

Croatian Journal for Defence and Security
DR. FRANJO TUĐMAN University of Defense and Security

STRATEGOS

Hrvatski znanstveni časopis za obranu i sigurnost
Sveučilište obrane i sigurnosti DR. FRANJO TUĐMAN



ISSN 2459-8917 (Online)
ISSN 2459-8771 (Print)

Strategos

Znanstveni časopis Hrvatskog vojnog učilišta
"Dr. Franjo Tuđman"

Dr. Franjo Tuđman
Scientific Journal of the Croatian Defence Academy

Volume VIII, Number 1, 2024

Hrvatsko vojno učilište "Dr. Franjo Tuđman"
Ilica 256b, HR-10000
Zagreb, Croatia

Published twice a year
100 pcs

STRATEGOS

Znanstveni časopis
Sveučilišta obrane i sigurnosti „Dr. Franjo Tuđman“ i
Hrvatskog vojnog učilišta „Dr. Franjo Tuđman“ /
Scientific Journal of the
Dr. Franjo Tuđman Defense and Security University and
Dr. Franjo Tuđman Croatian Defense Academy

Izdavač / Publisher

Sveučilište obrane i sigurnosti „Dr. Franjo Tuđman“
Hrvatsko vojno učilište „Dr. Franjo Tuđman“ /
Dr. Franjo Tuđman Defense and Security University
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IVAN TRLIN

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Riječ urednika

Poštovani čitatelji,

pred vama je prvo izdanje časopisa Strategos u 2024. godini, u koje su članovi uredništva i autori radova uložili velik trud. Izdanje izlazi nešto kasnije od planiranog jer je časopis promijenio vlasnika, tako da sada izlazi kao izdanje Sveučilišta obrane i sigurnosti „Dr. Franjo Tuđman” u suradnji s Hrvatskim vojnim učilištem.

I ovo izdanje ima širok obuhvat radova. Ukupno šest radova pokriva vrlo zanimljiv odabir tema. Prvi je pregledni rad mladog znanstvenika Trlina koji obrađuje temu vatrogastva u radu pod nazivom „Mogućnosti optimizacije procesa uzbunjivanja dobrovoljnih vatrogasaca: primjer DVD-a Trnje”. Autor piše o dobrovoljnom vatrogastvu kao ključnom elementu sustava domovinske sigurnosti i čija je primarna svrha gašenje požara te spašavanje ljudi, imovine i životinja u elementarnim i drugim nepogodama. Drugi rad autora Tomašević, Ćutić i Trzun „Situacijska svjesnost i strateška kultura” prikazuje stratešku kulturu i situacijsku svjesnost kroz analizu znanstvenih izvora te na primjeru Ukrajine pokazuje kako nepotpuna situacijska svijest može dovesti do pogrešnog razmišljanja i, u konačnici, tragično pogrešnih odluka. U trećem radu „Propast strateškog pohoda JNA na Hrvatsku u rujnu 1991.” autori Kostanjevac, Benković i Kretić objašnjavaju razmjere oružane pobune u zapadnoj Slavoniji i ulogu koju je ona imala u planu vojnog vrha JNA za slamanje Hrvatske. Kinder u tekstu „Ometanje konvoja humanitarne pomoći kao prekršaj međunarodnog prava – studija slučaja konvoja Bijeli put” razmatra strateški kontekst oružanog sukoba koji je uzrokovao potrebu za formiranjem hrvatskog konvoja pod nazivom „Bijeli put za Novu Bilu i Srebrnu Bosnu” krajem 1993. godine. Autor zaključuje da je konvoj „Bijeli put” imao ispravnu i zakonitu svrhu, da je pripremljen i odobren na

odgovarajućim razinama odlučivanja te da je proveden nepristrano i bez ikakve diskriminacije. Zadnjim radom u ovom izdanju časopisa „Strateško predviđanje kao preduvjet za pravodobnu reakciju“ autori Tomašević i Ćutić pružaju uvid u procese i analitiku strateškog predviđanja kao ključnog koncepta i alata za donošenje učinkovitih i pravodobnih odluka. Na samom kraju, s osobitim ponosom preporučujem čitateljstvu radove u prvom zajedničkom izdanju Sveučilišta obrane i sigurnosti i Hrvatskog vojnog učilišta. I ovom prilikom pozivam i druge autore da ponude radove iz svojeg područja ekspertize kako bi dali svoj doprinos u podizanju kvalitete radova koji se objavljuju u Strategosu.

Glavni urednik



Editor's Word

Dear readers,

You are holding the first edition of the *Strategos* journal for 2024, into which the editorial team and authors have invested a great deal of effort. This issue is being released slightly later than planned due to a change in ownership. The journal is now published by the University of Defence and Security "Dr. Franjo Tuđman" in collaboration with the Croatian Military Academy.

This edition also features a wide array of papers, with six articles covering a highly interesting selection of topics. The first is a review by young researcher Trlin, who tackles the topic of firefighting in his paper titled "*Optimization Possibilities for Volunteer Firefighter Alarm Processes: A Case Study of the Trnje Volunteer Fire Department*". The author writes about volunteer firefighting as a key element of the homeland security system, with the primary purpose of extinguishing fires and rescuing people, property, and animals during natural and other disasters.

The second paper, authored by Tomašević, Čutić, and Trzun, titled "*Situational Awareness and Strategic Culture*", presents strategic culture and situational awareness through the analysis of scientific sources. Using Ukraine as an example, the paper demonstrates how incomplete situational awareness can lead to flawed thinking and, ultimately, tragically wrong decisions.

In the third paper, "*The Failure of the JNA's Strategic Campaign Against Croatia in September 1991*", authors Kostanjevac, Benković, and Krertić explain the scale of the armed rebellion in Western Slavonia and the role it played in the JNA's military leadership's plan to crush Croatia.

Kinder, in his work "*Obstruction of Humanitarian Convoys as a Violation of International Law – A Case Study of the 'White Road' Convoy*", examines the strategic context of the armed conflict that led to the formation of the Croatian convoy "White Road for Nova Bila and Silver Bosnia" in late 1993. The

author concludes that the “White Road” convoy had a legitimate and lawful purpose, was properly prepared and approved at the appropriate decision-making levels, and was carried out impartially and without discrimination.

The final paper in this issue, authored by Tomašević and Ćutić, “*Strategic Forecasting as a Prerequisite for Timely Response*”, provides insights into the processes and analytics of strategic forecasting as a key concept and tool for making effective and timely decisions.

In conclusion, I proudly recommend the articles in this first joint edition by the University of Defence and Security and the Croatian Military Academy to our readership. I also take this opportunity to invite other authors to contribute papers from their areas of expertise to help raise the quality of the works published in *Strategos*.

Editor-in-Chief

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be the initials 'AB' or similar, written in a cursive style.

Mogućnosti optimizacije procesa uzbunjivanja dobrovoljnih vatrogasaca: primjer DVD-a Trnje¹

Ivan Trlin²

Sažetak

Dobrovoljni vatrogasci ključni su element sustava domovinske sigurnosti i primarna im je svrha gašenje požara te spašavanje ljudi, imovine i životinja u elementarnim i drugim nepogodama. Razvojem tehnologije i napretkom društva širi se spektar djelovanja vatrogasaca, pa tako i dobrovoljnih, te dolazi do povećanog broja intervencija, a poglavito onih tehničke prirode.

Za pravovaljano i pravodobno obavljanje njihove dužnosti kritično je vrijeme uzbunjivanja te upućivanja na mjesto intervencije. Dobrovoljni vatrogasci najčešće nisu fizički prisutni u svojoj vatrogasnoj postaji pa se na intervenciju upućuju iz svojeg doma, s radnog mjesta i slično. Analizom trenutnog procesa uzbunjivanja vatrogasaca DVD-a Trnje u Zagrebu uočeno je kako trenutni model nije optimalan, zastario je i troši previše vremena. Ovaj će rad detaljno analizirati trenutno stanje te ponuditi rješenja predstavljenog problema.

Ključne riječi

uzbunjivanje, vatrogasci, proces, DVD Trnje, optimizacija

1 Rad je nastao u sklopu prijave na natječaj za Rektorovu nagradu Sveučilišta u Zagrebu 2022. godine.

2 Corresponding author: Ivan Trlin, univ. bacc. art. milit. ivan.trlin2000@gmail.com.

Uvod

Oružane snage Republike Hrvatske su organizacija namijenjena ponajprije obrani suvereniteta i teritorijalne cjelovitosti hrvatske države, ali su i temeljna sastavnica sustava domovinske sigurnosti, koji „čine resursi unutarnjih poslova, obrane, sigurnosno-obavještajnog sustava, civilne zaštite, vatrogastva, službe vanjskih poslova te drugih tijela koja organizirano i koordinirano obavljaju poslove i zadaće prepoznavanja, procjene, smanjenja i/ili uklanjanja sigurnosnih rizika od važnosti za nacionalnu sigurnost Republike Hrvatske” (Zakon o sustavu domovinske sigurnosti, NN 108/2017 – 2489). Jedna je od Ustavom utvrđenih funkcija Hrvatske vojske i pomoć u protupožarnoj zaštiti Republike Hrvatske (Ustav RH), dok je jedna od četiri misije Hrvatske vojske i „pomoć civilnim institucijama u zemlji” (Strateški pregled obrane, 2005), a upravo u tom kontekstu i nastaje ovaj znanstveni rad. Samo ostvarivanje ove misije vidljivo je kroz sudjelovanje Hrvatske vojske u gašenjima požara u Dalmaciji te angažmanu nakon razornog potresa 2020. godine, kada je Hrvatska vojska uklanjala građevinski materijal, osiguravala nestabilne lokacije, snimala oštećenu kritičnu infrastrukturu i sl. (Vlada RH, 2021).

O dobrovoljnom vatrogastvu i opterećenosti JVP-a Zagreb

Dobrovoljno vatrogastvo u Republici Hrvatskoj uređeno je Zakonom o vatrogastvu, donesenom 2019. godine, te drugim zakonskim i podzakonskim aktima iz područja vatrogastva, zaštite i spašavanja, civilne zaštite i sl. Vatrogastvo je ustrojeno kroz „Hrvatsku vatrogasnu zajednicu kao središnji državni ured nadležan za poslove vatrogastva kojim rukovodi glavni vatrogasni zapovjednik, vatrogasne zajednice županija i Grada Zagreba, vatrogasnim zajednicama jedinica lokalne samouprave” (Zakon o vatrogastvu, NN 125/2019). Zakon poznaje šest vrsta vatrogasnih postrojbi:

- javna vatrogasna postrojba
- postrojba dobrovoljnog vatrogasnog društva
- profesionalna vatrogasna postrojba u gospodarstvu
- postrojba dobrovoljnoga vatrogasnog društva u gospodarstvu

- vatrogasna postrojba vatrogasne zajednice županije odnosno Grada Zagreba
- intervencijska vatrogasna postrojba (Zakon o vatrogastvu, NN 125/2019).

Jedna je od vrsta vatrogasnih postrojbi i dobrovoljno vatrogasno društvo, koje je definirano kao tijelo nadležno za poslove vatrogastva. Osniva se kao udruga, a djeluje na području jedinice lokalne samouprave kako je to definirao vatrogasni plan grada. Vatrogasna postrojba DVD-a djeluje kao operativna snaga u skladu sa statutom DVD-a (Zakon o vatrogastvu, NN 125/2019).

DVD-ovi su često jedina operativna snaga sustava domovinske sigurnosti odnosno Civilne zaštite u ruralnim krajevima i predstavljaju okosnicu sigurnosti stanovništva. Tijekom nedavne povijesti, u kojoj je 2014. godine bilo poplava, a zatim ponavljajućih požara u Dalmaciji i snažnih potresa u Petrinji i Zagrebu, važnost vatrogastva, a pogotovo onog dobrovoljnog, sve je jača. Vatrogastvo je prije svega „neprofitna, stručna i humanitarna djelatnost od interesa za Republiku Hrvatsku“ (Zakon o vatrogastvu, NN 125/2019), no unatoč tome vatrogasci su često zaboravljeni, iako su sveprisutni, a njihov je rad prečesto nedovoljno zapažen.

Potreba za vatrogasnom djelatnošću nije upitna, „ne samo zbog brojnosti populacije koju je potrebno zaštititi, već i zbog ostalih uloga koje ta služba ima“ (Popović i dr. 2015). Zbog toga se vatrogastvo prilagođavalo pa mu je temeljna značajka „stalna pojava novih izvora i vrsta ugroženosti. Tehnološkim razvojem usložnjavaju se različiti sadržaji funkcioniranja ljudske zajednice, pri čemu čovjek u sve većoj mjeri troši postojeće prirodne resurse i utječe na ekološke sustave, što rezultira različitim oblicima disbalansa u prirodi“ (Toth i dr. 2015). U skladu s navedenim, vidljiv je trend povećanja tehničkih intervencija u odnosu prema onima vatrogasnog tipa, što je i vidljivo iz Izvještaja o radu JVP-a Zagreb.


Tablica 1. Intervencije JVP-a Zagreb
(Izvjешća o radu JVP-a Zagreb za 2017., 2018., 2019. i 2020. godinu)

Godina	Broj intervencija	Broj tehničkih intervencija	Broj požarnih intervencija	Broj ostalih intervencija (izvidi, lažne dojave i sl.)
2017.	3166	1380	1405	381
2018.	2544	1178	1010	356
2019.	3971	2066	1295	610
2020.	6360	3509	1052	1799

Vatrogasne intervencije su one intervencije koje izravno ili neizravno uključuju primjenu vatrogasnih taktika i tehnika, opreme i sredstava radi gašenja požara.

Tehničke intervencije su sve one druge intervencije koje izravno nisu vezane uz gašenje požara, kao što je spašavanje unesrećenih osoba u prometu, uklanjanje dimnjaka, uklanjanje stabala na prometnicama i sl.

Grafički prikaz intervencija daje bolji uvid u trenutno stanje opterećenosti JVP-a Zagreb.



Slika 1. Broj intervencija JVP-a Zagreb u razdoblju od 2017. do 2020. godine

Osim velikog porasta broja tehničkih intervencija, čemu je pridonio i potres 2020. godine, vidljiv je i porast od 254 % u broju tehničkih intervencija u odnosu prema 2017. godini. Isto tako, vidljiv je i općenit trend porasta broja intervencija za JVP Zagreb za 201 % u odnosu prema 2017. godini.

Dobrovoljno vatrogasno društvo Trnje

Dobrovoljno vatrogasno društvo Trnje osnovano je 1934. godine na prostoru Gradske četvrti Trnje radi promicanja vatrogasne djelatnosti i protupožarne zaštite. Administrativno pripada Vatrogasnoj zajednici Grada Zagreba, koja broji 2538 članova – djece u dobi od 6 do 18 godina, zatim 3682 člana vatrogasnih postrojbi (vatrogasaca) i 2895 pričuvnih članova, a u sklopu nje ustrojeno je ukupno 57 DVD-ova (<https://vatrogasci.zagreb.hr>, pristupljeno 28. 6. 2022.). DVD Trnje nalazi se na adresi Budmanijeva ulica 9, na postajnom području VP-a Žitnjak, koja je jedna od pet vatrogasnih postaja JVP-a Zagreb.



Slika 2. Karta JVP-a Zagreb i pripadajućih DVD-ova s oznakom mjesta DVD-a Trnje (<https://vatrogasci.zagreb.hr/>, pristupljeno 28. 6. 2022.)

DVD Trnje ustrojen je kao udruga građana koja je „strukovna, humanitarna i nestranačka udruga od posebnog interesa za RH glede zaštite od požara i vatrogastva” (Statut DVD-a Trnje). O članstvu u Društvu odlučuje Upravni odbor na temelju zahtjeva za ućlanjenje, a članstvo može biti: operativni član (dobrovoljni vatrogasac), veteran (osobe s 50 i više godina staža u

Društvu), pričuvni (bivši operativni ili izvršni članovi), počasni (osoba koja materijalnim dobrima i aktivnošću pomaže u ostvarenju zadaća Društva) te mladež (osobe od 6 do 18 godina) (Statut DVD-a Trnje).



Slika 3. Broj intervencija DVD-a Trnje u razdoblju 2014. - 2021. godina

DVD Trnje na dan 23. ožujka 2022. godine broji sljedeće članove:

Tablica 2. Članovi DVD-a Trnje (Aplikacija VZGZ-a, 2022)

Broj članova (ukupno)	Broj operativnih članova (vatrogasaca)	Broj aktivnih vatrogasaca ³
114	100	35

³ Aktivni vatrogasci su one osobe koje su članovi DVD-a Trnje u statusu operativnog člana, dakle oni koji imaju položeno osposobljavanje barem za zvanje vatrogasca i valjano liječničko uvjerenje za obavljanje vatrogasne djelatnosti, tj. one osobe koje udovoljavaju zakonskim propisima za odlazak na intervenciju.

Iz grafičkog prikaza vidljiv je značajan porast broja intervencija DVD-a Trnje, što prati i trend porasta JVP-a Zagreb, na čijem području djeluje DVD Trnje. Godina 2020. obilježena je snažnim potresom pa je samim time i vidljiv značajan skok broja intervencija, koji se uglavnom odnosi na intervencije tehničkoga tipa.

Analizom intervencija utvrđeno je kako u prosjeku DVD Trnje bude uzbunjen⁴ na 43 % intervencija, dok na 57 % intervencija bude upućen⁵.

Tablica 3. Broj intervencija DVD-a Trnje u razdoblju 2014. – 2021.

Godina	Broj intervencija
2014.	39
2015.	6
2016.	5
2017.	13
2018.	21
2019.	37
2020.	288
2021.	49

⁴ Broj intervencija na koje je DVD Trnje poslan prateći proceduru uzbunjivanja članova.

⁵ Broj intervencija na koje je DVD Trnje upućen po završetku prvotne intervencije na koju je uzbunjen ili je na intervenciju upućen sukladno planu (npr. intervencije uklanjanja prijetnji s visine nakon potresa radile su se planirano, tako da DVD nije uzbunjivan, već je u dogovoreno vrijeme izišao na intervencije).

Uzbunjivanje

Pojam uzbunjivanja podrazumijeva „skretanje pozornosti na opasnost korištenjem propisanih znakova za uzbunjivanje te pružanje pravodobnih i nužnih informacija radi poduzimanja aktivnosti za učinkovitu zaštitu” (Zakon o sustavu Civilne zaštite, NN 20/21). Prije svega, uzbunjivanje vatrogasaca DVD-a podrazumijeva obavještavanje vatrogasaca o vatrogasnoj intervenciji i potrebi za žurnim upućivanjem u društvo. „Uzbunjivanje vatrogasnih i drugih postrojbi civilne zaštite obavlja se putem telekomunikacijskih sredstava, a kada to nije moguće, znakom *vatrogasna uzbuna*” (Pravilnik o postupku uzbunjivanja stanovništva, NN 82/25).



Slika 4. Raspored sirena za uzbunjivanje u blizini DVD-a Trnje (podatci Zemljopisnog obavijesnog sustava Civilne zaštite)

Najpoznatiji i najrašireniji način uzbunjivanja vatrogasaca u ruralnim područjima je uzbunjivanje uporabom sirena za uzbunjivanje. Njima se daje znak vatrogasne uzbune, koji je „signal koji se upotrebljava za potrebe žurnog okupljanja vatrogasnih i drugih postrojbi civilne zaštite, a emitira se putem sirena. Oglašava se jednoličnim tonom sa stankama sveukupno u trajanju od devedeset /90/ sekundi (tri jednolična tona po dvadeset /20/ sekundi i dvije stanke po petnaest /15/ sekundi)” (Uredba o jedinstvenim znakovima za uzbunjivanje).

ZNAK ZA UZBUNJIVANJE VATROGASNIH I DRUGIH POSTROJBI CIVILNE ZAŠTITE

Vatrogasna uzbuna



Slika 5. Grafički prikaz znaka vatrogasne uzbune
(Uredba o jedinstvenim znakovima za uzbunjivanje)

Model uzbunjivanja DVD-a Trnje

Trenutni model uzbunjivanja operativnih članova odnosno vatrogasaca DVD-a Trnje sastoji se od nekoliko koraka kako slijedi:

- Građanin poziva Centar veze JVP-a Zagreb na broj 193 zbog opasnosti.
- Centar veze zaprima dojavu i odlučuje hoće li na intervenciju uputiti JVP ili DVD (ili oba).
- Centar veze odlučuje da će na intervenciju uputiti DVD Trnje.
- Centar veze telefonski poziva odgovorne osobe za uzbunjivanje u DVD-u ili šalje SMS poruku odgovornim osobama.
- Odgovorna osoba zaprima znak za uzbunu odnosno intervenciju s podacima o mjestu intervencije i vrsti intervencije.
- Odgovorna osoba koja je zaprimila poziv, provodi uzbunjivanje operativnih članova odnosno vatrogasaca na sljedeći način: telefonskim pozivanjem, slanjem SMS poruka, uporabom društvenih mreža (Facebook, WhatsApp).
- Operativni članovi odnosno vatrogasci potvrđuju dolazak.
- Okupljanje operativnih članova odnosno vatrogasaca u DVD-u i uzimanje potrebne opreme.
- Upućivanje na intervenciju i obavijest radiovezom Centru veze o izlasku na intervenciju.


Kada građanin pozove broj 193, dispečer Centra veze uzima podatke o: mjestu opasnosti, vrsti opasnosti i njezinu opsegu, ozlijeđenim ili ugroženim osobama i objektima, podatke pozivatelja te ostale relevantne podatke za

intervenciju. Centar veze je mjesto gdje se zaprimaju dojave građana o opasnim događajima koje je operativno 24 sata na dan i služi za koordinaciju vatrogasaca na terenu (<https://vatrogasci.zagreb.hr/>, pristupljeno 28. 6. 2022.).

U trenutku kada Centar veze odluči na intervenciju uzbuniti DVD, uzima popis odgovornih osoba (koji se najčešće sastoji od zapovjednika DVD-a, zamjenika zapovjednika DVD-a i osoba ovlaštenih za rukovođenje intervencijom). Centar veze redoslijedom upisanih osoba provodi pozivanje sve dok ne dobije jednu od osoba pa tu osobu poziva na intervenciju i daje joj nužne podatke o vrsti intervencije (tehnička intervencija, požarna intervencija). Ovi su podatci nužni kako bi DVD znao koju dodatnu opremu ponijeti na intervenciju. Primjerice, ako je riječ o ispumpavanju vode, DVD mora ponijeti pumpe, a ako je riječ o uklanjanju stabla, mora ponijeti motorne pile i sl. Zbog ograničenosti prostora u vatrogasnim vozilima, najčešće se u vozilu ne nalazi sva oprema za sve vrste intervencija.

Po zaprimanju dojave o intervenciji, odgovorna osoba pristupa uzbunjivanju vatrogasaca. U za to predviđene grupe na aplikaciji WhatsApp upućuje poruku sadržaja „intervencija”, a po potrebi koristi i grupu na Facebooku. Nakon slanja poruka, pristupa i telefonskom pozivanju osoba pojedinačno, sve dok ne dobije pozitivan odziv dovoljnog broja ljudi za upućivanjem na intervenciju. Zakonom je propisano da DVD mora izići na intervenciju u roku 15 minuta od trenutka primitka znaka za uzbunu. Nerijetko se događa da vatrogasci koji bi i mogli izići na intervenciju, ne vide znak za uzbunu poslan na društvenim mrežama ako nemaju uključene mobilne podatke (internet) na mobitelu ili jednostavno ne prate grupe gdje se pišu uzbune za intervenciju. U trenutku kada se dovoljan broj osoba odazvao na uzbunu, odgovorna osoba prestat će s telefonskim pozivanjem osoba jer bi pojedinačno pozivanje svih 35 vatrogasaca predugo trajalo i probio bi se zakonom propisan rok od 15 minuta (Pravilnik o osnovama organiziranosti vatrogasnih postrojbi na teritoriju Republike Hrvatske, NN 58/93).

Po okupljanju vatrogasaca u DVD-u i uzimanju opreme i vozila, Društvo izlazi na intervenciju i o tome radiovezom obavještava Centar veze, koji bilježi vrijeme izlaska na intervenciju.



Shematski prikaz procesa uzbunjivanja DVD-a Trnje

Da bismo lakše vizualizirali proces uzbunjivanja DVD-a Trnje, koristit ćemo BPMN notaciju kako slijedi na skici dolje.


Početni je događaj kada je građanin pozvao 193, i to je prijemni događaj obavijesti. Razgovor dispečera i građanina (zaprimanje dojave i uzimanje nužnih informacija) prijemna je aktivnost.

Na temelju dobivenih informacija, dakle uvjetovano ulaznim informacijama, dispečer odlučuje koga će uputiti na intervenciju. Stoga, koristimo ekskluzivno grananje uvjetovano događajem. Ako se upućuje JVP, dolazi do korisničke aktivnosti koju provode vatrogasci u VP-u. Ako se upućuje DVD, prijemnu aktivnost zaprimanja znaka za uzbunu slijedi međudogađaj, prijemni događaj obavijesti kada je odgovorna osoba u DVD-u zaprimila informacije. Slijedi predajna aktivnost uzbunjivanja vatrogasaca DVD-a kojom se šalje znak za uzbunu vatrogascima, a ona je popraćena prijemnom aktivnošću potvrde dolaska. Korisnička aktivnost je ona koju provode vatrogasci tijekom okupljanja i upućivanja na mjesto intervencije. Po izlasku iz DVD-a obavještava se JVP o odlasku (međudogađaj predajne obavijesti) i naposljetku: završni je događaj dolazak na mjesto intervencije, čime i prestaje proces uzbunjivanja.

Analiza utrošenog vremena na uzbunjivanje

Na temelju službenih statističkih podataka Centra veze JVP-a Zagreb, a preko kojeg se i uzbunjuje DVD Trnje, utvrđeno je kako vrijeme razgovora dispečera CV-a i pozivatelja broja 193, tj. vrijeme zaprimanja intervencije, u prosjeku traje 105 sekundi.

Analizom pristiglih poziva CV-a prema odgovornim osobama DVD-a Trnje za potrebe uzbunjivanja, utvrđeno je kako razgovor dispečera CV-a i odgovorne osobe DVD-a Trnje u prosjeku traje: 46 sekundi.



Slika 6. Uzbuna putem
WhatsAppa

Analizom vremena provedenog za uzbunjivanje od strane odgovorne osobe DVD-a Trnje, utvrđeno je kako se prosječno utroši 23 sekunde na pisanje obavijesti uzbune na WhatsAppu i Facebooku, koja je najčešće sadržaja „intervencija” i „javite tko dolazi” te prosječno do 90 sekundi na telefonsko pozivanje i obavještanje drugih odgovornih osoba za pozivanje. Gotovo nikada nije potrebno provesti i telefonsko pozivanje vatrogasaca jer svi zaprime uzbunu, ali ne treba isključiti i mogućnost da u jednom trenutku neće svi biti spojeni na mobilne podatke ili Wi-Fi, a samim time neće zaprimiti signal za uzbunu. Usporedno se putem SMS-a i društvenih mreža zaprimaju potvrde o odzivu.

Za okupljanje vatrogasaca čeka se do 300 sekundi, u što ulazi i do 90 sekundi za upućivanje na intervenciju (ulazak u vozila i izlazak iz postaje te sve druge potrebne radnje) te 30 sekundi za potvrdu dolaska.

Tablica 4. Vrijeme uzbunjivanja DVD-a Trnje

Aktivnost	Zaprimanje dojave i uzimanje nužnih informacija	Zaprimiti znak za uzbunu	Uzbuniti vatrogasce		Potvrditi dolazak	Okupiti vatrogasce i uzeti opremu	Uputiti se na intervenciju	
Opis	Razgovor CV-a i pozivatelja	Razgovor odgovorne osobe DVD-a i CV-a	Pisano uzbunjivanje društvenim mrežama	Telefonsko uzbunjivanje od strane odgovorne osobe		Vrijeme okupljanja		UKUPNO
Vrijeme (sekunde)	105	46	23	do 90	do 30	do 180	do 90	do 564

Iz gore navedenih podataka vidimo veću tromost u trenutnom sustavu uzbunjivanja. Podatci su dobiveni na temelju mjerenja i statističkih podataka koje je dostavio JVP Zagreb.

Prema podacima JVP-a Zagreb za DVD-ove u 2021. godini prosječno je vrijeme dolaska na intervenciju 564 sekunde na uzorku od 479 intervencija DVD-ova od trenutka kada DVD napusti svoju postaju do trenutka dolaska na mjesto intervencije.


Zaključno, DVD Trnje utroši 564 sekunde na proces uzbunjivanja i prosječno 564 sekunde na put od postaje do mjesta intervencije, što je dakle 1128 sekundi (18 minuta i 48 sekundi) od trenutka kada je građanin pozvao 193 do trenutka kada je DVD pristigao na mjesto intervencije. Dakle, trenutni proces uzbunjivanja je dugotrajan, a vrijeme odziva i dolaska na intervenciju od ključne je važnosti i za vatrogasce i za sve žurne službe. Sukladno postojećim rješenjima, pretpostavljamo da uz pomoć analize trenutnog stanja i mogućih rješenja možemo optimizirati proces uzbunjivanja DVD-a Trnje i isti model preslikati na sve DVD-ove u Zagrebu, a i šire.

(1) Polazni elementi SWOT analize																				
S1	Postojanje informatičke i dr. infrastrukture	W1	Potrebno vrijeme prilagodbe kod promjene načina uzbuñivanja	O1	Postojanje i pristup mobilnim podatcima putem GSM-a u cijelom Zagrebu	T1	Mogućnost pada mobilne GSM mreže													
S2	Postojanost osnovne informatičke pismenosti vatrogasaca	W2	Ograničenost finansijskih resursa	O2	Potpora zapovjedništva DVD-a za optimizaciju	T2	Nedostatak interesa HVZ-a za uvođenjem novih rješenja													
S3	Postojanje gotovih rješenja za uzbuñivanje	W3	Neupućenost vatrogasaca o novim rješenjima uzbuñivanja	O3	Postojanje mogućeg alternativnog uzbuñivanja putem sirena za uzbunu	T3	Utrošak vremena za obuku vatrogasaca za novi proces uzbuñivanja													
(2) Rangiranje SWOT elemenata																				
	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	W1	W2	W3	W4	W5	O1	O2	O3	O4	O5	T1	T2	T3	T4	T5
S1		S1	S3			W1	W2	W1			O1	O1	O3			T1	T1	T1		
S2			S3			W2		W2			O2		O3			T2		T2		
(3) Pronalaženje strategije za realizaciju strateškog cilja																				
Rang SWOT		Korektivne: (S→W), (O→T), (S→T), (O→W)					Agresivne: (S→O)					Obrambene: (W ili T)								
S3	W2	O3	T1	(S2, W3), (S3, W2), (S2, W1), (O1, W2), (S3, T3), (S2, T3)										Preostale prepreke (W ili T)						
S1	W1	O1	T2											T1						
S2	W3	O2	T3																	

SWOT analiza

Cilj: M1. Optimizirati proces uzbuñivanja vatrogasaca DVD-a Trnje

Upitne strategije su: (S3, T3), (S3, O2).



Slika 7. Prikaz upitnih strategija

Navedene strategije su upitne jer prolaze kroz cijelo granično područje (žuto označeno), što je i prikazano slikom dolje.

Strategije mogu biti upitne zbog dva razloga:

- kad pokušavamo nisko rangiranom snagom ili prilikom riješiti visoko rangiranu slabost ili prijetnju; tada se može dogoditi da ćemo potrošiti resurse, a nećemo riješiti problem (slabost ili prijetnju)
- kad pokušavamo visoko rangiranom snagom ili prilikom riješiti nisko rangiranu slabost ili prijetnju; tada moramo voditi brigu da ne potrošimo sve resurse snage ili prilike za mali problem (slabost ili prijetnju).

U jednom i drugom slučaju, strelica koja označava strategiju ide preko srednjeg područja.

KOREKTIVNE STRATEGIJE - nastaju kombinacijom snage i slabosti (S i W), prilika i prijetnji (O i T), snage i prijetnji (S i T) te prilika i slabosti (O i W).

AGRESIVNE STRATEGIJE - nastaju kombinacijom snage i prilike (S i O), tj. korištenjem vlastitih prednosti i pogodnosti okruženja.

OBRAMBENE - nastaju kada neke slabosti ili prijetnje ostaju neponištene snagom ili prilikom.


PREOSTALE PREPREKE - one prijetnje koje značajno mogu utjecati na novi proces uzbuđivanja.

Oznaka strategije	Naziv strategije	Aktivnost provedbe strategije	Oznaka cilja	Naziv cilja	Utječe na cilj
(S3, W2)	Uporabiti gotova rješenja zbog ograničenih resursa	Implementirati postojeće sustave za uzbunjivanje u operativnu uporabu	K1 P1	Implementirati postojeće rješenje za uzbunjivanje (80 - 100 %)	K1.P2
(S2, W3)	Uporabiti osnovna informatička znanja vatrogasaca za upućivanje vatrogasaca u nove načine uzbunjivanja	Razraditi elaborat uzbunjivanja za primjenu tehnologije u uzbunjivanju za novo rješenje	K1 P2	Izraditi elaborat novog rješenja uzbunjivanja (0 - 100 %)	K1.P1
(S2, W1)	Uporabiti osnovna informatička znanja vatrogasaca za smanjenje vremena prilagodbe kod promjene načina uzbunjivanja	Izraditi novi način uzbunjivanja za koji su potrebna osnovna informatička znanja	K1 U1	Izraditi novo rješenje uzbunjivanja prilagođeno osnovnim informatičkim znanjima (0 - 100 %)	K1.U2, K1.P3, K1.P4
(O1, W2)	Uporaba GSM tehnologije u uzbunjivanju zbog ograničenih financijskih resursa	Razviti novi način uzbunjivanja temeljen na GSM tehnologiji, koji je moderniziran u usporedbi sa sadašnjim	K1 U2	Izraditi novi način uzbunjivanja temeljen na GSM tehnologiji (0 - 100 %)	K1.U1, K1.P3, K1.P4
(S2, T3)	Uporabiti osnovna informatička znanja vatrogasaca za smanjenje utroška vremena za obuku za uporabu novih rješenja	Na temelju evaluacije informatičkog znanja izraditi novo rješenje	K1 P3	Izraditi novo rješenje na temelju provedene evaluacije (0 - 100 %)	K1.P4
(S1, O1)	Uporabiti postojeću informatičku infrastrukturu i pristup mobilnim podacima putem GSM mreže za optimizaciju procesa uzbunjivanja	Uporabiti postojeću infrastrukturu i GSM tehnologiju za razvoj vlastitog rješenja uzbunjivanja	K1 P4	Izraditi rješenje primjenom postojeće informatičke strukture (0 - 100 %)	K1.P3

Dobivenom SWOT analizom možemo zaključiti kako (1) postoji želja unutar DVD-a Trnje za razvojem novog procesa uzbunjivanja, (2) postoji potrebna infrastruktura i postojeća rješenja za optimizacijom procesa uzbunjivanja te (3) postoji *back-up* sustav uzbunjivanja putem sirena za uzbunu u slučaju pada GSM tehnologije. Provedenom analizom odlučujemo se za metodu (S3, W2). Ovom ćemo metodom maksimalno iskoristiti postojeća rješenja kako bismo smanjili troškove. Na ovaj način ne bismo previše zadirali u ograničene resurse DVD-a, a posredno bismo smanjili vrijeme potrebno za uvođenje novog načina uzbunjivanja i samim time smanjili vrijeme optimizacije.

Mapa ciljeva

U donjem prikazu nalazi se strateška mapa ciljeva koje smo postavili.




Slika 8. Mapa ciljeva

Zaključak analize

Provedenim analizama i mjerenjima utvrđeno je kako je postojeće rješenje za uzbunjivanje dobrovoljnih vatrogasaca DVD-a Trnje neprimjereno sporo. „Minuta ili dvije može napraviti razliku između života i smrti“ (izvješće Fire Brigades Union, 2010), što se, nažalost, pokazalo i u praksi. Stoga je vrijeme uzbunjivanja od krucijalne važnosti kako bi okupljanje, uzimanje

opreme, upućivanje na intervenciju, kao i sam dolazak na intervenciju bio sveden na što kraće vrijeme. No, važnost vremena potrebnog za dolazak na intervenciju ne znači samo razliku između života i smrti za unesrećene osobe već i za same vatrogasce jer se stvara razlika u tome može li se vatra ugaziti na siguran način ili će biti potrebno utrošiti dodatne resurse (izvješće Fire Brigades Union, 2010).

