište kroz OACOK² vojnu analizu terena niti navode ključno zemljište.

Cilj ovog rada je sintetizirati zaključke iznesene u navedenim knjigama i radovima te analizirati bojište (prostor bitke) kroz GIS prostornu analizu, determinirati ključno zemljište i obrazložiti koje su značajke ključnog zemljišta predodredile ta područja kao mjesta na bojnom polju koja omogućuju strani koja ih drži značajnu taktičku prednost nad protivnikom.

U ovom radu prostorna analiza utjecaja zemljišta na tijek operacije provedena je aplikacijom tvrtke ESRI – ArcGIS, verzije 10.3. Za potrebe analize reljefa korišten je digitalni model reljefa ASTER GDEM v2³ veličine ćelija 30×30 metara. Uz pomoć ekstenzije Spatial analyst aplikacije ArcGIS izračunat je indeks vojnog potencijala terena na provedbu operacije. On je uz analizu ostalih prostornih elemenata zemljišta, te razmještaja i pravaca djelovanja vojnih snaga bio osnova za definiranje ključnog odnosno odlučujućeg zemljišta. Vojni potencijal terena izračunat je na temelju triju ključnih parametara reljefa koji su imali utjecaj na provedbu ove operacije. To su nadmorska visina, vertikalna raščlanjenost reljefa i optička vidljivost u promatranom prostoru. Time se odredio utjecaj nadmorske visine, orografije i morfometrije reljefa na definiranje ključnog zemljišta. Utjecaj reljefa na mogućnost zaštite i prikrivanja kroz indeks zaštitnog potencijala reljefa opisali su Pahernik i Kereša (2007).

² OACOK (engl. *Observation and Fields of Fire, Avenues of Approach, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles – man made and natural, Key or Decisive Terrain*) standardna je vojna procedura koja uključuje vrednovanje zemljišta i meteoroloških uvjeta kroz njihov utjecaj na preglednost bojnog polja te zaštitu, maskiranje, paljbu, kretanje i manevar postrojba.


³ Izvor: The United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2004) *Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer, Global Digital Elevation Model, Version 2*. Raspoloživo na: <https://asterweb.jpl.nasa.gov/gdem.asp> [Pristupljeno: 22. ožujka 2016.]

Tijek operacije

Od ulaska Turske u rat na strani sila Osovine britanski je stožer razmatrao zamisao o snažnom udaru kroz Dardanele i otvaranju pomorskih pravaca prema Rusiji. Feldmaršal Kitchener je tu zamisao izložio, a prvi lord admiraliteta Winston Churchill s oduševljenjem ju je prihvatio (Evans, 2005). Admiral John Fisher prihvatio je zamisao kao kombinirani pomorsko-kopneni napad na Tursku uz uvjet da se on proveđe bez odgađanja (Evans, 2005). Za razliku od mišljenja admirala Fishera, u početnoj etapi planiranja operacije postojala su razmišljanja unutar britanske mornarice kako britansko-francuska flota operaciju može provesti samostalno djelovanjem topništva s brodova i iskrcavanjem mornaričkog pješaštva za osvajanje turskih obalnih utvrda, a bez opsežnog angažmana kopnene vojske. To je jedan od razloga zbog kojeg pripreme za desantnu operaciju, uključujući i vojno-geografsku analizu bojnog polja, nisu provedene s dovoljnom pažnjom. Isto tako, za planiranje operacije korištena je karta u mjerilu 1 : 250 000 koju je Ministarstvo obrane izdalo 1908. godine; pružala je samo opću sliku područja, što se pokazalo nedovoljnim za planiranje operacije (Evans, 2005).

Britanska mornarica provela je 3. studenog 1914. godine nasilno izviđanje⁴ Dardanelia, koje su provela dva bojna broda granatiranjem turskih utvrda na europskoj strani tjesnaca kod Sid el Bara i rta Helles, a istodobno su francuski bojni brodovi napali turske položaje na azijskoj strani kod mjesta Kum Kali. Ispaljeno je samo osamdesetak granata, ali su stare turske utvrde jako oštećene i zadani su veliki gubitci posadama tih utvrda, a glavni cilj nasilnog izviđanja bio je ispitati domet turskog topništva, kvalitetu utvrda i mogućnost probroja do turskih obala (Horvat, 1967). Tri i pol mjeseca kasnije, 2. veljače 1915. godine, došlo je do drugog nasilnog izviđanja Dardanelia. Tada je britanski admiral Sackville Carden granatirao utvrde s dobrim učinkom, što je stvorilo pretpostavku da bi i manje snage pješaštva mogle

⁴ Nasilno izviđanje vrsta je izvidničkog djelovanja namijenjena za otkrivanje ili provjeru protivničke jakosti ili za dobivanje drugih informacija o protivniku. Ako protivničko stanje treba provjeriti duž široke fronte, nasilno se izviđanje može sastojati od snažnih probnih djelovanja po protivniku kako bi se utvrdilo njegovo stanje na odabranim točkama.



Slika 1. Područje operacije s rasporedom turskih obalnih bitnica i minskih polja

zauzeti utvrde i napredovati dalje (Horvat, 1967). Tjesnac je branilo šest starih kamenom građenih obalnih utvrda s modernim topništvom, devet modernih betonskih utvrda s modernim topništvom i desetak mobilnih topničkih bitnica (**Slika 1**). U tjesnacu je, na nazužem dijelu, u početku bilo položeno deset minskih polja od kojih je svako imalo između šesnaest i pedeset tri mine, a 8. ožujka pridodano je i jedanaesto minsko polje s dvadesetak položenih mina, koje su postavljene paralelno

s azijskom stranom obale tjesnaca (Evans, 2005). Napad britansko-francuske flote započeo je 19. veljače 1915. godine dalekometnim granatiranjem utvrda na rtu Helles, te utvrda na azijskoj strani ulaza u Dardanele. Britanski i francuski bojni brodovi u početku su sa sigurne udaljenosti granatirali obalne utvrde, a onda su se u drugoj fazi približili turskim utrvrdama kako bi preciznost i učinak vatre bio veći. Nakon približavanja britansko-francuske flote turskoj obali uslijedio je odgovor turskog topništva. Glavni napad flote na turske obrambene položaje pokrenut je 18. ožujka⁵. Unatoč značajnim oštećenjima na turskim utrvrdama, tursko topništvo nije neutralizirano, a francuski bojni brod „Bouvet“ naišao je na minu, nakon čega se prevrnuo i potonuo. Nakon potonuća francuskoga bojnog broda, i britanski bojni

⁵ Flota se sastojala od tri divizijuna brodova u čijem je sastavu bilo 18 bojnih brodova uz pratnju krstarica i razarača.

brodovi „Ocean“ i „Irresistible“ naišli su na minu i potonuli, a bojni krstaš „Inflexible“ teško je oštećen. Još je nekoliko brodova oštećeno paljbom turskog topništva pa je time zaustavljen proboj britansko-francuske flote kroz Dardanele (Horvat, 1967; Evans, 2005).

Početni planovi, razmještaj snaga i pripreme za desant. Nakon očitog neuspjeha britansko-francuske flote u proboru kroz dardanski tjesnac, general-pukovnik William Birdwood, koji je bio pridodan floti kako bi nadzirao napredovanje, izvijestio je 5. ožujka 1915. godine feldmaršala Kitchenera kako mornarica neće moći izvršiti dodijeljenu zadaću bez pomoći kopnene vojske. Zbog toga je britanski ministar rata u Londonu 12. ožujka postavio generala Iana Hamiltona za zapovjednika kopnenih snaga koje će provesti desant na Galipolje (Evans, 2005). Turski ministar rata Enver Pasha postavio je za zapovjednika turske vojske njemačkog feldmaršala Limana von Sandersa. Feldmaršal Sanders odmah je počeo ojačavanje i reorganizaciju obrane Dardanela i Galipolja. Ta je reorganizacija uključivala sustavno utvrđivanje turskih snaga na obali u području rta Hellesa, na vrhu brda Achi Baba, te oko mjesta Buloira u središnjem dijelu Galipolja. Izgrađeni su rovovi punog profila s ukopanim skloništima, vatrenim položajima i prometnicama među rovovima, a pred rovove je postavljena bodljikava žica.

Nakon neuspjelog pokušaja britansko-francuske flote da uništi turske obalne fortifikacije i bitnice, kopnena vojska trebala se iskrcati na europskoj i azijskoj strani tjesnaca te zauzeti zapadni dio poluotoka, neutralizirati turske obalne utvrde i bitnice. Time bi se stvorila minimalna operacijska osnovica za dalji tijek operacija u kojem bi mornarica razminirala podmorska minska polja koja su blokirala tjesnac i uplovila u Mramorno more te ugrozila Carigrad kao gravitacijsko središte Osmanskog Carstva⁶. Britanski general Ian Hamilton imao je na raspolaganju oko 75 000 vojnika iz različitih dijelova Britanskog Carstva, a francuski korpus brojao je oko 16 000 vojnika (Evans,

⁶ Carigrad (Istanbul) gravitacijsko je središte čijim bi osvajanjem ili blokadom Turska mogla biti izbačena iz rata, a Bospor otvoren za opskrbne konvoje prema Rusiji. Istanbul je gravitacijsko središte kao točka na zemljишtu u kontekstu razmatranja pojma gravitacijskog središta po Jominiju, odnosno, kao središte s izvorima moći (turska vlada, stožer, ministarstva, industrija, središte trgovine i financija), u kontekstu razmatranja pojma gravitacijskog središta po Clausewitzu.

2005). Feldmaršal Liman von Sanders na azijskoj strani tjesnaca smjestio je dvije divizije, 11. i 3. diviziju. Na europskoj strani kod Bulaira, u središnjem dijelu poluotoka postavio je 5. diviziju, a nešto južnije 7. diviziju. Rt Helles branila je 9. divizija, a sjeverno od nje pokraj grada Boghalija u pričuvu je bila 19. divizija pod zapovjedništvom Mustafe Kemala. Položaj je omogućivao 19. diviziji da prema potrebi može žurno biti upućena na jug, zapad ili sjever, ovisno o potrebi i mjestu iskrcavanja protivnika.

Iskrcavanje kod rta Hellesa i na plaži ANZAC. Britanske snage su se kod rta Hellesa iskrcale 25. travnja 1915. na plaže pod oznakom Y, X, W, V i S (**Slika 1**). Treba uzeti u obzir da plaža pod oznakom Y nije plaža nego vododerina u stijenama (Evans, 2005), a plaža X vrlo uska i zatvorena grebenima te premale površine za podržavanje dinamike iskrcavanja ljudstva, naoružanja i vojne opreme iz niza desantnih valova koji su pristizali (Masefield, 1916).