Ako za prosječno utrošeno vrijeme za sve radnje koje prethode izlasku vatrogasnog vozila iz vatrogasne postaje (DVD-a) uzmemo 8 minuta, na što moramo dodati i vrijeme potrebno za prijevoz, tj. dolazak na mjesto intervencije, trenutni proces uzbuđivanja u većini će slučajeva probiti zadanih 15 minuta za dolazak na mjesto intervencije. Isto tako treba istaknuti kako WHO navodi da je idealno vrijeme dolaska na mjesto intervencije od trenutka pozivanja do dolaska 8 minuta (Cabral i dr. 2018), dok DVD Trnje utroši prosječno 8 minuta na radnje koje prethode samom izlasku vatrogasnog vozila.



Slika 9. Grafički prikaz odnosa vremena dolaska i mogućnosti gašenja (izvješće Fire Brigades Union, 2010)

Primjena postojećih rješenja

VATROnet i Sustav za uzbunjivanje (SzU)


Hrvatska vatrogasna zajednica (HVZ) krovna je organizacija vatrogastva u Republici Hrvatskoj. U službi svih vatrogasaca HVZ je proveo informatizaciju vatrogastva, što podrazumijeva „uvođenje programskih alata koji olakšavaju protok, spremanje i pristup informacijama” (Jagodin 2017). Razvojem novih programskih rješenja nastoji se objediniti sve informacije o vatrogascima i vatrogasnoj djelatnosti na jednom mjestu, a kao rezultat toga nastaje i VATROnet. „VATROnet je središnja baza podataka Hrvatske vatrogasne zajednice u koju se pohranjuju podaci o vatrogasnim organizacijama, njihovim članovima, zaposlenicima, opremi, vozilima i aktivnostima. VATROnet se koristi primarno kao alat za evidenciju podataka i generiranje različitih vrsta izvještaja i statistike. Uz to, aplikacija se koristi u procesu dodjele odlikovanja, izradi vatrogasnih iskaznica, te administraciji vatrogasnih osposobljavanja i vatrogasnih natjecanja” (Jagodin 2017).

Temeljni dio VATROneta je i Sustav za uzbunjivanje (SzU), koji omogućuje uzbunjivanje vatrogasaca uporabom GSM tehnologije, tj. s pomoću SMS-a ili pozivom (glasovna poruka). Osoba koja je pokrenula uzbunjivanje putem računala ili mobitela (Jagodin 2017), odmah dobiva povratnu informaciju o broju osoba koje su se odazvale, broju osoba koje su spriječene doći, kao i o broju osoba koje nisu ni prihvatile ni odbile uzbunu.


Putem VATROneta uređuju se grupe brojeva telefona za uzbunjivanje, a troškove pozivanja i slanja SMS poruka snosi jedinica regionalne samouprave (županije) u kojoj se nalazi vatrogasna postrojba koja se koristi aplikacijom (Jagodin 2017).

Dakle, u Republici Hrvatskoj već postoji razvijen i provjeren sustav uzbunjivanja vatrogasaca i dostupan je svim vatrogasnim postrojbama.

Kada bi se ova aplikacija implementirala u operativnu uporabu u VZGZ-u i kada bi JVP Zagreb (kao nadležni JVP za DVD Trnje) koristio ovu aplikaciju, bitno bi se ubrzao proces uzbunjivanja, što ne bi izravno stvorilo troškove ni za JVP ni za DVD jer bi se troškovi podmirili iz proračuna Grada Zagreba.



Slika 11. Poziv uzbune SzU-a



Slika 10. Poruka uzbune SzU-a

S obzirom na to da je aplikacija vlasništvo HVZ-a, HVZ snosi odgovornost i trošak održavanja aplikacije sredstvima iz državnog proračuna.

Proces uzbune primjenom SzU-a

Novim procesom značajno štedimo vrijeme, a što je najvažnije: riječ je o provjerenom procesu koji neće stavljati dodatno opterećenje na skromne proračune DVD-a Trnje ili JVP-a Zagreb. Sve što treba napraviti jest staviti u operativnu uporabu aplikaciju u CV-u JVP-a Zagreb.

Novi je proces uzbunjivanja kako slijedi:


1. Građanin poziva Centar veze JVP-a Zagreb na broj 193 zbog opasnosti.
2. Centar veze zaprima dojavu i odlučuje hoće li na intervenciju uputiti JVP ili DVD.
3. Centar veze odlučuje da će na intervenciju uputiti DVD Trnje pa putem SzU-a provodi uzbunjivanje svih vatrogasaca DVD-a Trnje SMS porukama i pozivima.
4. Operativni članovi odnosno vatrogasci potvrđuju dolazak. CV odmah dobiva podatak o broju vatrogasaca.
5. Okupljanje operativnih članova odnosno vatrogasaca u DVD-u i uzimanje potrebne opreme.
6. Upućivanje na intervenciju i obavijest radiovezom Centru veze o izlasku na intervenciju.

Uočavamo kako je trenutni model opterećen s devet koraka, dok je novi proces sastavljen od šest koraka. Najvažnije je da su maknuta dva koraka koja iziskuju najviše vremena u cijelom procesu uzbunjivanja, kao i jedan međukorak.

Tablica 5. Vrijeme uzbunjivanja (optimizirano – SzU)

Aktivnosti	Zaprimiti dojavu i uzeti nužne informacije	Uzbuniti DVD s pomoću SzU-a	Potvrditi dolazak	Okupiti vatrogasce i uzeti opremu	Uputiti se na intervenciju	
Opis	Razgovor CV-a i pozivatelja	Vrijeme za uzbunjivanje		Vrijeme okupljanja i uzimanje opreme		UKUPNO
Vrijeme (sekunde)	105	5	do 30	do 180	do 90	410

Iz analize vremena uočavamo drastično smanjenje vremena utrošenog za uzbunjivanje od čak 154 sekunde, što predstavlja smanjenje 27 % u odnosu prema trenutnom modelu. Ukupno vrijeme od trenutka pozivanja CV-a do dolaska na mjesto intervencije smanjuje se sa 18 minuta i 48 sekundi na 16 minuta i 14 sekundi (tj. 14 % smanjeno ukupno vrijeme).



Model uzbune primjenom SzU-a
S pomoću BPMN notacije prikazujemo proces.

Implementacija aplikacije FireApp

FireApp slovenska je aplikacija koja omogućuje uzbunu vatrogasaca dobrovoljnih vatrogasnih društava u Republici Sloveniji, a izišla je i na tržište u Republici Hrvatskoj. Ova je aplikacija već u uporabi u nekoliko dobrovoljnih vatrogasnih društava.

Aplikacija je podijeljena u 12 modula, koji olakšavaju uzbunjivanje vatrogasaca i praćenje intervencija:

1. UZBUNJIVANJE – podsustav aplikacije koji omogućuje upućivanje uzbune koja se očituje glasnim zvukom i vibracijom mobitela te automatskim otključavanjem zaslona mobitela. Uzbuna se pokreće putem mrežnog sučelja ili same aplikacije te se unosi tekst / opis intervencije.
2. DOJAVLJIVAČ – dio aplikacije koji se očituje uključivanjem uzbune na mobitelu vatrogasca. Ako vatrogasac ne odgovori na uzbunu, automatski se šalje odgovor: NE DOLAZIM. Ako vatrogasac odgovori: DOLAZIM, aplikacija svakih 15 sekundi izračunava njegovu udaljenost od vatrogasnog doma (DVD-a). Ako na mobitelu nisu uključeni mobilni podatci ili ako mobitel nije spojen na internet putem Wi-Fi-ja, šalje se SMS poruka koju čita aplikacija i pokreće uzbunu.
3. ODAZIV – prikaz odgovora na uzbunu te GPS praćenje lokacije vatrogasaca koji se upućuju u DVD.
4. BRZA NAVIGACIJA – automatsko izračunavanje puta do mjesta intervencije od vatrogasnog doma (DVD-a). Podsustav povlači adresu iz poruke uzbune.
5. POLOŽAJ – putem GPS-a praćenje lokacije vatrogasaca na intervenciji, kao i vatrogasnih vozila.
6. IZLAZAK VOZILA – bilježenje i evidentiranje vremena izlaska vozila iz vatrogasnog doma / DVD-a te izvještavanje odgovorne osobe.
7. OTVARANJE VRATA – s pomoću relejnog modula omogućuje otvaranje vrata putem aplikacije kada se vatrogasac približi DVD-u na 50 m.

8. BRZI KONTAKTI – imenik s važnim kontaktima.
9. RASPOLOŽIVOST POSTROJBE – s pomoću sučelja za odsutnost vatrogasci evidentiraju kada neće biti raspoloživi za intervenciju pa odgovorne osobe znaju s koliko operativnih vatrogasaca raspolažu u kojem trenutku.
10. GRUPE DRUŠTVA.
11. VJEŽBE POSTROJBE – planer vježbi.
12. SVAKODNEVNE OBAVIJESTI – grupiranje članova u grupe i slanje obavijesti (<https://hr.fireapp.eu/>, pristupljeno 27. 6. 2022.).



Slika 12. FireApp uzbuna (<https://hr.fireapp.eu/>, pristupljeno 27. 6. 2022.)

Dakle, FireApp je moderno softversko rješenje koje pruža cijelu lepezu usluga za uzbunjivanje vatrogasaca i olakšava praćenje postrojbe na intervenciji i u mirovanju.

Proces uzbune uporabom aplikacije FireApp

Novim procesom značajno štedimo vrijeme, a posebno je važno da je riječ o provjerenom procesu koji neće značiti veliko opterećenje za skromne proračune DVD-a Trnje ili JVP-a Zagreb. Sve što treba napraviti je – staviti aplikaciju u operativnu uporabu.

Novi je proces uzbunjivanja kako slijedi:

1. Građanin poziva Centar veze JVP-a Zagreb na broj 193 zbog opasnosti.
2. Centar veze zaprima dojavu i odlučuje hoće li na intervenciju uputiti JVP ili DVD.
3. Centar veze odlučuje da će na intervenciju uputiti DVD Trnje i obavještava odgovornu osobu.
4. Odgovorna osoba pokreće uzbunu uporabom aplikacije FireApp.
5. Operativni članovi odnosno vatrogasci potvrđuju dolazak. CV odmah dobiva podatak o broju vatrogasaca.
6. Okupljanje operativnih članova odnosno vatrogasaca u DVD-u i uzimanje potrebne opreme.
7. Upućivanje na intervenciju i obavijest radiovezom Centru veze o izlasku na intervenciju.

Uočavamo kako je trenutni model opterećen s devet koraka, dok je novi proces sastavljen od sedam koraka. Najvažnije je da su maknuta dva koraka koja iziskuju najviše vremena u cijelom procesu uzbunjivanja, kao i jedan međukorak.

Tablica 6. Vrijeme uzbunjivanja (optimizirano – FireApp)


Aktivnost	Zaprimiti dojavu i uzeti nužne informacije	Uzbuniti odgovornu osobu	Aplikacijom FireApp uzbuniti vatrogasce	Potvrditi dolazak	Okupiti vatrogasce i izuzeti opremu	Uputiti se na intervenciju	
Opis	Razgovor CV-a i pozivatelja	Razgovor odgovorne osobe DVD-a i CV-a	Uzbunjivanje putem aplikacije FireApp		Vrijeme okupljanja		UKUPNO
Vrijeme (sekunde)	105	46	22	do 30	do 180	do 90	473

Uporabom aplikacije FireApp smanjujemo vrijeme uzbunjivanja za 91 sekundu, odnosno za **16 %**. Isto tako valja istaknuti kako postoji mogućnost implementacije aplikacije FireApp u CV kako bi dispečer automatski uzbunio DVD, bez prethodnog pozivanja odgovorne osobe koja u ovom modelu provodi uzbunjivanje aplikacijom FireApp. Na ovaj bi se način vrijeme smanjilo za dodatnih 46 sekundi.

Cijena

S obzirom na veličinu postrojbe (35 operativnih vatrogasaca) i 2 vozila za intervencije, DVD-u Trnje trebalo bi kupiti Paket L (50 mobilnih aplikacija + 4 aplikacije za vozilo) po cijeni 1550 kn godišnje.


Navedena se sredstva mogu osigurati u proračunu DVD-a za sljedeću godinu odnosno u financijskom planu. Vatrogasna zajednica Grada Zagreba u 2022. godini dobila je od Grada Zagreba proračun u iznosu 14 440 000,00 kn, koji se raspodjeljuje na vatrogasne postrojbe u Gradu Zagrebu (DVD-ovi i JVP) (Proračun Grada Zagreba). Valja naglasiti kako i DVD ostvaruje dobitak od gospodarske djelatnosti (dežurstva i sl.).



Model uzbune primjenom aplikacije FireApp
 Ponovno ćemo koristiti BPMN notaciju za vizualni prikaz.

Implementacija SzU-a u ZEOS

Zemljopisni obavijesni sustav (ZEOS), koji je razvila nekadašnja Državna uprava za zaštitu i spašavanje, operativni je GIS sustav Ravnateljstva civilne zaštite. GIS „nije samo programski alat za izradu karata, već organizirani skup sastavnica: hardvera, softvera, podataka, procedura, interneta i ljudi. Specijaliziran je za učinkovitu pohranu, ažuriranje, manipuliranje, analiziranje, interpretaciju i vizualizaciju svih oblika geo-referenciranih podataka s mogućnošću rada na stolnim računalima, mobilnim uređajima i cloud tehnologiji” (Roland i dr. 2015).



Slika 13. Zemljopisni obavijesni sustav CZ-a
(Zemljopisni obavijesni sustav Civilne zaštite, 2022)

U sklopu VATRONeta nalazi se i GIS sustav Praćenje vozila i GIS alati. „Ovaj sustav omogućuje operaterima uvid u trenutne pozicije vatrogasnih vozila i osoba na GIS karti. Osim toga, moguće je i generirati izvještaje, povijest kretanja te rekonstrukciju intervencija...” (Jagodin 2017).

Dakle, primjena GIS tehnologije u vatrogastvu nije novost, kao ni primjena ZEOS-a u vatrogastvu. Naime, ZEOS omogućuje prikaz informacija autoriziranim korisnicima putem predefiniраниh slojeva koji se prikazuju na zemljovidu: Aktivnosti na otvorenom, Zdravstvene ustanove, Aktualni podaci, Ugroze za RH i sl. Jedan od posebno nama zanimljivih slojeva upravo je predefiniрани sloj Vatrogastvo.


Ovaj sloj omogućuje nam prikaz raznih informacija vezanih uz vatrogastvo, kao i prikaz razmještaja hidranata na području cijelog Zagreba. S obzirom na navedeno, on je u operativnoj uporabi i u vatrogastvu i u DVD-u Trnje.

Iako je riječ o GIS sustavu, kada bi se SzU implementirao u ZEOS, koji je ionako već u operativnoj uporabi u DVD-u, njega bi mogla koristiti odgovorna osoba koja je primila poziv za uzbunu. Putem njega na jednom bi se mjestu mogli uzbuniti vatrogasci, vidjeti važne informacije o mjestu intervencije, kao i razmještaj hidranata u blizini, što je od krucijalne važnosti za intervencije gašenja požara.


Autoriziranim se korisnicima isto tako omogućuje praćenje TETR-a radioveza u uporabi u vatrogastvu i HGSS-u, kao i praćenje vatrogasnih vozila. ZEOS možemo zamisliti kao unaprijeđeni GIS sustav HVZ-a.

ZEOS nam isto tako omogućuje prikaz razmještaja DVD-ova pa bi tako odgovorna osoba koja je uzbunila vatrogasce putem ZEOS-a, mogla vidjeti i koji su obližnji DVD-ovi, a po potrebi putem CV-a zatražiti uzbunjivanje i njih.


Naravno, prethodno bi administratori ZEOS-a ili korisnici koji mogu unositi, mijenjati i pregledavati podatke kao osobe „kojima su omogućene kvalitativne i kvantitativne intervencije u sustavu“ (Pravilnik o Zemljopisno-obavijesnom sustavu Državne uprave za zaštitu i spašavanje, NN 82/15), morali nadopuniti aplikaciju informacijama o razmještaju svih DVD-ova u Zagrebu. Isto tako bi bilo potrebno provesti povezivanje SzU-a i ZEOS-a, za što bi se morala osigurati sredstva u proračunu MUP-a i HVZ-a.



Slika 14. Predefinirani sloj Vatrogastvo (Zemljopisni obavijesni sustav Civilne zaštite, 2022)



Slika 15. Razmještaj središnjih DVD-ova u Zagrebu (Zemljopisni obavijesni sustav Civilne zaštite, 2022)



Dakle, uz minimalne napore i trošak, povezivanjem dva postojeća sustava možemo optimizirati trenutni proces.

Novi proces uzbunjivanja istovjetan je kao i kod implementacije aplikacije FireApp jer će uzbunjivanje provoditi odgovorna osoba koja je zaprimila uzbunu od CV-a, a u isto će vrijeme pristupiti i informacijama bitnima za mjesto intervencije.

Promjena u sustavu izgledala bi kao na Slici 16.

Slika 16. Povezivanje SzU-a i ZEOS-a

Zaključak

Provedenom analizom uočavamo opći trend porasta vatrogasnih intervencija u Gradu Zagrebu, a koji je uzrokovan širenjem djelatnosti vatrogasaca te povećanom primjenom tehnoloških rješenja u svakodnevnoj uporabi. Potresi, poplave, oluje i slične pojave doprinose većem opterećenju zagrebačkih vatrogasaca.

Usporedno i DVD Trnje broji sve veći broj intervencija, a sustav uzbunjivanja vatrogasaca nije se mijenjao godinama. Trenutačni model uzbune troši čak 564 sekunde, odnosno 9 minuta i 24 sekunde, što svakako otežava brz izlazak i sanaciju mjesta intervencije. Uvidom u postojeća rješenja pronađena su tri relativno jeftina i provjerena rješenja koja će smanjiti proces uzbune za nekoliko minuta.

Predložena rješenja za optimizaciju procesa uzbunjivanja primjenjiva su i na druge DVD-ove u Gradu Zagrebu. Ta rješenja ne iziskuju velike materijalne troškove ni predugo vremensko razdoblje implementacije u operativnu uporabu. Iz danih analiza možemo utvrditi postojanje volje i želje za promjenom, i u DVD-u Trnje i u većem broju DVD-ova u Gradu Zagrebu. Svakako bi jedno od najboljih rješenja bilo kada bi se na razini Vatrogasne zajednice usuglasile želje, interesi i potrebe za novim rješenjem, i to implementacijom postojećih rješenja ili pak izradom potpuno novih, sukladno postojećim resursima.

Zaključno, proces uzbunjivanja uspjeli smo smanjiti: (1) za 154 sekunde, (2) za 91 sekundu ili (3) za 91 sekundu. Istodobno smo dodatno pojednostavili proces uzbunjivanja, a samim time i proces odlaska i dolaska na mjesto intervencije, a kao što je već napomenuto: svaka je sekunda bitna za sanaciju požarišta pa samim time i drugih oblika mjesta intervencije. Sukladno analizi, ustanovili smo postojanje mogućnosti za unaprjeđenjem, optimizacijom, pojednostavljenjem i ubrzanjem procesa uzbunjivanja. Navedena rješenja mogu se uvesti u operativnu uporabu i za druge službe, kao što su postrojbe Civilne zaštite na lokalnoj i regionalnoj razini, HGSS, Državne intervencijske postrojbe Civilne zaštite (DIP CZ), a u krajnjem slučaju isto ili slično rješenje može se primijeniti za Oružane snage Republike Hrvatske.

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Possibilities of optimizing the process of alerting volunteer firefighters: Trnje Volunteer Fire Department example

Summary

Volunteer firefighters are a key component of the homeland security system as their primary purpose is to prepare for and respond to fire and rescue people, property, and animals in natural disasters and non-fire emergencies. With the development of technology and societal advancement, the array of actions of firefighters, especially volunteer ones, is spreading, which results in an increase in calls, especially in calls related to technical issues.

For the timely performance of fire departments, emergency response is of utmost importance. Since volunteer fire stations are only occupied until there is an emergency call, volunteer firefighters are summoned to a host of emergencies while being at their respective homes, at work, etc. The analysis of the current emergency response process of the Volunteer Fire Department „Trnje” in Zagreb has shown that not only it is inefficient, but it is also obsolete and time-consuming. The purpose of this paper is, thus, to analyze the current state of the fire department and to offer solutions to the detected problem(s).

Key Words

emergency response, firefighters, process, Trnje Volunteer Fire Department, optimization

Impeding Humanitarian Aid Convoys as a Violation of International Law – the “White Road” Convoy Case Study

Ivica Kinder

Summary

For decades, the humanitarian actors have been facing a challenge of secure access to those in need of humanitarian aid. There is a variety of modalities of impeding, from administrative to deterrence and physical violence, while those who impede realization of convoys usually hide their real intentions. Several well-known modalities had arisen during the realization of the Croatian convoy named „White Road for Nova Bila and Silver Bosnia” at the end of 1993, too. The research starts from the strategic context of the armed conflict which had caused the necessity for the Convoy, as well as from general international legal framework for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Thus, the content of numerous testimonies of direct participants of the Convoy is analyzed across the (dis)obedience of existing obligations provided for by international law. Furthermore, the research provides the insight into the relevant practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) regarding Bosnia and Hercegovina, into selected documents and actions of United Nations bodies, as well as into the opinions of legal authors. The author concludes that the “White Road” convoy had correct and licit purpose, was prepared and approved on adequate decision-making levels, while carried out impartially and without any kind of discrimination. The series of events to the detriment of the Convoy cannot be attributed to mere coincidence, juncture of circumstances, spontaneity in acting or to the element of war, but rather to the intent and the plan of the Muslim (Bosniak) side. Despite of wide practice of attacks on humanitarian aid convoys, the international criminal judiciary regularly gives priority to war crimes of larger scale and those

originating from comprehensive political agendas and plans. Due to such reality the author advocates for a greater engagement of national judiciary systems. Finally, no matter of the time lapse since the „White Road“ convoy, the experience gathered on that occasion can still be beneficial in critical assessment of the role of peacekeeping forces in protection of such convoys.

Keywords

humanitarian aid, convoy, Central Bosnia, White Road, UNPROFOR, Geneva Conventions

Introduction

Without the intention to extensively analyze the political and military ambitions of the Muslim (Bosniak) side in the armed conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is necessary to highlight the key features of the broader strategic context that necessitated the humanitarian aid convoy “White Road.” This convoy’s purpose and the circumstances surrounding it are essential for understanding its realization.

On September 28-29, 1993, the 1st Bosniak Assembly in Sarajevo decided to change the ethnic designation, reflecting the strategic objectives of the Muslim leadership. Above all, it is crucial to state clearly and unequivocally that the Muslim side aimed to ethnically cleanse the Croats from Central Bosnia (Domazet-Lošo, 2010). The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted military operations to achieve this objective, although it did not receive directives from the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which included a representative of the Croatian people (Tuđman, 2017).

Although nominally the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović played a key role in directing the Army. As the political leader of the Muslim forces, Izetbegović openly declared that he would pursue his policies through negotiations, but if necessary, by military means. Regarding Central Bosnia, he stated at the end of 1993 that “Central Bosnia is not agreed upon” and that “the Army has the freedom of action because nothing has been agreed upon yet” (Tuđman, 2017, p. 365).

This context must be considered when examining the initiative, preparations, and course of the convoy for Nova Bila, the largest Croatian enclave in Central Bosnia. Essentially, there was a siege of strategic significance in direct support of the Muslim political goal to seize control of Central Bosnia and ethnically cleanse it of the Croatian population. By the end of 1993, the fall of Central Bosnia seemed imminent (Granić, 2022).

Due to the months-long siege and intensive attacks by Muslim forces, the supply of essential items for the survival of the civilian population, including medical care, was severely disrupted. There was a shortage of all types of food, basic necessities, electricity, fuel, and drinking water. Attempts to obtain water and firewood from the suburbs were made difficult by sniper fire from Muslim forces, often with fatal consequences. The number of sick individuals, especially the elderly and children, was increasing due to the cold, and the risk of spreading infections was high.

The only institution caring for the civilian population, the wounded, and the sick was the improvised Franciscan hospital located in the Church of the Holy Spirit in Nova Bila. This hospital itself was often targeted, suffering damage and occasional injuries to its staff. The number of physicians and other medical personnel was generally insufficient, and the use and maintenance of many medical devices were not possible. As a result, it was impossible to provide adequate medical care to many of the wounded, as helicopter evacuations were extremely complicated, dangerous, and irregular.

“If any war hospital can be compared with the Vukovar hospital in terms of its role and sacrificial attitude in healing people under the most difficult conditions, then it is the hospital in Nova Bila” (Lučić, 2018, p. 305).

In summary, it became clear that a humanitarian aid convoy was the only way to mitigate the situation and avoid a humanitarian catastrophe. Strategically, it was indispensable for the survival of the Croatian people in Central Bosnia. When preparations for the convoy began, the central effort focused on collecting food, medical supplies, and clothing to alleviate the hardships faced by the civilian population.

International law governing armed conflicts, both treaty and customary, has long prohibited the starvation of civilian populations as a method of warfare.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) views the prohibition of civilian starvation as „a rule from which no derogation may be made“, meaning it allows no exceptions for military necessity (ICRC, 1987c, p. 1456).

In recent years, significant advancements have been made in international criminal law, particularly with the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) under the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute categorizes the starvation of civilian populations as a war crime in international armed conflicts and, since 2019, in non-international armed conflicts as well. This includes conflicts between state armed forces and various organized armed groups, or between such groups themselves (ICC Statute, 1998).

According to Article 8 of the Rome Statute, it is a war crime to intentionally use starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions (ICC Statute, 1998). The ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes „in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes“ (ICC Statute, 1998).

When it comes to humanitarian aid convoys, the key problem that humanitarian actors have faced for decades is how to securely reach those in need and how to overcome intentional human actions aimed at preventing their arrival. Experience shows that those who obstruct or impede the movement of humanitarian aid convoys often conceal their true intentions. Common methods of hindering convoys include various border crossing restrictions, prohibitions on movement during the journey, imposing duties and taxes, claims that the security of the convoy cannot be guaranteed, withholding goods (sometimes regardless of actual need), robberies, unnecessarily prolonged but legally justified searches of convoys, creating physical obstacles on roads (including laying mines), open intimidation of convoy participants, and direct attacks (often involving sniper fire), as well as initiating military operations shortly before the convoy's arrival.

Many of these tactics were employed during the “White Road” convoy. Some of these actions were immediately condemned on political and moral grounds, though unfortunately not yet on criminal legal grounds. Given that

such tactics continue to be used worldwide today, we find it beneficial to highlight the experiences of the “White Road” convoy based on numerous records made by its immediate participants and to present these experiences in the context of international law rules.

The General International Legal Framework for the Provision of Humanitarian Aid in the Armed Conflicts

The Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 (Fourth Geneva Convention), contains provisions (Articles 17 and 23) aimed at alleviating the plight of civilian populations under siege in the context of international armed conflicts (ICRC, 1958). A siege occurs when attacking forces encircle defending forces at a specific location or area with the intent to capture it. To achieve this, the attacking forces employ weapon fire against the defenders and disrupt their supply lines to create a scarcity of critical goods, primarily food and drinking water, thereby coercing the defending forces to surrender or abandon the location.

On the other hand, if the defending forces are unable to improve their conditions through military means, they might seek ways to protect their civilian population. This can be done either by evacuating civilians from the besieged area or by mitigating their suffering through humanitarian aid. Considering the risk that evacuated civilians might not be able to return for years, or perhaps ever, obtaining humanitarian aid seems to be a far better solution. Despite the risks of casualties due to prolonged stay under siege, this approach helps prevent the ethnic cleansing of the besieged location or area.

Article 17 of the Fourth Geneva Convention addresses the “removal from besieged or encircled areas” and the passage into such zones, urging the parties of the conflict to conclude “local agreements.” Removal pertains to “wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases,” while passage refers to “ministers of all religions, medical personnel, and medical equipment” en route to besieged or encircled zones (ICRC, 1958).

Article 23 requires the parties to the Convention to allow the free passage of “all consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for

religious worship intended only for civilians of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary." This requirement also extends to "all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing, and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers, and maternity cases" (ICRC, 1958).

In addition to these requirements, the Fourth Convention respects the position of the party expected to allow the passage. It stipulates that such a party should be convinced that "there are no serious reasons for fearing" that the consignment would be diverted from its destination, that effective control may not be possible, or that the enemy could benefit from these consignments in terms of its military efforts or economy. Consequently, the Convention allows for the possibility of making permission conditional, such that the distribution of goods is conducted "under the local supervision of the Protecting Powers" (ICRC, 1958).

In addition to the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), dated 8 June 1977, further elaborates on humanitarian relief actions. Article 70, within Section II entitled "Relief in favour of the civilian population" stipulates that relief actions should benefit the civilian population "of any territory under the control of a Party to the conflict, other than occupied territory" (ICRC, 1987a). When such a population is insufficiently provided with essential supplies, relief actions should be undertaken. These actions must be humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned (ICRC, 1987a).

The relief actions should primarily include the provision of food and medical supplies, as well as clothing, bedding, means of shelter, and other supplies essential to survival, along with objects necessary for religious worship. The party expected to allow the free passage of aid consignments is obliged to do so and to facilitate their speedy and unimpeded passage. However, this party is entitled to prescribe the technical conditions for the realization of passage, including the right to conduct searches. It can also make its permission conditional on the requirement that the distribution of aid is conducted under the local supervision of the Protecting Powers.

Importantly, the party allowing passage may not divert the consignments from their intended destination or delay their delivery (ICRC, 1987a).

Regarding the personnel involved in relief actions, Article 71 of Protocol I allows for the inclusion of relief personnel as part of the assistance, particularly for the transportation and distribution of relief consignments. This inclusion is subject to the approval of the party in whose territory the personnel will carry out their duties. Protocol I also requires that such personnel be respected and protected. However, these personnel must strictly adhere to the terms of their mission and respect the security requirements of the party controlling the territory. Failure to comply with these obligations and requirements may result in the termination of their mission.

Similarly, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), dated 8 June 1977, also addresses “Relief actions” in Article 18. It states: “If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.” (ICRC, 1987b).

However, it is essential to recognize the significantly different attitudes toward the provision of humanitarian aid in non-international armed conflicts. While there is a general understanding that unnecessary suffering of the civilian population must be prevented, there is also an opinion that humanitarian aid constitutes a form of external intervention with ambitions to meddle in internal affairs (Fabijanić Gagro, 2008). Nonetheless, the provision of humanitarian aid in non-international armed conflicts has expanded significantly over time, becoming an important means of protecting the civilian population within the principles and rules of international humanitarian law (Fabijanić Gagro, 2008).

Given these disputes and difficulties, Fabijanić Gagro emphasizes that the realization of such humanitarian efforts often requires comprehensive political, diplomatic, economic, and social endeavors (Fabijanić Gagro, 2008).

As an illustration, Dr. Mate Granić, then Vice-President of the Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Croatia, commented on the preparations of the “White Road” convoy: “During the past couple of weeks, we have been conducting particularly intensive political, diplomatic, and humanitarian activities to alleviate the life of the civilian population during wintertime, in order to avoid an imminent humanitarian catastrophe. In our estimation, the situation is particularly difficult for the Croats in Central Bosnia, a population that has been cut off from the rest of the world for months due to the merciless offensive of the Muslim forces” (Prosoli, 1994, p. 3).

A particularly important step forward in international law, building on the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977, was the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal (the Rome Statute) in 1998, which entered into force in 2002. The Republic of Croatia is among the original parties to the Rome Statute. This development significantly contributed to the protection of the civilian population in armed conflicts. Based on this international treaty, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established (Škorić & Fabijanić Gagro, 2008). Amendments adopted in 2019 extended the scope of the Rome Statute to include non-international armed conflicts, encompassing both conflicts between state forces and organized armed groups, as well as conflicts between such groups themselves.

As mentioned in the introductory remarks, the Rome Statute emphasizes war crimes committed „as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes“. In this context, the term “war crimes” includes “Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law ...” (Article 8). Among these “other serious violations” is the specific crime of “Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions” (ICC, 1998).

In our understanding, it is unlawful conduct when attacking forces in a certain armed conflict, aware of the context in which they operate, intentionally seek

to deprive the civilian population of goods indispensable for their survival. Through deliberate actions, these forces create conditions of scarcity for food, drinking water, medications and other medical supplies, objects necessary for religious worship, and essential items like clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers, and maternity cases. The goal is often to accelerate the conquest of a specific area or location under siege, and possibly to include ethnic cleansing of the territory (Rottensteiner, 1999). Such actions cause malnutrition, the spread of diseases, and even the death of the civilian population. Therefore, prosecuting and punishing the perpetrators is a desirable course of action to prevent such conduct in future situations.

However, to qualify the deprivation of humanitarian aid as a crime against humanity, it must be conducted as a systematic and widespread practice inspired by and based on political objectives. This interpretation would exclude cases of obstruction that are not part of a broader plan or political agenda, such as spontaneous attacks on convoys by a group of drunk soldiers or random pillages of storage facilities. It is important to note, however, that what may appear to be spontaneous acts can often result from careful planning by the perpetrators (Rottensteiner, 1999).

For these reasons, when deliberating cases of obstructing humanitarian aid convoys, proving the commission of war crimes may be more productive than proving crimes against humanity. Furthermore, Rottensteiner acknowledges that prosecutorial priority is generally given to crimes of larger scale, especially those committed as part of a wider, politically motivated plan (Rottensteiner, 1999).

The Preparations for the Establishment and Work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with Respect to Starvation of the Civilian Population

One of the key foundations for the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was the Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), also known as The Bassiouni Report (UN-Final Report, 1994). Among other issues, the Commission addressed the legal qualification of the armed conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia to provide a basis for the application of appropriate rules of international law: "...the character and complexity of the armed conflicts concerned, combined with the web of agreements on humanitarian law that the parties have concluded among themselves, justifies the Commission's approach in applying the law applicable in international armed conflicts to the entirety of the armed conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia." (UN-Final Report, 1994, para. 42).

The Commission further analyzed numerous violations of international law during military operations, focusing on attacks on protected objects and the use of forbidden means and methods of warfare. Regarding the practice of starving the civilian population, the most significant issue in the Report was the siege of Sarajevo. However, the Report did not provide sufficient findings for indictments for violations of the prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare (UN-Final Report, 1994). The Commission explained that all parties in the conflicts controlled food, water, and electricity supplies "for publicity purposes." Additionally, the military forces and civilian populations predominantly lived together in the same areas, and "no one appears to have died during the siege from starvation, dehydration or freezing" (UN-Final Report, 1994, para. 204). The Commission concluded that while the behavior of the parties was deplorable, its criminality was debatable (UN-Final Report, 1994).

In our view, the Commission's assessment that "no one appears to have died" unduly ignored the physical and mental torment experienced by the civilian population due to the intentional actions of the attacking forces, which resulted in a shortage of water and food. International law prohibits

starvation as a method of warfare, irrespective of fatal consequences, because the deprivation of food and water inherently causes physical and mental suffering to the civilian population. If the consequences had been more severe, resulting in illness or death, it would have further justified more severe criminal liability. From this perspective, we believe that the Commission reached its conclusion too lightly, thus diminishing an important opportunity for the international judiciary to achieve stronger specific and general prevention of starvation as a prohibited method of warfare in a significant historical and legal context.

However, by highlighting the illegality of impeding humanitarian aid convoys, the Commission made a valuable contribution to understanding this specific modality of starvation of the civilian population in armed conflicts (UN-Final Report, 1994).

As far as impeding humanitarian aid convoys is concerned, the Commission found that all parties in the conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia resorted to such practices (UN-Final Report, 1994). The Commission emphasized that “the safe and expeditious passage of these convoys is essential to the well-being of the civilian population” (UN-Final Report, 1994, para. 71). However, in relation to the practice of ethnic cleansing, the Commission did not recognize starvation as one of the modalities, nor did it place the impeding of humanitarian aid convoys within this context.

Among the modalities of ethnic cleansing, the Commission identified various forms of violence and intimidation against the civilian population, including the destruction of villages, with only one mention of attacks on hospitals and medical staff (UN-Final Report, 1994, para. 134). Regarding the behavior of the Muslim forces in the armed conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Commission noted that while these forces also committed grave violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 against the Serbs and Croats, they did not do so to the same extent as the other two parties, nor did they do so as part of a policy of ethnic cleansing (UN-Final Report, 1994, para. 148). Simultaneously, the Commission made no remarks regarding the role of the UN peacekeeping forces in the protection of convoys.