Turske snage zapriječile su plaže bodljikavom žicom, a iznad njih su na uzvisinama iskopani rovovi i bunkerji za teške strojnice. Tursko topništvo s vrha Achi Baba imalo je mogućnost izravne vatre po protivničkim ciljevima. Turske snage koje su bile utvrđene kod rta Helles i branile plaže na kojima su se iskrcavali Britanci, usporile su, zadržale ili odbile prve valove iskrcanih britanskih postrojba. Osvajanje obalnog mostobrana⁷ teklo je sporo, i zbog otpora turskih snaga i zbog konfiguracije zemljišta. Površina, lokacija i broj plaže za iskrcaj britanskih snaga bili su premali za veličinu postrojba i materijalnih sredstava koja su iskrcana i stvorilo se „usko grlo” za iduće valove postrojba koji su pristizali na plaže, a koncentracija pješaštva na uskom i otvorenom području povećala je učinak turske vatre. Britanski gubitci bili su osobito veliki u iskrcavanju na plaže V i W jer se navedene plaže sužavaju i uspinju prema unutrašnjosti u obliku lijevketa, što je usporavalo napredovanje desantnih snaga i omogućivalo turskim vojnicima u rovovima da s povišenog zemljišta paljbom iz teških strojnica gađaju britanske vojниke na otvorenom zemljištu (Callwell, 1919; Horvat, 1967; Evans, 2005).

⁷ Obalni mostobran određeno je područje na neprijateljskoj ili potencijalno neprijateljskoj obali, koje kada je osvojeno i osigurano, omogućuje neprekidno iskrcavanje vojnika i sredstava te pruža manevarski prostor potreban za sljedeća planirana djelovanja na obali. Osvajanje obalnog mostobrana je fizički cilj pomorsko-desantne operacije.

Iskrcavanje francuskih postrojba na azijskoj strani kod Kum Kale turske su snage zaustavile na početku vojne operacije. Učinak iskrcavanja na azijskoj strani tjesnaca bio je upitan i u kontekstu demonstracije, odnosno vezanja značajnih snaga turske vojske na azijskoj strani, što je i bio glavni cilj iskrcavanja na tom području. Zbog toga su francuske snage prebačene na europsku stranu tjesnaca kod rta Hellesa. Tako se u nekoliko tjedana od iskrcavanja u području rta Hellesa koncentriralo nekoliko britanskih i francuskih divizija na širini fronta približno 6 kilometara. Osvojeni prostor bio je površinom premašen i zbog velike vertikalne raščlanjenosti reljefa nepovoljan za borbeni razvoj nekoliko divizija koje su se trebale iskrcaći i nastaviti prodor prema Istanбуlu.

Plaže i obala duž jugozapadnog dijela poluotoka kod rta Hellesa izgrađene su od relativno čvrstih miocenskih vapnenaca (Doyle i Bennett, 2002). U takvoj geološkoj podlozi britanske postrojbe nisu mogle u kratkom vremenu izraditi rovove punog profila koristeći se samo standardnom opremom pješaštva. Zbog toga su u početku na dostignutim crtama izradili samo plitke rovove, a oni nisu pružali dostačnu zaštitu ni od protivničkog topništva ni od pješačkog oružja. Zbog toga su britanski gubitci bili značajni. Britanski rovovi produbljeni su i prošireni naknadno inženjerijskim radovima uz pomoć inženjerijskih alata i eksploziva (Doyle i Bennett, 1999). Daljim napredovanjem Britanaca prema mjestu Krithia na zapadnim obroncima brda Achi Baba britanske postrojbe došle su na povoljniju geološku podlogu za ukopavanje, koju predstavljaju pješčenjaci i konsolidirani pijesci. Turske su postrojbe na brdu Achi Baba i platou Kalid Bahr bile na povišenim i dobro utvrđenim položajima na povoljnoj geološkoj podlozi za utvrđivanje, a imale su dovoljno vremena za sustavno utvrđivanje i kvalitetnu izradu rovova punog profila s ukopanim skloništima. Načelno je za izradu rovova u mekim pješčenjacima mlađih geoloških formacija i konsolidiranim pijescima dovoljna standardna oprema pješaštava, a turske su snage imale na raspolaganju i druge alate i opremu, kao i dovoljno vremena za utvrđivanje.

Istodobno s iskrcavanjem britanskih snaga kod rta Hellesa, pripadnici australskog korpusa iskrcači su se nešto sjevernije od planirane plaže za iskrcavanje pod oznakom Z. Plaža na kojoj su iskrčane postrojbe dobila je naziv plaža ANZAC jer su se na njoj iskrcale postrojbe iz Australije

i Novog Zelanda. Plaža ANZAC je preuska, a obala prestrma za iskrcaj i pokret topništva i opskrbnog materijala prema unutrašnjosti. Zbog toga je iskrcavanje postrojba i njihovo napredovanje u unutrašnjost bilo jako usporeno. Samo uz krajnji napor dopremljeno je nekoliko brdskih topova na uzvišenja iznad plaže. Zapovjednik turske 19. divizije general Mustafa Kemal⁸ odmah je po primitku informacije o iskrcavanju britanskih snaga na plaži u podnožju masiva Sari Bahr zapovjedio pokret cijele divizije⁹ prema masivu Sari Bahr shvaćajući važnost položaja na vrhovima masiva za obranu poluotoka. Turska 19. divizija odbila je napade britanskih postrojba, preotela pojedine položaje, zadržala ključne vrhove na masivu Sari Bahr i time zaustavila dalji prodor protivnika na poluotok.

Iskrcavanje u zaljevu Suvli. Nakon početnih neuspjeha odlučeno je da se u kolovozu u zaljevu Suvli iskrca 9. korpus pod zapovjedništvom general-pukovnika Fredricka Stopforda i uništi tursko desno krilo. Naknadno iskrcavanje u području zaljeva Suvle više nije omogućivalo taktičko iznenađenje. Reljef je s obzirom na morfologiju bio nešto povoljniji za iskrcavanje od prethodnih lokacija na poluotoku, ali je geološka podloga koja se sastojala od kvartarnih pjesaka, glina i evaporita bila nepovoljnija za utvrđivanje na dostignutim crtama. Iskrcavanje i pokret postrojba u dubinu za stvaranje povoljne dubine mostobrana teklo je presporo, bez potrebne energije i inicijative, uz mnoge pogreške u zapovijedanju i nadzoru. Nakon uspješnog početnog iskrcavanja prve iskrcane postrojbe predugo su čekale da se u idućim etapama iskrca topništvo i zalihe, a istodobno su turski položaji na uzvišenjima oko zaljeva Suvle popunjavani svježim turskim postrojbama (Evans, 2005). Do jutra 8. kolovoza britanske su postrojbe, usprkos sporosti i neodlučnosti zapovjednika, ostvarile većinu početnih ciljeva i bile u podnožju brda Takke Tepe. Turci su na to bojište žurno uputili dvije nove divizije iz središnjeg dijela poluotoka, gdje su te divizije prvotno bile raspoređene u područja mjesta Bulaira. Kad su se idućeg jutra britanske postrojbe prikupile i organizirale napad na turske položaje, turska su pojačanja već bila na svojim položajima i odbila su napad (Evans, 2005).

8 Mustafa Kemal, poslije predsjednik Republike Turske Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

9 Do tada je turska 19. divizija bila u pričuvi u blizini mjesta Boghali.

Turske su snage držale uzvišenja oko zaljeva Suvle, a Britanci brežuljke ispod njih i time se i taj dio bojišta stabilizirao i većih pomaka nije bilo do završetka operacije. Operativni tempo¹⁰ iskrcavanja i zauzimanja mostobrana od britanskih snaga tekao je sporije od operativnog tempa turskih snaga, što je brzo dovelo pričuve i ojačalo snage na ključnom terenu. Britanske snage ostale su „prikovane” na brežuljcima i u nizini s močvarnim područjem u središtu svog borbenog rasporeda, što se nepovoljno odrazило na kretanje, manevar i utvrđivanje postrojba. U studenom je nastupila kišna jesen i oštra zima s iznadprosječno niskim temperaturama za to područje. Jake kiše stvorile su bujične potoke i odrone, a oborinske vode i podizanje razine podzemnih voda dovele do potapanja britanske druge crte rovova koja je bila uz slano jezero u zaljevu Suvli (Evans, 2005). Nakon toga je pao snijeg i tlo se smrznulo. Većina britanskih vojnika nije imala opremu i uvjete za nastavak operacije u zimskim uvjetima. Britanska strana donosi odluku o povlačenju svih invazijskih snaga s poluotoka.

Povlačenje s Galipolja i završetak vojne operacije. Bitka za Galipolje započela je 25. travnja 1915. godine iskrcavanjem postrojba Antante, a završena 6. veljače 1916. godine potpunim povlačenjem invazijskih snaga. Planiranje i provedba povlačenja britanskih snaga s Galipolja najučinkovitiji je dio vojne operacije jer je proveden brzo i bez gubitaka u ljudstvu. Snage Antante na kraju vojne operacije, jačine 16 divizija, činile su postrojbe Britanskog Carstva (*Mediterranean Expeditionary Force*) i francuske snage (*Corps Expeditionnaire d'Orient*), a turska strana u bitki je uporabila snage ukupno 15 divizija (Trnski, 2009). Cijena neuspješnog pokušaja zauzimanja galipolskog poluotoka bila je visoka, a gubitci sila Antante procjenjuju se na više od 200 000 mrtvih i ranjenih. Isto tako, neuspjeh sila Antante kod Galipolja ohrabrio je Bugarsku da uđe u rat na strani sila Osovine (Horvat, 1967), a izostalo je povezivanje i vojna pomoć Rusiji preko Crnog mora pa se taktički neuspjeh odrazio na strateškoj razini.

¹⁰ Operativni tempo ritam je aktivnosti (u taktičkim angažmanima i bitkama) u odnosu prema ritmu protivnika. To uključuje održavanje sposobnosti brzog odlučivanja i djelovanja koncentracijom vojnih sposobnosti i gomilanjem učinka na odlučujućim točkama u vremenu i prostoru brže od protivnika.