As a result of all the points elaborated above, the Statute of the ICTY did not include the starvation of the civilian population as a separate crime, neither among the violations of the laws or customs of war nor among the crimes against humanity. Thus, the practice of starvation, including the misuse of supplies provided by the UNHCR and various non-governmental organizations, remained the object of public condemnations only. Consequently, in the trials before the ICTY, there were only a few examples of the treatment of starvation of the civilian population. None of those examples pertained to the situation of the Croats in Central Bosnia.

For instance, in the case against Dragomir Milošević (case number: IT-98-29/1-T), concerning the siege of Sarajevo, sniper fire against civilians while collecting food and water was mentioned. This act was legally qualified as a violation of the laws or customs of war, specifically the crime of terror, in accordance with Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTY (UN-Final Report, 1994, para. 95). In the trial against Radislav Krstić (case number: IT-98-33-T), there was a discussion about the prevention of humanitarian aid convoys from reaching the Muslim enclave in Srebrenica. It was established that at the beginning of July 1995, a few people died due to starvation (Global Compliance, 2023). The legal grounds for criminal responsibility were found under Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTY, citing violations of the laws or customs of war, specifically cruel or inhuman treatment, including the crimes of murder and persecution.

As will be presented later in this article, similar illegal conduct was present on the Muslim side against the Croatian civilian population in Central Bosnia, including the impeding of humanitarian aid deliveries by the “White Road” convoy. Particularly serious violations included the murder of one and the wounding of several other participants of the convoy by Muslim forces. However, neither Bassiouni’s Commission nor the ICTY Prosecutor addressed these issues. Not even the UN Security Council addressed the attack on the convoy, unlike their response to the murder of the Danish driver from the humanitarian aid convoy in Central Bosnia at the end of October 1993.

The Situation in Central Bosnia, the Needs of the Civilian Population and the Preparations of the „White Road“ Convoy

In addition to other general factors that led to the outbreak of armed conflict between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the main reason was Izetbegović’s vision of establishing a Muslim state (Nazor, 2020). The American military historian Charles R. Shrader believes that as early as the autumn of 1992, Muslim leadership had strategically decided to start a war against the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mainly because the Croats were weaker than the Serbs in the region (Nazor, 2020). In addition to eliminating Croats from Central Bosnia, the Muslim objective included reaching the Adriatic coast (Nazor, 2020).

According to the Vance-Owen Plan, which was presented in January 1993, Central Bosnia and the Neretva River valley were supposed to belong to the Croatian province in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Nazor, 2020). This made the plan unacceptable to the Muslim leadership (Nazor, 2020). The Muslim-Croatian conflict, which began somewhat earlier in Gornji Vakuf (Uskoplje), started to spread into Central Bosnia precisely in January 1993 (Marijan, 2020). By April 1993, the Croatian political and military leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded that the Third Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was completing its preparations for a large-scale armed conflict against the forces of the Croatian Defense Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane – HVO) (Marijan, 2020). Militarily, the proportion of forces of the Army to the HVO in Central Bosnia varied between 6:1 and 9:1 in favor of the Army (Praljak, 2007).

On the other hand, according to numerous sources, the objective of Croatian politics within Bosnia and Herzegovina was to protect the Croatian people without questioning the internationally recognized borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to these sources, Croatian politics was conducted in line with the political and territorial framework imposed by the international community (Nazor, 2020).

According to the book "Pružena ruka", by the end of 1993, there were approximately 160,000 Croats living in six Croatian enclaves in Central Bosnia, including about 80,000 displaced persons. Nova Bila was the largest of these enclaves, housing over 60,000 Croats. Central Bosnia was also home to 12,500 children, approximately 600 of whom were under one year of age (Lang & Ivanović, 2006). The care for all these people, not just the wounded and sick, was provided by the improvised Franciscan hospital "Dr. fra Mato Nikolić," situated in the Church of the Holy Spirit in Nova Bila (Lučić, 2018).

During this time, the conditions of encirclement and intense attacks by Muslim forces in Central Bosnia, which had persisted for several months, severely hampered and effectively disabled the provision of critical survival goods and medical care. The only support came from an HVO humanitarian helicopter, which flew only occasionally and was subject to UN requirements and procedures. Evacuation of the wounded was subjected to triage conducted by UN and HVO physicians (Lang & Čulo, 2014). The hospital itself was occasionally hit and damaged, and its staff were wounded or injured (Prosoli, 1994). Fra Franjo Grebenar, the hospital's principal, described the warfare, primarily conducted through exhaustion, as "medieval" (Prosoli, 1994, p. 81).

There was a severe shortage of essential supplies such as flour, oil, sugar, soap, toothpaste, various medications including vaccines for newborns, vitamins, and more (Prosoli, 1994). The lack of electricity and fuel disrupted regular bread production, while the scarcity of livestock resulted in a meat shortage (Prosoli, 1994). Ongoing combat operations hindered timber harvesting and firewood transportation. Low temperatures led to an increase in illnesses, especially among the elderly and children, and the rate of stillbirths also rose (Prosoli, 1994).

Overcrowded lodgings due to displaced people adversely affected general and personal hygiene conditions (Prosoli, 1994). The fuel shortage restrained public utility services in waste management, increasing the risk of contagious diseases. The water system frequently failed, forcing people to seek drinking water in outer settlements where Muslim forces often opened sniper fire, resulting in fatalities (Prosoli, 1994).

In the hospital, there was an insufficient number of physicians and medical staff, and many medical devices were inoperable. This situation made it impossible to provide adequate medical care to the wounded, creating a dependency on rare and occasional evacuations. Shortly before the arrival of the Convoy, the hospital had over a hundred seriously wounded patients, with around fifty needing evacuation, including about ten children (Prosoli, 1994).

Simultaneously, it was evident that the Muslim side was receiving significantly more humanitarian aid, and more frequently, including by air (Prosoli, 1994). Additionally, fuel supplies to Sarajevo and Zenica, often organized by international organizations and UNPROFOR, were taking place on a more regular basis (Prosoli, 1994). Given these circumstances, the primary effort during the preparation for the convoy to Nova Bila was focused on gathering food, clothing, and medical supplies to improve the living conditions of civilians during the winter and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. At the same time, the Croatian side was constantly worried about the possibility of events similar to those that happened in Vukovar and Ovčara in November 1991 (Prosoli, 1994).

In summary, from a strategic standpoint, the convoy was considered indispensable for “supporting the survival of the Croatian people in Central Bosnia” (Prosoli, 1994, p. 140). The organizers of the convoy also promised to extend aid to Muslims in Mahala, Kruščica, and Zenica, as well as to the Jewish community in Zenica (Lang & Čulo, 2014). From the beginning, it was clear that much of the realization of this plan would depend on UNPROFOR and, definitively, on the opposing side in the conflict. Both gave assurances for the free passage of the convoy. Important actors also included the ICRC and the UNHCR.

Finally, after forty days of preparations, the convoy, which stretched 20 kilometers long, included 102 participants: five in leadership roles, 13 physicians and other medical staff, 10 journalists and cameramen, three priests, one member of parliament, 56 drivers, one mechanic, and 13 volunteers (Prosoli, 1994).

Realization of the Convoy and the Modalities and Consequences of its Impeding

According to the research conducted by Mark Cutts, which was published in 1999, the UN Security Council adopted 46 resolutions regarding the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina between May 1992 and November 1995. Although most of these resolutions addressed measures to mitigate the suffering of the civilian population, 16 resolutions directly called on the parties in the conflict to allow unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid. International humanitarian organizations were also called upon to collect information regarding violations of international humanitarian law (Cutts, 1999). Following Resolution 770 of 13 August 1992, Resolution 776 of 14 September 1992 noted the offers of member states to provide military personnel to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. Subsequent resolutions primarily focused on the situations in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Žepa, Gorazde, Bihać, and Srebrenica (UN-SC Resolution 776, 1992). Resolution 776 also expressed support for the Statement of Principles adopted under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, wherein the parties to the conflict agreed to cooperate in the delivery of humanitarian relief and to adhere to their obligations under international humanitarian law. They also agreed that those “who commit or order grave breaches of the (Geneva) Conventions” would be held personally responsible (London Conference, 1992, para. vii). Hence, all the aforementioned resolutions and statements were amending the legal framework provided by the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, as previously discussed in this article.

During the armed conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN Security Council consistently demanded that all parties take necessary measures to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid and the safety of personnel involved in such activities. The Security Council regularly condemned attacks on convoys and other forms of obstruction. However, as stated earlier in this article, the Bassiouni Commission found that all parties to the conflict were widely engaged in impeding convoys. In practice, serious violations of international humanitarian law would prompt investigations, but formal reactions from the Security Council did not follow every incident.

For instance, after two convoys were attacked on 25 October 1993 in Central Bosnia near Novi Travnik, resulting in the death of a Danish driver of a humanitarian convoy, the United Nations temporarily halted all humanitarian aid deliveries to Central Bosnia. Following consultations among Security Council members, the Council issued Presidential Statement S/26661 on 28 October 1993 (UN-SC Presidential Statement, 1993). The Secretary-General was requested to report on the responsibility for these attacks (UN-SC Presidential Statement, 1993).

One convoy, operated by the Danish Refugee Council under the auspices of the UNHCR, consisted of ten trucks and a lead vehicle, with all drivers being civilians. The other convoy, part of a Dutch military transportation unit within UNPROFOR, also consisted of ten vehicles (trucks, jeeps, and an ambulance), with all drivers being military personnel (UN-SG Letter, 1993). The attack occurred near the village of Trenica, south of Novi Travnik, close to the confrontation line between Muslim and Croatian forces.

The UN Board of Inquiry found that the convoys were unaware of the battle that had just begun in the area between the Bosnian Army and the HVO. After considering the terrain, angles of penetration, and the preponderance of hits on the cabins, the Board determined that the cabins of the vehicles were the principal targets, thereby excluding the possibility of crossfire. It concluded with high probability that the attacks were carried out deliberately by a few soldiers of the Bosnian Army.

In his response to the Security Council, the Secretary-General expressed admiration for all personnel involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina “for their courage and determination in pursuing this difficult and dangerous task” (UN-SG Letter, 1993, p. 1). He reported to the Security Council that the attack on both convoys was deliberate and concluded with high probability that the responsibility for the attack lay with “soldiers of the Bosnian government forces” (UN-SG Report, 1993, para. 5).

Prior to this report, based on initial knowledge of the attack, the Commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina sent a letter to the Commander of the Army, stating that “the attack ... must be considered as deliberate and

unprovoked” and requested an investigation (UN-SG Report, 1993, para. 7). The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, upon receiving the initial report on the investigation, sent a letter on 2 November 1993 to President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović and to Mr. Mate Boban (then President of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia; however, addressed in the letter as „Mr.“), requesting them to complete their investigations and forward the results by 5 November 1993.

Izetbegović responded on 4 November 1993 to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN, Thorvald Stoltenberg, stating that the convoys were “caught in crossfire” and “unaimed bullets hit the driver”, which he interpreted as “accidental” (UN-SG Report, 1993, para. 7).

In his letter, Boban conveyed “assurances and the firm determination of the Croat side to facilitate ... unconditional and completely free activity on the territory of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and unhindered and secure movement on the roads under HVO control in accordance with agreed principles” (UN-SG Report, 1993, para. 7). The extent to which the UN bodies paid attention to the incidents is further evidenced by the meetings that Thorvald Stoltenberg held with the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haris Silajdžić, in Sarajevo on 9 November 1993, as well as with Mate Boban in Split. These meetings were arranged to discuss the findings of the investigation and to seek credible assurances from both sides for the safe passage of humanitarian convoys. Stoltenberg particularly demanded that those responsible for the attacks be arrested and brought to justice (UN-SG Report, 1993).

Both the Muslim and Croatian sides expressed their deep regret to Stoltenberg over the death of the Danish driver and the injuries of other individuals. They also proposed pursuing additional measures for cooperation and improving the safety of humanitarian convoys, while pledging their own support.

Hence, both the Muslim and Croatian sides considered UNPROFOR to be an indispensable actor in improving the safety of humanitarian aid convoys (UN-SG Report, 1993). However, UNPROFOR continued to act passively, as it had before, which became evident with the Croatian convoy for Nova Bila. When examining UNPROFOR’s role in protecting humanitarian aid deliveries, it is

clear that, instead of establishing safe routes and corridors and improving the safety of humanitarian personnel, only “passive protection” was in place (Cutts, 1999). This passive protection involved armored personnel carriers escorting humanitarian aid convoys through dangerous areas. The protection provided was essentially limited to sheltering humanitarian personnel in the carriers when they came under fire (Cutts, 1999).

In general, both UNPROFOR and UNHCR were dependent on the approvals of forces controlling specific areas, which was particularly true with the Serbian forces. Under such circumstances, the issuance of these approvals was often conditional on the requirement of the approving party to receive part of the humanitarian aid, regardless of their actual needs for those goods (Cutts, 1999).

When signing the Sarajevo Joint Declaration on 12 November 1993, the ministers of foreign affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, Haris Silajdžić and Mate Granić, also agreed that the Croatian side would organize a humanitarian aid convoy for Nova Bila, while the Muslim side would do the same for Maglaj. The Croatian side was aware of numerous obstacles and blockades, as well as various units in the field, including local forces, a very demanding route, and difficult weather conditions (Lang & Čulo, 2014). According to the agreement, both sides were to support the organization and execution of the convoys in the field (Granić, 2022).

With winter approaching, the UNHCR organized a meeting on 18 November 1993 with political leaders of all parties to the conflict, requesting freedom of movement and safety for humanitarian aid convoys. The leadership of the convoy to Nova Bila first received assurances from the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina for free passage through areas under their control (Prosoli, 1994). On behalf of the General Staff of the Army, General Rasim Delić signed the order (Prosoli, 1994). The order included provisions for the convoy’s free passage and minimized delays at checkpoints (Prosoli, 1994). Thus, the approval from the Muslim side was obtained well before the convoy’s departure, on 8 December 1993 (Lučić, 2018).

Both Minister Silajdžić and UNPROFOR’s Commander, General Briquemont, along with the British contingent within UNPROFOR, assured that everything

would proceed smoothly (Prosoli, 1994). However, these assurances were not fulfilled in the end. After the murder and injuries of some participants of the convoy, the British contingent post festum, i.e., after the fact, relativized the assurances it had previously given.

It was on 13 December 1993, upon the arrival of the convoy in Tomislavgrad, that the British contingent of UNPROFOR operating in Central Bosnia informed the convoy's leadership that without the approval of General Delić, no passage across the Muslim-controlled area would be possible (Lučić, 2018). When the convoy reached Rama on 14 December 1993, it was held there for almost four days (Prosoli, 1994). The Muslim military forces demanded additional negotiations, effectively "buying time" for the organization of the parallel convoy for Maglaj, under the auspices of the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb, aimed for the Muslim side (Marušić, Marušić & Lang, 1994).

After the convoy finally left Rama for Uskoplje (also known as Gornji Vakuf, under Muslim control) on 18 December 1993 and safely passed through the town, a robbery occurred shortly after. "People were stealing jewelry, cameras, money, and personal documents from the trucks" (Lang & Čulo, 2014, p. 280). There was maltreatment of drivers and even journalists, including threats with firearms and cold weapons (Lang & Čulo, 2014). The perpetrators were members of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and UNPROFOR did nothing to stop them, merely taking notes of what happened.

Shortly after, two trucks were hijacked, but the Muslim military police, who had joined the convoy after the first attack, accompanied by British peacekeepers, intervened and promptly returned the trucks along with the unharmed drivers. However, the cargo was not returned, spreading fear among the participants of the convoy (Lang & Čulo, 2014).

After the convoy continued its journey and reached the mountain pass at Pavlovica (between Uskoplje and Novi Travnik), the Muslim soldiers subjected it to a thorough search. The immediate commander of the search was Džemal Merdan, the Deputy Commander of the Third Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Lang & Čulo, 2014). In an open area, under

extremely harsh winter weather conditions, the convoy was held for a total of 51 hours. During the night, vehicles, drivers, and some other participants of the convoy were robbed again (Lučić, 2018). The soldiers were “resolutely demanding food and cigarettes” and the search of the convoy was conducted “with protraction and casually” (Lang & Čulo, 2014, p. 25).

Additionally, a ban was issued on the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Jewish community in Zenica (Lučić, 2018). The Muslim soldiers staged the discovery of a few boxes of “military materiel”, while oxygen bottles intended for the hospital were declared as military materiel and confiscated (Prosoli, 1994, p. 106). In an effort to compromise the convoy, Muslim radio stations promptly spread the news about the “allegedly humanitarian”, but in fact “military” convoy (Prosoli, 1994, p. 23). This significantly aggravated the already tense relationship between the soldiers conducting the search and the participants of the convoy, while increasing fear and restlessness among the convoy members (Lang & Čulo, 2014).

It has never been reliably established what exactly was found during the search, as apart from detonators and optical devices, explosive materials and ammunition were also mentioned (Lang & Čulo, 2014). According to the report of Lieutenant Colonel Williams to General Briquemont, “5000 explosive capsules, 10000 universal detonators, 4 sniper telescopes, 9 military radios, and 2 radio chargers” were found and confiscated by the Muslim side as “military materiel” (Lang & Čulo, 2014, p. 280). Some cargo from another truck was confiscated too, including oxygen bottles and batteries of 1.5, 4.5, and 9 volts, “all considered by the Muslim side as material for making bombs” (Lang & Čulo, 2014, p. 280).

It was never established who exactly infiltrated the “military materiel” into the convoy. From the beginning of the convoy, its chief, Herman Vukušić, had been “insisting with police-like scrutiny that every single item should be inspected to prevent discreditation of the whole idea and avoid danger for the lives of the people in the convoy” (Lang & Čulo, 2014, p. 26). In his testimony about the convoy, within the defense of General Slobodan Praljak before the ICTY in January 2006, Dr. Lang stated that it was an imputation (Lang & Čulo, 2014).

It was mostly suspected that the disputed materiel was infiltrated in the privately-owned truck in Split, when various people came very early in the morning before the convoy's departure, bringing additional packages and loading them onto the trucks themselves, which someone maliciously took advantage of (Lang & Čulo, 2014). The suspicion that everything was pre-arranged was only increased by the behavior of the Bosnian Army officer who led the search at Pavlovica and spoke in a theatrical manner about his unusual dream in which he heard a voice telling him about the hidden military materiel (sic!) (Lang & Čulo, 2014).

Only after the Muslim side was certain that the parallel convoy aimed for their population in Maglaj had crossed the area under the control of Croatian forces and reached Bugojno, did they allow the further movement of the Croatian convoy to Nova Bila (Lučić, 2018). However, even more coal and flour were taken away. An additional condition was imposed: upon arrival in Nova Bila, the convoy had to unload all cargo and leave within 24 hours, with all its personnel (Lučić, 2018). Moreover, one of the drivers was taken hostage, and 40 tons of humanitarian aid were withheld as assurance that a broken-down truck from the convoy for Maglaj would be released from the area under Croatian control (Lučić, 2018).

Furthermore, physicians and other medical staff who planned to stay and work in the hospital were forbidden to enter Nova Bila and were returned to Rama (Marušić, Marušić & Lang, 1994). Media reporters were also turned back, and the media accreditations of some of them were seized (Prosoli, 1994). "The condition for approval to get into Lašva Valley was that everyone who comes with the convoy must leave with the convoy" (Lang & Čulo, 2014, p. 16). In the end, only two physicians and a few journalists were allowed to enter, but under the obligation to leave with the convoy. When the convoy, despite all obstructions, suspicions, disinformation, and imputations, finally reached Nova Bila, the Muslim forces started with shelling, infantry fire, and menacing propaganda, while the electricity system was disabled (Lučić, 2018). The start of the attack coincided exactly with the arrival of the first trucks in Nova Bila. According to Croatian historian Lučić, the Muslim forces expected that Croatian defenders would relax and be less vigilant upon the arrival of the convoy (Lučić, 2018).

In comparison, the previously mentioned convoy for the Muslim side had unimpeded movement under the protection of the HVO and reached Maglaj safely, which was commended by the UNPROFOR’s leadership (Lučić, 2018).

However, the Croatian convoy faced serious problems and difficulties even on its way back from Nova Bila. The convoy’s leadership was acutely aware of the bad experiences from the journey to Nova Bila, primarily related to ineffective protection from both the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and UNPROFOR, despite all assurances pledged by their civilian and military authorities at the highest levels of leadership. Despite these issues, the convoy was originally requested to leave Nova Bila within 24 hours, by 21 December 1993. Ultimately, it was demanded by ultimatum that the convoy leave on the morning of 22 December 1993 (Lang & Čulo, 2014).

The British contingent of UNPROFOR was continuously hurrying the convoy’s departure, citing ongoing Muslim offensive operations along the HVO’s defense lines across Bosnia and Herzegovina (Lang & Čulo, 2014). Even UNPROFOR’s head of civilian affairs came from Kiseljak to Nova Bila to insist on the convoy’s immediate departure (Lang & Čulo, 2014).

Being aware of the risks of returning across territory controlled by Muslim forces, especially amid ongoing combat operations, the convoy’s leadership insisted on adequate security assurances and measures from both the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and UNPROFOR. No one in the convoy was interested in staying in Nova Bila for too long. The ongoing combat operations required local defenders to focus fully on their military tasks, and the convoy participants were eager to return. They had limited food, which they had brought for the needy population, and many participants had family members in Nova Bila, making prolonged stays emotionally challenging.

Intensive negotiations with Muslim military authorities and UNPROFOR aimed to secure the convoy’s prompt return. However, it became clear that UNPROFOR would not transport the convoy participants in armored carriers. It was exactly a measure they finally took after an armed attack on the convoy occurred (sic!). Faced with no real alternative, the convoy started its journey back. Groups of ten vehicles were formed, each escorted by one

UNPROFOR armored carrier. “The participants of the convoy set out fully aware of the risks to their lives, with the objective of defending the dignity of Croatian politics and fully clarifying who the victim was in Central Bosnia” (Lang & Čulo, 2014, p. 278).

Lieutenant Colonel Williams, Commander of the British contingent, later claimed that Lieutenant Colonel Tihomir Blaškić, Commander of the HVO’s Operational Zone in Vitez, accepted the Muslim side’s request for the convoy’s departure from the Lašva Valley on 21 December 1993 (Lang & Čulo, 2014). However, Williams himself admitted that there were several different interpretations of the deadline (Lang & Čulo, 2014). Despite this, he later criticized Dr. Lang for holding a press conference in Nova Bila at noon on 21 December, rather than moving south with his convoy (Lang & Čulo, 2014). Williams also claimed he visited Nova Bila with a UN civilian representative to warn Dr. Lang and the convoy’s leadership that they had not met the departure deadline, exposing themselves to a possible prolonged stay in the Lašva Valley (Lang & Čulo, 2014). He admitted, however, that he had withdrawn the escort vehicles for the convoy in the meantime (Lang & Čulo, 2014).

When the convoy finally departed from Nova Bila on 22 December 1993, using the same route as its arrival, the Muslim forces’ attack on the Lašva Valley was still ongoing (Lučić, 2018). The first group of ten vehicles was attacked at the same location where the convoy had been robbed with impunity a few days earlier (Lang & Čulo, 2014). The driver Ante Vlaić was murdered, and several other convoy participants, including a foreign media reporter, were wounded (Lučić, 2018). The attack was carried out “under the guise of uncontrolled gangs” that the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina allegedly could not control (Prosoli, 1994, p. 27). During the attack, more than twenty trucks were seized, although their drivers were later transferred to a secure location by the British contingent of UNPROFOR (Lučić, 2018). Additionally, Muslim civilians stoned the convoy (Lang & Čulo, 2014). Dr. Lang asserted that UNPROFOR merely recorded the events instead of taking adequate measures to protect the convoy and mitigate the danger. UNPROFOR did not assist the convoy during the robbery on 18 December

1993, so it was not surprising that they did not do more during the physical attack on 22 December 1993.

From the perspective of the Commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgian Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont, after direct coordination between General Rasim Delić and General Ante Roso had been established, UNPROFOR did everything within its responsibilities to guarantee the safety of “Dr. Lang’s convoy” (Lang & Čulo, 2014, p. 282). Much more detail about the critical events was provided by British Lieutenant Colonel P.G. Williams, the Commander of the British contingent of UNPROFOR, who had to submit a report to General Briquemont. Briquemont then forwarded this report to the Vice-President of the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mate Granić, attaching it to his own letter to the Minister (Lang & Čulo, 2014).

One of the key participants of the Convoy, the Croatian patriot, defender, and humanist Ante Damjanović, described Lieutenant Colonel Williams as follows: “Lieutenant Colonel Williams, unpleasant, callous, and arrogant man. I am explaining to him that we have been attacked, that our and some other trucks have just been shot at, that I am sure there must be some wounded or dead, as we were in the lead vehicle in the column only. He is ignoring me. He does not react, like I am not even there.” (Lang & Čulo, 2014, p. 27).

In his report, Williams pointed out that he never promised to ensure the complete safety of the participants of the Convoy. He emphasized that UNPROFOR exceeded its technical mandate and that, without BRITBAT’s involvement, neither convoy would have achieved even a fraction of their actual accomplishments, which both Dr. Lang and Commander Merdan admitted (Lang & Čulo, 2014). Williams also stated that he was fully committed to the success of both convoys. He personally visited local commanders in the week preceding the convoys, while his liaison officers and the ECMM tirelessly worked at the local levels to support the mission (Lang & Čulo, 2014). The immediate, concrete engagement of his forces for the protection of the convoys was described as close protection by BRITBAT’s armed vehicles (Lang & Čulo, 2014).

Williams attributed the critical event of the attack on the Convoy and the death of the driver Vlaić to a “cowardly” sniper who took the life of a “brave man” (Lang & Čulo, 2014, p. 282). He also mentioned that all parties agreed the shooting was not connected to the general tactical situation in Uskoplje at the time of the attack (Lang & Čulo, 2014). This leads to the conclusion that, from UNPROFOR’s perspective, despite ongoing combat operations, no one from the Convoy was hurt collaterally but rather as a result of an intentional attack.

It was only after the attack that UNPROFOR undertook strengthened security measures along the road, established an armed vehicle escort, and transported all participants of the Convoy through Gornji Vakuf to Sičaje in UNPROFOR vehicles (Lang & Čulo, 2014). Williams also stated that he offered the last group from the Convoy the option to stay overnight in UNPROFOR’s base to provide the drivers with the same security and living conditions as his soldiers (Lang & Čulo, 2014). This indicates that much more could have been done before the attack if UNPROFOR had chosen to act more proactively.

Regarding the legal classification of the armed conflict between Croatian and Muslim forces in Central Bosnia, the ICTY’s chambers in cases against Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, as well as Tihomir Blaškić, established that it was an international armed conflict (ICTY-Trial Chamber, 2001, paras. 109 and 145; ICTY-Appeals Chamber, 2004a, para. 342; ICTY-Trial Chamber, 2000, para. 77; ICTY-Appeals Chamber, 2004b, para. 187). Although the defenses in both cases argued that it was a non-international armed conflict, the establishment that it was an international armed conflict created grounds for responsibility for the disrespect and violation of the relevant rules of international law provided by the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I.

However, it is important to note that even the rules provided by Protocol II, which covers non-international armed conflicts, also regulate relief actions in favor of the civilian population under conditions of scarcity of foodstuffs and medical supplies. Protocol II stipulates the humanitarian and impartial character of such actions, prohibits any adverse distinction, and requires the consent of the High Contracting Parties. Therefore, regardless of the legal

classification of the armed conflict in Central Bosnia, the Croatian side had the right to organize the “White Road” humanitarian convoy, while the Muslim side was obliged to facilitate it.

Conclusion

In relation to the framework of international law, the humanitarian aid convoy for Nova Bila had both a correct and licit purpose. It was prepared and approved at appropriate decision-making levels, including “local agreements”, and the content of the humanitarian aid was admissible. The unclear situation regarding the discovery of “military materiel” demonstrates the potential for moral damage and physical danger to the convoy participants in such instances. It also highlighted that items such as oxygen bottles or batteries, although intended for medical use and hospital functioning, could be interpreted differently than “medical equipment”, especially due to their potential dual-use for military purposes.

A specific issue in the execution of the convoy was the prohibition of medical staff from staying in Nova Bila, despite their intention to work there. There was a fully justified and legitimate humanitarian need for their presence in Nova Bila, particularly because the Muslim side had previously not allowed the evacuation of the wounded and sick from Nova Bila, a duty mandated by international humanitarian law. Allowing mere passage of medical staff without permission for them to stay in Nova Bila is not only absurd from a humanitarian standpoint but also an example of malicious circumvention of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.

Regarding the obligations of impartiality and non-discrimination in the execution of relief actions, the Croatian side demonstrated full respect for these principles. From the beginning, they pledged to transport aid to Kruščica, Mahala, and Zenica, addressing the needs of both Muslim and Jewish communities. However, the Muslim side prohibited the delivery of aid to the Jewish community, which constitutes an example of adverse distinction prohibited by international humanitarian law.

The Muslim side exercised its right to search the contents of the convoy. However, their approach was extremely malicious, characterized by

unnecessary delays of the convoy en route to Nova Bila, hurried demands for its return from Nova Bila accompanied by vague and unclear ultimatums, repeated searches of the cargo, prolonged detention of convoy participants in harsh winter conditions, robbery of some participants and vehicles, and intimidation and maltreatment of others. These actions are clear violations of international humanitarian law, which mandates that the passage of relief convoys be rapid, unimpeded, and without unnecessary delays.

In contrast, the Croatian side in Bosnia and Herzegovina fully respected the international legal framework and all its obligations concerning the convoy that traveled simultaneously to meet the needs of the Muslim civilian population. This adherence to international law underscores the disparity in how the two sides managed their respective humanitarian responsibilities.

Based on numerous factual findings and the variety of features and circumstances of the presented case, it is reasonable to conclude that the treatment of the convoy for Nova Bila was calculated to deter any future Croatian attempts to send humanitarian aid convoys to the civilian population in Central Bosnia. After extensive and comprehensive efforts to prepare the convoy for Nova Bila on diplomatic, social, economic, military, and other grounds, the series of unfavorable events during its execution can hardly be attributed to mere coincidence, a juncture of circumstances, spontaneity in actions, or the general chaos of war.

While it is understandable that humanitarian organizations should not impede military operations during wartime, initiating a large-scale military operation precisely at the time of the arrival of a carefully and consensually agreed-upon humanitarian aid convoy suggests a deliberate and strategic decision by the highest levels of Muslim political and military leadership. This calculated behavior highlights an intent to discourage any future Croatian humanitarian efforts, reflecting a broader strategy beyond the immediate tactical situation.

In our opinion, considering the material damage caused, the inflicted mental pain and suffering, as well as the murder and wounding of the participants of the Convoy, a war crime has been committed. By its nature, it must be investigated and prosecuted in accordance with both individual and

command responsibility criteria. It is a fact that international criminal justice prioritizes crimes of larger scale and those committed intentionally as part of wider plans and political agendas. However, to prevent the impunity of the still widespread practice of both massive and individual attacks on humanitarian aid convoys, states whose citizens fall victim to such crimes should also rely on their own judicial systems. This approach not only seeks justice within their national framework but also practically reaffirms their commitment to the principles that once inspired states and international organizations to establish the international legal framework discussed in this article.

When deliberating the role of peacekeeping forces, the case of the convoy for Nova Bila revealed a discrepancy between the potential for protection and the protection that was actually provided. Furthermore, the reaction from both peacekeeping forces and the UN Security Council, as well as the UN Secretary-General, was notably less robust compared to a similar incident that occurred only a few weeks earlier. Regardless of the complexities involved in the mandates and practices of peacekeeping forces concerning the protection of humanitarian aid convoys, accompanied by various views and interpretations in the international arena, the fact remains that the participants of the convoy for Nova Bila ultimately received the protection they had demanded from the beginning. However, this protection was not provided in a timely manner, and the assistance extended after the attack on the convoy, which resulted in death and injury to participants, came too late. Considering everything presented in this article, mostly based on the experiences of the immediate participants of the convoy, it is still hoped that the “White Road for Nova Bila and Silver Bosnia” convoy case study will contribute, among other things, to a comprehensive review of the duties and tasks of UN peacekeeping forces regarding humanitarian aid convoys, despite the three decades that have passed since its occurrence.

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Ometanje konvoja humanitarne pomoći kao povreda međunarodnog prava – studija slučaja konvoja za Novu Bilu

Sažetak

Humanitarni subjekti desetljećima se širom svijeta suočavaju s izazovom sigurnog dolaska do onih kojima je humanitarna pomoć namijenjena. Razni su modaliteti ometanja, od administrativnih do zastrašivanja i fizičkog nasilja, dok oni koji ometaju realizaciju konvoja redovito prikrivaju svoje prave namjere. Niz prepoznatljivih modaliteta ometanja pokazao se i prilikom realizacije hrvatskog konvoja „Bijeli put za Novu Bilu i Bosnu Srebrenu” potkraj 1993. Polazeći od strategijskog konteksta oružanog sukoba, iz kojega je proistekla potreba za tim konvojem, te općeg međunarodnopravnog okvira za pružanje humanitarne pomoći, u članku se sadržaj brojnih svjedočanstava neposrednih sudionika konvoja „Bijeli put” promatra kroz prizmu (ne)poštivanja preuzetih međunarodnopravnih obveza. Članak također daje uvid u relevantnu praksu Međunarodnog kaznenog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju (MKSJ) vezano uz Bosnu i Hercegovinu (BiH), kao i u neke dokumente i postupanja pojedinih tijela Ujedinjenih naroda (UN) te mišljenja nekih pravnih pisaca. Zaključak je kako je konvoj „Bijeli put” imao pravilnu i dopuštenu sorhu, bio pripremljen i odobren na adekvatnim razinama, a proveden bez pristranosti i nepovoljnog razlikovanja. Niz događaja na štetu konvoja nije moguće pripisati slučaju, stjecaju okolnosti, spontanosti u postupanju ili ratnoj stihiji, već namjeri i planu muslimanske (bošnjačke) strane. Kako u međunarodnom pravosuđu prednost u procesuiranju redovito imaju ratni zločini većih razmjera i oni koji izviru iz širih planova, odnosno političkih ciljeva, u uvjetima raširenosti prakse napada na konvoje humanitarne pomoći u članku se zagovara veće angažiranje nacionalnih pravosudnih sustava. Naposljetku, bez obzira na vremenski odmak, iskustva konvoja „Bijeli put” još uvijek mogu poslužiti za kritičko sagledavanje uloge mirovnih snaga u zaštiti konvoja.

Ključne riječi

humanitarna pomoć, konvoj, Srednja Bosna, Bijeli put, UNPROFOR, Ženevske konvencije

Croatian Red Cross in the Homeland Security System

Matea Brižić

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the Croatian Red Cross, as the national society of the Red Cross in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, has its place and significance within the newly established homeland security system, which gained legitimacy through the Homeland Security System Act of 2017. However, this system requires further development to fulfill its fundamental functions in that system. Furthermore, the paper describes the activities of the Croatian Red Cross as an international organization that operates on unique principles in crisis situations, which make this organization recognizable worldwide. The paper provides personal observations, guidelines, and recommendations from the author regarding the further development of the homeland security system and the Croatian Red Cross as one of its components, which has a wide network of societies and direct interaction with a many of citizens. Through synergistic collaboration and the utilization of comparative advantages of each component that builds the homeland security system, the system becomes a coordination platform that places the individual at its center, develops state resilience in crisis response, and significantly contributes to overall security.

Keywords

Croatian Red Cross, homeland security system, operational forces of the civil protection system, action in crisis situations, Homeland Security System Act

Introduction

The world and its dynamics are becoming increasingly complex, with a higher level of interdependence. The world has become an arena of constant conflicts and competitions among state and non-state actors, making it difficult to maintain a state of security, which is one of the fundamental functions of a state. "A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is capable of preserving them by war if it is provoked" (Lippmann, 1943).

Although discussions on national security have been as old as the considerations of society and the state, the concept of national security is associated with the work of W. Lippmann's "U.S. Foreign Policy," and it first entered legislative documents in 1947 when the United States introduced the National Security Act (Tatalović, 2006).

"The concept, as well as the need for national security, emerged because the survival of the state and society could no longer be organized solely by organizing and implementing military defense on a certain territory, but states and society had to undertake comprehensive actions to achieve their goals, primarily peace and survival" (Tatalović, 2006).

Security is a social concept and a need characterized by the absence of direct threats to fundamental values, which change over time as the understanding of security itself evolves. As German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967) once said, "Security is not everything, but everything without security is nothing," (Mayer, 1994) and that remains unchanged, while everything changes, becoming more dependent and complex. Therefore, as society develops, various security concepts and systems also evolve. One of the recent concepts related to security is homeland security, which attempts to respond to the security paradigm of the modern world and environment.

The concept of homeland security is not universal, as it appears declaratively in legal documents in a smaller number of countries such as the United States, Croatia, or Germany.

Depending on its geostrategic and geopolitical position and global trends, the task of the Republic of Croatia (RH) as a state is to develop a secure

environment for all citizens. Security, besides being the goal and need of every citizen, is also one of the fundamental values of RH, and as such, it is mentioned multiple times in the Constitution approaches security at a personal level, for example, Article 37: "Everyone is guaranteed security and confidentiality of personal data..." However, the Constitution also defines when the security of the state can take precedence over individual security through legislation. For example, Article 50 states: "Entrepreneurial freedom and property rights can be restricted by law in order to protect the interests and security of the RH, nature, human environment, and human health..." (The Constitution of the RH, NN 05/14)

Ultimately, on July 1, 2013, RH became a full member of the European Union (EU), and based on the legal basis of membership and the transfer of constitutional powers to the Union, it added Article 143 to its Constitution, stating "The Republic of Croatia, based on Article 142 of the Constitution, as a member state of the European Union, participates in the creation of European community in order to ensure lasting peace, freedom, security, and prosperity together with other European countries and to achieve other common goals, in accordance with the fundamental principles and values on which the European Union is based." It is clear from this that security is a common value of all EU member states. (The Constitution of the RH, NN 05/14)

The issue of homeland security in Croatia is directly addressed by only two documents adopted in 2017, the National Security Strategy and the Law on Homeland Security System (NN108/17). The National Security Strategy underwent its revision after more than fifteen years, and in the same year, the Law on Homeland Security System was enacted for the first time (NN108/17). (National Security Strategy, 2017), (Law on Homeland Security System, NN 108/17). More than 150 experts, led by the Deputy Prime Minister of the Croatian Government and the Minister of Defense, Damir Krstičević, worked on these two strategic documents, emphasizing that "the issue of national security is non-partisan and requires the consensus of the entire society because it is in the interest of Croatia and all its citizens" (Government RH, 2017)

In the 2017 National Security Strategy, the need for a homeland security system is defined in official documents dealing with security in Croatia for the first time, with the establishment and development of the homeland security system defined as one of the nine strategic goals for the next period. Following the strategy, the Law on Homeland Security System (NN108/17) came into force in November of the same year. Both documents place significant importance on risk assessment. In the book "National Security of Croatia in the 21st Century," Pokaz emphasizes that risk assessment was the starting point in the development of the homeland security system, which led to the development of a system designed as a platform for interdepartmental and interdisciplinary risk management (Pokaz et al., 2019). Pokaz further states, "...Croatia had a need to formally establish a system in which its components, through their complementary competencies, obligations, functions, and competencies, could effectively carry out all tasks within the framework of managing security risks, with the aim of preserving and strengthening national security... The Law on Homeland Security System is a *conditio sine qua non* when it comes to its establishment. However, it is only the first necessary step towards the establishment, construction, and development of the projected homeland security system" (Pokaz et al., 2019).

On the other hand, in 2021, Barić wrote on this topic, stating, "This is a very short document (only six pages and 22 articles) that did not address any key issues necessary for the establishment and development of the homeland security system. Like the National Security Strategy, the law does not provide any indication of the system's concept and objectives to be achieved. The only thing that can be inferred from the law is that the principle of coordination, rather than integration of the components of the national security system engaged in these tasks, will be applied" (Barić, 2021).

In the foundational provisions of the Law on Homeland Security System (NN 108/2017), the importance and tasks of the homeland security system are emphasized explicitly. It states:

- (1) This Law, to systematically manage security risks of importance to national security and crisis actions, establishes the homeland security system.
- (2) This Law regulates the coordinated actions of the bodies of the homeland security system and the implementation of activities and tasks within the

jurisdiction of the bodies of the homeland security system arising from this Law, relating to the management of security risks and crisis actions (Law on Homeland Security System, NN 108/17).

The system took a step forward by enacting the Law on Homeland Security System, which legally defines the term of crisis for the first time (Article 3 of the Law). However, the problem is that the term is not harmonized with other legislative and sub-legislative acts. As mentioned earlier, the establishment of the homeland security system does not lead to the development of a new system but rather the integration of capabilities of its components (Articles 6 and 7). However, it is unclear why the components of the system in Article 7 are placed under conditional participation. The law explicitly states that "Within the homeland security system, legal persons that are particularly important for defense, protection, and rescue (Croatian Firefighters Association, Croatian Red Cross, Croatian Mountain Rescue Service, etc.), associations originating from the Homeland War, citizen, like other legal entities that, due to their capabilities, can support the homeland security system in implementing activities and tasks related to managing security risks and crisis situations of national importance." Therefore, the fundamental operational forces of the civil protection system have been conditionally involved without a clear answer as to when and under what conditions. By interpreting the Law on Civil Protection, one could argue that they are indirectly mentioned in Article 6 and that their engagement and actions are implied through civil protection. However, the previous practice has been confusing when the engagement of fundamental operational forces was expected based on their own assessment in accordance with legal provisions and public authorities, without additional decisions. Since such decisions also entail a series of other rights, including material ones, it remains to be seen whether this practice will continue during the operations within the homeland security system or if it will be regulated by other documents (standard operating procedures, plans, and/or decisions).

However, after the Law on Homeland Security came into force at the end of 2017, Croatia unfortunately experienced various extraordinary events and disasters (COVID-19 crisis, Zagreb earthquake, Banovina earthquake, floods, Ukrainian crisis, drone crash...) in which the coordination of the

components of the homeland security system was tested, and time will tell how successful it was. Similarly, with each subsequent case, all participants in the system received further confirmation that it is essential to continue developing such a system with an emphasis on the coordinating role, as clearly stated in the law itself.

From a strategic level, it can be said that the legal framework has been provided, clearly defining the purpose of system development. However, the first oversight in the further process of system development was made right at the beginning. The Law itself, in transitional and final provisions, states the following steps to be taken within six months of its enactment: the adoption of a Plan of Standard Operating Procedures (Article 19) and the enactment of Regulations on the criteria and conditions for engaging legal entities (Article 20). However, as it is known, this has not been done so far.

Croatian Red Cross

Croatian Red Cross (CRC) has been involved in all significant emergencies that have occurred on the territory of Croatia, from the Homeland War to the present day. It has demonstrated its readiness and continues to act as one of the components of the civil protection system, the former protection and rescue system, in line with its tasks and public responsibilities. Throughout its actions, the fundamental principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, as well as international influence and support, have never been neglected. Based on this experience, this paper aims to demonstrate that CRC, with its role and significance, has an appropriate place in the newly established homeland security system.

The National Society of CRC, headquartered in Zagreb, coordinates the work of 20 county branches and 111 city branches. Therefore, a total of 131 branches within the CRC, with each society having its legal personality and financial independence. The largest branch is the City Branch of the Red Cross Zagreb, which has the status of both a county and a city branch. Besides the City Branch of Zagreb, a similar situation exists only with the Red Cross Branch Čakovec. Within the Red Cross branches, there are various clubs or sections that do not have legal personality, such as blood donor clubs, youth sections, rescue clubs, and/or intervention teams. (CRC, 2022.)

The work of CRC is managed by the bodies of CRC based on the Law on the Croatian Red Cross (NN 71/10), the Law on Associations (NN 74/14, 70/17), and the Statute of the Croatian Red Cross:

- The Assembly of the society is the highest governing body.
- The President presides over the Assembly and the Main Board.
- Two Vice Presidents.
- The Main Board serves as the executive body responsible for the work between Assembly meetings.
- The Executive President manages the Central Office and is responsible for implementing the activities, tasks, and decisions of CRC. The Executive President is accountable to the Main Board and the Assembly.
- The Supervisory Board oversees the financial and material operations of CRC and reports on its work to the Main Board and the Assembly (Markt, 2021).

One of the specificities of the CRC, compared to other humanitarian organizations, is the public authorities conferred upon it by the Republic of Croatia through the Law on the Croatian Red Cross (NN 71/10, 136/20). The Law regulates public authorities, activities, and financing of the CRC as the national society of the Red Cross within the territory of the RH, as well as the conditions and manner of use and protection of the Red Cross emblem and name.

According to the Law on the Croatian Red Cross (NN 71/10, 136/20), CRC exercises 14 public authorities (under Article 8.), several of which are directly related to crisis operations:

“4. Requests, receives, and distributes humanitarian aid from international organizations and other donors, as well as national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, for the needs in the territory of Croatia in exceptional situations. (Law on the Croatian Red Cross NN 71/10, 136/20)

13. Establishes, trains, and equips teams for performing tasks in case of major natural, ecological, technological, and other disasters resulting in mass casualties, epidemics, and armed conflicts for domestic and international aid

actions. These teams include: situation assessment and activity coordination, first aid, water life-saving, hygiene and epidemiological protection, care for the injured and sick, work in mobile medical stations, social work, psychosocial support to the population, preparation and organization of displaced centers, search services, logistics, provision of drinking water, communication services, technical assistance, and prevention of secondary harm." Furthermore, indirectly, almost all 14 public authorities are connected to one of the phases within crisis operations, from prevention to recovery." (Law on the Croatian Red Cross NN 71/10, 136/20)

In addition to the Law on the Croatian Red Cross (NN 71/10, 136/20), the specific actions of CRC in crisis situations are also regulated by the Law on the Civil Protection System (NN 82/15, 118/18, 31/20), which defines the rights and obligations of state administration, local and regional self-government units, as well as the roles of legal and natural persons in preparedness, prevention, and response to crisis events. According to Article 20. paragraph 1. subparagraph c), CRC operational forces are listed as the operational forces of the civil protection system. Article 29, paragraph 2, states that CRC's operational forces are called the basic operational forces of the civil protection system in major accidents and disasters.

The principles of action, divided into two categories, are defined in Article 7 of the Law on the Civil Protection System. The general principles, which include the principles of humanity and non-discrimination, fully overlap with the fundamental principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The principles of operational action of the civil protection system – subsidiarity, solidarity, and continuity of action – are also part of the code of action of the Red Cross.

The legal framework for the activities of humanitarian organizations in crisis situations is further defined through several other laws, including the Law on Associations (NN 74/14, 70/17), the Law on Humanitarian Aid (NN 128/10), and the Law on Volunteering (NN 5/07, 22/13, 84/21), as volunteers constitute the basis of CRC's operational forces.

In addition to the laws, the actions of the Red Cross during crisis situations

are regulated and described in various internal acts, among which the following are important:

- Statute of the Croatian Red Cross – the fundamental document that regulates the organization’s structure, relations among levels of organization, certain authorities, and responsibilities, and defines the scope of CRC’s work.
- Regulation on the Organization, Preparation, and Action of CRC in Crisis Situations – establishes the legal framework, principles of action, organization of operational forces, tasks and activities, rights and obligations, and other important issues for action in crisis situations.
- Standard Reserves – a document that plans and recommends the stock status of humanitarian aid and equipment for the operational forces of the Red Cross at the national and county levels, based on risk assessments and previous experience.

Role and Significance of the Croatian Red Cross Within the Homeland Security System

The number of participants in the security risk management process has been increasing over time, and due to the large number of system stakeholders, coordination becomes more complex. As stated by Pokaz et al. (2019), “The same is true for the civil protection system, where management responsibilities become more complex at different levels ... as well as due to the large number of participants, which leads to numerous ambiguities regarding management and coordination.” Moreover, based on the lessons learned, all participants in the operational forces unanimously agree that there has been a lack of effective coordination, which is defined as the subject of the Law in Article 1. While most services have performed their tasks and been active in the field, the “only” thing that was often lacking was information. Almost always, all the necessary components for a response exist, with the required capacities and competencies, but a unified platform is missing through which the response of actors can be coordinated, thereby significantly increasing the effectiveness of the response, and rationalizing

the use of material and human resources. As mentioned earlier, Croatia had a need to establish a homeland security system, and the Law on Homeland Security System was the first and necessary step.

Article 5 of the Law on Homeland Security System defines its purpose through seven paragraphs. The following paragraphs will describe the position of the CRC, define its current capacities, and explore the possibilities for contributions to the development of the homeland security system.

“1. Ensure rational and efficient, coordinated use of existing resources to reduce or eliminate security risks of national importance.” (NN 108/17)

Security is the foundation of a state, and risk management reflects the ability of a state. To reduce or eliminate risks, several prerequisites need to be fulfilled. The first is to identify risks and then have a good understanding of them. Raising awareness among citizens, acquainting them with risks, and ultimately educating them are necessary for reducing or eliminating security risks and ensuring an adequate response in the event of a crisis. This is also connected to the education of specialized personnel, the development of operational capabilities of civil protection system forces, and the involvement of scientific institutions. In line with these goals, the Government of the Republic of Croatia adopted the Disaster Risk Assessment for Croatia in 2019, which served as the basis for the Disaster Risk Management Strategy until 2030, with the primary objective of strengthening disaster risk management capabilities. The mentioned strategy was adopted in October 2022.

According to the Global Development Research Centre (GDRC), the goal of risk management is to reduce or avoid potential damages and losses, ensure prompt and appropriate assistance to disaster victims, and achieve a fast and effective response.

“The purpose of the Disaster Risk Management Strategy until 2030 is to improve risk management capabilities in every segment, in all sectors and at all levels, for all risks in Croatia, determining priority measures in line with the Risk Assessment. The strategic objectives of the Disaster Risk Management Strategy until 2030 divide the risk management cycle into two parts for ease of implementation: a) activities aimed at reducing disaster risks during the pre-disaster period and after the response phase, and b) activities aimed at

improving disaster management, including strengthening preparedness and response to disasters” (SUROK , 2022).

The CRC has a developed network of 131 Red Cross branches, and there is a hierarchical management system developed at three levels: city, county, and national. Through this system, the CRC has a broad base and direct contact with citizens. (CRC, 2022.)

Education of the population and raising public awareness about risks identified through the Disaster Risk Management Strategy can be easily carried out through the CRC system. The CRC has implemented a range of successful education programs and initiatives and can continue to do so. An additional advantage of the CRC is its direct contact with a large number of proactive populations gathered around local Red Cross societies, where these resources can be easily utilized in various national interest education campaigns that have not been utilized as potential so far.

“2. Strengthen the management function in extraordinary and crisis situations that pose a risk to national security, including crisis situations managed at the level of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and/or the European Union.” (NN108/17)

Within the homeland security system, the CRC can provide part of its staff that is educated and/or experienced in crisis situations, both from previous crises on Croatian territory and through participation in various international missions. The leadership of the Croatian Red Cross’s operational forces often undergoes training and exercises within the framework of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, which is well-known and recognized at the international level. This experience and diversity of approaches should be utilized as a benefit within the homeland security system.

Crises and disasters usually do not recognize borders, as we have experienced in recent history (the floods of 2014). By joining the European Union and NATO, CRC work is not finished; on the contrary, we must work on developing leaders and their positioning to become increasingly resilient to security challenges every day.

When setting the strategic goal of Croatia's accession to the EU, Lasić wrote in 1992: "It is important that we do not resemble those blind people mocked by De Gaulle who shouted in parliaments - Europe, Europe, thinking that they had solved all the problems. It is important that we try to determine our possibilities and chances that are currently available as precisely as possible. In order to succeed, we must never forget that Europe is a group of nations who have been playing a merciless and bloody poker game for a thousand years and cannot leave the table." (Lasić, 1992). The same applies today, as the differences between nations have diminished on the surface and are not so evident in everyday peacetime situations. However, during crises, each of these differences comes to the forefront.

One only needs to remember the COVID-19 crisis and the disparities and independence with which European Union member states acted. Therefore, it is extremely important to position ourselves in different positions but also not to forget about the opportunities we currently have.

"3. Enable systematic and coordinated development of capabilities of bodies within the homeland security system."

Systematic development of capabilities is almost always tied to financial resources, which have always been insufficient or very limited, especially for institutions with secondary roles like the CRC. However, despite this, the CRC has managed to build capabilities and modernize through a series of international projects and programs, as well as through EU funds, to be able to operate within the homeland security system according to its tasks. It can be expected that the homeland security system, through its components, will enable systematic development based on rational and efficient measures, with a special emphasis on coordinated risk prioritization and measures to avoid unnecessary duplication.

As an example, we can mention activities related to water rescue. In accordance with its public authority, the Croatian Red Cross leads the Water Rescue and Coastal Environmental Protection Service based on internationally accepted standards. It conducts training courses for lifeguards, instructors, and leaders and has developed capabilities, material resources, and human capacities for active operations in open waters. Over the past 25 years, the

Croatian Red Cross has trained over 4,700 lifeguards and has specialized teams for operating in challenging conditions (according to internal data of the Croatian Red Cross). Additionally, almost all other operational forces have their own teams for operating on or in water (Croatian Mountain Rescue Service, firefighters, police, and the military). However, there is no unified database of trained individuals or existing equipment, and almost every year, all the mentioned forces participate in interventions related to floods. After the initial step of defining what the national-level system encompasses, it would be advisable to network and valorize the education system in this area to direct the most prepared individuals from the system to specific tasks, enable coordinated development of capabilities within the system, and avoid duplicate equipment procurement.

“7. Enable adequate contributions from the public and private sectors and civil society in the protection and strengthening of national security at all levels of the state and society.”

“The Law on Homeland Security System does not define a rigid and closed structure of the homeland security system. It allows all subjects of society and the state, legal and natural persons who have the necessary resources and abilities, to engage in the implementation of activities and tasks.” (Pokaz et al., 2019). The Law on Homeland Security System, through Article 7, defines the composition of the homeland security system, where, among other things, the CRC is listed together with the other two fundamental operational forces of the civil protection system: the Croatian Firefighting Association and the Croatian Mountain Rescue Service. In this regard, the operational forces of the CRC, in accordance with the public authority and the legal framework, see their position and function within the homeland security system.

CRC Capacities and Active Operations

CRC has existing capacities and active operations in line with the Regulation on the Structure, Organization, and Action in Crisis Situations. The operational forces of CRC consist of employees and volunteers organized in staffs, intervention teams, and support teams at the local, county, and national levels.

Currently, there are around 1,500 employees and volunteers deployed in intervention teams. These teams include individuals with specialized training for situation assessment and coordination (first response units), search and rescue tasks, psychosocial support, first aid, logistics, food security, hygiene and water, accommodation, and more. In addition to these teams, there are highly specialized teams such as the Water Rescue Intervention Team for rescue operations in challenging conditions. The support teams make up the largest operational force of CRC and undergo the prescribed basic training and a basic first aid course. They are predominantly composed of volunteers.

Throughout various crisis situations, both national and local, CRC has increased its readiness level and gained experience in providing an adequate response to crisis situations. What has set CRC apart from other operational forces in the system is that it remains active until the end.

The crisis response phase during the incident itself, as well as the recovery phase for CRC's operational forces, lasts significantly longer than for other emergency services in the system. This is why CRC currently has two major ongoing national operations: "Earthquakes," with a focus on the Sisak-Moslavina County, and the "Ukrainian crisis."

Existing capacities have been overstretched and continuously under maximum load for more than three years. The COVID-19 pandemic affected the entire country and activated the entire operational force of the Red Cross branches. In the first year alone, over 72,522 volunteer hours were worked, with around 3,500 volunteers and more than 1,600 employees in the field. The call center received over 85,000 calls and provided over 6,000 psychosocial support services. It is difficult to speak about CRC's indirect impact in the prevention phase before and during the pandemic, but it should be noted that there is almost no public sanitary facility without a CRC poster on proper handwashing.

The active operations in response to the pandemic were further intensified by devastating earthquakes that hit Zagreb and its surroundings in March 2020, as well as the Sisak-Moslavina County, parts of Zagreb County, and Karlovac County in December of the same year.

CRC was one of the first operational forces on the ground during the evacuation and recovery from the destructive earthquakes in Banovina. Currently, it is the last operational force still carrying out daily activities in that area with its volunteers and over 60 employees. The ongoing activities include the collection and distribution of necessary humanitarian aid, the provision of psychosocial support through individual visits and organized workshops tailored to the most vulnerable groups. Additionally, a well sanitization project is being implemented, which has multiple importance in the recovery process. In the initial months, CRC cared for over one hundred thousand beneficiaries, and although the number has decreased over time, it still exceeds 5,000 beneficiaries monthly. In line with its core mission, CRC will remain active on the earthquake-affected area until the last person returns to their home from temporary accommodation.

Due to the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, and in line with the fundamental mission of the Movement, CRC prepared and started receiving displaced persons from Ukraine on February 25, 2022. Currently, CRC is providing care for over 15,000 displaced persons, with the participation of 109 Red Cross branches. Initially, the intervention teams were stationed in three main reception centres: Osijek, Varaždin, and Gospić, and they continue to be present in all collective accommodation facilities organized by local self-government units or civil protection. The activities in the Ukrainian crisis are divided into three areas of operation: 1) Collection and distribution of humanitarian aid, 2) Psychosocial support, and 3) Tracing service.

Discussion

After presenting a review of theoretical facts and knowledge obtained from studying the available literature on this topic, as well as closely following the lectures in the "War School" Ban J. Jelačić" that had connections to it and based on my own experience as a volunteer and later as a professional staff member of the CRC, in the following chapter, I will present my thoughts and observations. I will attempt to highlight some of the challenges that, in my opinion, exist in the development of the homeland security system, as well as the CRC itself. Furthermore, I will try to describe some guidelines for the

future. This is my opinion and is based on the knowledge available to me, my reflections, and my own experience.

First and foremost, I want to say that I have a completely positive, affirmative, and open view of the year 2017 and the processes initiated by the then Deputy Prime Minister for National Security, Damir Krstičević, which pertained to the development of the homeland security system. However, I can also agree with colleagues who, during their lectures and discussions, stated that the first step was taken, but the agility in implementation was lacking. Today, when we retrospectively look at that period, we can find numerous justifications for why this is the case, but I believe that for looking forward, it is currently not overly important. On the contrary, if we want to be wise and extremely proactive – in these crisis years – we need to incorporate them into the ongoing process.

For the continuation of the comprehensive construction of the homeland security system, it is important to work simultaneously in three areas:

1. Strengthening and developing the homeland security system.
2. Strengthening and developing each component of the homeland security system, including the CRC
3. Working on the integration of components into the system and their coordination, to achieve the ultimate goal of the system's development.

All three directions must be pursued persistently, actively, and in parallel because only then can we ensure the rational and efficient utilization of existing resources, reduce, or eliminate certain risks relevant to national security, and effectively manage such a system when an extraordinary event occurs.

Strengthening and Developing the Homeland Security System

The construction and strengthening of the homeland security system is a complex process and an ongoing task. The purpose of the Law on Homeland Security, and dare I say, the purpose of the system itself as defined in

Article 5 of the Law on Homeland Security, will not be achieved until the question of who will implement it is answered. Since the coordination for the homeland security system is a coordinating body and not a managerial or operational one, practice has shown that the system lacks an operational body. According to my knowledge, such an operational body was supposed to be established as a separate state office or within the Office of the National Security Council, but to this day, none of that has been realized in practice.

Currently, there is no Department for Homeland Security within the system, and there is no designated email address or responsible individuals to work with as components of the system and seek guidance for further development.

Furthermore, according to Article 16 of the Law on the Homeland Security System, the Office of the National Security Council is mentioned as a component that provides administrative support to the work of the Coordination for the Homeland Security System. This leaves unclear who is responsible for providing administrative support to the system's work.

Continuing in Article 17 of the same law, it states that "The Office of the National Security Council participates in the development of strategic documents in the field of national security and the homeland security system, as well as in the assessment of national security risks and the determination of priorities in their treatment, and in connection with that, cooperates and provides support to competent state bodies, especially those whose obligations are determined by the law regulating the security protection of critical infrastructure." However, it is not clear who is responsible for these activities and who operationalizes them.

Due to these and similar uncertainties, operationalization has been lacking. The development of the system is hindered by these and similar ambiguities, as well as the inability to amend not only the core Law but also all other Laws that should be regulated and adapted to the contemporary environment, even at the initiative of the Homeland Security system.

The need for the existence of a homeland security system is significant, as demonstrated by past extraordinary events. Even the United States did not adequately respond to the initial challenges placed before them even

five years after the establishment of their system, as evident in the initial mistakes made during the response to Hurricane Katrina. However, these challenges should not shake us; instead, they should create a desire within us to respond precisely through regulations, rules, plans, strategies, and other subordinate acts – specifying who, where, when, how, and why will participate in the development of the homeland security system. When we answer these questions, the integration of components, their coordination, and the response to the next extraordinary event will be of higher quality, and the existence of such a system will be clearer to the public.

2. Strengthening and Developing Components of the Homeland Security System - Strengthening and Developing the Croatian Red Cross

Since its inception and early operations during the Croatian War of Independence until today, the CRC has participated in all significant crisis events that have occurred on the territory of Croatia. It has demonstrated its readiness to act as one of the components of the homeland security system in line with its tasks and public authorities. Throughout these operations, the fundamental principles of the Red Cross Movement, as well as international influence and support utilized by the CRC from international sources for its operations in Croatia, have never been neglected.

For the CRC to become a quality and valuable component of the homeland security system in the future, efforts should continue to be made to develop human potential - expanding the network of active participants (staff and volunteers) and enhancing their knowledge to make them even more resilient. Simultaneously, attention should be given to the material resources necessary for crisis response. The development of material resources is based on personal equipment for staff and volunteers to operate in crisis situations, as well as shared equipment needed in such situations, along with stocks of humanitarian aid required for initial response in crisis situations.

In the coming period, the CRC aims to further empower and prepare prominent individuals within city and county teams, as well as establish a National Intervention Team as an elite operational unit in crisis situations, ready to face various challenges in different disasters. (Strategic plan Croatian Red Cross 2023-2027) According to the plan, members of the CRC's

National Intervention Team should undergo additional specialized training, exercises, and assessments to be prepared to provide assistance and respond adequately to any crisis event, not only in Croatia but also in international missions where such aid is needed. The National Intervention Team would consist of up to 50 of the best members from the Intervention Teams of County branches of the CRC, who possess a range of developed capabilities necessary for field operations. (CRC, Strategic plan of the Croatian Red Crisis for the period 2024-2027)

In line with the purpose of the Disaster Risk Management Strategy until 2030, which aims to improve risk management capabilities in all segments and sectors, it is important to focus on the modernization of disaster management through the application of new knowledge and lessons learned. This will ensure that the readiness to respond to disasters is equally effective at the local, regional, and national levels. With its structure and network of branches, the CRC can certainly make a significant contribution to this goal, especially through prevention programs and raising awareness among many citizens about the security challenges and risks we will face in the future. The CRC has a network of 131 branches throughout Croatia, which already engage in a variety of activities in this field. With adequate guidance and synergistic cooperation with other components of the system, many citizens could be reached within a short period, making them more resilient to future challenges.

Integration of Components into the System and Their Coordination

“The further development of the homeland security system will necessitate the need to amend and supplement certain legal solutions, which will require the active involvement of the Coordination for the Homeland Security System in directing and coordinating this process from all aspects, not just in terms of harmonizing existing legal solutions” (Pokaz et al., 2019). Such a sequence of events will create prerequisites for the development of a platform that manages security risks in a modern, intersectoral, and interdisciplinary manner, along with their associated threats.

By developing such a platform, questions of duplication and parallel development of capabilities among multiple components can be easily addressed. Such a platform can better respond to financial challenges and operate more efficiently and purposefully. The development of such a platform opens the possibility for the establishment of stronger public-private partnerships, with individuals at the centre.

Through such an integrated platform consisting of system components working in a coordinated manner, challenges from previous crises, such as the emergence of a large number of volunteers, associations, and non-governmental organizations that want to participate in the response but lack effective management, can be addressed. From clear strategic objectives set by the Law, the system should derive its activities for operationalization and begin to act within them. In this age of computerization and digitization, I believe that databases of personnel and equipment can be easily developed to centrally manage information about what the system has and what it prioritizes. After that, mechanisms for attracting and retaining people in the homeland security system should be developed, followed by the effective management of knowledge and capabilities within the system, without neglecting the valuable experiences and lessons learned so far.

Conclusion

Security is one of the most complex functions of states. Therefore, as society and the state develop, various security concepts and systems are being developed to respond to known and unknown actors and ensure the security of the state, the nation, and ultimately the individual. One of the latest concepts that attempts to address the changing security paradigm is the Homeland Security system, which is sporadically developing in Western countries. In 2017, Croatia began developing its own Homeland Security system, based on two documents: the National Security Strategy, which recognizes the moment and the need for the development of the homeland security system, and the Law on the Homeland Security System, which provides the system with foundations and legitimacy.

The CRC has participated in all significant extraordinary events that have occurred on the territory of the Republic of Croatia since the Croatian War of Independence until today. Based on this experience, this paper aimed to demonstrate that the CRC, with its role and significance, should have a place in the newly established homeland security system.

During the continuation of the development of the homeland security system, several parallel directions need to be addressed: a) working on the system itself, its subordinate documents, and the operational part of the system; b) working on all components of the system, building and strengthening their capabilities; and c) working on the coordination of components within the system, to avoid duplication of specific capabilities and to prevent neglect or loss of specific capabilities of individual components.

All of this will require legal changes in the future, which should not be avoided but rather seen as a step forward. It is not excluded that there will need to be changes or expansions to the core Law on the Homeland Security System and/or changes and alignment of laws of specific components of the system. Overall, the homeland security system is necessary for Croatia because the threats and risks to which Croatia is constantly exposed require efficient and coordinated actions of all bodies of state administration and legal entities during crisis management.

In the future, the CRC in accordance the strategic plan for the period 2023.-2027. will continue to develop its own capabilities, material resources, and prepare for the challenges of the modern security environment through a wide range of activities. As a component of the system and one of the largest operational forces, based on voluntarism and solidarity, the CRC will empower every individual in our society and thereby contribute to the resilience and readiness of every citizen, ensuring that Croatia continues to be a secure state on the world map.

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Hrvatski Crveni križ u sustavu domovinske sigurnosti

Sažetak

Cilj je ovog rada pokazati da Hrvatski Crveni križ, kao nacionalno društvo Crvenog križa na teritoriju Republike Hrvatske, ima svoje mjesto i značaj unutar novouspostavljenog sustava domovinske sigurnosti, koji je legitimitet stekao donošenjem Zakona o sustavu domovinske sigurnosti 2017. godine. Međutim, ovaj sustav zahtijeva daljnji razvoj kako bi u potpunosti ispunio svoje temeljne funkcije unutar tog sustava. Nadalje, rad opisuje aktivnosti Hrvatskog Crvenog križa kao međunarodne organizacije koja djeluje prema jedinstvenim načelima u kriznim situacijama, što ovu organizaciju čini prepoznatljivom diljem svijeta. Rad donosi osobna zapažanja, smjernice i preporuke autora o daljnjem razvoju sustava domovinske sigurnosti i Hrvatskog Crvenog križa kao jedne od njegovih sastavnica, koja ima široku mrežu društava i izravnu interakciju s brojnim građanima. Sinergijskom suradnjom i korištenjem komparativnih prednosti svake sastavnice koja gradi sustav domovinske sigurnosti, sustav postaje koordinacijska platforma koja u središte stavlja pojedinca, razvija otpornost države u odgovoru na krize i značajno doprinosi ukupnoj sigurnosti.

Ključne riječi

Hrvatski Crveni križ, sustav domovinske sigurnosti, operativne snage sustava civilne zaštite, djelovanje u kriznim situacijama, Zakon o sustavu domovinske sigurnosti

Situation Awareness and Strategic Culture

Andreja Tomašević, Davor Ćutić, Zvonko Trzun

Abstract

The state of uncertainty in the strategic environment has been a persistent challenge throughout human history. The concept of situational awareness has existed for many years and entails understanding what is currently happening and, based on that information, what might occur in the future. Strategic culture represents a set of beliefs held by a specific community, gradually formed over time through a unique and lengthy historical process, with clear principles and practical application regarding the use of force. In this context, effective strategic planning requires a credible assessment of the starting point and the operational environment in the form of situational awareness, which is crucial before developing a VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity) strategic plan. Both components support strategic foresight as a key concept and tool for making effective and timely decisions. The aim of this paper is to present strategic culture and situational awareness, analyze scientific sources, and using the example of Ukraine, demonstrate how incomplete situational awareness can lead to erroneous thinking and, ultimately, tragically incorrect decisions.

Key words

situational awareness, strategic culture, decision making, concept of situational awareness

Introduction

Situation Awareness is the process of building comprehensive pictures of the battlespace to the decision maker who can further utilize it for threat evaluation. The concept of situational awareness is well-established in the domain of studying human factors in complex environments. In practice, there is a long list of examples that convince someone that situational awareness has its reality and significance. Indeed, knowledge of information relevant to the effective performance of tasks is crucial for safety and productivity in a wide range of situations, such as air traffic controllers, supersonic aircraft pilots, operators of nuclear power plants, and military commanders (Durso, F. T., & Gronlund, S. D. (1999). Situation awareness. In F. T. Durso (Ed.), *Handbook of applied cognition* (pp. 283–314). John Wiley & Sons Ltd.).

However, when attempting to define situational awareness (SA), the result is highly variable. Reviews of definitions from different sources (e.g., Dominguez, 1994; Breton and Rousseau, 2001) clearly indicate a diversity of perspectives on SA. As Breton and Rousseau (2007) and emerged as a crucial concept in dynamic human decision-making. When experts discuss the existence of the general phenomenon known as situational awareness, most discussions are reasonably consensual.

One might not be overly concerned about this situation. As Pew (2000) pointed out: The concept of situational awareness shares a common history with several psychological concepts such as intelligence, vigilance, attention, fatigue, stress, workload, or compatibility. For decades, all these concepts were poorly defined. However, each became important as it drew attention to critical processes or mental states that were previously unknown. Ultimately, they changed the ways in which human factors issues were studied and brought about new advantages

Defining Situation Awareness

Situation awareness is the understanding of an environment, and represents the understanding of what is happening now, and given that information, what may happen in the future. Furthermore, SA is an adaptable, externally

focused awareness that yields knowledge about the dynamic environment of tasks and directed action within that environment. It is recognized as a key foundation for successful decision-making in various situations, while inadequate situational awareness is acknowledged as one of the primary causes of accidents attributed to human error.

Research into SA definitions reveals a diversity of concepts currently conveyed in the literature. Breton and Rousseau (2001) conducted a systematic classification of 26 SA definitions. It turned out that these definitions were evenly divided into two classes that correspond to the now accepted duality of SA as a state or as a process.

Situational awareness represents the dominant concern of a system's operation, based on a descriptive view of decision-making. This exploration delves into the relationship between situational awareness and numerous factors comprising individuals and the environment. Among these factors, the ability to concentrate, focus on tasks, and absorb large amounts of information constitutes critical limiting factors in gathering and interpreting information from the environment to form situational awareness. Mental models and goal-directed behavior are assumed to be important mechanisms for overcoming these limitations. Individual awareness can be influenced by various factors such as specific design or model by which an individual behaves in a work environment, workload, stress, as well as the complexity of the information system used as a tool.

Modeling situational awareness is often used in the command and control domain to assess situations and provide decision support. However, models are complex in real-world applications and not straightforward to use. This paper introduces a Context-aware Decision Support system (CaDS), which consists of a situation model for collaborative modeling of situational awareness and a group of entity agents, one for each individual user, for focused and tailored decision support. By incorporating a rule-based reasoning mechanism, entity agents provide functions including event classification, action recommendations, and proactive decision-making. The implementation and performance of the proposed system are demonstrated through a case study on a simulated management and control application.

Defining Strategic Culture

Today, strategic culture can best be defined as a set of beliefs, which arise gradually over time and are created through a unique long-term historical process, held by a certain community, with clear attitudes and application in practice regarding the use of force. These beliefs of values and norms shape the country's approach to strategy and decision-making in international relations.

The study of strategic culture teaches us how to understand and interpret state and military action, how to locate individual maneuvers in a broader historical context, and consequently, how to better predict state behavior.