Prostorna analiza utjecaja geografskih i geoloških čimbenika

Geološka građa bojnog polja može biti jedan od ključnih čimbenika, a povijest vojnih operacija pokazala je da može biti i odlučujući čimbenik za uspjeh ili neuspjeh vojne operacije (Zečević, 2016). Isto tako, brojni su primjeri da je nedovoljno poznavanje geografskih značajki nekog prostora ili podcenjivanje njihova utjecaja dovelo do neuspjeha vojne operacije ili kampanje. Značaj i širina utjecaja geomorfologije i geologije (uključujući hidrogeologiju) bojišta na planiranje i provedbu pomorskog desanta uglavnom je određeno prirodnom vojne operacije, površinom prostora predviđenog za iskrcavanje, brojem ljudstva i opreme koja sudjeluje u operaciji, dinamikom iskrcanja ljudstva, klimom u području operacija, meteorološkim uvjetima, kvantitetom i kvalitetom cestovne, lučke i vodoopskrbne infrastrukture i strateškim okruženjem. Što je teren razvedeniji i fizički zahtjevniji, broj vojnika i opreme veći, klima nepovoljnija, vodoopskrbna infrastruktura u području operacije slabe kvalitete i kvantitete, a opskrba iz matičnih luka ili iz zraka nedostatnija, to je značaj i spektar utjecaja geologije i geomorfologije terena na ishod pomorskog desanta veći.

Utjecaj na dinamiku iskrcavanja, kretanje i manevar. Mala površina plaža, nedostatak luka i lučke infrastrukture koja bi podržala pristajanje brodova, iskrcavanje i prelazak ljudstva, opreme i vozila, iskrcaj logističkog materijala i kvalitetna cestovna mreža od plaža prema unutrašnjosti poluotoka odrazila se na operativni tempo operacije. Odabrane plaže bile su premalih površina da bi prihvatile ljudstvo, naoružanje i vojnu opremu iz niza desantnih valova koji su pristizali, a geomorfološka obilježja obale nisu omogućivala brz prekrcaj i premještaj ljudstva, naoružanja i vojne opreme od plaža prema unutrašnjosti poluotoka¹¹. Zbog toga je operativni tempo i pristizanje turskih pojačanja bio brži od operativnog tempa Britanaca i Francuza.

Reljef na poluotoku Galipolju nepovoljan je za povezivanje zauzetih plaža i stvaranje jedinstvenog mostobrana britansko-francuskih snaga. Plaže su

11 Dobar primjer za nepovoljnu sredinu za iskrcaj snaga je plaža ANZAC: prostor te plaže vrlo je uzak i nepovoljan za iskrcaj topništva. Ono se zbog velike vertikalne raščlanjenosti reljefa, odnosno strmih litica, nije moglo dovoljno brzo prebaciti na položaje s kojih bi učinkovito djelovalo po protivniku.


premalih površina za generiranje snaga i logističkog materijala za razinu nekoliko brigada koje su iskrcane u prvim danima desanta te za razvoj snaga na uskom prostoru rta Hellesa. Zbog toga sile Antante nisu iskoristile borbenu moć¹² na učinkovit način i nakon prvih nekoliko tjedana od iskrcavanja dva su se korpusa našla zbijena na širini fronte približno šest kilometara.

Utjecaj na logističku potporu. Grčki otoci Lemnos i Imbros bili su dobri kao pristaništa (zaljev Mudros na otoku Lemnosu) za brodove u slučaju nevremena, ali nisu imali potrebnu lučku infrastrukturu i potrebne količine hrane, streljiva i vode za dostatnu logističku potporu postrojba koje su se iskrcale na Galipolju pa su mogli biti samo mjesto za pretovar i skladištenje robe (Masefield, 1916). Britanske matične luke za logističku potporu bile su udaljena Aleksandrija u Egiptu i luke na Malti, a za francusku flotu francuske luke na Mediteranu. U području rta Hellesa bila je jedna manja luka čiji kapacitet i dubina za pristajanje brodova nije omogućivala prihvatanje većih brodova koji bi osigurali dostatnu dinamiku opskrbe hranom, vodom, naoružanjem i streljivom¹³. Na nekim su plažama izrađeni improvizirani dokovi kako bi mogli pristajati čamci i manji brodovi, ali odabrane plaže nisu imale dostatnu površinu, odnosno kapacitet za zaprimanje velike količine logističkog materijala pa su plaže bile zakrčene ljudstvom i vojnom opremom. To je usporavalo iskrcavanje ljudstva i topništva i iskrcaj logističkog materijala potrebnog za podržavanje planiranoga operativnog tempa operacije. Izdužene i prenapregnute logističke crte značajno su utjecale na poteškoće dopreme materijalnih sredstava i uzrokovale su angažiranje većeg broja vojnika u opskrbnim postrojbama. Uzak mostobran i velika koncentracija zaliha na uskim plažama koje su bile u dometu turskog topništva, povećavali su mogućnost uništavanja zaliha na mjestu iskrcavanja.

12 Ukupna razorna snaga koju vojna postrojba može uporabiti protiv protivnika u danom vremenu. Borbena se moć sastoji od učinaka manevra, vatrene moći, zaštite i djelotvornosti vođenja.

13 Streljivo, hrana i voda za piće morali su biti dopremani iz velike udaljenosti. Najbliže logističke luke u središnjoj Grčkoj i matične luke britanske mediteranske flote u Aleksandriji i na Malti bile su predaleko za učinkovitu i dostatnu logističku potporu pa je razvučenost logističke crte utjecala na održivost vojne operacije.

Opskrba vodom za piće promatrana kroz težinu i volumen tereta velika je stavka i značajno opterećuje logistički sustav opskrbe ako voda kao resurs nije dostupna na samom bojnom polju. Presušivanje vodotoka karakteristično je za aridni prostor Galipolja tijekom ljeta pa se opskrba vodom za piće mogla



Slika 2. Idealizirani hidrogeološki profil s prikazanim odnosom slane i slatke vode u podzemlju

provesti ili iz bunara crpljenjem podzemnih vodonosnika u pješčenjacima i vapnencima ili dopremom izvan područja operacija. S obzirom na to da su resursi vode za piće, odnosno bunari s vodom za piće na samom bojištu bili ili u dometu turskog topništva s ključnog zemljишta ili pod nadzorom turske strane u pozadini turskih obrambenih crta, opskrba vodom za piće britanskih i francuskih postrojba ovisila je o dopremi iz udaljenih područja¹⁴. Većina bunara u dosegu britanskih snaga bila je u rubnom dijelu poluotoka uz plaže. Ti su bunari kod povećanog crpljenja bili izloženi prođoru slane vode zbog spuštanja i širenja konusa depresije, a time i spuštanja razine

14 Kvalitetni bunari, udaljeni od ruba obale, s većim kapacitetom pridobivanja vode za piće, bili su u pozadini turskih prvih crta i britansko-francuske snage nisu se uspjeli probiti do njih.

vodnog lica (**Slika 2**). Nedostatak vode za piće prouzročio je mnoge zarazne bolesti¹⁵ (Evans, 2005), a odrazio se i na borbenu spremnost jer je povećavao borbeni stres. Svi navedeni problemi u logističkoj potpori utjecali su vrlo nepovoljno na pravodobnost, urednost, potpunost, neprekidnost, sigurnost i elastičnost opskrbe u području operacije.


Utjecaj na utvrđivanje. Turske su postrojbe na ključnom zemljištu bile na povišenim i dobro utvrđenim položajima na povoljnoj geološkoj podlozi za izradu fortifikacijskih sustava. Pod sustavom utvrđivanja podrazumijevaju se svi objekti izgrađeni u okviru borbenih položaja koji su usklađeni sa sustavom vatre i planom obrane fortifikacije. Takav složeni fortifikacijski sustav najčešće se sastoji od niza površinskih, pripovršinskih i podzemnih objekata koji su u interakciji s prirodnom osnovom, odnosno funkcionalno i tehnički se prilagođavaju geografskim, geološkim (uključujući hidrogeološke) i pedološkim karakteristikama zemljišta na kojem se nalaze (Zečević i Jungwirth, 2007; Zečević, 2011). Za izradu rovova u mekim miocenskim i pliocenskim pješčenjacima i konsolidiranim pijescima u kojima je izrađen turski sustav rovova u načelu je dovoljna standardna oprema pješaštva, odnosno lopatica koju standardno nosi svaki vojnik kao dio opreme. Dobro konsolidirani pijesci imaju povoljne inženjersko-geološke i geotehničke karakteristike jer su rovovi u takvoj geološkoj sredini relativno otporni na urušavanje ako je stijenka rova kvalitetno podgrađena daskama i kolcima, a ne zadržavaju oborinsku vodu u rovu jer su porozni (Bülow i dr., 1938). Pješčenjaci su u većini slučajeva vrlo povoljni za ukopavanje jer su rovovi u takvoj geološkoj sredini dovoljno čvrsti da se ne urušavaju, a ako imaju kvalitetno izgrađenu pokrivku i duboko ukopana skloništa, mogu izdržati i udare topništva većega kalibra (Zečević i Jungwirth, 2007). O kvaliteti izrade turskih sustava rovova u povoljnoj geološkoj podlozi najbolje govori činjenica da su ti utvrđeni položaji na ključnom terenu izdržali višemjesečno granatiranje britanskih i francuskih bojnih brodova i napade pješaštva.

15 Najčešća zarazna bolest bila je dizenterija, koja se brzo proširila zbog loših higijenskih uvjeta, ljetnih vrućina i brojnih tijela poginulih vojnika koja su se raspadala na ničoj zemlji između britanskih i turskih rovova.

GIS analiza i ključno zemljište na zapadnom dijelu galipolskog poluotoka

Ključno zemljište definirano je na temelju prostorne analize reljefa (**Slika 3**) i utjecaja drugih vojno-geografskih čimbenika na provedbu vojne operacije. Reljef je kvantificiran kroz indeks vojnog potencijala reljefa, i to na temelju triju elemenata. Svaki pojedini element vrednovan je u rasponu od 1 do 3 boda (pondera) na temelju statističke distribucije raspona vrijednosti unutar istraživanog prostora. Nadmorska visina ponderirana je ponderom 1 do visine 50 m, ponderom 2 visine od 50 do 200 m i ponderom 3 visine preko 200 m (**Slika 3a**). Vertikalna raščlanjenost reljefa koja predstavlja visinsku razliku najviše i najniže točke unutar jedinične površine (uzet je 1 km^2) ponderirana je vrijednošću 1 do 40 m/km^2 , ponderom 2 od 40 do 100 m/km^2 i ponderom 3 preko 100 m/km^2 (**Slika 3b**). Potencijal reljefa vezan uz mogućnost motrenja i posrednoga gađanja, odnosno optičke vidljivosti u prostoru, definiran je kroz analizu optičke vidljivosti. Unutar područja istraživanja nasumično je određeno 55 točaka u prostoru iz kojih je napravljena analiza optičke vidljivosti u prostoru (**Slika 3c**). Dobiven je rasterski sloj s vrijednostima koliko je pojedina ćelija vidljiva s postavljenih motrišta. Što je veći broj motrišta, to je i potencijal te ćelije u prostoru veći, odnosno ona pruža bolju preglednost prostora. Tako je ponder 1 dodijeljen ćelijama koje ne vide ni jedno, odnosno samo jedno motrište, ponder 2 od 1 do 4 motrišta, a ponder 3 više od 4 motrišta.