International Security Studies and Strategic Culture

Johnston (1995) discusses the progress made in studying strategic culture and raises conceptual and methodological issues in the literature. He advocates for caution in using strategic culture as an analytical tool and argues that the dominant approach to strategic culture is simultaneously insufficient and predetermined. Johnston suggests that the links between strategic culture and behavior should be approached with a great deal of caution because research on symbolic elements of strategy suggests that strategic culture may not have a direct, independent, and socially specific impact on strategic choices.

The question of culture did not attract much attention in international security studies and international relations theory until the last ten to fifteen years, when interest in culture, strategic culture, and other ideational explanations for the behavior of states has grown. Much of this new research is consistent with the conclusion of Joseph Nye and Sean Lynn-Jones (1988) that strategic studies has been characterized by American ethnocentrism and a concomitant neglect of "national styles of strategy". At the same time Ken Booth's study (1979), investigates the way in which cultural distortions have affected the theory and execution of strategy.

Most of those who use the term "culture" tend to argue, explicitly or implicitly, that different states have different predominant strategic preferences that are

rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites. Ahistorical or “objective” variables such as technology, polarity, or relative material capabilities are all of secondary importance. It is strategic culture, they argue, that gives meaning to these variables. The weight of historical experiences and historically-rooted strategic preferences tends to constrain responses to changes in the “objective” strategic environment, thus affecting strategic choices in unique ways. If strategic culture itself changes, it does so slowly, lagging behind changes in “objective” conditions.

Although the works on strategic culture of Jonathan Adelman and Chih-yu Shih (1993), David T. Twining (1989) and James March (1978), are somewhat older, they are still relevant and contemporary this does not imply that the strategic culture approach necessarily rejects rationality-though some of its proponents mistakenly treat strategic culture as opposed to assumptions of rationality. Indeed, strategic culture is compatible with notions of limited rationality (where strategic culture simplifies reality), with process rationality (where strategic culture defines ranked preferences or narrows options), and with adaptive rationality (where historical choices, analogies, metaphors, and precedents are invoked to guide ~choice). Scheling (1980) in his series of closely interrelated essays on game theory discuss how the strategic culture approach does seem potentially incompatible with game rationality. Whereas strategies in games focus on making the “best” choice depending on expectations about what other players will do, strategic culture, as the concept has been used to date, implies that a state’s strategic behavior is not fully responsive to others’ choices. Johnson (1991) point out how a burgeoning literature, however, points out that in multiple equilibria games (eg, coordination games, iterated prisoners’ dilemma games, etc.), ideational variables may explain why players’ expectations converge on certain equilibria, and how initial preferences and perceived payoffs are defined.

Instead, a historically imposed inertia on choice makes strategy less responsive to specific contingencies. Thus, in the view of some American analysts of Soviet strategic culture, the Soviets did not adopt American

MAD-based deterrence doctrines, as US. policy makers had once predicted they would, since Soviet strategic culture-based preferences

Gray (1999), one of the most esteemed scholars in the field of strategic thinking, elevates the scientific argument on studying and understanding strategic culture to a new level in his work titled "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation Theory Strikes Back." This article serves as a direct response to recent criticisms of the so-called first generation theorists of strategic culture. The author reexamines both the topic of strategic culture and what he wrote about it fifteen or more years ago. He finds that, while there is significant room for improvement in what he wrote at that time, recent theorizing by Alastair Iain Johnston, in particular, is based on a misunderstanding of the nature, character, and "action" of strategic culture. Johnston's insistence on separating ideas from behavior, with the dominant purpose of developing a theory that can be falsified, is particularly noteworthy. Therefore, "Strategic Culture as Context" thoroughly reconsiders issues of definition, with a specific focus on the nexus of ideas and behavior. The article proceeds to identify arguments that should enhance the understanding of how strategic culture "functions" and proposes a better set of discriminators, different perspectives, for a more nuanced consideration of evidence on strategic culture. Overall, the article suggests that strategic culture provides a context for understanding, rather than explaining causality of behavior.

Strategic culture: definition and origins of the debate

Strategic culture refers to a set of beliefs, values, and norms that shape a country's approach to strategy and decision-making in international relations. This culture plays a crucial role in forming perceptions of external threats, the state's identity, security priorities, and in shaping long-term strategic goals. Understanding strategic culture assists analysts, policymakers, and experts in international relations in better interpreting a state's behavior on the world stage.

Al-Rodhan Nayef (2015) speaks very broadly about strategic culture giving the view on strategic culture as an analytical lens through which to better view the continuities underlying international crises and the motivations

of a state's actions. Often, they are supported by a historical tendency of the state to preserve its perceived spheres of influence. Strategic culture can leave a lasting legacy in a state's strategic thinking for decades. Essentially, strategic culture is an attempt to integrate cultural considerations, cumulative historical memory, and their impacts into the analysis of a state's security policies and international relations.

Snyder (1977) defined strategic culture as the "sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to [...] strategy".

The strategic culture emerged from the Cold War and remain in low profile until the end of the Cold War when it was liberated from the monopoly of realist and neo-realist theories. Culture and nation-specific narratives deserve a thorough examination in the analysis of state security because they are engrained in our irrational mental strata, forming a code of conduct that is strong enough to resist environmental changes.

The strategic culture of any country has numerous sources and must remain a 'flexible' concept given the various factors influencing the formation of national culture and subsequent rationality of security policy and strategic thinking. Some essential principles can be extracted from the theoretical framework of strategic culture. Factors such as geopolitics, norms and customs, perceptions of regional and international roles, political systems, and power structures (including the balance between military and civilian actors or how military power and institutions are structured) solidify in collective memory and identity through political narratives, educational programs, artistic and popular interpretations (often carefully selected) of historical episodes, interpretations of shared memories, etc.

As Al-Rodhan (2015) emphasize each and every state enters the international arena with its historical baggage of accumulated experiences, beliefs, cultural influences and geographic and material limitations; all of which impact its conduct. As examples he presents Israel's highly emotional view of its culture or Iran's deep need for distinguishing itself are not just superficial facets of their 'national personality' but constant and predominant features of their

foreign policy. A clear example of these historical motivators could be given by China. It is virtually impossible to look at the foreign policy of China without considering the deeper historical and cultural roots that shaped it.

Policy framework

Studying strategic culture teaches us, as Al-Rodhan (2015) suggests, how to understand and interpret state and military actions, how to place specific maneuvers in a broader historical context, and consequently, how to better predict a state's behavior. Strategic culture is not dogma, nor is it a restrictive lens through which we view the past or future. It is a useful tool for understanding the circumstances under which a state defines appropriate means and goals to achieve its security objectives. Strategic culture thus encompasses what I term the 'emotions of states' (national pride and prestige) and the 'self-interest of states' (pursuit of national interests). This approach provides a holistic view of strategic culture as it considers both conceptual variables and specific constraints that states encounter in the international system.

In the process of deconstructing this discourse, more space is created for a clearer depiction of history, a more realistic and balanced acceptance of one's own past, friends, and foes. Such introspection reveals the sources of state self-characterization and also reveals deeply rooted uneasy, apprehensions and aspirations. It also build the groundwork for construct peace and a more stable international environment. Anarchy that can appear in global environment and its implications can be mitigated if and when these perceptions are successfully managed. Therefore, the relevance of strategic cultural analysis to policymaking aids interstate interaction to occur in an atmosphere of reduced tension and diminished prejudice.

Strategic culture represents a country's presentation of its culture and history, and more often than not, it is crucial for its state-building presentation. This paper is not supporting for abandoning the discourse of national unity but rather for a less hyperbolic and more moderate interpretation of cumulative experiences and the others that support individual national histories.

Cultural approaches to strategic studies, as Lantis (2009) sees it have existed in various forms for many years. The argument that culture influences national security policy is grounded in classical works, including the writings of Thucydides and Sun Tzu. Clausewitz advanced these ideas by recognizing war and military strategy as a “test of moral and physical strength.” The goal of strategy was much more than defeating the enemy on the battlefield – it was the elimination of enemy morale. In the twentieth century, studies of national character linked Japanese and German strategic choices in World War II to deeply rooted cultural factors. Russell Weigley’s classic 1973 work, “The American Way of Warfare,” further emphasized the importance of cultural roots in strategic dispositions. Jack Snyder’s work on Soviet nuclear strategy during the Cold War directed scholars’ attention to the crucial link between political and military culture and strategic choices.

The subject of strategic culture matters deeply because it raises core questions about the roots of, and influences upon, strategic behaviour. By strategic behaviour, Gray (1999) means behaviour relevant to the threat or use of force for political purposes. Gray and other scholars of the first generation authors on strategic culture, though, how fundamentally correct in understanding of the subject, could be insufficiently critical of the friction that intervenes between cultural preference and behaviour.

Situation Awareness and Strategic Culture

Predicting the future of warfare is a highly challenging task that requires a deep understanding of geopolitics, military strategy, and human behavior. While historical trends and patterns can provide insights into future possibilities, the complexity and unpredictability of war make it nearly impossible to accurately predict its outcomes with certainty.

To embark on predictions, one must first reflect on the present and become aware of the dynamism of the security environment. This entails continuous monitoring of events, data collection, and processing, as well as dissemination. Without a high level of situational awareness and the presence of strategic culture, strategic prediction would not be comprehensive and valid. These

two concepts are fundamental to successful decision-making, as illustrated in the figure below. For this reason, the paper will first explain both concepts before delving into strategic prediction, which forms the backbone.

Figure 1. Dependence of strategic forecasting on situational awareness and strategic culture




Source: Authors

Looking back over the years, good situational awareness has mostly involved training and experience, focusing on recognizing individual signs and learning about the “weight” of their significance. Technology, advanced sensors, data analysis tools, and decision support systems have elevated situational awareness to a higher level, enabling it to provide real-time information, data visualization, and predictive analytics.

Today’s systems and sensors dedicated to data collection are capable of generating vast amounts of data, both about the status of their own components and the conditions of the external environment. Thanks to advanced achievements in various segments of data communication and internet technologies, these systems provide data on almost everything, anywhere in the world. The challenge with such systems is no longer a lack of information but rather finding exactly what is needed at the moment it is needed.

The trend that is emerging, triggered by the overwhelming deluge of data, is a lack of informativeness. The reason for this is the vast gap between the large amount of data collected and people's ability to sift through and discern what is truly important in that heap. As the image below illustrates, more data does not necessarily mean more information. After identification, the data needs to be processed along with existing data to generate the necessary real and relevant information. When processing this data, special caution should be taken with all the challenges that arise due to the presence of strategic culture.

Figure 2. Information gap



Source: Authors

Theoretical Framework: Situation Awareness and Strategic Culture

The theoretical framework of situation awareness defined by Mica R. Endsley and Daniel J. Garland (2000), is based on various disciplines, including psychology, cognitive science, ergonomics, and various military sciences. A widely accepted definition describes situation awareness as the perception of elements in the environment within time and space, understanding their meaning, and projecting their status in the near future. This includes

awareness of relevant information, its accurate interpretation, and using that understanding to make effective decisions. Simply put, situation awareness is “knowing what is happening around you.”

According to the model developed by Endsley and Garland, situational awareness consists of three basic components: perception of situational elements, understanding situational elements, and predicting future events.

Strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols that act to establish pervasive and enduring strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and effectiveness of military force in inter-state political affairs and shaping these concepts in a way that makes strategic preferences uniquely realistic and effective. According to a widely accepted definition: “Strategic culture provides an analytical lens through which the continuities underlying international crises and the motivations of state actions are better perceived” Al-Rodhan (2015). In other words, it is a system of inherited concepts expressed in symbolic forms through which people communicate, sustain, and develop their knowledge and attitudes towards life. Many theorists conceptualize strategic culture as collectively held semi-conscious or unconscious images, assumptions, codes, and scripts that define the external environment. Johnston (1995) explain how these codes, images, and scripts enable a group to cope with issues related to external adaptation or internal integration. Essentially, it is an attempt to integrate cultural considerations of cumulative historical memory and their impacts on the analysis of states’ security policies and international relations.

Impact of Situation Awareness and Strategic Culture on the Decision-Making Process

By providing a foundation for assessing options and selecting appropriate courses of action, situational awareness influences decision-making processes¹. When discussing the decision-making process, the Situation Awareness (SA) model consists of several levels that form the structural

1 The general definition of this term states that it is “the process of identifying decisions, collecting information, and evaluating alternative solutions, with the result being a decision.” More commonly known as the Decision-Making Process.

basis for creating systems and tools that effectively measure and support SA. If any of these levels are not satisfied, strategic planning will not be effective, and decisions may be flawed. Additionally, it is crucial in the forecasting stage to ensure a “pool of expert analysts” who are unbiased, objective, and carefully consider all parameters, avoiding any influence from bias in their analyses.

The relationship between situational awareness and the decision-making process is mutual. Situational awareness provides the necessary information and overall understanding for effective decision-making, while decision-making relies on a clear and accurate understanding of the situation. Situational awareness also influences the speed and reliability of decision-making. Individuals who are situationally aware can process information more quickly, identify important details, and make real-time decisions.

Without situational awareness, an individual would lack the ability to gather, interpret, and analyze relevant information, resulting in irrational decisions. It is important to emphasize that all analytical work related to situational awareness, involving continuous monitoring and measurement, should be presented in numerical or other measurable forms. Referring to the quote at the beginning of this chapter, without a numerical representation and the ability to numerically demonstrate results, it would be challenging to convince people around them of the accuracy of their predictions.

What strategic culture should do is provide decision-makers with a uniquely structured set of strategic choices from which predictions about future behaviors can be derived. These behaviors can be observed in strategic cultural artifacts, and their changes can be tracked over time. The problem that arises with strategic culture is the dominance of subcultures that impose cultural forms on other groups, manipulate them, or persuade them that the dominant cultural forms are precisely their own forms.

Most users of the term “strategic culture” tend to argue that different states have different preferences rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state. They claim that the cognitive characteristics of a state and its elite are, to a certain extent, influenced by philosophical and political factors. The weight of historical experiences and historically rooted strategic preferences tends

to limit the response to changes in the “objective” strategic environment, thus influencing strategic choices and decisions.

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If it is established that strategic culture limits decision-makers, then it must be monitored and analyzed from its origins. In other words, if strategic choice is largely determined by values or assumptions deeply rooted in the ideological history of the state, it must be approached with caution because strategic culture provides the framework for strategic foresight through which decision-makers ultimately interpret or assess information. It shapes their perceptions, priorities, and inclinations. For example, different cultures may have different risk tolerances, leading to different influences on decision-making readiness. A culture more inclined to risk will result in an adventurous approach, while a risk-averse culture will likely opt for a more conservative version. Cultural factors such as openness to new ideas, willingness to adapt, and the ability to learn from mistakes also significantly influence the outcome of decisions. It is concluded that both situational awareness and strategic culture are equally important, and without them, it is impossible to conduct strategic foresight that will provide quality outcomes for decision-making.

Consequences of Poor Situation Awareness: Case Study Ukraine

The dual aggression of Russia against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 is an example of how incomplete situational awareness can lead to erroneous thinking and, ultimately, even tragically wrong decisions. Since Russia’s significant involvement in the so-called uprising of the threatened population and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, a belief prevailed among Western political leaders and analyst that Russian President Putin would not lead his country into new armed conflicts.

For example, on February 16, 2022, eight days before the start of the Russian aggression, the analyst from the Atlantic Council listed reasons „why Putin won't invade Ukraine“ (Ullman, 2022). It is worth noting that the Atlantic Council is a reputable organization with a rich 60-year history, describing itself as a nonpartisan organization that galvanizes US leadership and engagement in the world, in partnership with allies and partners, to shape solutions to global challenges - and precisely for that reason, one could expect their analysts to provide better assessments. But of course, it was not just the Atlantic Council that erred. There are other examples of poor forecasters, such as the BBC, which on February 21, 2022 (just three days before the start of the aggression), stated „reasons why Putin might not invade“ (Gardner, 2022).

In these articles, analysts argued that the Russian economy would suffer significant damage due to the aggression; a worsening standard of living would prompt the Russian population to revolt; and consequently, president Putin would (as a rational politician and even a businessman) prefer to abandon the planned „special operation“.

Not even an open attack on a neighboring sovereign state has opened the eyes of all analysts. A year and a half after the start of military operations, many analysts continued to predict the imminent cessation of military operations, still citing the same reasoning.

Indeed, the Russian economy did suffer a blow. The European Council summarizes reports from international financial organizations at the end of 2023 as follows: „According to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2022 was a bad year for the Russian economy. It is estimated that in 2022, Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) dropped by 2.1%. Russia's economy may continue to shrink in 2023. Its GDP is forecast to decline by 2.5% in the worst-case scenario (OECD) ...“ (European Council, 2023).

And still, despite the decline in economic indicators and the likely negative impact on the standard of living for Russians, Putin's popularity and support for the continuation of the „special operation“ remain high. In October 2023, according to a survey by the independent Levada Center, a significant 82%

of Russians supported President Putin's policy, and almost an equal level of support Russians expressed for the actions of Russian military forces in Ukraine (Levada-Center, 2023). Naturally, despite the predictions of Western analysts, the war continues with the same intensity. How is it possible that analysts were so wrong?

Above all, Western analysts persistently underestimate the strength and significance of Russian nationalism. A. C. Nehrbass writes about Russian nationalism, which is not just a harmless part of folklore but a clear foundation of the regime's strategy (Nehrbass, 2020). Putin does not casually evoke nationalism in the Russian public; instead, he almost exclusively uses it to push through unpopular decisions or secure a new presidential mandate for himself. Therefore, even when all else fails, as is the case when indicators of the standard of living begin to decline, Putin returns to nationalism, encouraging Russians to dream of the once-great Russian Empire. Russian pride is further fueled by reminders of the „glorious Soviet Union“. Actually, it was the time of the USSR that laid the groundwork for many of today's paranoias and phobias in the Russian public. During that era, the ruling members of the Communist Party constantly warned the domestic public about the „evil West“, portraying it as a force just waiting to destroy their country. The decadent and capitalism-poised West was the primary justification for all problems – a narrative that persists even today. Putin, therefore, is now merely reflecting decades of perfected mass manipulation, with inevitable external and internal enemies. External enemies have consistently been embodied in the West, characterized by capitalism and imperialism, while internal enemies no longer include opponents of communism or the Church. Instead, a new minority has been identified (homosexuals), towards whom concentrated public hatred is directed. This eventually led to Putin's 2013 law imposing fines and restrictions on propagandizing „nontraditional“ sexual relationships among minors.

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), on the other hand, has undergone a transformation from an enemy of the state to the foremost advocate for the ruling structure. The state actively promotes the Church's involvement in all spheres of public life. In this manner, a perfect harmony is established, driven more by the mutual interests of both sides than by any sincere alignment

of ideologies (Soroka, 2022). Some authors even refer to this phenomenon as the „weaponizing of the Church“ (Davis, 2019). The reality is that the Church adeptly fulfills its role as a mobilizer of masses for the Kremlin’s needs. The influence and interests of Russian Orthodox Church extend beyond the borders of today’s Russian Federation. Given the Church’s canonical jurisdiction, not to mention its economic interests, ROC also willingly participates in cross-border affairs.

The enduring presence of the imperial legacy in Russia’s political life cannot be ignored. The relationship between imperialism and Russian nationalism is perfectly reciprocal because, on the one hand, invoking the ancient glory of Tsarist Russia nurtures nationalism, just as nationalism prevents Russian society from stepping into the 21st century but constantly draws it back to times long past. The combination of Russian nationalism and imperial consciousness is a phenomenon distinctive to Russia and could be termed „imperial nationalism“. While this term may sound peculiar, especially to scholars raised within the Western academic tradition where nationalisms more often aimed at destroying empires, in Russia, imperial nationalism precisely supports imperial aspirations and aggression towards neighboring states that are supposedly to be reattached (effectively subjugated) to some new Russian Empire (Pain, 2016).

This imperialism at the expense of neighboring countries was blessed by Putin himself during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, in his well-known speech where he introduced the term „russkii narod“ (Kolstø, 2016). Here, Putin does not refer to the multi-ethnic people of his country or only to ethnic Russians within the Russian Federation; instead, he refers to Russians wherever they may live. In this speech, Putin lamented how the „russkii narod“ had become perhaps the most dispersed ethnic entity in the world after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The expression he used was a concept used, in the modern Russian political lexicon, only in the ethnic sense and not in referring to the political nation. For the latter, the Yeltsin Administration had introduced the term „rossiiskii narod“.

But now Putin returns to the terminology of the Russian Empire, and this would decisively mark the continuation of his policies. By invoking historical injustice that scattered Russians mercilessly across the world and

then claiming some imaginary right to reunite the entire „russkii narod“ in one homeland (even if it meant changing borders with other states), Putin laid the groundwork for a new, aggressive policy towards neighbors.

This backward (and foreign to them) thinking surprised scientists, analysts, and politicians of the modern West. The role of nationalism within the Russian public remained an underexamined but especially important driver of the crisis surrounding Russia's annexation of Crimea and the open aggression against Ukraine in 2022 (Gerber, 2014).

Situation awareness obviously failed in this case. It failed in the analysts' ability to understand the thought process of the subject of their analysis. The analyses of Western intelligence services (and the political leadership of these states) started from the assumption of a rational Russian society that would, with its rational decisions, compel Putin to make rational choices. Could he perhaps abandon the idea of aggression against Ukraine, realizing the crisis and isolation that Russia could face?

However, that did not happen, primarily because Putin was not a politician willing to engage in diplomatic solutions and dialogue with neighbors and the West (a separate article could be written about the absence of the same willingness in the West). Additionally, there was no control mechanism in the form of reduced public support that would force Putin to take corrective actions. Better situation awareness could and should have recognized the prevalence of nationalism in Russian society and the consequent high likelihood of precisely such a negative course of events.

Conclusion

From the discussion on strategic culture and situational awareness, several conclusions can be drawn such as: mutual influence, limitations of strategic culture, strategic foresight, risk and decision-making, comprehensive understanding, strategic predictions and adaptability. For each of components can be described as follows:

Mutual Influence: Situational awareness and strategic culture mutually influence each other. Strategic culture shapes the framework through which decision-makers interpret information, while situational awareness provides the necessary information for effective decision-making.

Limitations of Strategic Culture: Strategic culture, if overly dominant, can limit decision-makers. It may lead to biases and predetermined preferences that stem from the historical or cultural background of a state.

Strategic Foresight: Strategic culture is crucial for strategic foresight, as it provides decision-makers with a unique set of strategic choices rooted in the cultural and historical experiences of a state. This influences how information is interpreted and decisions are made.

Risk and Decision-Making: Cultural factors, such as risk tolerance, impact decision-making. Different cultures may exhibit varying degrees of risk aversion or risk-taking, influencing the approach to strategic decisions.

Comprehensive Understanding: Both situational awareness and strategic culture are essential for a comprehensive understanding of the factors influencing decision-making. While situational awareness provides real-time information, strategic culture offers a deeper context for interpretation.

Strategic Predictions: The combination of situational awareness and strategic culture is necessary for effective strategic predictions. Decision-makers need to consider both the immediate context and the historical-cultural context to make informed and successful predictions.

Adaptability: Cultural factors like openness to new ideas and the ability to learn from mistakes influence adaptability. Decision-makers from cultures with these traits may be more flexible and responsive to changing situations.

In essence, the interplay between strategic culture and situational awareness is vital for decision-makers to navigate complex geopolitical scenarios, make informed choices, and adapt to evolving circumstances.

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Svijest o situaciji i strateška kultura

Sažetak

Stanje nesigurnosti u strateškom okruženju predstavlja trajan izazov kroz povijest čovječanstva. Koncept situacijske svjesnosti postoji već dugi niz godina i podrazumijeva razumijevanje onoga što se trenutno događa, a isto tako – na temelju tih informacija – što bi se moglo dogoditi u budućnosti. Strateška kultura predstavlja skup uvjerenja koje određena zajednica drži, a koji se postupno oblikuju kroz jedinstven i dugotrajan povijesni proces, s jasnim načelima i praktičnom primjenom u pogledu uporabe sile. U tom kontekstu, učinkovito strateško planiranje zahtijeva vjerodostojnu procjenu početne točke i operationog okruženja u obliku situacijske svjesnosti, što je ključno prije izrade VUCA strateškog plana (volatilnost, nesigurnost, složenost i dvosmislenost). Obje komponente podržavaju strateško predviđanje kao ključni koncept i alat za donošenje učinkovitih i pravodobnih odluka.

Cilj je ovog rada predstaviti stratešku kulturu i situacijsku svjesnost, analizirati znanstvene izvore te, na primjeru Ukrajine, pokazati kako nepotpuna situacijska svjesnost može dovesti do pogrešnog razmišljanja i, u konačnici, tragično pogrešnih odluka.

Ključne riječi

situacijska svjesnost, strateška kultura, donošenje odluka, koncept situacijske svjesnosti

Strategic Foresight as a Prerequisite for a Timely Reaction

Andreja Tomašević, Davor Ćutić

Abstract

The state of uncertainty in the strategic environment has been a challenge throughout human history. Today's intelligence analysts must be not only creative, but also able to anticipate a new threat before it actually materializes. Without awareness of the current situation in the strategic environment and the trends that shape it, it is almost impossible to predict and develop relevant future scenarios. If we add to that today's picture of a very complex and dynamic world, strategic foresight is becoming an increasingly important tool for organizations and individuals in adapting to changes, anticipating risks and taking advantage of opportunities.

The aim of this paper is to provide insight into the processes and analytics of strategic forecasting" as a key concept and as a tool for making effective and timely decisions. Strategic foresight is fundamentally qualitative, but also quantitative in nature and includes not only the military dimension, but also others such as political, diplomatic, economic, social and others that are often crucial in relation to the military, but this paper will deal with mostly only in the military dimension.

Keywords

strategic foresight, forecast, analysis, risk assesment, uncertainty, defence

Introduction

Carl von Clausewitz (1997), one of the most influential and respected theorists of military strategy, argued that during military operations, it is impossible to predict all the circumstances that can affect the course of an operation. He explained the concept of the “fog of war,” asserting that war is nothing more than an area of uncertainty where individuals operate in a “fog,” making their actions unpredictable.

Predicting the future is very demanding, and when we add the word “war” to that term, it becomes even more complex. Predicting the escalation of crisis to war is an exceedingly challenging task for several reasons.

Firstly, war is a complex and dynamic phenomenon influenced by a broad array of factors, including political, social, economic, and cultural elements. This complexity makes it highly demanding to foresee how these factors will interact and impact the outcomes of war. Secondly, technology and military capabilities are continually evolving, significantly altering the character of warfare and its potential outcomes. For instance, the development and deployment of new technologies and tactics can give certain countries a desired advantage or lead to the emergence and evolution of new forms of warfare, such as cyber, information, and hybrid warfare.

Thirdly, the actions and decisions of individual leaders and groups often result from their personal preferences, emotions, and character, rendering prediction methods based solely on strict rational parameters irrelevant. Moreover, geopolitical dynamics rapidly change, dramatically altering the course of events.

Nevertheless, with existing historical trends and patterns, it is possible to develop outlines and predictions for future wars, bearing in mind that such forecasts are prone to errors due to the persistent unpredictability of human behavior and the intricate interplay of other external factors.

The purpose of this paper is to provide insight into the processes and analytics of strategic foresight. The aim of the paper is to highlight the importance of the strategic foresight as a tool and practice, by providing a brief overview of the concept within the European Union and NATO, forming the basis for a later proposed conceptualized model of strategic foresight.

Through content analysis and a case study of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the paper seeks to answer the questions related to monitoring critical indicators to achieve a high level of caution and readiness for events of this nature.

Being largely unexplored area within the framework of national defence planning process in the Republic of Croatia, this paper argues for a need to make strategic foresight an effective tool (precursor) for strategic planning. Consequently, we propose a creation of an integrated framework (methodology) that shapes strategic foresight analysis both as a capability (integrated in the MoD's organizational culture) and a tool (processes and systems). Implementing such a framework would mean establishing a starting point for the development of the process that starts with the creation of predictive hypotheses, and is in direct function of the strategic planning and support to decision making at the strategic level.

Assuming that "timely action," without preceding strategic foresight analysis, is highly questionable, the authors aim to demonstrate that a prerequisite for a timely response to future security challenges is high-quality designed and well-executed strategic foresight analysis.

The paper also presents the current state in the Republic of Croatia within the framework of the posed question, emphasizing that Croatia has not fully implemented this concept in its national defense and security system. However, it is a fact that there are no unified documents in Croatia addressing long-term plans; instead, there are sectoral planning documents. The concept of strategic foresight has not yet been incorporated into doctrinal documents and dictionaries, and thus, its introduction into practice is not expected. There is still a lack of synergy between national strategy and a timely response in Croatia

Definition and Characteristics of Strategic Foresight

Predicting the future of strategic environment is a highly challenging task that demands, among others, a profound understanding of geopolitics, economy, technology development, ecology and human behavior. While historical trends and patterns can offer insights into future possibilities,

the complexity and unpredictability that characterize the environment make it nearly impossible to accurately predict outcomes of such a system with certainty.

The aim of this chapter is to provide the theoretical framework of the concept of strategic foresight.

The first distinction that has to be made is between Forecasting and Foresighting. The main difference lies in the approach to describing the future. The focus of Foresight is on identifying driving forces of change, exploring their interactions and understanding a range of issues, signals and trends. Foresight is more about exploring possibilities than predicting numbers. It serves, primarily, as a precursor for strategic planning and development of long-term strategies. On the other hand, Forecasting uses analyses of past events and current conditions, and is based on the assumption that past results are a reliable predictor of future results. It is useful for creating short-term (near-term) scenarios. It follows that Forecasting, as a methodology, is actually just a part of a more comprehensive Foresight.

In Croatian terminology, both terms are translated as “strateško predviđanje,” and this work will use parentheses to indicate which aspect is being referred to.

Definition and Characteristics of Strategic Foresight

As stated by Coates (2010) strategic foresight is the practice of researching and anticipating future developments and trends, using this knowledge to make strategic decisions in the present. It typically involves a range of tools and methods, including scenario planning, trend analysis, environmental scanning, and the engagement of numerous participants. It occurs when any planner utilizes reviewed and categorized input data, forecasts, research on alternative futures, analysis, and feedback to develop or adjust plans and activities implemented by a particular organization. It is a potent tool for organizations and individuals seeking to navigate an increasingly complex and uncertain world, positioning themselves for success in facing future challenges and opportunities.

The practice of strategic foresight provides impetus for military leaders as well as civilian executives to anticipate the future, plan potential scenarios, and develop strategic decision-making. In this context, there are critical leadership qualities associated with foresight that, by their presence or absence, make a noticeable difference between success and failure when organizations confront uncertainty. To facilitate a clearer understanding of strategic foresight, numerous approaches exist to identify its characteristics. The authors have chosen four fundamental ones proposed by Sam Cook (2023), which relate to the qualities a leader or executive of an organization should possess. According to him, these characteristics involve cultivating “future” thinking, scenario planning, long-term vision, and agile decision-making.

In developing “future” thinking, Cook identifies horizon scanning as a crucial element of foresight leadership. He considers scenario planning a key aspect of embracing foresight leadership within an organization. The long-term vision possessed by a leader is seen as motivation for teams and a tool to align essential activities, ensuring all participants work as a cohesive unit with a common purpose. Agile decision-making, involving adaptability and versatility, is a characteristic that makes a leader adept at utilizing foresight in every decision-making process, earning the trust of the entire team in their leadership. These characteristics are typical of a military organization.

Basic Approaches to Strategic Foresight

Due to the presence of various parameters, strategic foresight can be examined through three distinct dimensions, relying on the past, the present, and the future. Therefore, an appropriate classification of strategic foresight falls under the general categories of:

Forecasting: This approach treats strategic foresight as a form of prediction, where the focus is on anticipating future developments based on historical and current data.

Episodic Interventions: In this perspective, strategic foresight is considered a result of ad hoc future exercises, emphasizing sporadic interventions to address specific scenarios.

Practice Approach: This approach views strategic foresight as a set of everyday practices and activities that enable organizations to create and secure sustainable competitive advantages.

By categorizing strategic foresight under these general headings, it provides a framework for understanding its diverse applications, encompassing both predictive elements and ongoing practices that contribute to an organization's adaptability and competitiveness.

Strategic forecasting represents a traditional perspective on strategic foresight. It generally relies on a linear assessment of the future, often formalized through strategic planning. In this sense, it utilizes traditional forecasting techniques such as S-curves, time series, econometrics, and mathematical modeling to address organizational challenges. By focusing on mapping and generalizing sets of historical data, this research stream promotes strategic forecasting as the capability to use quantitative techniques to predict technological directions, uncover evolving trends in the environment, and their potential impacts on the future competitiveness of the organization.

This approach is suitable for those who tend to believe that the future will closely resemble the past. In other words, observing strategic forecasting in this way suggests it to those who often let the future "take care of itself" rather than actively shaping it. This doesn't imply that creating a tangible future ensures its accuracy, but it can aid in finding a strategy robust enough to navigate changes in behavior and, in turn, contribute to shaping the future.

The tradition of episodic intervention treats strategic forecasting as a result of strategic exercises that are played out, involving the enactment of future scenarios in various directions and the monitoring of their outcomes. The narratives of such games are then used to develop compelling visions that closely resemble current global events. When modeling these narratives, internal resources, organizational structure, and all external factors with a likely impact on the future are considered. The results of modeling are diverse future scenarios that are then ranked based on their perceived uncertainty, resulting in a map of potential consequences for the organization's strategy.

This approach allows for seamless and free interaction with external participants who interpret and combine relevant past and present contextual

cues into meaningful knowledge directed towards the future. Moving away from the positivist approach to prediction, which relies on numbers, this approach, often referred to as intuitive logic due to its reliance on qualitative and informal tools, embraces methods such as value chain analysis, counterfactual narratives, mind mapping, and lateral thinking.

The practical approach shapes strategic foresight through the outcome of creative actions and daily activities of competent organizational actors. This approach advocates for a continuous focus on future thinking, not just episodic interventions as seen in the previous tradition. The practical approach is grounded in strategic dialogues and reflective, adaptive learning, with an open possibility for the involvement of external theorists and strategists. The result of this approach is strategic foresight in the form of strategies, defining strategic foresight as something organizations actively engage in, as opposed to something they possess.

Particular emphasis is placed on the importance of everyday organizational practices and micro-interactions among organizational members as the foundation for understanding the future and, consequently, effective ways to address challenges.

Strategic Foresight in the EU and NATO

The following section provides an overview of strategic foresight in the European Union and NATO, serving as the foundation for the later proposed conceptualized model of strategic foresight. Additionally, the status of strategic foresight in the Republic of Croatia is examined in this context.

EU and Strategic Foresight

Strategic forecasting plays a crucial role in the context of the European Commission (2023), as a tool for decision-making and future planning. The EU faces various challenges and complex issues that require anticipating future events, trends, and possibilities. As stated on the official website of the European Union: "Forecasting is a discipline that involves examining, predicting, and shaping the future, contributing to the development of

collective intelligence and its structured and systematic use for anticipating changes. Strategic forecasting should become part of the EU policymaking process. It systematically and structurally leverages collective intelligence, assisting in better planning for possible transitions, strengthening the EU's resilience to future shocks, and shaping the future we desire."

The EU bodies have prescribed the following steps in the implementation of strategic foresight:

Perspective Assessment: Systematically examining and collecting data on events and trends to predict future courses of action or visually mapping new signs of change.

Mega Trends Analysis: Analyzing changes in patterns and the interaction of trends, engaging in discussions to obtain a unified model of the future and an action plan.

Scenario Planning: An interactive and iterative process involving interviews, analyses, and modeling, resulting in a series of possible scenarios (desirable or undesirable) and the pathways leading to them.

Ultimately, *Vision Development:* Establishing the preferred direction, resulting in a shared understanding and a clear description of the desirable future and a medium-term plan outlining specific steps toward realizing the vision.

The report issued in 2022 is the latest and provides a comprehensive depiction of how rapid and robust changes in the environment impact transformations. Each new report confronts what is happening in the surroundings and offers the best possible solutions at the given moment for the coming years. For the first time, the EU's policy shifts towards green and digital transition, creating a comprehensive outlook until 2050, departing from the previously more short-term planning.

The report analyzes the significant impacts of digital technologies and the influence of all geopolitical, economic, and social factors on these two concepts. In the pursuit of ecological action and nature preservation, a connection and synergy are identified between digital technology and green technology, aiming for mutual collaboration and support for the common good.