Lokalnom funkcijom prostorne rasterske analize zbrojeni su ponderi svih elemenata reljefa na istim pozicijama ćelija te grupirani u tri klase: mali, srednji i visoki vojni potencijal reljefa. Na temelju dobivenih vrijednosti izdvojeno je pet područja potencijalnoga ključnog zemljišta unutar područja operacija, a to su: 1. brdo Achi Baba, 2. plato Kalid Bahr, 3. masiv Sari Bahr, 4. brdo Takke Tepe i 5. greben Karakol (**Slika 3d**). Međutim, greben Karakol ipak nema sva obilježja ključnog zemljišta jer ima pružanje paralelno sa smjerom napada i nalazi se sa strane na rubu bojišta, a brdo Takke Tepe koje je uz njega, nadvisuje ga i pruža se okomito na smjer napada pa time predstavlja ključno zemljište na tom dijelu poluotoka. Brdo Achi Baba, iako nema visoki vojni potencijal zemljišta, prva je dominantna uzvisina od rta




Slika 3. Prostorna analiza parametara vojnog potencijala terena

Hellesa prema unutrašnjosti poluotoka, odnosno na glavnom smjeru napada britansko-francuskih snaga pa je kao uzvišenje na zemljištu dobro motrište i može pružiti vatrene sektore preko zemljišta koje ga okružuje.

Temeljem provedenih analiza mogu se izdvojiti četiri uzvisine koje predstavljaju ključno zemljište na poluotoku Galipolju. Prvo ključno zemljište šire je područje brda Achi Baba uključujući mjesto Krithia na zapadnim padinama toga brda. Drugo ključno zemljište je plato Kalid Bahr, treće masiv Sari Bahr s vrhovima Chunuk Bair i Koja Chemen Tepe, a četvrto brdo Takke Tepe na sjeverozapadu poluotoka. Ova četiri područja omogućuju strani koja ih drži značajnu taktičku prednost nad protivnikom jer izravnom vatrom nadziru ulaz u tjesnac, a time posredno štite podmorska minska

polja. Također, vatrom nadziru plaže na zapadnom dijelu poluotoka, posjeduju i nadziru bunare s vodom za piće visoke izdašnosti (visoki kapacitet pridobivanja) te vatrom nadziru bunare s bočatom vodom na rubnim dijelovima zapadnog dijela poluotoka. Zaštitni faktor reljefa koji svojim razmještajem u prostoru tvore u znatnoj mjeri i ove četiri uzvisine, štiti glavne cestovne komunikacije koje se protežu od rta Helles na krajnjem jugozapadnom dijelu poluotoka, prema unutrašnjosti turskog teritorija pa sve do Carigrada. Ključno zemljište izgrađeno je uglavnom od



Slika 4. Prostorni raspored bunara u odnosu prema ključnom zemljištu i crtama razdvajanja

pješčenjaka i dobro konsolidiranih pjesaka te u manjoj mjeri od drugih vrsta sedimentnih stijena kao što su konglomerati, gline i vapnenci. Sustavi rovova punog profila koje su izradile turske postrojbe izdržali su udare topništva velikoga kalibra s britanskih i francuskih bojnih brodova.

Brdo Achi Baba. Ključan teren na brdu Achi Baba na jugozapadnom dijelu galipolskog poluotoka uključuje vrh Achi Baba i mjesto Krithia. Turskoj strani držanje ovog zemljišta daje značajnu taktičku prednost nad protivnikom jer izravnom vatrom¹⁶ nadzire ulaz u tjesnac Dardanele. S povišenog terena nadzire vatrom plaže na rtu Hellesu, bunare s vodom za piće zapadno i jugozapadno od brda Achi Baba, a jedan dio bunara nalazi se na ključnom zemljištu u području naselja Krithia (**Slika 4**).


Brdo Achi Baba kroz utjecaj zaštitnog faktora reljefa štiti prilaze pričuvnim snagama koje dolaze iz unutrašnjosti teritorija. Za desantne britansko-francuske snage zauzimanje i držanje brda Achi Baba ključno je zemljište jer omogućava mornarici da s promatračnice na vrhu brda može navoditi i koordinirati vatru topništva s bojnih brodova na turske obalne utvrde i mobilne topničke bitnice, kao i na turske snage na platou Kalid Bahr. Isto tako, zauzimanjem brda Achi Baba turske snage na platou Kalid Bahr mogu biti pod izravnom vatrom ako se postavi topništvo na vrh brda Achi Baba. Zauzimanjem brda Achi Baba bunari vode za piće između mjesta Krithia i rta Helles više nisu pod izravnom vatrom turskog topništva, što omogućava neometanu opskrbu vodom za piće u području mostobrana i značajno skraćuje izduženu logističku crtu. Kroz naselje Krithia preko brda Achi Baba prolazi glavna prometnica na poluotoku koja povezuje rt Helles s Carigradom pa je zauzimanje te prometnice od velike važnosti za kretanje i manevar prema unutrašnjosti Turske. Brdo Achi Baba, uz to što je ključan teren, ima i sva obilježja dominirajućeg zemljišta¹⁷ (**Slika 5**).

16 Izravna vatra je topnička vatra usmjerena na cilj koji je vidljiv ciljaču i koji sam služi kao ciljna točka za ciljaču ili postrojbu koja ostvaruje vatu.

17 Dominirajuće zemljište je zemljište koje zbog svoje visine, nagiba, dimenzija ili položaja omogućuje kvalitetno motrenje i može pružiti vatrene sektore preko zemljišta koje ga okružuje.

Plato Kalid Bahr. Turskoj strani držanje ovog zemljišta na platou Kalid Bahr omogućuje nadzor vatrom najužeg dijela tjesnaca Dardaneli i minskih polja u tjesnacu. Isto tako, držanje ovog zemljišta omogućuje turskoj strani da paljbom topništva drži pod nadzorom bunare sjeverno od platoa. U podnožju platoa Kalid Bahr nalazi se veći broj turskih utvrda na europskom


dijelu tjesnaca, a s platoa se može vatrom djelovati i po većem broju turskih utvrda na azijskoj strani tjesnaca pa bi britanskoj strani nadziranje ovoga ključnog zemljišta omogućilo neutralizaciju turskih fortifikacija s obje strane tjesnaca. Time se otvara prostor britanskim minolovcima da očiste minска polja.



Slika 5. Uzdužni profili od obale prema unutrašnjosti južnog dijela poluotoka Galipolja

Masiv Sari Bahr s vrhovima Chunuk Bair i Koja Chemen Tepe. Turskoj strani držanje ovog zemljišta omogućuje nadzor nad nizom plaža, od plaže koja će dobiti naziv ANZAC plaža do zaljeva Suvla na sjeverozapadu. Isto tako, držanjem tog zemljišta turska strana nadzire bunare sjeverno od masiva Sari Bahr i južno od masiva uz obalu, kao i zalihe vode za piće u pozadini turskih obrambenih crta. Masiv Sari Bahr kroz zaštitni faktor reljefa štiti glavnu komunikaciju u pozadini turskih položaja koja povezuje jugozapadni dio poluotoka Galipolja s ostatkom poluotoka i Istanbulom, te omogućuje prikriven dolazak turskih pričuva i opskrbe na prve crte. Prostornom analizom ustaljeno je kako britansko-francuske snage nisu imale vizualni pregled glavne cestovne komunikacije na poluotoku, čime

nisu imale mogućnost neposrednog vatrenog djelovanja po smjerovima uvođenja pričuvnih turskih snaga i opskrbnim pravcima turske vojske (**Slika 6**). Također, britanski i francuski bojni brodovi koji su činili vatrenu potporu desantnih snaga, nisu mogli izravnom vatrom djelovati po ciljevima na toj komunikaciji, bez navođenja i korekcija vatre s položaja na vrhovima masiva koje su držale turske snage. Osim što bi zaposjedanjem ovoga ključnog zemljišta Britanci stavili pod vatreni nadzor glavnu komunikaciju u zapadnom dijelu Galipolja, stvorili bi dobro polazište za presijecanje te



Slika 6. Analiza optičke vidljivosti s crte maksimalnog prodora britansko-francuskih snaga

komunikacije kod mjesta Boghali, te odsijecanje turskih snaga južno od mjesta Maidosa. Time bi se turske pozicije na brdu Achi Baba i platou Kalid Bahr našle u vrlo nepovoljnoj situaciji.

Brdo Takke Tepe. Držanje ovog zemljišta turskoj strani omogućuje nadziranje vatrom šireg područja oko slanog jezera, uključujući plaže u zaljevu Suvla kao i plažu u zaljevu Ejehner (*Aja Liman*) sjeverno od brda Takke Tepe, na kojoj se Britanci nisu pokušali iskrcati. Isto tako, turska strana nadzire vatrom bunare s vodom za piće u zaljevu Suvla i bunare s vodom za piće u pozadini turskih položaja istočno od brda Takke Tepe. Britancima bi zaposjedanje ovoga ključnog zemljišta omogućilo djelovanje vatrom po glavnoj komunikaciji u sjeverozapadnom dijelu Galipolja pa bi bilo dobro polazište za presijecanje te komunikacije kod mjesta Selveli i odsijecanje turskih snaga u jugozapadnom Galipolu.