Strategic Foresight and NATO

Due to the complexity and a certain high level of data protection within NATO operations, this chapter will not outline the specific steps of strategic foresight taken by NATO. However, it will provide insight into how strategic foresight within NATO promotes a long-term understanding and raises awareness of future trends, supporting decision-makers in their actions. The following paragraphs will illustrate how strategic foresight in the NATO Alliance is a fundamental tool for future considerations and the development of strategic documents. This concept is crucial given NATO's broad range of interests and the security challenges it faces.

Therefore, strategic foresight in NATO (2023) enables the organization to recognize and prepare for future threats and opportunities. Based on the results of strategic foresight, NATO can adjust its policies, strategies, resources, and operational capabilities to effectively respond to changes in the international environment. It is important to note that strategic foresight in NATO takes place in the context of ongoing dialogue and mutual collaboration among allies, aiming to ensure a common vision of the future and coordinate efforts to strengthen collective defense.

The collaborative effort in strategic foresight by all NATO member countries makes the alliance stronger. Representatives from NATO member countries, partners, and contributing nations gather to discuss future trends and the new realities the Alliance faces. The results of these discussions are compiled into a report analyzing strategic foresight for a specific upcoming period. The report examines key trends in global changes and the resulting defense and security implications for NATO, highlighting challenges as well as opportunities.

The aim of such reports is to identify trends that will shape the future strategic context and report implications for the Alliance up to a specific year and beyond. The first NATO (2013) document of this kind was adopted in 2013 under the title "Strategic Foresight Analysis," stating that SFA would be a living document regularly updated in line with developments in the environment. As stated in the document, SFA will identify trends in five broad areas: political, human, technological, economic, and environmental.

This document is designed to monitor and shape the Alliance's strategic context until 2030.

The latest NATO (2017) SFA document was adopted in 2017, building on previous reports from 2013 and 2015 year NATO3 (2015). It describes NATO's expectations for the period up to 2035 and beyond. It is noteworthy for proposing the creation of the document "Long-Term Military Transformation," where SFA is again responsible for raising awareness of security, without which military decision-makers cannot effectively operate.

It is concluded that, in the face of changes that are faster than ever today, both the EU and the NATO Alliance must act swiftly and make decisions in line with the challenges. For this reason, the reports that are produced are subject to changes and supplements if the situation requires it. The importance of involving the entire collective in extensive consultations that require cooperation among member states is emphasized, with each member state being ready to contribute with its comprehensive and informed approaches. Therefore, each country, including the Republic of Croatia, must conduct continuous foresight, both through a series of exercises within the Alliance and independently. The key is to focus on meeting and fulfilling all the steps of strategic foresight, as outlined and presented in this paper.

Strategic Foresight Status in the Republic of Croatia

Following an overview of strategic foresight within the EU and NATO, of which the Republic of Croatia (RH) is a member, this section provides an examination of the status of strategic foresight in Croatia. As an introductory segment, it is essential to highlight that the European Commission (2023) of the European Union, in one of its definitions of strategic foresight, stated: "*Strategic foresight seeks to integrate foresight into the creation of European Union policy. It is built on the collective collection of intelligence data in a structured and systematic manner.*"

As evident from the definition, collective intelligence data collection is a concept to which all members, including Croatia, are obliged to contribute. The aim of such data collection is to create a strong and resilient EU capable of withstanding all challenges and shaping the future in the desired

direction. To make its contribution, Croatia primarily needs to develop its own capabilities to achieve national security and, consequently, the security of the community.

In the subsequent parts of this chapter, we will explore specific initiatives and activities of the Republic of Croatia in the field of strategic foresight to gain a better understanding of its current status and contribution to this crucial aspect of European and international security.

The problem lies precisely in the fact that the Republic of Croatia (RH) has not yet embraced the importance of these concepts and has not invested sufficient effort and commitment in implementing strategic foresight across all areas, particularly noticeably in the field of national security.

As reported by Stip Compass (2023), the closest to strategic foresighting is the 2016 document „Smart specialization strategy of the Republic of Croatia for the period from 2016 to 2020“, whose authors are the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development and the Ministry of Science and Education.

When considering strategic foresight in the context of national security, it involves identifying key trends and actors on the horizon of long-term planning. Such identification of factors enables further prioritization and a clear focus on expected changes over time.

Prompted by this issue, Professor Tatalović (2011) initiated several questions and spurred targeted audiences to contemplate the matter through his professional work titled “Does Croatia Need a New National Security Strategy?” In his work, he emphasizes that Croatia has not recognized the need to develop strategic foresight to support strategic planning and the ultimate development of strategic documents. Instead, it remains a vision of those who do not have a strong enough influence on policy makers. From this, one may gather the impression or conclude that there is a lack of competence among policy makers in creating and developing strategic foresight, which is a result of the absence of a strategic culture.

Namely, the last existing Defence Strategy (2002) has certainly become outdated, not only due to changes happening in the vicinity of the Republic of Croatia (RH) or changes occurring on a global scale but also due to changes

in Croatia's status and strategic framework and environment after joining NATO and the EU. Therefore, the documents developed by NATO and the EU can and should be a good foundation in the creation of Croatia's own national documents, but they must not be the only reliance. They should provide a framework to which elements of national specificity are added and implemented." The creation of national documents has become extremely complex, undoubtedly influenced by upheavals in the political sphere of the RH, but this work will not delve into the exact causes of these changes.

This part of the paper emphasizes the importance of this issue and indicates the existence of an appropriate nucleus of experts working on projects for future periods. These are professionals who have realized that strategic foresight in the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia (MORH/OS RH) is not institutionalized either methodologically or organizationally. Following this realization, a project in the field of strategic foresight and strategic culture has recently been initiated. The ultimate goal of the project is to anticipate the strategic environment of the Republic of Croatia in 2030, focusing on challenges, priorities, and opportunities, and to identify implications for national defense.

The project aims to develop a strategy and decision-making concept at the political and military-strategic levels. As discerned from the text, strategic foresight serves as the foundation for the development of a national security strategy, which holds a special place in the hierarchy of a state's strategic documents. Tatalović (2011) states that it represents the "crown and starting point of the legislative pyramid of documents in the field of national security. Its development should be based on a comprehensive approach with a systematically developed national risk assessment method."

In conclusion, Croatia needs a new national security strategy based on strategic foresight, taking into account strategic culture and situational awareness. Moreover, the newly adopted strategy should be suitable for responding to potential challenges in the environment and precisely defining the desired status of Croatia in the global context. Without clearly defined goals, progress becomes difficult. High-quality strategic foresight will enable

the government to make decisions regarding the future need to strengthen specific capabilities in light of a certain level of risk.


As Tatalović (2011) notes in his work, the prevailing and current trend in Croatia is that the Drafts of the strategy do not reveal hierarchies of threats and risks faced by Croatia. Concrete goals of foreign and security policy or national objectives are not clearly defined. There are no attempts to rank threat priorities or develop scenarios. There are no perspectives on the main processes within international relations and international security; Croatia's place cannot be found in regional or global levels.

All the issues point towards one thing - it's time for a new Strategy, and its precursor must be strategic foresight. For this reason, the next chapter proposes a conceptualization of strategic foresight that, if applied, could mitigate this issue to a more acceptable level.

4. Analysy on the Basis of EU and NATO Approaches

Drawing on the literature on strategic foresight, we propose a framework that suggests a higher level of abstraction of strategic foresight capabilities beyond the fundamental processes or activities. Specifically, this framework considers three broad conceptualizations of strategic foresight and emphasizes three groups of analytical-level capabilities: (i) environment scanning, (ii) strategic choice, and (iii) capability integration.

Figure 1. Strategic foresight activities



Source: Authors

From Figure 1, nine specific sub-components supporting higher-level capabilities are evident. The specific components in the first subset encompass: time horizon, scanning depth, and the use of network connections linked to sources.

Following the model, for the capability support group of strategic choice, activities related to analyzing and interpreting information gathered through scanning are undertaken. This involves visualization activities of conceptual connections between data and planning activities on how to use this information to achieve competitiveness. Lastly, leadership collaboration in coordinating database management enables the formation of organizational integration capabilities, resulting in the creation of a future picture.

Second-order capabilities

In the proposed model, there are three second-order capabilities of equivalent importance. Below is a brief explanation of each, along with a tabular representation indicating the percentage of their representation and the percentage of benefits derived from them.

I. Scanning/Environment Scanning Capability

This capability involves systematically examining both the external and internal environment to identify key forces, technologies, competitor positions, and organizational processes causing changes. This builds the ability to envision the future on a broader horizon than our visionary capabilities. It needs to be carried out continuously and uninterruptedly to create awareness of ongoing changes that affect the situational context. The breadth of scanning is often conditioned by the time period it needs to cover - it can be short-term or long-term. The scope of the performed scanning, termed as scanning depth in this model, reflects the territory that needs to be covered by the search. The intensity and quality of the data identified through scanning largely depend on the degree of developed connections within the organization. In other words, it depends on the level of development of strategic relationships; the number of memberships in business groups or involvement in online communities. Active interaction within these networks can be a valuable source of alerts for organizations about risks and threats, i.e., a source for recognizing latent opportunities for action.

II. Capability to Identify and Select Relevant Information

Environment scanning can generate a large amount of data scattered across different time periods, so the second step in this model is to identify and select only what is relevant for creating a comprehensive picture of the future. The ability to identify and select relevant information that can be transformed into reusable future knowledge relies on interpretation, envisioning, and planning. Interpretation refers to activities that support the analysis of information collected through scanning. Visualization involves building pragmatic conceptual connections between selected data and how they

can be interpreted. Future planning utilizes organizational resources and experts to achieve the desired state and realize an idealized vision. Strategic selection capabilities as a subcomponent of strategic foresight, therefore, relate to organizational capabilities that enable systematic interpretation of the security environment and the optimization of limited resources to achieve an idealized future.

III. Capability to Integrate Possibilities

The final second-order capability involves integrating processed information into organizational processes, future technological platforms, and plans for the development of new products. This requires engaging all available resources and involving experts deployed throughout the organization. To fully leverage the potential, there is a need to develop the organization's knowledge base, enabling quick and creative exploitation of identified opportunities and constraints in moments of unpredictability. Leadership and coordination of organizational processes that support the development of organizational resources to achieve the desired goal come to the forefront. Leadership relies on the commitment of management to different visions of organizational actors, thus creating a common interpretation of the future, while coordination involves aligning different visions to direct current actions. This is crucial for creating, confirming, and accepting the idealized image of the future by all departments and functions within an organization.

Table 1 provides a tabular overview of second-order activities for easier perception of their role in the strategic planning process. The table highlights the benefits these capabilities bring, with the most prevalent being the creation of creative and broad insights into issues, the establishment of quality leadership, and the coordination of dedicated and confidential participant work.

Table 1. Second-Order Activities and Their Representation (%) within the Strategic Foresight Process

ACTIVITIES	BENEFIT
<p>FRAMEWORK CREATION (22%)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To think with an open mind, balanced and impartial (9%) • Focus on the real problem and its core (7%) • Be careful with influences, assumptions and previously created mental profile (6%)
<p>SCANNING (16%)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understanding the context and all the complexities through the established framework (5%) • Quick adaptation and avoiding surprises (11%)
<p>INTERPRETING (21%)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creating more creative, deeper and broader insights (16%) • Identifying a wider range of opportunities and possibilities (5%)
<p>VIZUALIZATION (10%)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prioritizing and decision-making (10%)
<p>PLANNING (7%)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constructing paths from the present to the future that will enable training and preparation for the future. (7%)
<p>ACTION (23%)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Catalysing actions and changes (7%) • Creating good leadership and conditions for work - conformity, commitment, trust (14%) • Building an organization that constantly learns (2%)

Source: „ Thinking about the Future: Guidelines for Strategic Foresight“, by Andy Hines, 2012.

This chapter is written with the purpose of contributing to the theory and practice of strategic foresight, aiming to develop a framework that specifies the organizational logic of strategic foresight. This comprehensive framework presents strategic foresight not only as a process, method, or practice but as a unified organizational capability that enables organizations to “deal with the future.” Higher-order capabilities play a distinct role, including environmental scanning, strategic selection, and integration capabilities, and are at a higher level of abstraction than their fundamental activities. They come together to link the everyday activities that an organization undertakes to maintain constant awareness of the environment and improve its overall functioning.

The authors believe that such an integrated framework would enhance organizations by assisting them in developing future scenarios, thus enabling them to take action at the right moment, with the caveat that setting and defining a precise problem is a prerequisite. As known, solving the wrong problem brings no benefit. As the paper has already demonstrated, to recognize and determine a precise problem, situational awareness and timely responsiveness are crucial.

Moreover, it must be ensured with certainty that there are sufficient capacities and resources for the implementation of all planned activities. After selecting and providing the capacity to work, creating an interactive atmosphere is very important. Particularly, the involvement of those willing to challenge hypotheses and interpret outcomes in their own way is promoted. The essence is to create a strategic working environment conducive to open thinking, experimentation, and prototype creation to gain a clearer picture and develop as many possible future scenarios as possible. The formation of alternative futures should be guided by the understanding that the initial foresight is almost always wrong because data never lead to just one conclusion. Solutions need to be developed, and the quality and consistency of obtained solutions should be verified and supported by empirical data.

Case Study: Russian Invasion Of Ukraine

After establishing the theoretical and methodological framework of strategic foresight and its foundations for successful operation, it is necessary to illustrate and test it in a real-world event within a real environment. Given the significant changes that have affected the global stage, the paper will focus on one of the currently key global crisis hotspots – the example of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The following chapter will provide insights into critical indicators that pointed to the impending invasion, and continuous monitoring of these indicators would undoubtedly lead to the preparation and reaction of the attacked party. The paper will not analyze these reactions, political decisions, nor will it delve into the outcomes and forecasts of the war. What it will attempt to demonstrate is the importance of recognizing tendencies of opposing parties, establishing critical indicators as input parameters for developing strategic foresight. It should be noted that the paper will not delve into the historical sphere of relations between conflicting parties, nor will it address economic policies. The exploration of these factors, as well as the factor of “underestimating the enemy,” is left open for further research in the mentioned areas.

This chapter is based on research conducted by the RAND organization, summarized in an article from 2022, as well as the book “The Battle for Ukraine: World War III?” by American author Yuri Felshtinsky (2022). The RAND research is particularly interesting as it illustrates how the Russian Ministry of Defense reexamines the likelihood and character of future wars, probing the relationships of military capabilities between Russia and its adversaries. In these studies, the authors rely on a previously established framework for examining key indicators. The analysis of their forecasts and continuous comparison with potential adversaries, such as the United States, showcases their method of tracking changes and making predictions. This serves as a good example of functional positioning in the broader global context and acting in accordance with it.

Critical Indicators as Input Parameters for Strategic Foresight

It is known that there is no certain, predictable future for which one can plan. However, trends can be examined, and their development can be monitored. This was precisely the focus of Yuri Felshtinsky, a historian of the Russian secret service.

What could be observed in the period leading up to the invasion, without the presence of extensive expert analytical commentary or access to confidential intelligence information, was the increase in public rhetoric and threats from Russia toward Ukraine in anticipation of the attack. This includes statements from political officials, media propaganda, and other moves that clearly and openly indicated what would happen. Vladimir Putin himself expressed dissatisfaction with NATO's policy, especially in the period before the invasion, publicly warning that Russia would be ready to act if it were the only way to stop the spread of NATO. For several years, starting in 2007 when he stated at the Munich Security Conference as reported by Politico (2007) that the emergence of a unipolar world with the dominance of the United States and NATO in Europe disturbed Russia.

Furthermore, the media reported on the amassing of forces along the border between these two countries. Previous conflicts that occurred between these two countries also served as indicators that had to be carefully monitored over the years. In the broader context, Ukraine can be seen as a geostrategically important region that is at the "crossroads" of interests between Russia, Europe, and the United States. This implies that any political crisis or tension within the country carries the potential for the escalation of larger disturbances.

In support of these statements, Felštinski's account reinforces that this war was anticipated, and February 24, 2022, was not a surprise. As Felštinski (2022) notes, "Putin has been preparing for a major war for a long time. Russia conducts military exercises in all its border zones, from the Kuril Islands to Kaliningrad and from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. Bilateral military agreements are unilaterally canceled, and nobody pays attention to it." He also emphasizes: "... add to that Putin's rhetoric about establishing a powerful military base in Crimea, the concentration of the Russian army

along the border with Ukraine, the presence of a powerful military force in Transnistria (supposed peacekeepers), a series of cases where the Russian navy violated the maritime boundaries of neighboring countries, joint military exercises with Belarus, calling reservists for summer training, changes in laws on the schedule and frequency of reservist recruitment, increasing spending on weapons, the provocative rhetoric of Duma representatives like Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), close to the Kremlin and Putin, and the policy of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation buying gold - and it quickly becomes clear that Russia is building a war machine." elshinsky, 2022)

The other clear indicators are outlined through the 'retaliatory sanctions' by the Kremlin against Europe and the USA, indicating that Russia is preparing for isolation. It states: 'Aware that absolute isolation awaits the moment it launches a comprehensive aggression, Russia is actively preparing for such a scenario and a break with the civilized world. Among other measures, it has stopped the credit-based gas deliveries and banned the import of foreign food to gradually reform the country and start self-sufficiency. Kremlin-affiliated companies like Lukoil are already selling their foreign stakes. This is even more true for 'private citizens' close to the Kremlin: they have long been preparing for war and are also selling their overseas assets. All this is happening at a time when Russian strategic bombers have again begun to penetrate the borders of NATO countries, and Russian fighter planes have started to pursue NATO aircraft." Felshtinsky,(2022)

On the other hand, Russia has conducted a quality and detailed strategic prediction by correctly identifying critical indicators, monitoring them, evaluating, and making decisions accordingly. According to open RAND research, Russian analysts operate by comparing their weaknesses and strengths with potential adversaries. Based on these comparisons, they determine their position, recognize and highlight implications, and rank them in terms of importance and urgency for remediation to achieve competitiveness. In simpler terms, they find their place, raise awareness of their weaknesses, and seek ways to ensure and strengthen their security by presenting a strategic plan. By following their analyses and thought processes, it could be concluded that something is being prepared.

According to the research findings, Russia has identified Ukraine, along with the support of the NATO alliance, as the main threat. The development of NATO's military capabilities is depicted in the analyses as the source of disruption of the strategic stability and as a potential opportunity for social disturbances in the former Soviet Union space. These developments led to the known decision - Russia's preventive action.

What they decided to do and set as a strategic goal is deepening their relationship with China because their analyses showed that only through a partnership with China can they achieve their objectives. However, before they began working on forming this partnership, they carefully decided to first ensure the correctness of that decision. In practice, it looked like this: "Recognizing the need to strengthen the partnership with China, in the spring of 2014, various Russian agencies analyzed potential risks of cooperation with the PRC: before rushing into the warm embrace of Beijing, Moscow wanted to be sure about the consent of its giant neighbor's presence in the economic space. What they undertook was a comprehensive insight into the main trends in the development of the Chinese military-industrial complex, Chinese foreign policy, and priorities of military strategic planning."

From the chapter, it can be concluded that by building what Felštinski likes to call a war machine, Russia provided numerous indicators that were sufficient to warn Ukraine, and the only logical step should have been to raise the level of readiness to a high degree. Similarly, in their analyses, they publicly portrayed the greatest threats to their security and clearly indicated that they would act when security lost its essence.

The step that Ukraine should have taken based on the gathered information, for which it cannot be guaranteed that it was actually taken, would have been anticipation aimed at providing a counterbalance to the "embedded tendency and belief that Russia will not attack, i.e., the tendency to ignore challenging information." Perhaps this could have allowed time for reflection and the devising of alternatives. Maybe it could have created space for discussions that do not exclude alternative perspectives, and perhaps the current world picture would not look like this today. Maybe these indicators could have been sufficient for a timely reaction and could have saved thousands of

lives. But the key word is “maybe.” What is certain, according to available literature and sources, is that the invasion was predicted based on the listed indicators, and the reactions and involvement of external actors leave room for the reader to contemplate.

Conclusion

After reviewing the theoretical framework of strategic foresight, the proposed conceptual model in which the action and purpose of strategic foresight are clearly presented, and after reviewing the real case - the Russian invasion of Ukraine - the paper came to the final part, in which a summary overview of everything written is given, with special reference to Republic of Croatia, together with the author’s comments.

Strategic foresight is a tool in strategic planning aimed at developing critical thinking skills for considering the impact of long-term uncertainties on decision-making. It serves as a counterbalance to the inherent human tendency to support well-known data and ignore challenges, providing users with sufficient time to contemplate alternatives. Decision-makers must be cautious, open to changes in thinking approaches, and prepared for cultural organizational changes. This work emphasizes the importance of fostering and reviving long-term strategic thinking, specifically strategic foresight, which holds a high position in the societal and security advancement of a nation. The paper describes strategic foresight as a method for systematically considering longer time horizons and a broader range of challenges. It illustrates how integrating strategic foresight into the planning process facilitates a systematic approach to problem-solving, enabling users to be prepared for future threats, emphasizing the early seizing of opportunities for action.

The importance of having a systematic theoretical framework was evident, as it not only facilitates the achievement of organizational goals but also promotes organizational culture, resulting in the avoidance of problems arising from isolationism, i.e., steering clear of task duplication due to lack of coordination. It is crucial to emphasize that individuals in high managerial positions in society, organizations, or businesses should be involved in

organizing strategic foresight. The success of strategic foresight depends on their engagement, awareness of the situation, and understanding of the issues on which they provide or withhold support for action. Accordingly, their involvement should be encouraged to create a trend of engagement, involving and encouraging other leaders from various parts of the organization. After all, more brains mean more diverse versions and potential future scenarios – key elements in strategic foresight.

Despite all the advantages and benefits that strategic foresight brings, there are still organizations, states, and others where strategic foresight remains only a dead letter on paper. From this arises the need to reach higher levels and raise awareness about the importance of this issue to start investing in this area. In such systems, it is initially necessary to change the long-standing and probably deeply rooted short-term planning; it is necessary to provide a shield context and introduce them to long-term and holistic thinking. If we look at the Republic of Croatia and literature addressing this issue, it can be rightly said that this is an untouched area eager for exploration, development, and implementation in security systems. Especially considering that Croatia is part of both NATO and the European Union, both of which clearly emphasize the importance of strategic foresight and encourage all member countries to contribute to the collective through their strategic foresight.

The authors of this paper recognize the importance, and as a result, propose an institutional model for strategic foresight based on studying foreign literature in this field. The proposed model is presented for one specific reason: without the institutionalization of strategic foresight as a component of strategic planning and decision-making processes, the ability to sustain foresight will be highly sensitive to changes in leadership, and its scope of action may be limited or unclear. It is crucial, along with precisely specifying the steps of action, to enable and maintain a “protected space” within which analysts feel empowered to express their views and exchange information with other collaborators.

History has repeated itself too many times, and everyone should strive to avoid the same. However, as this case illustrates, things are not always black and white. If history hadn't repeated itself with Russia, perhaps the EU

wouldn't have started gaining independence and creating autonomy from Russian energy, resulting in the construction of its own gas pipeline. This prompted Croatia to develop and upgrade existing terminals, contributing to Europe as a whole but primarily to itself. It remains to be hoped that in this scenario, Croatia will manage to achieve benefits and welfare because, as suggested, what is war if not profiting. Of course, the foundation for the development and concepts of such terminals and networks must again be well-executed strategic planning, with strategic foresight as its precursor.

The thesis is put forward that strategic foresight is not predicting the future. Nevertheless, by tracking trends and creating different action scenarios, very precise and robust strategies can be developed that will be ready to respond to a crisis if it arises. This confirms that strategic foresight is the key to a timely response, and if not undertaken, the reaction will be delayed or useless. Given the uncertain future and rapidly changing environment, this requires significant effort.

The summary clearly emphasizes the key aspects of strategic foresight as a tool in strategic planning. Here are several key points highlighted:

Definition of strategic foresight: Identified as a tool in strategic planning with a focus on developing critical thinking skills. Its goal is to consider long-term uncertainties to make informed decisions.

Counteracting human tendencies: Emphasizes the role of strategic foresight as a counterbalance to inherent human tendencies to confirm known information and ignore challenges. It provides users with enough time to consider alternatives.

Changes in thinking approaches: Decision-makers must be cautious and open to changes in thinking approaches, as well as willing to undergo cultural organizational changes.

Importance of long-term strategic thinking: The work underscores the importance of encouraging and reviving long-term strategic thinking in society and the security advancement of a nation.

Systematic problem-solving approach: The integration of strategic foresight into the planning process enables a systematic approach to problem-solving.

Readiness for future threats: Through strategic foresight, users are enabled to be prepared for future threats, while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of seizing opportunities for action early.

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Strateško predviđanje kao preduvjet pravodobne reakcije

Sažetak

Stanje nesigurnosti u strateškom okruženju predstavlja izazov kroz povijest čovječanstva. Današnji analitičari obavještajnih podataka moraju biti ne samo kreativni nego i sposobni predvidjeti novu prijetnju prije nego što se ona uopće materijalizira. Bez svjesnosti o trenutnoj situaciji u strateškom okruženju i trendovima koji ga oblikuju, gotovo je nemoguće predvidjeti i razviti relevantne buduće scenarije. Ako tome dodamo današnju sliku vrlo složenog i dinamičnog svijeta, strateško predviđanje postaje sve važniji alat za organizacije i pojedince u prilagodbi na promjene, predviđanju rizika i iskorištavanju prilika.

Cilj je ovog rada pružiti uvid u procese i analitiku strateškog predviđanja kao ključnog koncepta i alata za donošenje učinkovitih i pravodobnih odluka. Strateško predviđanje u svojoj je biti kvalitativno, ali i kvantitativno, i uključuje ne samo vojnu dimenziju nego i druge dimenzije, poput političke, diplomatske, ekonomske i društvene, koje su često presudne u odnosu prema vojnoj dimenziji, no ovaj rad uglavnom će se baviti samo vojnom dimenzijom.

Ključne riječi

strateško predviđanje, prognoza, analiza, procjena rizika, nesigurnost, obrana

Propast strateškog pohoda JNA na Hrvatsku u rujnu 1991.

Marijan Kostanjevac, Ivan Benković, Marijan Kretić

Sažetak

Nakon proglašenja hrvatske neovisnosti u lipnju 1991. godine, vojni vrh Jugoslavenske narodne armije (JNA) uz potporu srbijanskog političkog vodstva u jesen 1991. pokrenuo je napadnu vojnu operaciju kojoj je cilj bio razbiti i pokoriti Hrvatsku. Strateški plan Kadijevićeva vojnog vrha JNA za slamanje Hrvatske u petnaest dana doživio je krah i može se sorstati u najgore vojne promašaje u drugoj polovici 20. stoljeća.

Na samim počecima Domovinskog rata dva događaja bila su presudna za obranu Hrvatske u rujnu 1991. Prvi presudni utjecaj na opstanak Hrvatske u rujnu 1991. imalo je zauzimanje vojnih skladišta opreme s teškim naoružanjem 32. korpusa JNA (varaždinskog). Drugi presudni utjecaj na tijek vojne operacije imao je raspad 1. pgmd JNA, poznatije kao Titova divizija na posavskom koridoru.

U uvodnom dijelu rada objašnjavaju se razmjeri oružane pobune u zapadnoj Slavoniji i uloga koju je ona imala u planu vojnog vrha JNA za slamanje Hrvatske. U drugome dijelu rada pojašnjena je glavna ideja Kadijevićeva strateškog plana s ključnim smjerovima napada na Hrvatsku. Rad se fokusira na odluku zapovjednika 1. vojne oblasti JNA o napadu na Slavoniju i kolaps glavne snage JNA na posavskom koridoru kod Tovarnika i Ilače.

Ključne riječi

zapadna Slavonija, strateški plan napada JNA na Hrvatsku 1991., raspad snaga JNA na posavskom koridoru, 5. korpus JNA (banjalučki), 32. korpus JNA (varaždinski)

Uvod

Vojni vrh Jugoslavenske narodne armije (JNA) uz potporu srbijanskog političkog vodstva u jesen 1991. odlučio je vojnim pohodom pokoriti Hrvatsku, smijeniti legalno izabranu vlast Republike Hrvatske i vojno poraziti oružane snage novostvorene hrvatske države.

Prema strateškom planu JNA je planirala Hrvatsku napasti na nekoliko ključnih smjerova i prisiliti je na kapitulaciju. JNA je glavni napor u pohodu na Hrvatsku u jesen 1991. usmjerila na Slavoniju. Zapovjedništvo 1. vojne oblasti JNA u Beogradu odlučilo je s dvije velike vojne grupacije napasti istočnu Slavoniju s teritorija Srbije. Novosadska vojna grupacija, odnosno 12. korpus JNA s ojačanjima, napala je podravskim smjerom, a Titova divizija, poznatija kao elitna 1. proleterska gardijska mehanizirana divizija (1. pgmd), napala je posavskim smjerom. Zadaća ovih snaga JNA bila je spojiti se sa snagama 5. korpusa JNA (banjalučki) u zapadnoj Slavoniji, produžiti napade odnosno deblokirati vojarne 10. i 32. korpusa JNA u Zagrebu i Varaždinu.

Najvažnija uloga u porazu Hrvatske dodijeljena je 5. korpusu JNA (banjalučki). Zadaća mu je bila napasti Hrvatsku iz sjeverozapadne Bosne smjerom: *Gradiška – Pakrac – Virovitica*, presjeći hrvatski teritorij i prekinuti komunikacije hrvatskim snagama koje su se branile u istočnoj Slavoniji kako bi se olakšao prodor jugoslavenskoj vojsci prema Zagrebu i Varaždinu, sve do granice sa Slovenijom.

U to vrijeme na samim počecima Domovinskog rata dva događaja bila su presudna za obranu Hrvatske u rujnu 1991. Prvi presudni utjecaj na opstanak Hrvatske u rujnu 1991. imalo je zauzimanje vojnih skladišta opreme s teškim naoružanjem 32. korpusa JNA (varaždinskog). Drugi presudni utjecaj na tijek vojne operacije imao je raspad 1. pgmd JNA, poznatije kao Titova divizija na posavskom koridoru.

Bitka za Slavoniju kulminirala je u zapadnoj Slavoniji. Hrvatske snage zaustavile su 5. korpus JNA (banjalučki) u njegovu naporu da *okruži, razbije i razoruža hrvatske snage* u zapadnoj Slavoniji, probije se do Virovitice i prekine svu komunikaciju istočne Slavonije s ostatkom Hrvatske.

Odlučnost i visok borbeni moral hrvatskih snaga u obrani, kardinalne pogreške učinjene prilikom uvođenja glavnih snaga JNA u napadnu operaciju

u istočnoj Slavoniji i neuspjela mobilizacija u Srbiji – sve su to čimbenici koji su doveli do propasti strateškog plana napada JNA na Hrvatsku, a jugoslavensku vojsku suočili s porazom.

Rad je namijenjen široj javnosti kako bi bila bolje upoznata o navedenim događanjima; posebice o tome zašto je obrana (zapadne) Slavonije bila važna za opstanak Hrvatske na početku Domovinskog rata. Stručna javnost i pripadnici OSRH-a steći će bolji pregled događanja u rujnu 1991. koja su bila presudna za opstanak Hrvatske.

Srpska pobuna u zapadnoj Slavoniji

Velikosrpska politika predsjednika Srbije Slobodana Miloševića u drugoj polovici 1980-ih na području bivše države Jugoslavije vodila se idejom „*svi Srbi žive u jednoj državi*“. Smatrali su kako je došlo vrijeme da Srbija formira svoju državu. Milošević je želio ostvariti dugogodišnji san i stvoriti novu veliku srpsku državu (Malcom, 2011.), u koju bi bila uključena Bosna i Hercegovina, minimalno trećina Hrvatske s velikim dijelom jadranske obale, područje Dubrovnika, pa sve dalje do granice s Crnom Gorom. (Memorandum, 1986.)

U velikosrpskim planovima „*linija Virovitica – Karlovac – Ogulin – Karlobag*“ trebala je postati i zapadna granica nove srpske države. Teritorij zapadne Slavonije na kojem su živjeli Srbi, trebalo je pripojiti budućoj srpskoj državi. U intervjuu koji je Šešelj dao njemačkom magazinu Spiegelu, početkom kolovoza 1991. Srbiji bi pripala cijela Bosna i Hercegovina, Makedonija, Crna Gora i veći dio Hrvatske, tako da Hrvatima ostane samo „*ono što se može vidjeti s vrha zagrebačke katedrale*“. (Malcom, 2011). S komadanjem hrvatskoga teritorija pobunjeni Srbi započeli su godinu dana prije nego što je Hrvatska proglasila neovisnost u lipnju 1991. Velikosrpski ideolozi, emisari iz Srbije i velikosrpski krugovi u JNA poticali su srpski narod u Hrvatskoj na pobunu i odcjepljenje. Kadijević, ministar obrane JNA, i Jović, srpski član predsjedništva Jugoslavije, planirali su „*...U Hrvatskoj institucionalno i politički jačati srpsku krajinu i podržati njeno odcjepljenje od Hrvatske. Organizirati masovne mitinge u Hrvatskoj protiv HDZ-a, a Bosnu i Hercegovinu dići na noge za Jugoslaviju*“ (Jović, 1991.).

Krajem 1990. godine i tijekom prve polovine 1991. u dijelovima Hrvatske pod srpskom kontrolom formiraju se *srpske autonomne oblasti (SAO)*¹, u kojima je srpsko stanovništvo činilo većinu ili značajnu manjinu i donosilo odluke o političkom i teritorijalnom odvajanju hrvatskih područja od Republike Hrvatske.


Nakon što je Hrvatska proglasila neovisnost 25. lipnja 1991., srpski predstavnici izjavili su kako se odluke Sabora Hrvatske odnose samo za „etničke teritorije” hrvatskog naroda, a nikako za teritorije srpskog naroda u Hrvatskoj: Pakrac, istočnu Slavoniju, zapadni Srijem, Baranju i teritorij SAO Krajine. Sigurnosno stanje u Slavoniji počelo se pogoršavati, a oružani napadi na Hrvate postali su svakodnevni. Ostala rubna područja Hrvatske prema Srbiji, Crnoj Gori i Bosni također su se suočila s izravnim napadima. Na dijelu je bila politika masovnih deportacija i zločina nad civilima, odnosno etničkog čišćenja Hrvata i drugih nesrba iz područja za koja su pobunjeni Srbi smatrali da su „*srpske zemlje*” i da pripadaju budućoj velikoj Srbiji. (Sekula, 2022.)

Područje zapadne Slavonije² bilo je etnički heterogeno (naseljavali su je i Česi, Mađari, Talijani, Muslimani, Romi i Jugoslaveni), ali su Hrvati u devet zapadnoslavonskih općina činili najbrojnije stanovništvo, ukupno 67,23 %, dok je srpsko stanovništvo kao najbrojnija manjina činilo 21,32 % ukupnog broja stanovnika (Republički zavod za statistiku, 1991.). Na prostoru ovih općina 1991. živjelo je 373 004 stanovnika, a od toga: 271 658 Hrvata, 79 541 Srba i 42 707 drugih narodnosti (Čeha, Talijana i ostalih). Ni u jednoj općini zapadne Slavonije u ukupnoj strukturi stanovništva srpsko stanovništvo nije prelazilo 50 % (najviše: Pakrac 46,4 %, Slatina 35,9 %, Daruvar 33,5 %, Grubišno Polje 31,9 %) (Škvorc, 2010.). Bez obzira na to što nisu nigdje bili u apsolutnoj većini, prekrajali su postojeće općinske granice i stvarali svoju „*Srpsku Autonomnu Oblast Zapadna Slavonija*” sa sjedištem u Pakracu. Za njih

1 U jesen 1990. proglašena je SAO Krajina, u lipnju 1991. SAO Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem, u kolovozu 1991. SAO Zapadna Slavonija.

2 Pod zapadnom Slavonijom podrazumijeva se područje Republike Hrvatske u kojem se nalaze općine: Bjelovar, Grubišno Polje, Novska, Pakrac, Daruvar, Virovitica, Podravska Slatina, Slavonska Požega i Nova Gradiška.

je to bio srpski etnički prostor koji je trebalo očistiti od Hrvata, izdvojiti iz Hrvatske i pripojiti novoj srpskoj državi u nastanku.



Slika 1. Administrativne granice općina u zapadnoj Slavoniji


Izvor: Autori GIS, I. Benković (2024.)