Zaključak

Zbog nepovoljnog utjecaja zemljišta na dinamiku iskrcavanja, pokret trupa i brzo formiranje mostobrana, logističku potporu i utvrđivanje na dostignutim crtama, britanske su postrojbe imale gubitak raspoloživog borbenog potencijala. S druge strane, turske su postrojbe bile na povišenim i dobro utvrđenim položajima na povoljnoj geološkoj podlozi za utvrđivanje. Vojni potencijal terena i cestovne komunikacije između ključnog zemljišta koje su držale turske snage i dubine turskog teritorija omogućivao je prikriven i brz dolazak i razvoj pričuvnih turskih snaga te brzu i dostatnu logističku potporu. Nedostatna analiza zemljišta od strane britansko-francuskih snaga odrazila se na lošu provedbu pomorskog desanta. Odabrane plaže bile su premalih površina da bi prihvatile ljudstvo, naoružanje i vojnu opremu iz niza desantnih valova koji su pristizali, a geomorfologija obale i cestovna mreža nije omogućivala brz prekrcaj i premještaj ljudstva, naoružanja i vojne opreme od plaže prema unutrašnjosti poluotoka. Zbog toga je, uz neodlučnost britanskih zapovjednika na terenu, operativni tempo i pristizanje turskih pojačanja bio brži od operativnog tempa Britanaca i Francuza. Britansko-

francuske snage nisu dostigle zacrtane položaje u dubini turskog teritorija. Isto tako, od trenutka iskrcavanja na Galipolju pa do napuštanja Galipolja nisu zauzeli ni jedno ključno zemljište. Iako je britanska prethodnica s plaže ANZAC došla do vršnog dijela masiva Sari Bahr, nije ga zauzela i utvrdila se na vrhovima jer ju je odbacila turska 19. divizija, koja je na masiv Sari Bahr pristigla iz smjera mjesta Boghali. Turske su postrojbe imale bolje razumijevanje situacije i procjene utjecaja zemljišta na tijek vojne operacije. Zauzele su i utvrđile ključni teren, u ključnom su trenutku uvele pričuvne snage za obranu ključnog terena (uzvisine u zapadnom dijelu poluotoka). Četiri uzvisine predstavljaju ključni teren jer vatrom nadziru ulaz u tjesnac i podmorska minska polja, nadziru vatrom plaže na kojima je izvršen desant, kontroliraju bunare s vodom za piće visoke izdašnosti u svojoj pozadini, a vatrom nadziru bunare s bočatom vodom na rubnim dijelovima zapadnog dijela poluotoka. Britansko-francuske snage nisu dostigle zacrtane položaje i ostvarile dubok mostobran koji bi bio minimalna operacijska osnovica za nastavak vojne operacije. Turske su postrojbe imale preciznije karte bojnog polja te bolje razumijevanje situacije i procjene utjecaja zemljišta na tijek vojne operacije. Uspješnom obranom ključnog zemljišta od strane turskih snaga onemogućeno je da britansko-francuske snage zauzmu Galipolje i preuzmu nadzor nad tjesnacem, čime je zaustavljen prodor britansko-francuske flote prema Carigradu.

Britanci su naučene lekcije iz neuspješne desantne operacije na Galipolju primijenili u pripremi i provedbi operacije iskrcavanja u Normandiji 1944. godine u operaciji *Overlord*. Za operaciju *Overlord* prikupljene su detaljne karte područja desanta upotpunjene fotografijama snimljenima iz zrakoplova. Britanski vojni geolozi procijenili su pogodnost plaža za podržavanje prolaska različitih vrsta tenkova i drugih vozila, pogodnost i kapacitete cestovne infrastrukture u zaobalju, mogućnost opskrbe vodom i građevinskim materijalom u području operacije te izradili specijalne karte kao potporu onima koji donose odluke. Pet plaža koje su odabrane za iskrcavanje u Normandiji bile su po dužini plaža, geologiji i geomorfologiji obale i cestovnoj infrastrukturi koja vodi od plaža prema unutrašnjosti značajno povoljnije od plaža na Galipolju. Odabrane su plaže u Normandiji jer njihova ukupna dužina i površina može u kratkom vremenu primiti i

propustiti velik broj divizija i vojne opreme te tako stvoriti brojčanu nadmoć nad protivnikom u području mostobrana. Istodobno s iskrcavanjem, savezničko je zrakoplovstvo neutraliziralo protivničko topništvo i oklopno-mehanizirane postrojbe u pokretu koje su se kretale prema plažama a dotad su bile pričuva u dubini Normandije. Plaža u Normandiji kodnog naziva „Utah“ dužine desetak kilometara, imala je kapacitet primiti više ljudstva i vojne opreme iz desantnih valova koji su pristizali nego svih pet plaža na rtu Helles na Galipolju, čija je ukupna dužina 6,5 kilometara. Također, saveznici su sagradili dvije umjetne luke tipa „Mulberry“ izgrađene od pontonskih elemenata kako bi se omogućio lakši i brži istovar opreme i goriva te ubrzalo prebacivanje snaga na obalu jer veliki brodovi nisu mogli pristajati uz plaže zbog plitkoga gaza.

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Basil Germond, *The Maritime Dimension of European Security: Seapower and the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2015., 227 str. (ISBN 978-1-137-01781-9).

Usprkos stalnom strateškom značaju pomorske sigurnosti za Europsku uniju, EU je tek 2014. godine donijela strategiju pomorske sigurnosti kojom definira svoju ulogu i ciljeve na ovom području. Donošenje strategije bio je rezultat rastućega interesa EU-a za pitanja pomorske sigurnosti koje je vidljivo u proteklom desetljeću, kao i potrebe za daljim sustavnim razvojem politika, procesa i aktivnosti pomorske sigurnosti. U navedenom kontekstu knjiga *The Maritime Dimension of European Security: Seapower and the European Union* predstavlja sustavnu analizu potencijala EU-a kao subjekta na području globalne pomorske sigurnosti.

Autor prilazi ovom problemu kroz kombinaciju povijesnog i geostrateškog razumijevanja važnosti pomorske moći i sigurnosnih potreba EU-a. S jedne strane, istaknuta je važnost pomorske moći u XXI. stoljeću (njezina relevantnost za rješavanje sadašnjih i budućih sigurnosnih izazova). S druge strane, konkretizirana je važnost pomorske moći na analizi načina na koji je Europska unija uključila područje pomorske sigurnosti u njezine strategije, politike i aktivno djelovanje (uključivanje pomorske sigurnosti u sigurnosnu politiku EU-a utemeljeno na geografskom obliku Europske unije i potrebi postizanja sigurnosti njezinih morskih granica). Uz razmatranje djelovanja Europske unije na ovom području, u knjizi se analizira i djelovanje drugih subjekata značajnih za pomorsku sigurnost EU-a, primarno djelovanja NATO-a.

Knjiga je podijeljena u dva dijela. Prvi dio (1. – 5. poglavlje) bavi se analizom pomorske moći na početku XXI. stoljeća. Govoreći o pomorskoj sigurnosti, autor se zalaže za sveobuhvatni pristup koji uključuje, uz tradicionalne instrumente pomorske moći (države i njihove ratne mornarice) i nevojne instrumente. Germond ne zanemaruje vojnu komponentu pomorske moći: ona je nezaobilazna u procesu projekcije sigurnosti koji autor percipira kao široku aktivnost koja uključuje ljudske, društvene, regionalne i globalne sigurnosne izazove, kao i projekciju normi. Ali ovaj proces uključuje i druge nevojne subjekte. Iz toga proizlazi i potreba poboljšavanja koordinacije među različitim subjektima pomorske sigurnosti na nacionalnoj i međunarodnoj razini.

U drugom dijelu (poglavlja 6. – 10.) autor analizira djelovanje EU-a na području pomorske sigurnosti. Sposobnost Europske unije u projekciji sigurnosti na pomorskom području ovisi o razvoju suradnje s nizom subjekata unutar institucionalne strukture EU-a. S obzirom na činjenicu da je pomorska dimenzija Zajedničke sigurnosne i obrambene politike EU-a povezana sa širom nevojnom pomorskom dimenzijom djelovanja EU-a te je upravo ova šira dimenzija izvan ZSOP-a središte djelovanja Europske unije na pomorskom području (naglasak na ekonomskoj, a ne vojnoj dimenziji djelovanja), Germond ukazuje na potrebu reformiranja institucionalnog okvira suradnje svih subjekata Europske unije. Stvaranje integriranog i koherentnijeg sveobuhvatnog pristupa u njihovoј suradnji preduvjet je uspješnog djelovanja EU-a na području pomorske sigurnosti. Pri tome navodi kako je Europska unija razvila geopolitički diskurs koji je nadmašio njezinu tradicionalnu percepciju kao normativne sile koja se oslanja na nevojne instrumente djelovanja. Konstrukciju identiteta Europske unije povezuje s geografskim prostorom i prijetnjama koje proizlaze iz njega. U ovom pogledu, pomorske granice Europske unije istodobno su prostor za projekciju sigurnosti, ali i prostor koji se treba osigurati od niza transnacionalnih prijetnji i ugroza. Taj bi se cilj trebao postići upotrebom vojnih i nevojnih sposobnosti u integriranom institucionalnom okviru unutar Europske unije. U budućnosti sigurnost EU-a sve će više ovisiti o razvoju njegove pomorske moći. Kao zapreku postizanju ovoga cilja, Germond navodi kompleksni sustav koordinacije između raznih institucija EU-a (11

institucija i 8 instrumenata) koji dovodi do nedjelotvornosti i duplicitiranja na području razvoja sposobnosti.

U zaključku Germond navodi dva usmjeravajuća načela razvijanja pomorske moći EU-a. Prvo je potreba jasne podjele uloga između EU-a i NATO-a na području pomorske sigurnosti. EU bi trebao preuzeti civilne i policijske operacije te u određenoj mjeri vojne operacije niskog intenziteta (pomorske blokade, evakuacije), uključujući i takvo djelovanje u pomorskim zonama izvan Europe, dok bi NATO zadržao klasičnu ulogu projekcije vojne moći i vođenja konvencionalnog pomorskog ratovanja. Drugo je realizacija ciljeva postavljenih u Strategiji pomorske sigurnosti EU-a donesenoj 2014. godine s naglaskom na davanje prioriteta aktivnostima koje je moguće brzo realizirati bez velikih dodatnih ulaganja, uz jasne vidljive rezultate. Potrebno je i dodatno ojačati vezu između pomorske sigurnosti i održivog razvoja.

Trenutačno je ovo jedina knjiga koja se bavi pitanjem pomorske sigurnosti EU-a nakon donošenja prve pomorske strategije Europske unije. U knjizi se nudi analitički okvir pomorske sigurnosti kao i model razvoja pomorske moći EU-a kao instrumenta za djelovanje protiv širokog spektra vojnih i nevojnih prijetnji i ugroza. Ipak, autor nije razmatrao pitanje pomorskih interesa pojedinih članica Europske unije i utjecaja ovog čimbenika na dalji razvoj pomorske sigurnosti EU-a.

Deborah Sanders, *Maritime Power in the Black Sea*. Ashgate Publishing, Surrey 2014., 248 str. (ISBN 978-1-4094-5296-6).

Knjiga *Maritime Power in the Black Sea* analiza je pomorske moći šest crnomorskih država i, kao takva, dragocjen je doprinos razumijevanju ove regije čiji je značaj naglo porastao nakon ruske aneksije Krima i pružanja potpore proruskim pobunjenicima u istočnoj Ukrajini 2014. godine. U knjizi su analizirane pomorske strategije i sposobnosti Turske, Rusije, Ukrajine, Gruzije, Rumunske i Bugarske; također je dana i analiza širih implikacija ovoga pitanja za regionalnu i međunarodnu sigurnost. Pri tome nije zanemarena ni civilna komponenta pomorske moći – u knjizi je dan pregled

trgovačkih i ribarskih flota država regije te pregled njihovih aktivnosti u iskorištavanju maritimnih resursa.

Ključna je važnost knjige u detaljnoj analizi pomorske moći pet crnomorskih litoralnih država; premda se Rusija ne može zaobići u analizi ovoga pitanja, studije ostalih zemalja značajne su jer je po prvi puta na jednom mjestu dana komparativna analiza njihove pomorske moći. Kao elementi koji utječu na pomorske aktivnosti gotovo svih država regije (izuzetak je Turska), istaknuti su nedostatak finansijskih sredstava te zastarjeli brodovi i obalna infrastruktura.

U uvodnom poglavlju dana je definicija pomorske moći i analitički okvir za procjenu sposobnosti pomorske moći obrađenih država zasnovan na tri čimbenika (kvantitativna analiza koja uključuje vojne i civilne sposobnosti; kvalitativna analiza – sposobnost svake države za pretvaranje njezinih ekonomskih, vojnih i ljudskih resursa u pomorsku moć; strateški kontekst svake zemlje – nacionalni interesi i ciljevi te međusobni odnosi i odnosi sa subjektima izvan regije). U poglavlju o Turskoj ističe se njezino nastojanje za jačanjem pomorske moći na Crnom moru, ali i ograničenja koja utječu na ovaj cilj (a posebno pitanje civilno-vojnih odnosa u Turskoj pod vladom AKP-a). U analizi ruskih crnomorskih ambicija kao glavni ograničavajući čimbenik ističe se pitanje osiguravanja sredstava za modernizaciju njezinih pomorskih snaga na Crnom moru.

U slučaju Ukrajine analizirano je stalno slabljenje njezinih pomorskih sposobnosti koje je dovelo do gubljenja sposobnosti nezavisnog djelovanja u zaštiti njezinih pomorskih interesa (analiza je potvrđena i daljim slabljenjem ukrajinske ratne mornarice (RM) nakon ruske aneksije Krima 2014.). U gruzijskom slučaju istaknuta je ovisnost o vanjskom čimbeniku (SAD) u izgradnji pomorskih snaga, posebno nakon gubitaka u ratu s Rusijom 2008. godine, te osjetljivosti ove pomoći o širem strateškom kontekstu (odnosi između SAD-a i Rusije). Analiza rumunjskih interesa pokazuje napore u razvoju malih potpuno profesionalnih pomorskih snaga te granične i ekonomski sporove s Ukrajinom i Rusijom koji negativno utječu na ovaj cilj. U bugarskom slučaju istaknuta je strategija normalizacije odnosa s velikim susjedima (Turska, Rusija) radi stvaranja stabilnosti potrebne za razvoj bugarske pomorske moći.

Kao nedostatak knjige može se navesti njezino isključivo oslanjanje na međunarodne izvore podataka isključivo na engleskom jeziku. Izvori podataka iz obrađivanih država preneseni su samo ako su dani na engleskom, čime su zanemareni brojni izvori, poput stručnih i doktrinarnih rasprava u ruskim i turskim stručnim časopisima ili analize strateške pomorske situacije na Crnom moru prisutne u svim zemljama regije. Knjizi također nedostaje jedno poglavlje koje bi opisane pomorske sposobnosti država regije stavilo u kontekst širih događanja na Crnom moru, npr. ruska invazija Gruzije 2008. godine (i pitanje budućnosti reguliranja prolaza ratnih brodova kroz turske tjesnace), strateške slabosti turskog RM-a (najmoderniji RM čije su snage disperzirane između Crnog i Egejskog mora) ili naporu NATO-a za jačanjem pomorske moći na Crnom moru (koji su također ograničeni zbog pitanja prolaska ratnih brodova kroz turske tjesnace).

Bez obzira na navedene nedostatke, knjiga je prva sveobuhvatna procjena pomorske moći šest crnomorskih država s dobrim uvidom u njihove interese i ciljeve u obrađenom području.

Allesio Palatano: *Post-war Japan as a Sea Power: Imperial Legacy, Wartime Experience and the Making of a Navy.* Bloomsbury Academic, London 2015., 272 str. (ISBN 978-1-4725-2651-9).

Lindsay Black: *Japan's Maritime Security Strategy: The Japan Coast Guard and Maritime Outlaws.* Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2014., 140 str. (ISBN 978-1-137-38554-3).

Ponovni razvoj pomorske moći Japana nakon Drugog svjetskog rata tekoјe u dva smjera. Prvi, potreba osiguranja pomorskih komunikacija kao uvjeta nacionalnog opstanka doveo je do revitalizacije Japanske ratne mornarice (JMSDF) primarno kao dopune pomorskim aktivnostima SAD-a na području jugoistočne Azije tijekom hladnoga rata. Tek će završetak hladnoga rata dovesti do većeg samostalnog djelovanja JMSDF-a pri čemu aktivnosti ratne mornarice postaju važna sastavnica obrambene politike, posebno rastućeg involviranja Japana na području međunarodne sigurnosti. Usporedno s

razvojem JMSDF-a Japan je razvijao i civilnu komponentu njegove pomorske moći – obalnu stražu. Japanska obalna straža (JCG) uz tradicionalne zadaće ovakvih organizacija (traženje i spašavanje, oceanografsko istraživanje, čuvanje japanskih teritorijalnih voda i isključivog ekonomskog pojasa) nakon hladnoga rata postala je važno sredstvo vanjskopolitičkog djelovanja Japana u odgovoru na rastući kineski utjecaj na području jugoistočne Azije. Djelovanje JCG-a važno je ne samo zbog njezine uloge u teritorijalnim sporovima s Kinom, već i zbog činjenice kako je JCG preuzeo ulogu diplomatskoga sredstva projekcije „meke“ moći na području jugoistočne Azije. Iako je ova druga uloga tradicionalno područje djelovanja ratnih mornarica, JMSDF je (zbog i dalje svježih sjećanja na japansku agresiju u Drugom svjetskom ratu) i dalje ograničen u ovoj ulozi.

Obje komponente japanske pomorske moći analizirane su u dvije nedavno objavljene knjige. Prva, *Post-war Japan as a Sea Power: Imperial Legacy, Wartime Experience and the Making of a Navy* autora Allesia Palatana, analizira obnovu japanske pomorske moći nakon poraza u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Autor kao temelj za razumijevanje poslijeratnog JMSDF-a uzima njegovo povjesno nasljeđe – ulogu ratne mornarice u stvaranju japanskog carstva do 1945. godine te njezinu ulogu u japanskom porazu u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Patalano naglašava činjenicu kako je organizacijski i kulturni identitet današnjega JMSDF-a zasnovan na iskustvu Imperijalne japanske ratne mornarice (IJN). To je vidljivo u sustavu vojnog obrazovanja, primanju novih pripadnika, unutarnjim smjernicama djelovanja JMSDF-a te razgovoru autora s časnicima JMSDF-a. Kada je u poslijeratnom Japanu započela obnova pomorske moći, korištenje povjesnog iskustva IJN-a bilo je neizbjježno. Većina časnika u novostvorenom JMSDF-u došla je iz redova IJN-a i željela je ukloniti najveći nedostatak japanske ratne mornarice prije Drugog svjetskog rata – usredotočenost na tehnološki i doktrinarni razvoj koja je dovela do zanemarivanja definiranja strategije IJN-a koja bi bila u skladu s nacionalnim ciljevima. Rezultat je bio stvaranje impresivne strukture snaga IJN-a i njezino isključivo fokusiranje na poraz ratne mornarice protivnika (uništenje njegove flote) umjesto stvaranja fleksibilne strukture snaga koja bi osigurala i obranila pomorske komunikacije vitalne za opstanak Japana. Navedeni cilj definirao je i organizacijsku kulturu IJN-a. To je dovelo do

japanskog zanemarivanja područja protupodmorničke borbe. Posljedice su bile katastrofalne. U drugom dijelu rata IJN nije uspio očuvati strateške dobitke stvorene nizom pomorskih pobjeda u prvoj godini rata jer nije bio sposoban zaštitići japansku trgovačku mornaricu od američke podmorničke ofenzive. Navedenu analizu autor daje u prva dva poglavlja knjige.

Ovo povijesno iskustvo obilježilo je strukturu, ulogu i djelovanje današnjega JMSDF-a. Vodstvo obnovljenoga JMSDF-a odlučilo je stoga od početka povezati definiranje pomorske strategije s ostvarivanjem nacionalnih ciljeva Japana istaknuvši u prvi plan potrebu osiguranja pomorskih komunikacija. Kako bi se izbjegli unutarnji sukobi koji su obilježavali IJN, uvedena je centralizirana zapovjedna struktura, a rivalstvo s drugim granama oružanih snaga (u međuratnom razdoblju postojalo je snažno rivalstvo između mornarice i kopnene vojske koje je negativno utjecalo na proces strateškog donošenja odluka) izbjegnuto je stvaranjem sustava edukacije časnika koji je usmjeren prema suradnji, a ne rivalstvu s drugim granama.