Nakon održanih prvih slobodnih demokratskih višestranačkih izbora u Hrvatskoj u travnju i svibnju 1990., pobunjeni Srbi započeli su s pobunama i izazivanjem oružanih sukoba. Napadi na hrvatske policajce i civile s vremenom su postajali sve češći i intenzivniji. Oružni sukobi eskalirali su napadom na policijsku stanicu u Pakracu 1. ožujka 1991. i zarobljavanjem hrvatskih policajaca. Drugog dana intervenirala je specijalna postrojba MUP-a Republike Hrvatske i prekinula pobunu. U sukob se tada uključila JNA, stajući između sukobljenih strana kao „tampon-zona“, a zapravo je štitila pobunjene Srbe, sprječavajući time rad legalnih tijela Republike Hrvatske u obnašanju vlasti. To je postao uobičajen scenarij događanja: krajinski Srbi isprovocirali bi akciju hrvatskih vlasti, a zatim bi se pojavila JNA „kako bi

razdvojila *sukobljene strane*". JNA nije sprječavala etničke sukobe. Zaštićeni svjedok C-057 na Haškom sudu govorio je o svojem iskustvu oficira JNA u Hrvatskoj 1991. „Mi nismo znali za *buffer zone*. U praksi smo napadali i zauzimali teritorije s kojih je bježalo hrvatsko stanovništvo prilikom našeg dolaska." On kaže da su im u to vrijeme kao interni neprijatelji bile označene separatističke snage u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj. „Međutim, mi smo u običnom razgovoru za hrvatske snage koristili riječi ustaške snage. U zvaničnoj, pismenoj naredbi JNA, koja se odnosila na Vukovar, stajalo je da se sukob spriječi, ali to nije bio stvarni zadatak. U praksi smo upozoreni na to da su ustaške snage naši neprijatelji i da ćemo imati velike probleme s druge strane granice. Bili smo upozoreni da cijelo stanovništvo u hrvatskim naseljima ima simpatije prema ustašama. Zvanična naredba sadržavala je lijepe riječi, ali praktične instrukcije bile su potpuno drugačije." (Nilsen, 2013.)

Srpski pobunjenici barikadama su onemogućavali odvijanje prometa na prometnicama koje vode prema Požegi, Virovitici, Slatini i Našicama, minirali su dalekovode, zatvarali vodovode, otimali i zarobljavali civilno pučanstvo te odvodili ljude u logor Bučje³. Napadima na hrvatska naselja, hrvatske institucije i predstavnike državne vlasti na zapadnoslavonskom području pobunjeni Srbi započeli su otvoreni rat protiv Hrvatske. U razdoblju od godine dana, do proglašenja *autonomne oblasti Srpske Zapadna Slavonija* u Okučanima, 12. kolovoza 1991. (Slika 2), u Hrvatskoj je bilo „158 mrtvih, izgubili smo nekoliko općina, dio teritorija, bila je to ipak agresija i aneksija, odvajanje dio po dio hrvatskog teritorija na kojemu je JNA pomagala teroriste i srpski ekspanzionizam" (Manolić, 2015.).

³ U selu Bučje pobunjeni Srbi u kolovozu 1991. osnovali su logor kroz koji je u nekoliko mjeseci prošlo 300 hrvatskih branitelja i civila. Mjesto i logor oslobođeni su 26. prosinca 1991. Sudbina 22 osobe, među kojima je i predsjednik pakračkog HDZ-a dr. Ivan Šreter, još uvijek je nepoznanica.



Slika 2. SAO Zapadna Slavonija i prekrrojene općinske granice (plavo)

Izvor: Autor GIS, I. Benković (2024.)

Dana 18. kolovoza 1991. pakračko-lipičko područje prometno je bilo blokirano od strane srbočetničkih postrojbi i dijela JNA. Barikade su postavljene na svim prometnicama koje prolaze kroz srpska sela u smjeru sela Kusunje – Pakrac – Velika Krndija – Pakrački Baštinjeni – Toranj – šuma Turkovača – Kukunjevac – Klisa. Sljedeći dan rano ujutro započinje napad na policijsku stanicu u Pakracu, iz bolnice su odvedeni ljudi u logor Bučje, minobacačima pucaju po Lipiku, Prekopakri i Pakracu. Iza 18.00 sati u pomoć braniteljima u Pakracu došle su specijalne postrojbe MUP-a iz Zagreba i Bjelovara, uklanjaju barikade i oslobađaju prometnice, a srbočetnici bježe u brda (Raščlamba b/d, 2000.).

Nastavljaju sa svakodnevnim minobacačkim napadima, uništavaju infrastrukturu naselja, a zasjedama i pucanjem po ljudima prekidaju sve društveno-ekonomske aktivnosti te potiču stanovništvo na odlazak.

Na području samoproglašene SAO Zapadne Slavonije formirali su *Štab teritorijalne obrane (TO)* za zapadnu Slavoniju sa sedam općinskih štabova: Grubišno Polje, Daruvar, Pakrac, Podravska Slatina, Novska, Okučani, Slavonska Požega i samostalni odred „Zvečevo“. TO Zapadna Slavonija sa zapovjedništvom brojala je oko 7000 ljudi pod oružjem. Od teškog naoružanja imali su: 10 tenkova T 34, minobacače različitog kalibra (16 MB 120 mm, 51 MB 82 mm i 36 MB 60 mm), 6 topova B-1 76 mm, 12 Bst 82 mm, raketnih ručnih bacača „OSA“ 80 i „Zolja“ 950, 8 borbenih oklopnih vozila BOV-1 s topovima PZO kalibra 20/3 (Monografija, 2022. str. 159).

Vojni vrh JNA temeljio je svoje planove o osvajanju Slavonije i slamanju Hrvatske na kontroli područja zapadne Slavonije i presijecanju hrvatskog teritorija duž crte Okučani – Virovitica. Raspirujući srpsku pobunu u zapadnoj Slavoniji, JNA je naoružala i opremila snage pobunjenih Srba kako bi se mogli suprotstaviti hrvatskoj vojsci do dolaska snaga JNA.

„Srpska ustanička vojska u zapadnoj Slavoniji je bila toliko brojna i tako naoružana, da je uz adekvatnu vojničku organiziranost i spremnost za borbu, kao i neposredno taktičko sadejstvo sa jedinicama JNA na tom prostoru, apsolutno bila u stanju da potpuno drži pod kontrolom početno oslobođene srpske teritorije u Zapadnoj Slavoniji“. (Kadijević, 1993.)

Pobuna srpskog stanovništva potpomognuta od strane JNA na području zapadne Slavonije u ljeto 1991. doista je poprimila masovne razmjere i eskalirala u otvoren oružani sukob protiv hrvatske države.

U isto vrijeme na području Bosanske krajine provodila se mobilizacija i naoružavanje srpskog stanovništva, što je bilo i javno objavljeno na sjednici vlada bivše države. Predsjednik vlade Jugoslavije Ante Marković u srpnju 1991. javno je objavio sadržaj snimljenog telefonskog razgovora u kojem je Milošević obavijestio vođu srpske pobune u BiH Karadžića da će mu „sljedeću pošiljku oružja predati general Nikola Uzelac, komandant garnizona tzv. JNA u Banjoj Luci“ (Nilsen, 2007. str. 108).

Namjera velikosrpske politike i vojnog vrha JNA bila je teritorijalno povezati područja sjeverozapadne Bosne s područjem zapadne Slavonije radi zaokruživanja teritorija i osiguranja granice nove srpske države na liniji Virovitica – Karlovac – Karlobag.

Strategijski plan JNA za poraz Hrvatske

Srbijansko političko vodstvo i vojni vrh JNA odlučili su iskoristiti borbeni potencijal JNA za stvaranje manje jugoslavenske federacije kako bi teritorijalno okupili sve Srbe u jednu državu. Uz teritorije Srbije i Crne Gore, u novu Jugoslaviju uključili bi i teritorije naseljene Srbima u Hrvatskoj, Bosnu i Hercegovinu i možda Makedoniju (Slika 3). Nakon slovenskog rata JNA se povukla iz Slovenije i potpuno potpala pod utjecaj velikosrpske politike Slobodana Miloševića. Svoj oružani potencijal usmjerila je tada prema Hrvatskoj (ICTY, Jović, 2003. br. 88).

Nakon srpsko-slovenskog dogovora o odvajanju Slovenije od Jugoslavije, vojni vrh JNA odlučio je uspostaviti kontrolu nad cijelom Hrvatskom, potisnuti njezine težnje za neovisnošću, poraziti hrvatsku vojsku u nastajanju i prisiliti Hrvatsku na ostanak u *krnjoj Jugoslaviji*. Za vrijeme „slovenskog rata“ (od 27. lipnja do 6. srpnja 1991.), JNA je dodatno mobilizirala i rasporedila pet mehaniziranih brigada koje su zaposjele Baranju i mostove preko Dunava radi stvaranja operativne osnovice za napad na Slavoniju. Novosadski korpus JNA 3. srpnja 1991. ušao je u Baranju preko Dunava iz Bačke (Vojvodina) sa 60 tenkova i 40 oklopnih transportera te predao hrvatski teritorij na okupaciju lokalnim Srbima i četničkim dobrovoljcima iz Srbije. Po popisu stanovništva 1991., u Baranji je živjelo 25 % Srba, 42 % Hrvata, 17 % Mađara, 9 % Jugoslavena i 7 % ostalih. (Kamenjar, 2019.)

Predsjedništvo Jugoslavije većinom je glasova 18. srpnja 1991. donijelo odluku o povlačenju JNA iz Slovenije, što nije bilo predviđeno u Brijunskom sporazumu. Sloveniji je time zapravo priznata neovisnost. Za odluku je glasovalo šest članova Predsjedništva, Bogičević (Bosna i Hercegovina) suzdržao se, a hrvatski predsjednik Predsjedništva Stipe Mesić bio je protiv.

U pozadini svega bili su dogovori srpskih i slovenskih predstavnika – Srbija će Sloveniji dopustiti odcjepljenje od Jugoslavije u zamjenu da Slovenija pristane da svi Srbi žive u jednoj državi, odnosno na veliku Srbiju (Zgaga, 2014.). Mnogo je dokaza o srpsko-slovenskom dogovoru (Sabrina, 2008. str. 5), a najcjelovitije su sporazum Kučan – Milošević i zavjeru protiv jugoslavenske federacije predstavili Laura Silber i Allan Little u knjizi *Smrt Jugoslavije*, koja je nastala po istoimenoj televizijskoj dokumentarnoj seriji BBC-a.

Jugoslavenski oružani sukob pokrenuo je političke reakcije i osudu međunarodne javnosti. U jugoslavensku krizu umiješala se Europska zajednica (danas Europska unija), pokušavajući je riješiti mirnim putem. Uz posredništvo Europske zajednice na Brijunima su 7. srpnja 1991. održani sastanci predstavnika republika, savezne Vlade, Predsjedništva Jugoslavije i JNA. Potpisan je sporazum po kojem su Hrvatska i Slovenija odgodile svoje osamostaljenje na tri mjeseca, a snage JNA morale su se povući u vojarne. Za to vrijeme neće biti borbenih djelovanja, a sukob će se riješiti pregovorima.



Slika 3. „Velika Srbija”

Izvor: Autor GIS, I. Benković (2024.)

Brijunski sporazum i moratorij na proglašenje neovisnosti Hrvatske od tri mjeseca, nametnut od strane Europske zajednice, zaustavio je tada napad JNA na Hrvatsku. Napadna operacija trebala je započeti 9. srpnja 1991. u 4 sata ujutro, ali je u zadnji trenutak odgođena. (Marijan, 2012. str. 257) Branko Mamula, prethodnik Kadijevića, bio je inicijator plana o slamanju Hrvatske. *„Pokret prema Hrvatskoj prvobitno bio je zamišljen kao pokušaj rušenja vlasti u Zagrebu kako bi se nastavili pregovori o budućnosti Jugoslavije. Glavnina snaga trebala je doći na prostor Virovitica – Bjelovar–Koprivnica – Varaždin, a da u drugom dijelu ojača već pristigle snage na područje Karlovac – Sisak – Okučani i s oklopnim i artiljerijskim snagama iz Karlovca, Jastrebarskog i Dugog Sela krenu prema Zagrebu, oslobode blokirane kasarne u Zagrebu i Varaždinu i primoraju hrvatsku vlast na pregovore”* (Mamula, 2000. str. 231). Prema ovom smišljenom planu nastala je 19. rujna 1991. Direktiva komandanta Prve vojne oblasti za operaciju u Slavoniji.

Tri mjeseca od potpisivanja Brijunskog sporazuma JNA je iskoristila za pomoć snagama TO „SAO Krajine”, odnosno „srpskim pobunjenicima”, kako bi se reorganizirali i vojnički ojačali. JNA je uz potporu zrakoplovstva u to vrijeme izvodila manje taktičke napade s dobrovoljačkim srbočetničkim postrojbama kako bi operativno razmjestila svoje snage uz hrvatsku granicu i pripremala se za definitivni obračun s Hrvatskom (ICTY, Jović, 2003. br. 86). Europskoj i svjetskoj javnosti željelo se *“...prikazati reakcije hrvatskih snaga kao napade na pobunjene Srbe, kako bi svima bilo jasno tko je napadač, a tko branitelj, tko pokreće rat, a tko tek onda uzvraća.* (Radić, 2020. str. 71)

Za to vrijeme vojni vrh JNA na čelu s generalom Veljkom Kadijevićem, koji je po funkciji bio i ministar obrane u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, planirao je i pripremao napadnu operaciju širih razmjera za potpuno slamanje Hrvatske (Kadijević, 1993. str. 134–136). Na sastanku „šestorke” 5. rujna 1991. Kadijević je govorio: *„...rat mora biti ofenzivni i visokog intenziteta, jer bi drugačije išli u poraz. Mi bismo morali da nametnemo ofanzivni rat. Za to je potrebna mobilizacija u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori, zatim Srba u Hrvatskoj, Bosni i Hercegovini i nešto Makedonaca i Muslimana. Teritorijalnu obranu u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori, te Srbe u Bosni i Hercegovini, kao i partizanske snage u Hrvatskoj apsolutno treba podići na noge”* (ICTY, Jović, 2003. br. 88). Plan „Jedinstvo”, inicijalno zamišljen 1986. kako bi spriječio raspad Jugoslavije, pretvorio se nakon slovenskog rata u projekt za stvaranja velike

Srbije (Marijan, Polemos 6, 2003.). Stratejski cilj JNA više nije bilo očuvanje Jugoslavije, već plan za realizaciju velikosrpske ideje – stvaranja nove države *Velike Srbije*. Ali prije toga je trebalo „poraziti Hrvatsku vojsku” i izbiti na slovensku granicu.

Osnovne ideje Kadijevićeva strateškog plana za slamanje Hrvatske bile su:

- uspostaviti potpunu blokadu Hrvatske s mora i zraka
- provesti sveobuhvatnu zračnu i kopnenu ofenzivu i poraziti hrvatske snage u potpunosti, ako to situacija dopusti; glavne snage JNA u napadu usmjeriti za oslobađanje srpskih krajeva u Hrvatskoj, kao i vojarne JNA koje se nalaze u dubini hrvatskog teritorija
- osigurati održivost srpske Krajine.

JNA je planirala napasti Hrvatsku i ispresijecati je na četiri strateška smjera (Radić, 2020. str. 71). Iz Srbije Hrvatsku će se napasti na dva smjera i spojiti se s pobunjenim srbočetničkim snagama u zapadnoj Slavoniji. (Slika 4)

Na prvom i drugom smjeru (*OG 3*), JNA je koncentrirala najjače oklopno-mehanizirane snage u Srbiji. To su bile *1. proleterska gardijska mehanizirana divizija (pgmd)* i *12. (novosadski) korpus*.

– *12. novosadski korpus* s ojačanjima napast će *podravskim koridorom*: Osijek – Virovitica s mogućnošću produžetka napada prema Koprivnici i Varaždinu.

– *1. proleterska gardijska mehanizirana divizija (1. pgmd)* s ojačanjima napast će *posavskim koridorom*: Vinkovci – Đakovo – Požega, produžiti napad prema Pakracu i spojiti se sa snagama 5. korpusa JNA (banjalučkog).

– *5. korpus JNA (OG 1)* istodobno će napasti Slavoniju iz smjera Banje Luke, prijeći rijeku Savu i preko Nove Gradiške u suradnji sa snagama pobunjenih Srba, zauzeti područje Pakraca, Daruvara Virovitice i izaći na granicu Mađarske te presjeći Hrvatsku, odnosno odvojiti Slavoniju od središnje Hrvatske.

Nakon što bi se ova dva smjera spojila na području zapadne Slavonije, u sljedećoj fazi nastavili bi napade prema Zagrebu i Varaždinu, povezujući se s blokiranim snagama u vojarnama 10. i 32. korpusa JNA, sve do slovenske granice.

Na trećem smjeru (OG 5), od Bihaća preko Karlovca s južne strane prema Zagrebu dijelovi 10. korpusa JNA, ojačani postrojbama dovedenim iz drugih regija bivše SFRJ, krenuli bi u napad radi deblokiranja vojarni 10. korpusa na području Zagreba.

Na četvrtom smjeru (OG 4) u području Dalmacije napast će snage 9. korpusa JNA, koje se trebaju probiti do Zadra, Šibenika i Splita. Snage 9. Vojno pomorskog sektora (VPS), snage 2. korpusa JNA (titogradski) i dijelovi 37. korpusa JNA dovedenog iz Užica (OG 2) trebale su osigurati ušće rijeke Neretve, blokirati i okružiti stari grad Dubrovnik i držati ga opkoljenim kako bi poslije u pregovorima s hrvatskom Vladom poslužio kao ulog za dogovore i pregovore (Radić, 2020. str.74).

Zadaća snaga VPS-a, uz suradnju sa srpsko-crnogorskim dobrovoljačkim jedinicama, bila je:


„Sprečiti predaju objekata i borbene tehnike, naoružanja i municije protivniku. U nemogućnosti odbrane uništiti.“ Borbeno djelovati po „vitalnim objektima“ gradova Zadra, Šibenika i Splita kako bi se deblokirale vojarne te „razbile snage paravojsnih formacija i prinudile ih na predaju“. Planirano je brzo zaposjedanje jadranske magistrale u širem području Dubrovnika, a jedinice VPS-a trebale su deblokirati vojno odmaralište Kupari, zaposjesti objekte Srđ, blokirati Dubrovnik i odsjeći ga od ostalog dijela hrvatskog teritorija. „Sve jedinice flote trebale su pomorskom blokadom luka i vatrom s mora podržavati borbene aktivnosti kopnene vojske“ (Nikolić, K. i Petrović, V., 2018. str. 14).

Opći cilj JNA bio je deblokirati i osloboditi sve vojarne koje su opsjedale hrvatske snage u dubini Hrvatske, osigurati SAO Krajinu i proširiti teritorije pod kontrolom JNA. Tako sasječena u komade, Hrvatska bi bila pred kapitulacijom i prisiljena na pregovore kao poražena strana. JNA bi se postupno povukla s teritorija za koje su oni smatrali da su hrvatski. Namjere i vojni potezi JNA poklopili su se s Moljevićevom⁴ četničkom vizijom „Velike Srbije“. Vodeći generali JNA kada su započeli rat, krenuli su ponovo u

4 Stevan Moljević, glavni četnički ideolog, čovjek od najvećeg povjerenja Draže Mihailovića, u knjizi „O našoj državi i njenim granicama“, izdanoj 1941., definira Srbiju u granicama: cijela Bosna, Mostar, Metković, Šibenik, Zadar, Ploče, Dubrovnik, Karlovac, Osijek, Vinkovci, Vukovar, zatim Pečuh, Temišvar, Vidin, Kyustendil, cijela Makedonija i sjeverna Albanija.

ostvarenje četničkih ciljeva Draže Mihailovića iz 2. svjetskog rata. Velika se opasnost tada nadvila nad Hrvatskom.

Načelnik Generalštaba JNA general Blagoje Adžić tada je optimistično tvrdio kako će Hrvatska, kada bude ovako ispresijecana, vrlo brzo biti spremna za kapitulaciju. A Jovan Opačić, jedan od pobunjenih srpskih vođa u Hrvatskoj, govorio je: „Treat će nam samo petnaestak dana da se oružano obračunamo s Hrvatima” (Mogas Zanić, 2001. str. 30) i sugerirao srpskim predstavnicima koji su pregovarali s hrvatskim vlastima da odgode pregovore za dvadesetak dana.



Slika 4. Kadijevićev strateški plan pohoda JNA na Hrvatsku 1991.

Izvor: Autori GIS, I. Benković i M. Kretić (2024.)

Napomena: Karta pokazuje bit Kadijevićeva ratnog plana i uključenost glavnih snaga JNA u pohodu na Hrvatsku. Operativne grupe (OG) 1 – 5 formirane su od strane snaga JNA i snaga teritorijalne obrane (TO) pobunjenih Srba.

IX. vojno pomorska oblast – VPS (pomorske i kopnene snage) za napad na dubrovačko područje. Ispresijecana na komade, Hrvatska bi bila prisiljena na kapitulaciju i pregovore kao poražena strana.


Nastojanja predsjednika Republike Hrvatske dr. Franje Tuđmana za pacifiranjem i internacionaliziranjem sukoba te postizanjem mirnog odvajanja Hrvatske iz Jugoslavije, nadajući se potpori Europske zajednice i SAD-a za priznanje hrvatske neovisnosti kako bi se zaustavila agresija srpske JNA, nisu se ostvarila. Zapadne sile nisu željele raspad Jugoslavije i nisu davale potporu za osamostaljivanje jugoslavenskih republika.

Napadi srbočetničkih snaga uz potporu JNA u drugoj polovici srpnja i u kolovozu 1991., na području istočne Slavonije, Banovine i kninskom području prerasli su u oružanu agresiju kojom su pobunjeni Srbi željeli proširiti područje krajine, a nesrpsko stanovništvo protjerati iz zauzetih teritorija. Hrvatskom vodstvu postalo je jasno da su za obranu potrebne mnogo veće i bolje opremljene snage koje se mogu suprotstaviti pobunjenim srbočetničkim snagama i JNA.

U uvjetima brutalne agresije na Hrvatsku, uveden je i embargo na uvoz oružja 5. srpnja 1991. od strane Europske unije (tada EEZ), a 25. rujna 1991. i od strane Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a, što je išlo u korist JNA, a otežalo obranu Hrvatske. Zasluge za njegovo uvođenje pripadaju ponajprije Velikoj Britaniji, ali i tadašnjem jugoslavenskom ministru vanjskih poslova B. Lončaru, bez čijeg pristanka do nametanja embarga sigurno ne bi došlo (Jerabek, 2020.). Hrvatskoj nije bilo dopušteno kupiti suvremeno oružje za obranu. Opstanak Hrvatske ovisio je tada o osvajanju skladišta oružja i opreme JNA na teritoriju pod hrvatskom kontrolom.

JNA je u Hrvatskoj imala četiri korpusa: 32. u Varaždinu, 10. u Zagrebu, 13. u Rijeci i 9. u Kninu. Zone odgovornosti u Hrvatskoj dijelilo je nekoliko korpusa sa sjedištem u Bosni i Hercegovini: 5. korpus u Banjoj Luci (sa zonom odgovornosti u zapadnoj Slavoniji), 17. korpus u Tuzli (sa zonom odgovornosti u istočnoj Slavoniji), 5. zrakoplovni korpus i mornaričke snage (Vojnopomorska oblast sa sjedištem u Splitu). U blizini hrvatskih granica nalazile su se snage: 12. korpus u Novom Sadu, 2. korpus u Titogradu, elitna 1. proleterska gardijska mehanizirana divizija iz Beograda i velika podzemna

zrakoplovna baza kod Bihaća (Slika 5). Brojno stanje ovih snaga bilo je do 70 000 vojnika (Nikolić, K. i Petrović, V., 2018. str. 15).



Slika 5. Granice Hrvatske i zone odgovornosti 1. i 3 vojne oblasti i korpusa JNA

Izvor: Autori GIS, I. Benković i M. Kretić (2024.)

Napomena: Zone odgovornosti korpusa JNA i vojne oblasti: 17. k (tuzlanski) podudara se s *I. etapom*, a 5. k (banjalučki) s *II. etapom* napredovanja u napadu na Slavoniju. (Direktiva komandanta 1. VO). Zone odgovornosti 5. i 3. vojne oblasti (VO) podudaraju se sa zamišljenom granicom velike Srbije.

Na sjednici vlade Republike Hrvatske 11. rujna 1991. zaključeno je kako rat protiv Hrvatske traje i dalje, a nakon potpisivanja *Sporazuma o primirju*, čak se i pojačao. Istog dana predsjednik Republike Hrvatske dr. Franjo Tuđman potpisuje odluku za blokadu i zauzimanje vojnih objekata JNA u Hrvatskoj (Marijan, 2004., str. 122). General Tus navodi kako je s predsjednikom Tuđmanom 12. rujna 1991. razmatrao vojnu situaciju u Hrvatskoj i zaključili su kako se glavne snage JNA, tri korpusa JNA, koje se nalaze u vojarnama, mogu blokirati, a četvrti (kninski) ne, jer je već razmješten po Dalmatinskoj zagori. Odlučeno je da se aktivno blokiraju tri korpusa, a s varaždinskim korpusom da se ide do kraja, da se razoruža⁵. Isti dan ministar obrane Luka Bebić izdaje zapovijed *Općinskim kriznim štabovima i Zapovjedništvima brigada i samostalnih bataljuna ZNG-a o blokiranju vojnih objekata JNA*.

U Varaždinu opsada vojnih objekata započela je u kasnim poslijepodnevним satima 13. rujna 1991. (Hrastović, 2007.). Dana 17. rujna 1991. oslobođena je vojarna i tri pogranične postrojbe u Međimurju i time je stvorena prva oslobođena regija u Hrvatskoj. Oko 850 kompleta pješačkog oružja i protuoklopnih sredstava koje je zarobljeno u vojarnama JNA u Čakovcu, s većom količinom streljiva preneseno je u Varaždin i na taj je način borbena moć varaždinskih branitelja značajno povećana.

Najveće vojno skladište oružja i opreme 32. korpusa JNA „Banjščina“, smješteno na Varaždin Bregu, 19. rujna u 21:45 sati preuzele su hrvatske snage. Zbog mogućnosti napada borbenih aviona JNA s ciljem uništenja zauzetoga skladišta, krenulo se u tajno pražnjenje objekata, a zauzimanje se držalo u tajnosti sve dok skladišta oružja i opreme nisu potpuno ispražnjena. I skladište „Barutana“, pokraj sela Nova Ves, desetak kilometara udaljeno od Varaždina, u kojem se čuvalo oduzeto oružje Teritorijalne obrane općine Varaždin (Kostanjevac, 2022.), vraćeno je 19. rujna 1991. U blokadi vojarni i za napad bilo je angažirano oko 1040 ljudi (Škarec, 1991).

JNA je 19./20. rujna 1991. započela s vojnim pohodom na Hrvatsku. Tada u vojnome vrhu JNA još nisu imali saznanja da su skladišta 32. korpusa u

⁵ Antun Tus, film „Ivan Sokač – Život za Hrvatsku“, Udruga varaždinskih branitelja, 2023., 0:12.

Varaždinu zauzeta od hrvatskih snaga. Velika količina osvojenoga oružja i opreme počela se distribuirati na ratom zahvaćena područja.

Nakon sedmodnevne opsade, posljednja vojarna s pukovnikom B. Popovom, komandantom 32. mehanizirane „A” brigade, predala se 22. rujna 1991. Isti dan svi pripadnici JNA, njih oko 450, autobusima su otišli u pravcu Srbije.

Blokada vojnih objekata i osvajanje skladišta naoružanja JNA na širem varaždinskom području bili su presudni za obranu Hrvatske na početku Domovinskog rata. Bila je to bitka za oružje, za teško naoružanje koje je hrvatskim snagama omogućilo kvantni skok u daljnjem razvoju vojnih sposobnosti. Bez tog se oružja Hrvatska vojska (HV) u nastajanju ne bi mogla dovoljno mobilizirati i naoružati da zadrži napade JNA. S novim tisućama komada pješačkog naoružanja, uključujući i zalihe oružja i opreme Teritorijalne obrane koje je prije oduzela JNA, ne bi bilo moguće dodatno opremiti i naoružati nove brigade i uputiti ih na bojišta diljem Hrvatske. U sljedećih deset dana formirano je novih 14 brigada, dok je postojećem broju od 21 brigade dano prijeko potrebno naoružanje (A. Tus).

Napad JNA na Slavoniju

Odluka hrvatske Vlade o blokiranju vojarni od strane hrvatskih snaga, vojnom vrhu JNA bila je povod za pokretanje već prije planirane napadne operacije i vrijeme za konačni obračun s Hrvatskom. Vojnom operacijom namjeravali su srušiti legitimno izabranu vlast u Zagrebu, poraziti hrvatske snage i izbiti na slovensku granicu. Glavni napor u pohodu na Hrvatsku 1991., JNA je usmjerila na Slavoniju.

Vojni vrh JNA sa sjedištem u Beogradu planirao je napasti Slavoniju s „najjačim oklopno-mehaniziranim snagama radi oslobađanja Istočne Slavonije, a zatim brzo nastaviti dejstvo na zapad, spojiti se sa snagama u zapadnoj Slavoniji i produžiti ka Zagrebu i Varaždinu, odnosno ka granici Slovenije” (Kadijević, 1993.). Za provođenje napadne operacije Zapovjedništvo 1. vojne oblasti (1. VO) JNA okupilo je tri velike grupacije snaga korpusne razine: 12. korpus (novosadski), 1. proletersku gardijsku mehaniziranu diviziju (pgmd) s ojačanjima i 5. korpus (banjalučki) (Marijan, 2012.). U operaciji je bilo predviđeno i

angažiranje snaga 17. korpusa (tuzlanski), koji je imao zadaću prijeći rijeku Savu između Bosanskog Šamca i Bosanskog/Slavonskog Broda, napasti bok obrane hrvatskih snaga u istočnoj Slavoniji, povezati se sa snagama 1. *proleterske gardijske mehanizirane divizije (1. pgmd)* i nastaviti s napadom *posavskim koridorom* prema Zagrebu.

U područje između rijeka Drave i Save, ova istočnoslavonska grupacija, zamišljena kao „*glavna manevarska snaga Vrhovne komande za prodor ka Zagrebu i Varaždinu*” (Kadijević, 1993.), angažirala je oko 30 % tenkova i 50 % borbenih vozila pješništva kopnenih snaga JNA. Na području istočne Slavonije tada se zajedno s postrojbama pobunjenih Srba, nalazilo oko 80 000 ljudi pod oružjem, 1000 tenkova, 900 borbenih vozila pješništva i 1000 borbenih sredstava u smislu topničke podrške, od raketnih sustava do minobacača, topova i haubica raznih kalibara (Virč, 2011.).

Na pomoćnom smjeru napadne operacije, mobilizirane snage 5. korpusa JNA (*banjalučkog*) iz područja sjeverozapadne Bosne uz pomoć pobunjenih srbočetničkih snaga u zapadnoj Slavoniji imale su zadaću napasti Hrvatsku smjerom: *Nova Gradiška – Pakrac – Virovitica* i presjeći Slavoniju kako bi se ubrzao prodor glavnim snagama JNA kroz Slavoniju.

Nakon konfuzne i neuspješne vojne intervencije izvedene (*od 27. lipnja do 6. srpnja 1991.*) u Sloveniji, u kojoj su snage JNA doživjele fijasko i sramotan poraz u sukobu sa slovenskom Teritorijalnom obranom, JNA je pred svijetom odlučila demonstrirati snagu u napadu na Hrvatsku. Ravna slavonska zemlja bila je idealna prilika da se demonstrira *Blitzkrieg* jugoslavenskog vojnog stroja. Planirali su kako će s brojnim oklopno-mehaniziranim postrojbama uz potporu zrakoplovstva lako probiti hrvatsku obranu na liniji *Vinkovci – Osijek*, pregaziti Slavoniju, a zatim se spojiti s paravojnim srbočetničkim snagama u zapadnoj Slavoniji. Razbijene hrvatske snage u Slavoniji bile bi izolirane u manje skupine, a poslije bi bile prisiljene na predaju ili uništene.

Mnogi u svijetu nisu vjerovali da se Hrvatska može obraniti od tako moćne sile i vjerovali su kako će jugoslavenska vojska brzo poraziti hrvatske snage i izbiti na granicu Slovenije. James Baker, ministar vanjskih poslova SAD-a, izjavljuje kako je „*JNA tako snažna da Hrvatska neće izdržati ni dva tjedna*” (Ćosić, 2015.). Antun Tus navodi „*...dana 7. listopada 1991. imao sam posjetu*

generalata iz NATO, koji mi je rekao kako po njihovoj procjeni nećemo izdržati više od dva tjedna... kasnije, nakon nekoliko mjeseci ponovo smo se sreli u Parizu, priznao mi je kako nisu vjerovali da ćemo doista izdržati. JNA je planirala operaciju završiti za dvadeset dana" (Magas, Zanic, 2001.). Međutim, ambiciozni planovi vojnog vrha o brznoj i lakoj pobjedi i slamanju Hrvatske, brzo su propali.




Slika 6. Beograđani oduševljeno pozdravljaju tenkove koji kreću prema Vukovaru

Izvor: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=933261217195579>

Slika 6 prikazuje pripadnike 1. proleterske gardijske mehanizirane divizije JNA, poznatije kao *elitna Titova divizija*, u pokretu prema gradu Vukovaru. Tisuće stanovnika Beograda 19. rujna 1991. oduševljeni su izašli na ulice pozdravljajući s tri prsta u zraku i bacanjem cvijeća kretanje kolona tenkova prema Hrvatskoj. Vukovar je razoren, okolna sela opljačkana, Hrvati ubijeni ili prognani, ali slika cvijeća i oduševljenih Beograđana bit će trajno zapamćene u kolektivnoj memoriji hrvatskog naroda.

1. proleterska gardijska mehanizirana divizija (1. pgmd) bila je namijenjena za obranu Beograda i zaštitu najužeg političkog i vojnog vrha bivše države. Divizija je u svom sastavu imala tri mehanizirane brigade, dvije tenkovske pukovnije (oko 300 tenkova), dvije topničke pukovnije za potporu, pukovniju za protuoklopnu borbu, pukovniju za protuzračnu obranu i inženjerijsku pukovniju. Brojno stanje divizije bilo je između 18 000 i 20 000 ljudi.

U skladu s Kadijevićevim strateškim planom JNA o napadu na Hrvatsku, zapovjednik 1. vojne oblasti 19. rujna 1991. donosi Direktivu s početkom napada na Slavoniju 21. 9. 1991. Direktivu je u ime komandanta 1. vojne oblasti Živote Panića, njegov načelnik štaba Andrija Silić poslao komandantu Petog korpusa generalu Nikoli Uzelcu. (Nikolić, Petrović, 2018. str. 248).



Slika 7. Zamisao operacije 1. vojne oblasti prema Direktivi od 19. rujna 1999.

Izvor: Autori GIS, I. Benković i M. Kretić (2024.)

DIREKTIVA KOMANDANTA PRVE VOJNE OBLASTI ZA OPERACIJU U SLAVONIJI

19. septembar 1991.

1. Paravojne formacije Hrvatske

U zoni Prve vojne oblasti paravojne formacije Republike Hrvatske procjenjuju se na oko 45–50,000 naoružanih ljudi, od čega u istočnoj Slavoniji 28 000 – 32 000. Glavne snage grupisane su u Osijeku, Vukovaru i Vinkovcima, naseljima u neposrednoj blizini ovih gradova i u zahvatu komunikacija, kao i na prostoru zapadne Slavonije (širi rejon Okučani, Pakrac, Slavonski Brod.)

Snage u istočnoj Slavoniji raspoređene su po sljedećem:

A) ZNG jačine oko 12.000–14,000 u brigade: Vukovar, Osijek, Vinkovci i verovatno Đakovo.

B) Snage MUP-a oko 10,000–11,000 grupirane u tri policijske uprave (Osijek, Vukovar, Vinkovci) sa oko 12 policijskih stanica u sedištimu opština i policijskim ispostavama po mesnim zajednicama.

C) Snage HDZ oko 6000 - 8000 organiziranih po mesnim zajednicama.

U zapadnoj Slavoniji glavne snage su u rajonu Okučani - Pakrac oko 20 000 - 25 000 i u širem rajonu Novske oko 2000.