Navedeni proces dan je u trećem (održavanje tradicije IJN-a u današnjem JMSDF-u, pri čemu je istaknuta uloga dva novelista – Itō Masanori i Agawa Hiroyuki – koji su u nizu natpisa nakon Drugog svjetskog rata predstavili IJN kao profesionalnu organizaciju i time utjecali na pozitivnu percepciju ovoga povijesnog iskustva u japanskoj javnosti, ali i na proces formiranja i razvoja JMSDF-a), četvrtom (vrijednosti i tradicije JMSDF-a te uloga sustava školovanja u njihovu stvaranju, što je postignuto kroz korištenje IJN-a kao modela za postizanje visokih profesionalnih standarda časnika, ali uz ispravljanje nedostataka kao što je zanemarivanje strateške razine ratovanja) i šestom poglavlju (uloga JMSDF-a u širem okviru japanske obrambene strategije).

Patalano uvjerljivo dokazuje utjecaj iskustva IJN-a na formiranje strukture, identiteta i organizacijske kulture JMSDF-a. Nedostatak knjige njezino je ograničavanje na razdoblje do sredine prošlog desetljeća, čime je iz analize isključen čimbenik velikog jačanja pomorskih sposobnosti JMSDF-a tijekom posljednjih deset godina (uključujući i tih povratak nosača zrakoplova u obliku četiri broda klase Hyūga i Izumo koji, iako su opisani kao helikopterski razarači, zapravo su laki nosači zrakoplova).

Knjiga Lindsay Black *Japan's Maritime Security Strategy: The Japan Coast Guard and Maritime Outlaws* bavi se razvojem JCG-a kao primarnim instrumentom Japana na području pomorske sigurnosti jer je uloga JMSDF-a ograničena zbog japanske ratne prošlosti. Kroz razvoj obalne straže Japan je stvorio s jedne strane sredstvo za djelovanje protiv svih ugroza pomorske sigurnosti, osim konvencionalnoga pomorskog ratovanja. S druge strane, JCG je instrument vanjskopolitičkog djelovanja prihvativ susjednim zemljama jer se uklapa u percepciju Japana kao antimilitarističke zemlje. U knjizi se razmatra djelovanje JCG-a kao sredstva za razvijanje suradnje na području pomorske sigurnosti s vanjskim subjektima (članice ASEAN-a) u očuvanju regionalnog pomorskog poretka. Pri tome je naglasak na JCG-ovom identitetu kao civilnoj agenciji za provođenje zakona i spašavanje koja pridonosi razvoju sposobnosti zemalja jugoistočne Azije u izvođenju nevojnih zadaća pomorske sigurnosti.

U prvom dijelu knjige dan je teorijski okvir analize. U njemu se naglašava uloga odmetnika (*outlaws*) kao subjekata koji se ne podvrgavaju normama međunarodne zajednice koje su definirale velike sile. Autor u toj kategoriji navodi državne subjekte, poput Sjeverne Koreje, ali i nedržavne subjekte, poput terorista i pirata. Kroz odgovor na navedene prijetnje, velike sile (uključujući i Japan) definiraju pravila ponašanja u međunarodnoj zajednici. Black zastupa tezu Engleske škole međunarodnih odnosa kako se kroz razvoj institucija i normi ponašanja stvara međunarodni sustav te na ovoj osnovi razmatra međunarodno djelovanje Japana u ostvarivanju te uloge. S obzirom na to da ne postoji univerzalni sustav interpretiranja međunarodnih normi, svaka regija interpretira i stvara svoje vlastite norme (njihovo inoviranje radi prilagodbe lokalnoj situaciji), a time se uspostavlja regionalni politički i ekonomski poredak. Subjekti koji odbijaju primjeniti norme, „odmetnici“ su. Na temelju navedenih postavki, u drugom dijelu knjige analizirana su tri slučaja ugrožavanja pomorske sigurnosti Japana: upadi sjevernokorejskih brodova u japanske vode 1999. – 2001. godine, piratski napadi na području Adenskog zaljeva i jugoistočne Azije te protuterorističke zadaće i inicijative usmjerenе na sprječavanje proliferacije oružja masovnog uništenja na moru. U prvom slučaju djelovanje JCG-a predstavljalo je civilnu komponentu djelovanja u realizaciji japanske dvostrukе strategije pomorske sigurnosti

(vojna strategija kroz djelovanje ratne mornarice, odnosno civilna strategija kroz djelovanje obalne straže). Kada je riječ o borbi protiv pirata, prikazano je djelovanje japanskih državnih i nedržavnih agencija koje imaju protupiratske sposobnosti. One državama u regiji pomažu razviti takve sposobnosti, a time razvijaju i multilateralni okvir suradnje u primjeni nevojnih sredstava protiv pirata. U trećem slučaju razmatra se japsko djelovanje kroz uključivanje u niz međunarodnih inicijativa, ali uz izbjegavanje militariziranog pristupa rješavanju ovoga problema (traženje alternativnih načina djelovanja kroz izgradnju regionalnog okvira djelovanja protiv ovih sigurnosnih prijetnji). U svim navedenim slučajevima autor zastupa tezu kako je primjena JCG-a kao civilnog, a ne vojnog sredstva, bilo djelovanje u skladu s regionalnim normama, čime se daje i doprinos razvoju međunarodnog poretku. Također, kroz takvo djelovanje Japan nastoji dobiti regionalnu potporu svojim pomorskim politikama. Kao otvoreno pitanje može se navesti zastupanje ideje postojanja dvostrukе japanske strategije pomorske sigurnosti (jedna je u domeni JMSDF-a, a druga u domeni JCG-a). Prije bi se moglo reći da je riječ o jedinstvenoj strategiji unutar koje se (ovisno o situaciji) naglasak stavlja na jednu od dvije komponente ili njihovo zajedničko djelovanje, a ne o dvije strategije pomorske sigurnosti. Bez obzira na ovu dilemu, knjiga je važan doprinos razumijevanju japanske vanjske i sigurnosne politike te doprinos dimenziji pomorske sigurnosti u njihovoj realizaciji.

Joachim Krause i Sebastian Bruns (urednici), *Routledge Handbook of Naval Strategy and Security*. Routledge, New York 2016., 398 str. (ISBN 978-1-138-84093-5).

Ian Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*. Routledge, New York 2014., 217 str. (ISBN 978-0-415-52338-7).

U razumijevanju kompleksnosti modernog pomorskog ratovanja potrebno je uz njegovu doktrinarnu i tehnološku dimenziju razmotriti širi okvir pomorskih strategija koje definiraju način upotrebe pomorskih snaga. Obje navedene dimenzije pokrivenе su u dvije nedavno objavljene knjige.

Prva knjiga, *Routledge Handbook of Naval Strategy and Security*, široki je pregled koji obuhvaća teorijsko određenje pomorske strategije i pomorske sigurnosti te razmatra konkretne primjere sigurnosnih pitanja i strategija odgovora na njih u nizu svjetskih pomorskih regija. U prvom dijelu knjige obrađuje se pitanje razvoja moderne pomorske strategije. Iako je danas naglasak na pomorskim strategijama usmjerenima protiv mekih sigurnosnih prijetnji i ugroza (piratstvo, djelovanje organiziranog kriminala na moru, humanitarna pomoć, otklanjanje posljedica prirodnih i tehnoloških katastrofa, pomorske sigurnosne operacije, pomorska diplomacija), u ovom se poglavlju ne zanemaruje ni konvencionalna uloga ratnih mornarica, što je danas često slučaj (konvencionalno pomorsko ratovanje). Analiza značenja pojma pomorska sigurnost (*maritime security*) povezana je s detaljnim pregledom ovoga područja utemeljenom na primjeru aktivnosti EU-a i NATO-a (pri čemu je naglasak na djelovanju Europske unije). Nakon toga se razmatra pitanje razvoja pomorskih sukoba u prvoj polovini XXI. stoljeća kroz analizu strateškog konteksta (promjene u međunarodnom sustavu – pojava novih pomorskih sila), izazov novih tehnologija (mogu li kvalitativno bolje, ali brojčano manje pomorske snage nadmašiti kvantitativnu nadmoć protivnika, kada i protivnička strana ima pristup najnovijim tehnologijama – pitanje utjecaja A2/AD oružnih sustava protiv zapadnih ratnih mornarica) i razvoj pomorskih sposobnosti (budućnost nosača aviona) te uloga ratnih mornarica u ratovanju niskog intenziteta.

U drugom dijelu niz autora daje analizu ključnih strateških pomorskih tjesnaca i područja Južnokineskog mora, Indijskog oceana, Perzijskog zaljeva, Sredozemlja i Arktika. U prikazu svakog područja obuhvaćena je povijesna dimenzija, njegova geostrateška važnost, glavni akteri i njihovi motivi, prikaz sporova te prikaz pomorskih sigurnosnih pitanja karakterističnih za to područje.

U trećem dijelu obrađena su doktrinarna i tehnološka pitanja – sveobuhvatni i integrirani pristup djelovanja država u rješavanju pomorskih sigurnosnih pitanja, promjena prirode pomorskih sukoba u litoralnim područjima, pitanje projekcije moći pomorskih snaga zapada i odgovor protivnika (A2/AD strategije i sposobnosti protivnika), informacijska dimenzija pomorskog ratovanja (*cyberspace*), pomorski terorizam i piratstvo (primjer Somalije).

U četvrtom dijelu dan je niz studija slučajeva koje obuhvaćaju sve do sada navedene elemente pomorskih strategija – djelovanje SAD-a, Njemačke, Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva, Rusije, Indije, Kine, analize odnosa između ključnih pomorskih sila te djelovanje NATO-a i EU-a.

Druga knjiga *Understanding Naval Warfare* studija je modernoga pomorskog ratovanja. Autor je napisao ovu knjigu s namjerom davanja pregleda ključnih obilježja modernog pomorskog ratovanja, a ne pozivanja na klasične koncepte pomorskoga ratovanja čija je relevantnost u današnjim prilikama upitna.

Knjiga je podijeljena u dvije cjeline. U prvom dijelu autor objašnjava ključne koncepte povezane s teorijom i praksom pomorskoga ratovanja. Analiza započinje objašnjavanjem prirode pomorske okoline i njezinim utjecajem na pomorske operacije. Nakon toga slijedi analiza tradicionalnih koncepata pomorske strategije (Mahan, Corbett) gdje autor ističe dominantnu angloameričku tradiciju koja i danas ima veliki utjecaj na moderno pomorsko ratovanje. Kao opreka tradicionalnim teorijama navode se netradicionalni pogledi o pomorskoj strategiji (francuska Jeune École, sovjetska nova škola, pogledi francuskog admirala Raoula Castixa, pogledi sovjetskog admirala Sergeja Gorškova). Autorov je zaključak kako klasične teorije i koncepti i danas dominiraju u definiranju pomorskih strategija te su relevantni i u XXI. stoljeću (osiguravanje kontrole mora, sprječavanje protivnika u postizanju kontrole mora, iskorištavanje postignute kontrole mora). Međutim, manje ratne mornarice, umjesto oslanjanja na tradicionalne pristupe, trebaju razviti nove strategije koje su u skladu s njihovim resursima i ambicijama. U završnom poglavlju prvog dijela knjige razmatra se upotreba ratnih mornarica kao diplomatskog instrumenta te zadaće pomorske diplomacije u miru.