Cilj dejstva verovatno će biti da osloncem na naseljena mjesta, masovno zaprečivanje, upornom i aktivnom odbranom spreči prodor snaga JNA i TO u dubinu istočne i zapadne Slavonije i nanese im što veće gubitke.

2. Odlučio sam: završiti sa mobilizacijom, dovesti jedinice i energično preći u napad glavnim snagama u medurečju r. Drava – r. Sava, a pomoćnim (5. k) Okučani–Pakrac–Virovitica i Okučani – Kutina, sa zadatkom: uz avio i art. podršku i sadejstvo sa jedinicama TO okružiti i razbiti snage Republike Hrvatske u Slavoniji, deblokirati jedinice i vojne objekte, izbiti na liniju Našice – Slavonski Brod i biti u gotovosti za produženje napada ka Koprivnici i Okučanima.

Operaciju izvesti u dve etape:

I etapi, u trajanju od 2–3 dana, deblokirati snage u garnizonu Vinkovci, ovladati linijom Našice –Slavonski Brod i biti u gotovosti za dalja dejstva.

II etapi, u trajanju od 4–5 dana, izbiti na liniju Suhopolje - Okučani i biti u gotovosti za produženje napada ka Varaždinu i Koprivnici.

Delom snaga obezbediti granicu ka Madarskoj i levi blok glavnih snaga.

Snagama 1. i 5. korpusa RV i PVO vršiti protivvazdušnu odbranu glavnih snaga od eventualnog izvidanja i dejstva avijacije sa prostora Madarske i Austrije i vatrenu podršku jedinica. Težište podrške imati na snagama 12 korpusa i 1. proleterske gardijske motorizovane divizije, a delom snaga podržavati 5. korpus. Veća naseljena mesta obilaziti a njihovu blokadu i kontrolu puteva vrše jedinice TO.

Pešadijske sastave u okviru OMJ angažovati za obezbeđivanje bokova, b/v i raščišćavanje prepreka. Gotovost svih jedinica za pokret u 22.00 časova, a pokret vršiti po posebnim narednjima. Početak napada 21.09.1991. Ostale snage pripremati za izvođenje mobilizacije.

Tačnost izvoda overava:
Pukovnik Borisav Luković

Zastupa komandanta
General-potpukovnik Andrija Silić

Na istočnu granicu Slavonije JNA je započela dovoditi oklopno-mehanizirane brigade iz Srbije. Na vidjelo su tada izišle i mnoge slabosti sustava JNA: od lošeg održavanja, zastarjele borbene tehnike i opreme, loše provedene obuke mobiliziranih rezervista i nejasnih ratnih ciljeva na nižim razinama do niskog morala mobiliziranih pripadnika JNA. Mobilizirane vojne jedinice bile su vođene oficirima obučanim da misle i djeluju u sovjetskom stilu i rade samo ono što im se zapovijeda; inertnim i neinventivnim oficirima koji se odnose prema vojnicima kao prema potrošnom sredstvu za ostvarenje dodijeljenih zadaća i kojima nedostaju organizacijske i vodstvene vještine. Visok ugled koji je JNA imala u javnosti, nikako nije bio u skladu s postojećom razinom borbene spremnosti. To su bile posljedice desetljeća birokratizacije vojske, karijerizma i privilegija, zanemarivanja profesionalnih kriterija u napredovanju i utjecaju jugoslavenske komunističke ideologije na organizacijsku kulturu i klimu u JNA.

Na težišnom smjeru napada na *posavskom koridoru* preko Šida 19. rujna 1991. uvedena je glavna manevarska snaga JNA, elitna „*Titova*“ 1. proleTERSka gardijska mehanizirana divizija (1. pgmd). U sastavu te divizije bile su i tri proleTERSke gardijske mehanizirane brigade: 1. pgmb iz Beograda već se bila razmjestila u istočnom Srijemu, 2. pgmb i 3. pgmb iz Srbije krenule su komunikacijom od Šida prema Vinkovcima, a pridružila im se i 252. oklopna brigada iz Kraljeva. Napad planiran za 21. rujna 1991. zapovjedništvo 1. VO pomaknulo je dan ranije, za 20. rujna 1991.

Vojne kolone iz Beograda tako su u kretanju zakrčile komunikaciju Šid – Vinkovci, stvarajući prometni i organizacijski kaos. Na jednoj jedinjoj komunikaciji našla se velika masa ljudi i tehnike. Miješale su se vojne jedinice ročnika s jedinicama mobiliziranog rezervnog sastava, jedinice Teritorijalne obrane s raznim četničkim paravojnim formacijama u sastavu JNA i snagama *Državne bezbednosti Srbije*. Dolaskom vojnih jedinica JNA u područje operacije ništa se nije odvijalo po planu, logistička potpora ovisila je o civilnim dobavljačima, a sustav veze bio je slab i velikim dijelom ovisio o civilnim mrežama (Nikolić, Petrović, 2018.³) Nakon ulaska u Hrvatsku dolazi do prvih sukoba s hrvatskim snagama i do zaustavljanja kolone. U borbu se uvode jedinice JNA bez izviđanja i detaljnog planiranja, što je dovelo do stvaranja nereda i paljbe po vlastitim jedinicama kod izvođenja borbenih djelovanja.

Vojna kolona 2. gmb JNA iz Valjeva krenula je preko Šida prema Vinkovcima. Na području Tovarnika 20. rujna 1991. kolona je naišla na jak otpor malobrojne hrvatske obrane i tu bila zaustavljena. Tovarnik je branilo tristotinjak mještana, tridesetak policajaca iz Slavenskog Broda i Varaždina te skupina „Tigrova“, pripadnika 1. brigade ZNG-a, koja je trebala otići u Ilok. U tim prvim sukobima s hrvatskim snagama poginulo je desetak vojnika JNA, a velik je broj bio ranjen, što je dovelo do pomutnje, paničnih reakcija i do bježanja mobiliziranih vojnika iz postrojbi u sastavu 2. proleterske gardijske mehanizirane brigade JNA. Hrvatski branitelji tog su dana uništili tri tenka i jedan oklopni transporter, a zarobili dva napuštena tenka. (Marinić, B., 2023.)

Drugi dan nakon cjelodnevne topničke paljbe po selu neprijatelj je u večernjim satima tenkovima uspio prodrijeti u selo i branitelji su se morali povući nakon što su ispucali sve protutenkovske rakete „Zolja“. Neprijateljska kolona, vjerujući da je otpor branitelja slomljen, nastavila se u predvečerje dalje kretati prema selu Ilača.

Tijekom dana u selo Ilača u pomoć braniteljima dolazi skupina „Tigrova“, uklanja prepreke na cesti koje su postavili branitelji sela te organizira obranu. *„U planu je bilo da se kolona pusti do Hrvatskog doma i prekine na ulazu u Ilaču iz smjera Tovarnika.“* Ispred kolone kretao se tenk, koji je počeo nasumce pucati po kućama i nastavio se kretati prema srpskom selu Banovcima. Drugi tenk pogođen je „Zoljom“ i kolona se zaustavila (Tigrovi, 2015.). *„Na cesti sam vidio puno kamiona, i to najboljih koje je JNA imala, FAP 2026. Na nekima su bila zakvačena golema topnička oružja...“* Branitelji su otvorili paljbu po koloni koja je zastala na cesti. Bitka je trajala do kasno u noć. *„Silina napada izazvala je paniku i dobar dio ljudstva se razbježio na sve strane, lupali su po kapijama i vratima kuća vičući da se predaju. Topništvo iz kolone nastojalo se braniti, no u panici, dio granata ispalilo je na vlastite snage u Šidskim Banovcima. Bitka je trajala do kasno u noć, a drugi dan ujutro se dogodilo nešto nevjerojatno“* (Horvatić, 2017.).

Blokirane snage JNA su u rasulu i pod paljbom, u pomoć je pozvano zrakoplovstvo JNA kako bi bombardiralo položaje hrvatskih snaga. Međutim, pogreškom su na cesti između Ilača i Tovarnika bombama i raketama zasuli zaustavljenu kolonu topničkog divizijuna s haubicama „NORA 152 mm“ 2. pgmb JNA. Hrvatski branitelji pomislili su da neprijatelj želi uništiti

golemu količinu oružja i opreme kako ne bi pala u ruke hrvatskih snaga.⁶ „Neprijateljska kolona protezala se sve do Tovarnika. Poslije smo saznali da nije ni cijela izašla iz Šida.“ (Dragović, 2003.)

„Prema podacima kojima su raspolagali oficiri Gardijske brigade, pilot je u dva, tri navrata nadletio kolonu i tražio pozitivnu identifikaciju cilja od strane Operativnog centra (OC) 1. Armije, pri čemu je obavestio OC da kolona ide iz pravca Šida ka Vukovaru. Iz Operativnog centra 1. Armije su to deklarirali kao da se radi o hrvatskim snagama koje su se obukle u uniforme JNA i načelnik štaba Prve armije general Silić izdao je naređenje da se raketira kolona. Prilikom raketiranja kolone divizion je gotovo uništen, a komandant divizion po činu major je smrtno stradao.“ (Mlakar, 2018.)

Kada se razdanilo, Ilačani su vidjeli da je učinak napada na kolonu, što s njihove, što s druge strane, bio razoran. Stotinu mrtvih neprijateljskih vojnika ležalo je na cesti i u uništenim vozilima.

„U to vrijeme u rujnu krenuli smo u Hrvatsku – apsurdno – ne znajući kamo idemo, zašto idemo. Imali smo naredbu da prođemo Tovarnik, mjesto za koje znamo da je hrvatsko, da je bilo hrvatsko i u Drugom svjetskom ratu, gnijezdo ustaša i drugih skupina, i normalno da smo morali proći Tovarnik u koloni, gdje je samo jedna ulica, gdje znamo da nas mogu čekati u bilo koje doba dana s protuoklopnim oružjem i ako pogode prvi ili drugi tenk, ili unište gusjenicu tenka, svi ostali mogu biti zaustavljeni i postati žrtve snajperista... Tako je, prvi dan u našoj jedinici poginulo desetak ljudi, a veliki broj ljudi je bio ranjen. Ali drugi dan iz Beograda stiže naredba: Naprijed marš! Kroz Tovarnik! ...I taj dan i dan prije naša avijacija letjela je iznad Tovarniku, pa smo mislili: super, dobro će izaći, moći ćemo proći, ali bombardirali su naše ljude... Mi smo otišli, taj dan naše vlastito zrakoplovstvo iz Batajnice bombardiralo je vlastitu vojsku. Bilo je oko osamdeset četiri mrtva i više od stotinu ozlijeđenih...“ (Lucić, 2018.)

Robert Lucić navodi kako su poginula 84 vojnika, a više od stotinu ranjenih rezervista bilo je iz Valjeva. „Nakon toga je oko 2800 mobiliziranih rezervista, pripadnika 2. proleterske gardijske mehanizirane brigade JNA iz područja

6 Osobni razgovori s Matom Vidakovićem – legendom „Puma“.

Valjeva napustilo položaje, ostavilo teško naoružanje i opremu i otišlo kućama. Nakon što se pročulo da su avioni JNA kod Tovarnika⁷ bombardirali položaje 2. pgmb i kako ima mnogo mrtvih i ranjenih, s područja Šida „kompletne su pobjegle i neke druge postrojbe JNA prije no što su uopće imale borbeni kontakt s hrvatskim snagama. Među njima bile su i dvije motorizirane brigade Kragujevačkog korpusa (80. iz Kragujevca i 130. iz Smederevske Palanke). I kod 12. korpusa (novosadskog) u istočnoj Slavoniji razbježale su se vojvođanske brigade.” Masovnih slučajeva dezerterstva rezervista bilo je i kod 80., 169. i 544. mtbr, 19. pbr i dr. (Dimitrijević, 2011.). Nakon tog događaja smijenjeni su zapovjednik 1. vojne oblasti (1. VO) Aleksandar Spirkovski (Makedonac) i načelnik štaba Prve armije general Andrija Silić (Hrvat).

Mnogi analitičari i povjesničari previdjeli su i pogrešno objasnili ovaj događaj koji je pokrenuo kolaps u borbenom rasporedu 1. gardijske mehanizirane divizije, glavne snage JNA, koja je imala zadaću za tjedan dana *posavskim koridorom* spojiti se sa snagama 5. korpusa JNA u zapadnoj Slavoniji. To je bio početak propasti strateškog plana JNA o napadu na Hrvatsku.

Slučaj raketiranja vlastitih snaga kod Tovarnika s velikim brojem mrtvih i ranjenih ne spominje se u monografijama ratnog zrakoplovstva JNA, a ne analizira se ni raspad 2. proleterske gardijske mehanizirane brigade (valjevske) koja je bila dio 1. gardijske mehanizirane divizije (1. pmgd). Dimitrijević samo navodi: „*Tenzije je podigao i slučaj dejstva po snagama JNA koje su greškom izveli piloti 204. lap i 252. lbae, posle čega je došlo do smene u komandnom kadru kopnenih snaga JNA u tom sektoru: otišli su komandanti 1. VO, Spirkovski i 1. proleterske gardijske mehanizirane divizije Silić. Kako se stanje nije promenilo, 25. rujna 1991. zahtevala se i ostavka komandanta vazduhoplovstva gen. Zvonka Jurjevića*” (Dimitrijević, 2006. str. 317).

⁷ Jugoslavenski vojni avioni više su puta djelovali po vlastitim snagama: 14. rujna 1991 umjesto silosa Đergaj bombardirano je selo Bač u Vojvodini, tri su osobe poginule, a devet je bilo ranjeno. Zatim su pogreškom 21. rujna 1991. bombardirani položaji kod Opatovca, poginula su tri, a lakše i teže ranjeno desetak rezervista. Međutim, ne spominje se treći slučaj o bombardiranju vlastitih snaga između Ilače i Tovarnika s velikim brojem mrtvih i ranjenih.

U knjizi „*Nikad spominjani*” Ratko Dragović Klek opisuje svjedočanstva suboraca, zaboravljenih hrvatskih junaka, preživjelih „Tigrova” iz borbe za Ilaču. Klek navodi kako je srpska televizija 25. listopada 1991. izvještavala o zaustavljenoj koloni dugoj 30 kilometara kod Šida, o rezervistu koji prosvjeduje s oklopnom vozilom iz 2. pgmb JNA pred Skupštinom u Beogradu, o zarobljenom oružju hrvatskih vojnika, o 380 poginulih i nestalih vojnika, o velikom broju ustaša koji su došli iz inozemstva i brane naselja, skrivajući tako pravu istinu o katastrofalnoj pogrešci koja je usmjerila tijek velike vojne operacije. (Dragović, 2003.)

Autori *Balkan Battlegrounds*, vrlo korisnog djela za proučavanje jugoslavenskih ratova u Hrvatskoj i BiH, navode slučaj „*prijateljske vatre*” kod Tovarnika, i kako je „*vojna bolnica JNA u Sremskoj Mitrovici primila je 84 ranjenika iz trodnevnih borbi, među kojima su mnogi bili i žrtve prijateljske vatre*”, ali ne opisuju događaj u cjelokupnom obimu, posljedicama i utjecaju koji je imao na daljnji slijed događaja i propast Kadijevićeva strateškog plana o slamanju Hrvatske. (CIA, Volume 1, 2002. str. 195 i 211)

I danas još nemamo detaljnu analizu ovog događaja, o kojemu javnost malo zna, a koji je utjecao na raspad snaga JNA na *posavskom koridoru, na glavnome smjeru napada 1. VO*, odnosno o propasti *Strategijsko-operativne napadne operacije JNA* o slamanju Hrvatske, kako je u istočnoj Slavoniji mala skupina hrvatskih branitelja uspjela herojskom obranom *elitnu jedinicu 1. proleterske gardijske divizije dovesti u rasulo* i zaustaviti nadiranje srpske JNA u pohodu na Zagreb i Varaždin⁸.

8 Pokojni svećenik profesor Ivančić izjavio je na jednom svom predavanju da se to sve dogodilo kada su neke osobe iz državnog vrha došle k njemu znajući za kolone tenkova u Tovarniku i Ilači u kretanju prema Vukovaru i rekli da je situacija u zemlji gotovo izgubljena, a on je u miru odgovorio: „Organizirat ćemo veliki molitveni lanac i Bog će nam pomoći!” Jesu li uslišane molitve prof. Ivančića za Božjom pomoći Hrvatima? Je li u pitanju novo *Čudo na Visli?*



8.a



8.b



8.c



8.d



8.e



8.f



8.g



8.h

Slike 8a do 8h. Uništena kolona topničkog divizionara JNA NORA 152 mm između Ilače i Tovarnika 22. rujna 1991.

Izvor: M. Vidaković, sudionik bitke u Ilači, osobna arhiva

Obrana Tovarnika slomljena je tek trećeg dana, 22. rujna 1991., i to u drugom napadu 252. oklopne brigade JNA iz Kraljeva, koja je bila pridodana 1. pmgd. U Ilaču su neprijateljske snage ušle 25. rujna 1991., kada su branitelji ostali bez streljiva i protuoklopnih raketa, a pomoći od strane drugih postrojbi hrvatskih snaga nije bilo (Tigrovi – monografija, 2015.). Prema Strateškom planu, snage JNA morale su već deblokirati vojarne u Vinkovcima, ovladati I. etapom: linijom Našice – Slavonski Brod i *biti u gotovosti za dalja dejstva* (Direktiva 1. VO).

U isto vrijeme raspada snaga JNA na području Tovarnika, na drugom kraju Hrvatske, u Varaždinu, hrvatskim snagama predao se 32. korpus JNA, s kompletnom opremom i oružjem, a bio je jedan od najopremljenijih u JNA. Ova dva događaja imala su presudan utjecaj za opstanak i obranu Hrvatske.

Bio je to šok za vojni vrh JNA, na samom početku napadne operacije na Hrvatsku došlo je do kolapsa glavnih snaga i propasti planova u istočnoj Slavoniji. Raspala se „*elitna Titova divizija*” – glavni nositelj napada 1. VO, koja se posavskim koridorom trebala spojiti za tjedan dana sa snagama 5. korpusa JNA u Okučanima. Plan o dvotjednom *Blitzkrieg* pohodu JNA na Hrvatsku je propao. „*Kadijević deluje veoma zbunjeno, skoro izgubljeno. Govorio je o porazu vojske, o dezerterstvu, o nedostatku motivacije, o opasnosti od izdaje još uvek velikog broja Hrvata u vojsci, o velikom nepoverenju Srba čak i prema lojalnim nesrpskim oficirima...*” (Nikolić, Petrović, 2018. str. 249).

Mobilizacija je doživjela krah, posebno u Srbiji. Pozivu na mobilizaciju u Srbiji, kao posljednjoj regrutnoj bazi JNA odazvalo se oko 50 000 ljudi. U Beogradu se pozivu odazvalo 15 % vojnih obveznika, a u unutrašnjosti Srbije 50 %. Za JNA je to bila katastrofa. Neuspjeh masovne mobilizacije u Srbiji značilo je i promjenu ratnih planova, odnosno njihovo korigiranje.

U odnosu prema velikim snagama koje je JNA koncentrirala u istočnoj Slavoniji, u zapadnoj Slavoniji 5. korpus JNA nije imao dovoljno snaga ni sposobnosti za izvođenje proboja do Virovitice. Snage 5. korpusa JNA jedva da su mogle držati trokut Novska – Pakrac – Nova Gradiška, a nepregledna planinska područja sjeverno od Pakraca ostala su u zoni odgovornosti Teritorijalne obrane (TO) zapadne Slavonije i raznih četničkih skupina pristiglih iz Srbije i Bosne i Hercegovine. „Nigdje se neuspjeh mobilizacije o

kome sam govorio nije tako negativno odrazio kao na situaciju u Zapadnoj Slavoniji, od planiranih pet brigada, dobilo se samo ekvivalent jedne i po brigade, s tim što su i oni koji su stigli na front, u toku borbi ga napuštali.” (Kadijević, 1993. str. 109) Snage 5. korpusa JNA na dan početka operacije, 20. rujna 1991., procjenjuju se na oko 10 000 vojnika.

Vojnom vrhu JNA postalo je jasno da s ovakvom vojskom neće biti nikakvog munjevitog rata, prodora u dubinu i rezanja Hrvatske kako bi ju se prisililo na kapitulaciju. I umjesto vojničke parade po Hrvatskoj, JNA se suočila s vlastitim slomom.

U Beogradu je 30. rujna 1991. na održanom „*sudbonosnom sastanku*” generala JNA dogovorena promjena plana napada na Hrvatsku. Odustalo se od namjere da se poraze Oružane snage Republike Hrvatske i okupiraju područja Hrvatske na kojima je bio veći postotak Srba. Odlučili su se za nastavak rata, neke dijelove Hrvatske bi blokirali, a u Dalmaciji i istočnoj Slavoniji provodili bi napadne operacije kojima bi porazili Hrvatsku vojsku. Vatrenim udarima po vitalnim objektima u Hrvatskoj mislili su prisiliti vrhovništvo Hrvatske da dopusti izvlačenje snaga JNA na crtu koja je omeđena ugroženim narodima. Snage 5. (banjalučkog) korpusa dodatno bi ojačali radi provođenja napadnih operacija u zapadnoj Slavoniji.

Da bi otklonio nepovjerenje prema vojnom vrhu JNA (Veljko Kadijević, Blagoje Adžić i Stane Brovet) i umirio one koji su javno tražili ostavku i pokušali vojni puč, Kadijević je od prisutnih generala zatražio i dobio povjerenje za daljnji nastavak vođenja operacija JNA protiv Hrvatske (Cokić, 2008. str. 258–268). Naime, smjena Kadijevića i ostalih u tom trenutku samo je mogla povećati kaos i imati još negativniji utjecaj na funkcioniranje JNA.

Sljedeći dan Kadijević je vodstvu Srbije, Crne Gore i *srpskom bloku* Predsjedništva SFRJ-a predstavio plan Štaba Vrhovne komande i dobio potporu za nastavak ratnih djelovanja protiv Hrvatske. (Nikolić, 2020. str. 159–162). Vojni vrh JNA već se prije priklonio novome vođi, srbijanskom rukovodstvu s Miloševićem na čelu, koji je nastojao zadržati kontrolu nad vojnom organizacijom i usmjeriti je za stvaranje „*skraćene Jugoslavije*”, a ne spašavanje Jugoslavije

Kolaps glavnih snaga JNA u istočnoj Slavoniji ubrzao je njezin kraj i potrebu za transformacijom – od komunističke i unitarističke vojske završilo se u pravoslavlju i velikosrpskom nacionalizmu. Petokrake zvijezde na vojnim kacigama zamijenjene su jugoslavenskom trobojnicom na kojoj je ćirilicom bilo ispisano JNA. Vojni vrh JNA izgubio je autoritet i utjecaj. Četnici sa svojim vojvodama i ostale paramilitarne grupe raznih imena formalno postaju dio JNA. Srpski i crnogorski oficiri iz JNA (ali i mnogi drugi koji su ostali u tzv. JNA) stavili su se na raspolaganje velikosrpskoj četničkoj politici Slobodana Miloševića u cilju stvaranja *Velike Srbije*. „*Tadašnje srpsko rukovodstvo s Miloševićem i MUP Srbije imali su vlast nad sastavima paravojnih formacija. U kasnu jesen 1991. JNA i njene starješine bile su potrebne samo radi iskorištavanja ratne tehnike i kakvog-takvog taktičkog osmišljavanja akcija*” (Vreme, 2001.).

Novim „*reduciranim planom*” nastalim deset dana nakon donošenja Direktive, odnosno napada na Hrvatsku, JNA je odustala od prodora u dubinu Hrvatske. Za zauzimanje Slavonije bile su potrebne mnogo brojnije snage, trebalo je više pješačkih postrojbi koje JNA nije imala. Novo težište borbenog djelovanja usmjereno je na širenje, zaokruživanje i etničko čišćenje teritorija od Hrvata. Srbi su željeli očišćene „*srpske zemlje*” pripojiti budućoj srpskoj državi. Glavni cilj u istočnoj Slavoniji postao je Vukovar, koji se našao u pozadini borbenog rasporeda JNA, a koji se moralo osvojiti radi postizanja kompaktnosti osvojenog područja, kao budućeg političkog središta za taj dio SAO Krajine, ali i zbog neuspjeha napadne operacije na Hrvatsku.

Hrvatske oružane snage u nastajanju, sastavljene od pripadnika Narodne zaštite, policije, ZNG-a, dragovoljaca i bivših pripadnika JNA, okupile su se i pokušale nekoliko puta probiti obruč JNA oko Vukovara (Marijan, 2004. str. 169–184). Međutim, u uvjetima embarga na kupnju oružja, nemogućnosti nabave suvremenog protuoklopnog i protuavionskog naoružanja za obranu od napada tenkova i avijacije JNA, bez zračne potpore i opreme za razminiranje minskih polja koja je JNA postavila oko Vukovara, hrvatske snage, opremljene zarobljenim oružjem iz skladišta bivše vojske, iako visokog morala, tada nisu bile dostatne ni dovoljno vješte da bi mogle uspješno izvesti tako zahtjevnu napadnu operaciju. Neprijatelj je u jesen

1991. koncentrirao 9 oklopno-mehaniziranih brigada JNA (7 mehaniziranih i 2 oklopne) na prostoru istočne Slavonije uz potporu avijacije.

Golema brojčana, topničko-raketna i zrakoplovna nadmoć u odnosu prema hrvatskim snagama u obrani Vukovara omogućila je neprijateljskim snagama zauzimanje grada, ali dugotrajna opsada grada bila je i prekretnica u ratu za pobjedu nad JNA. Herojska obrana Vukovara omogućila je Hrvatskoj pripremu i organiziranje novih snaga za obranu na drugim smjerovima napada JNA.

U tromjesečnoj obrani Vukovar je potpuno uništen, s tisućama poginulih vojnika i civila, s desetcima tisuća protjeranih iz grada, s ranjenicima odvedenima iz bolnice i ubijenima na Ovčari, odvedenim zarobljenim braniteljima u logore Stajicevo, Begejci i druge u Srbiji, u kojima su poniženi i ubijani, s još mnogo nestalih za kojima se i danas traga. Srpski agresor počinio je mnoge zločine nad hrvatskim stanovništvom i braniteljima koje buduće generacije ne smiju zaboraviti. (Croativonline, 2020.) Ovo strašno poglavlje Domovinskog rata ostavilo je dubok i trajan ožiljak na buduće odnose Srbije i Hrvatske.

Bitka za Vukovar poprimila je istu simboliku kao i opsada Sigeta 1566. godine. Nadmoćne neprijateljske srbočetničke snage slomile su junački otpor hrvatskih branitelja i slavile Pirovu pobjedu. „*Gardijska divizija je bila praktički uništena, novosadski korpus iscrpljen, a tuzlanski pretrpio gubitke od koji se nije nikada oporavio*” (general A. Tus). Bitka za Vukovar generacijama Hrvata ostat će u kolektivnoj memoriji jednako kao i Sigetska.

Bitka za Slavoniju kulminirala je u zapadnoj Slavoniji. Napore 5. korpusa JNA (banjalučkog) da „*okruži, razbije i razoruža hrvatske snage i probije se do Virovitice te prekine svu komunikaciju istočne Slavonije*” s ostatkom Hrvatske, zaustavile su hrvatske snage u zapadnoj Slavoniji.

Zaključak

Vojni vrh JNA u jesen 1991. uz potporu srbijanskog političkog vodstva, pokrenuo je veliku napadnu operaciju na Hrvatsku i pokušao srušiti legalno izabranu vlast u Hrvatskoj. Dana 20. rujna 1991. krenuli su u konačni obračun s Hrvatskom i napali je na nekoliko smjerova, namjeravajući ispresijecati njezin teritorij i prisiliti hrvatsku vlast na kapitulaciju. Glavni napor JNA je usmjerila na Slavoniju. Zapovjedništvo 1. vojne oblasti u Beogradu odlučilo je s dvije velike vojne grupacije napasti istočnu Slavoniju. Novosadska vojna grupacija napadala je *podravskim koridorom*, a Prva proleterska gardijska mehanizirana divizija (1. pgmd) JNA, poznatija kao elitna Titova divizija, *posavskim koridorom*. Ove dvije grupacije trebale su za nekoliko dana doći u područje zapadne Slavonije i spojiti se sa snagama 5. korpusa JNA (banjalučki), koji je napao smjerom Banja Luka - Okučani - Virovitica, a zatim nastaviti napade prema Zagrebu i Varaždinu do slovenske granice.

Dva događaja na samim počecima Domovinskog rata bili su presudni za obranu Hrvatske u rujnu 1991.

Prvi događaj koji je imao presudni utjecaj na tijek vojne operacije jest sukob malobrojnih hrvatskih snaga s neprijateljskim postrojbama na posavskom koridoru. Borbeni moral i odlučnost koju su hrvatske postrojbe pokazale u borbi, negativno su utjecali na moral mobiliziranih vojnika JNA iz središnje Srbije, koji su napustili svoje postrojbe nakon što je pogreškom zrakoplovstvo JNA na cesti između Ilača i Tovarnika bombardiralo zaustavljenu kolonu JNA, od koje su ostale samo olupine kamiona, topova i tenkova. Tu je poginulo 84, a ranjeno više od stotinu pripadnika 2. gardijske mehanizirane brigade iz Valjeva, a 2800 mobiliziranih pripadnika brigade napustilo je položaje kod Tovarnika i samovoljno otišlo kućama u Srbiju. Njihov odlazak potaknuo je i druge postrojbe s područja Šida na napuštanje položaja prije nego što su uopće imale borbeni kontakt s hrvatskim snagama. Taj događaj, koji je neopravdano zapostavljen u hrvatskoj i stručnoj javnosti, imao je dalekosežne posljedice na nastavak provođenja velike napadne operacije JNA. Bio je to šok za vojni vrh JNA na *posavskom koridoru*; na glavnome smjeru napada raspala se 1. pgmd JNA, koja se prema planovima trebala lagano kroz Slavoniju probiti do Zagreba.

Drugi događaj koji je imao presudni utjecaj na opstanak Hrvatske u rujnu 1991. je osvajanje vojnih skladišta opreme s teškim naoružanjem 32. korpusa JNA (varaždinskog). I sami srpski analitičari priznaju kako je najveći uspjeh hrvatske strane bila blokada i osvajanje vojarni s kompletnim oružjem 32. korpusa u Varaždinu, kao jednog od najopremljenijih u JNA.

Vojni vrh JNA izgubio je autoritet i potpao pod utjecaj srbijanskog rukovodstva s Miloševićem na čelu. Kadijevićev strateški plan je *reduciran*, a cilj mu više nije bilo rušenje vlasti u Zagrebu, prodor u dubinu Hrvatske i njezina kapitulacija te ostanak u skraćenoj Jugoslaviji. Konačni je cilj proširiti i zaokružiti osvojene teritorije koji će se pripojiti novoj državi *Velikoj Srbiji*, a osvojena područja etnički očistiti od Hrvata i drugih nesrba. Vojni potezi vodećih generala JNA poklopili su se u realizaciji velikosrpske politike s ciljevima koje je još četnički ideolog Moljević ucrtao u kartama 1941. Mnogi oficiri i podoficiri JNA, pretežno srpske i crnogorske nacionalnosti, priklonili su se toj velikosrpskoj politici, čineći zlodjela u ratovima koje su vodili na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije.

Nakon što su reducirali svoje planove, snage JNA i pobunjeni Srbi iz zapadne Slavonije nisu uspjeli zaokružiti područje SAO Zapadna Slavonija i poraziti hrvatske snage na lipičko-pakračkom bojištu. Planovi o granici Velike Srbije na rijeci Ilovi propali su u zapadnoj Slavoniji. Kolaps glavnih snaga JNA u Slavoniji samo je ubrzao kraj jugoslavenske armije i njenu transformaciju. Od komunističke i unitarističke vojske završilo se u pravoslavlju i velikosrpskom nacionalizmu. Petokraka zvijezda na vojnim kacigama je prebrisana jugoslavenskom trobojnicom na kojoj je ćirilicom ispisano JNA.

Odlučnost i visok borbeni moral hrvatske obrane, kardinalne pogreške JNA učinjene prilikom uvođenja glavnih snaga na početku napadne operacije na Slavoniju i neuspjeh mobilizacije u Srbiji, sve to šokiralo je JNA i dovelo do propasti Kadijevićeva strateškog plana o slamanju Hrvatske.

Napoleonova izreka kako je u ratu „*moralno prema fizičkom*“ vrijedno „*kao tri prema jedan*“ potvrdila se i u obrani Hrvatske. Odlučnost, nepobjedivi hrvatski borbeni duh i osvojeno oružje iz skladišta JNA spasilo je Hrvatsku na početku velikosrpske agresije kada je neprijatelj bio brojčano jači i tehnički opremljeniji. Svaki hrvatski branitelj znao je da štiti svoj vlastiti dom, vlastitu obitelj od užasa velikosrpske okupacije.

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The fiasco of the JNA's strategic campaign against Croatia in September 1991

Abstract

After the declaration of Croatian independence in June 1991, the military leadership of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) with the support of the Serbian political leadership launched an offensive military operation in the fall of 1991 with the aim of defeating and subjugating Croatia. The Offensive strategic plan of Kadijević's JNA military leadership to crush Croatia in fifteen days, experienced a collapse, and can be classified as one of the worst military failures of the second half of the 20th century.

At the very beginning of the Homeland War, two events were decisive for the defense of Croatia in September 1991. The first decisive influence on the survival of Croatia in September 1991 was the occupation of military equipment and heavy weapon depot of the JNA 32nd-Corps (Varaždin). The second crucial influence on the course of military operations is the disintegration of 1. JNA guard division, better known as Tito's division, on the Posavina corridor.

The introductory part of the paper explains the extent of the armed rebellion in Western Slavonia and the role it played in the plan of the JNA military leadership to crush Croatia. The second part of the paper clarifies the main idea of Kadijević's strategic plan with the key directions of the attack on Croatia. The paper focuses on the decision of the commander of the 1st JNA military district to attack Slavonia as well as on the collapse of JNA main force on the Posavina corridor near Tovarnik and Ilača.

Key words

West Slavonija, strategic plan of JNA attack on Croatia in 1991, disintegration of JNA forces on Posavina corridor, the 5th JNA corps (base in Banja Luka, the 32nd JNA corps (based in Varaždin

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The Editor-in-Chief of *Strategos* makes his/her own independent decisions about publication, has full responsibility for the content, and is ultimately responsible for the quality of all contributions. A rejection based on the outcome of a review process will be backed up by the actual reviews, and a motivation by the Editor-in-Chief.

The Editor-in-Chief reserves the right to refuse any article, whether invited or otherwise, and to make suggestions and/or modifications before publication, particularly to ensure readability standards of the journal.

Contributions that have already been published, as well as those being considered for publication elsewhere, will not be taken into consideration for publishing in *Strategos*. If a manuscript contains, either in whole or in substantial part, already published information or a reprint of a previously published work, the author(s) need to acknowledge that fact in a cover letter to the Editorial Board and explain the reasons for such a duplication of text. If the Editorial Board discovers a case of overlapping or dual publication without a previous acknowledgement on the part of the author(s), the Editorial Board will require the author(s) to provide a detailed explanation in written form. If such an explanation is not provided, or if the Editorial Board find it inadequate, the manuscript will be rejected.

Copy editing

After a contribution has been accepted for publication, *Strategos*' Editorial Board provides detailed advice about formatting. *Strategos*' Editorial Board may also suggest revised titles and adjust the abstracts of articles so the conclusions are accessible to a broad reading audience. The Editorial Board subeditors (copyeditors) ensure overall clarity of text, figures, figure legends and captions.

The Editorial Board shall provide authors of accepted articles with proofs for the correction of printing errors. The proofs shall be returned within 14 days of submittal. The Editorial Board shall not be held responsible for errors which are the result of authors' oversights.

Publication Ethics

The opinions and views set out in the articles are those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect the official opinions and views of any institution.

The Editorial Board shall take reasonable steps to identify and prevent the publication of papers where research misconduct has occurred, including plagiarism, citation manipulation, and data falsification/fabrication, among others. In no case shall the journal or its Editorial Board encourage such misconduct, or knowingly allow such misconduct to take place. In the event that the Editorial Board is made aware of any allegation of research misconduct relating to a published article, the Editorial Board shall follow Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) guidelines in dealing with allegations.

The Editor-in-Chief, members of the Editorial Board and reviewers of *Strategos* oblige themselves to keep the content of received manuscripts confidential.

For details, please see our Publication Ethics and Publication Malpractice Statement, on the *Strategos*' website.

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