U drugom djelu knjige autor prikazuje glavna obilježja pomorskog ratovanja. Kroz usporedbu djelovanja ratnih mornarica s konceptima na kojima je zasnovano njihovo djelovanje identificiraju se promjene u djelovanju i ispituje djelotvornost koncepata pomorskog ratovanja. Koristeći navedeni metodološki okvir autor analizira različite oblike pomorskog ratovanja: iskorištavanje kontrole mora (pomorski transport, pomorska blokada/

embargo/karantena, pomorsko presretanje i zaštita civilnog pomorskog prometa), borbene operacije (projekcija pomorske moći, pomorski napadi, topnička potpora, fokus je na načinima kroz koje ratne mornarice ostvaruju ili narušavaju kontrolu mora), načini kojima ratne mornarice iskorištavaju kontrolu mora (pomorski udari, amfibijske operacije, ekspedicijске operacije) te zadaće pomorske sigurnosti (policijska uloga ratnih mornarica, izvođenje pomorskih sigurnosnih operacija). U završetku analize autor daje viziju pomorskog ratovanja u budućnosti (s naglaskom na primjenu novih tehnologija) te procjenjuje do koje će mjere vojne, ekonomске, političke i društvene promjene poboljšati ili ograničiti sposobnosti ratnih mornarica za ispunjavanjem budućih političkih ciljeva (razvoj pomorske politike u XXI. stoljeću). Knjiga završava opisom koncepta zračno-pomorske bitke (*air-sea battle*) koji razvija ratna mornarica SAD-a – integriranih i umreženih pomorsko-zračnih snaga sposobnih za izvođenje dubokih udara s ciljem ometanja, uništenja i poraza protivničkih snaga.

Kao glavna zamjerka knjige može se navesti prekratka analiza današnjih i budućih pomorskih politika i strategija odabralih zemalja (Brazil, Rusija, Indija, Kina, Iran, Malta, Singapur, europske ratne mornarice općenito te SAD).

Objenavedene knjige međusobno se tematski nadopunjaju te su sveobuhvatni prikaz svih aspekata modernoga pomorskog ratovanja.

Jezični savjetnik

Dalibor Vrgoč

Strategos – vojskovođa, general, strateg

Riječ strateg u hrvatskom je jeziku posuđenica, grecizam, odnosno internacionalizam te kao standardna hrvatska riječ pripada općem jeziku, no i jeziku struke. Premda se ona danas koristi u svim područjima društvenih djelatnosti, ovdje ćemo se u glavnim crtama osvrnuti na njezino značenje i značenje njezinih izvedenica (strategija, strateški/strategijski) u vojnemu nazivlju u kojem izvorno i ima ishodište te na njezinu jezičnopovijesnu evoluciju.

Etimološki gledano riječ *strateg* potječe iz grčkoga jezika, u kojemu je u svojem izvornom smislu značila „vojni zapovjednik“ ili „vojskovođa“ od grč. *stratos* – vojska + *ago* – vodim → *strategos* (στρατηγός). Od kraja VI. st. pr. Kr. u Ateni se svake godine biralo po 10 stratega (vojnih zapovjednika), koji su se u ratu svakodnevno izmjenjivali. Od doba grčko-perzijskih ratova (od 492. do 449. pr. Kr.) titula vrhovnoga zapovjednika (*strateg autokrator*) davala se jednom strategu za određeni ratni pohod ili tijekom jednoga rata. Titulu strategosa, u smislu čina generala ili vojskovođe, nosio je i atenski državnik Periklo (od 443. do 429. pr. Kr.). Kasnije se naziv, osim u svojem doslovnom smislu vojskovođe, počeo koristiti i za „vojne upravitelje“, tj. „vojne guvernere“. Tako se u Bizantskome carstvu strateg nalazio na čelu armije i svakog temata (teme), gdje ne samo da je upravljao lokalnom vojskom već je *de facto* bio upravitelj vojno-upravne provincije (temata). Zna se da su i južnoslavenski vladari koji su vladali nad područjem bizantskoga temata dobivali naslov *stratega*. Osvrnemo li se ovdje na teritorij Hrvatske, povijest potvrđuje vojno-upravnu podjelu Bizantskoga Carstva koja je uključivala i temat Dalmacije sa sjedištem u Zadru. Postoje sumnje je li Bizant imao stvarnu ili samo nominalnu vlast na istočnome Jadranu, ipak, postojanje

dalmatinskoga temata potvrđeno je, među ostalim, i pronalaskom pečata iz prve polovice IX. stoljeća na kojem za bizantskoga namjesnika stoji titula „strateg Dalmacije“.

Zanimljivo je ovdje napomenuti kako je u današnjim Oružanim snagama Helenske Republike (Grčkoj vojsci) naziv za najviši časnički čin, generala, *stratigos* (στρατηγός). Uz već navedena povijesna značenja danas riječ *strateg* u smislu vojnih znanosti može značiti 1. osoba koja je stručnjak za (vojnu) strategiju, strateški planer; 2. voditelj ratnih operacija velikih vojničkih masa na bojištu. Ovo nas uvodi u izvedenicu *strategija*.

Rječnici hrvatskoga jezika na sljedeći način definiraju riječ *strategija*:

Školski rječnik hrvatskoga jezika (Institut za hrvatski jezik i jezikoslovlje):
strategija VOJN. dio ratne vještine koja se bavi pripremom i vođenjem oružanih snaga kao cjeline

Veliki rječnik hrvatskoga standardnog jezika (Školska knjiga):

strategija VOJN. dio ratne vještine koji se bavi pripremom i vođenjem cjeline oružanih snaga u velikim operacijama

Hrvatski enciklopedijski rječnik (Novi liber):

strategija VOJN. dio ratne vještine koja se bavi pripremom i upotrebom oružanih snaga kao cjeline i u velikim operacijama

Vidljivo je da se definicije u ova tri rječnika gotovo sasvim preklapaju.

Rječnik hrvatskoga jezika (ur. Jure Šonje, LZMK i Školska knjiga) razjednačuje unutar vojne struke dvije uporabe:

strategija VOJN. 1. znanost o jedinstvenoj vještini uporabe vojnih, demografskih, političkih, geografskih, geopolitičkih, gospodarskih, tehnoloških i drugih globalnih čimbenika rata 2. VOJN. planovi glavnog stožera o ukupnoj uporabi vojnih snaga u ratu

O tac hrvatskoga znanstvenog nazivlja, što bez daljnog u njegovu slučaju uključuje i ono vojno (domobransko), Bogoslav Šulek, već u svojem *Njemačko-hrvatskom rječniku* iz 1860. prevodi njemačke riječi *Strategie* kao *vojnoznanstvo*, *ratoznanstvo*, i tek na trećem mjestu kao *strategija*. Navodi i riječ *Strategifer*

koju prevodi kao *vojnoznanac*, *ratoznanac* i *strategik*. Zanimljivo, kasnije, u svojem znamenitom i kapitalnom *Hrvatsko-njemačko-talijanskom rječniku znanstvenoga nazivlja* iz 1874. navodi obje njemačke riječi – *Strateg* prevodeći je samo kao *strateg* i *Strategie* kao *ratstvo*.

Iz svega navedenog razvidno je da je pojam *strategije* nadišao svoja prvotna uža značenja *znanja i vještina vođenja vojske, rata ili većih vojnih operacija* te danas ima daleko složenija značenja koja se i unutar vojnih znanosti dalje razjednačavaju.

Budući da je u pripremi izrada Leksikona hrvatskoga vojno-obrambenog i sigurnosno-obavještajnog nazivlja, ne ulazeći ovdje u definicije, ukratko ćemo navesti neke leksikografske članke koji se odnose na *strategiju*, te neke njezine sintagme koje će Leksikon inauguirati. Uz već „krovni“ naziv *strategija* Leksikon prepoznaće i njegove podređene nazine kao što su *opća strategija, nacionalna strategija* tj. *strategija nacionalne sigurnosti, vojna strategija* (kao segment opće strategije), *strateški koncept*, a u još užem smislu npr. *strateško okružje, strateški izazovi, strateske prigode, strateški manevar, strateški razmještaj, strateška vatra* itd.

Umjesto zaključka, jezični savjet:

Kod riječi *strategijski* i *strateški* često se javlja dvojba radi li se o istoznačnicama i mogu li se proizvoljno upotrebljavati zadržavajući pritom isti smisao. Naime, riječ je o pridjevima izvedenima od imenica *strateg* i *strategija*. No, ovdje možemo razlučiti dva slučaja:

1. Pridjev *strateški* može se odnositi i na *strategie* i na *strategiju*.

strateški prid. definicija: koji se odnosi na strategie i strategiju
(Veliki rječnik hrvatskoga standardnog jezika – Školska knjiga)

npr. *strateški ciljevi*; u smislu ciljeva utvrđenih strategijom

npr. *strateški sastanak*; – u smislu sastanka stratega

2. Pridjev *strategijski* odnosi se **isključivo** na *strategiju*.

strategijski prid. definicija: koji se odnosi na strategiju;
(Veliki rječnik hrvatskoga standardnog jezika – Školska knjiga)

npr. *strategijski dokumenti*; dokumenti koji se odnose na strategiju

U donekle starijoj normativnoj literaturi, npr. *Hrvatskom jezičnom savjetniku* Instituta za hrvatski jezik i jezikoslovje iz 1999. nastojalo se razgraničiti značenja riječi kao što su *strateški* i *strategijski* ili *filozofski* i *filozofijski*, *biološki* i *biologički*, *pedagoški* i *pedagogički*, *kirurški* i *kirurgički*, pri čemu bi prva imenica u tom paru značila 'koji se odnosi na stručnjaka određene struke', a druga 'koji se odnosi na samu struku'. Ipak, pokazalo se da je u praksi ta značenja gotovo uvijek nemoguće razgraničiti. Stoga se u novijoj literaturi preporučuje samo uporaba kraćega pridjeva, dakle *strateški*, *filozofski*, *pedagoški*, *kirurški* itd.

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