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Riječ urednika

Poštovani čitatelji,

pred vama je drugo izdanje časopisa *Strategos* u 2024. godini. Godina se privodi kraju i uredništvo *Strategosa* nudi čitateljima nove zanimljive radove. I ovo izdanje sadržava radove koji imaju širok obuhvat tema.

Umjetna inteligencija danas je iznimno aktualna tema i primjenjiva na široki spektar aktivnosti, pa tako i kao jedna od najintegrativnijih konceptualnih praksi u razvoju strategije koja zahtijeva sposobnosti suočavanja s ogromnom složenošću svijeta u kojem djelujemo. Je li upotreba umjetne inteligencije upitna u razvoju strategije, pokušat će dati odgovor autori rada „Potencijali i ograničenja umjetne inteligencije u razvoju strategije". Sljedeći rad „Osnove teorije i prakse strategije" ima cilj ispitati kako se teorije tradicionalne vojne strategije usklađuju sa suvremenim izazovima u nacionalnoj obrani uspoređujući stajališta odabranih teoretičara strategije.

Primjetna je namjera uredništva redovito u izdanjima časopisa objavljivati radove s temama vezanim uz Domovinski rat. „Pobuna kao usmjereno političko nasilje: Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990-ih" jedan je takav rad koji raspravlja o ratu kao oponašajućoj i recipročnoj aktivnosti. Rad razmatra pobunu kao usmjereno političko nasilje koordinirano od strane vodstva, čija je temeljna zadaća raskinuti veze između naroda i vlada i uspostaviti vjerodostojnost njihova pokreta, što je bilo osnovno oruđe jugoslavenskog vodstva.

Djelo „Napad 5. korpusa JNA na zapadnu Slavoniju u jesen 1991." daje uvid u ulogu 5. korpusa JNA u strateškom planu napada JNA na Hrvatsku. Rad navodi zadaće, namjere i zamisli zapovjednika 5. korpusa JNA na području zapadne Slavonije. Ovdje se pojašnjava i uloga nositelja borbenih djelovanja na glavnom smjeru napada 5. korpusa JNA, 343. brigade „R" JNA na lipičko-pakračkom bojištu u jesen 1991., do dolaska 104. brigade ZNG-a Varaždin.

U djelu „Utjecaj vojnih aktivnosti na okoliš" autori razmatraju odnos sigurnosti i okolišnih čimbenika te utjecaj vojnih aktivnosti na okoliš. Stalno rastući interesi i sve složenija međuovisnost sigurnosnih trendova i čimbenika dovodi do značajnih i nepredvidivih utjecaja na okoliš.

I ovom prilikom preporučujem čitateljstvu radove u zajedničkom izdanju Sveučilišta obrane i sigurnosti i Hrvatskog vojnog učilišta te pozivam i druge autore da ponude radove iz svojeg područja ekspertize. Također vjerujem da će se mnogi autori koristiti prikazanim djelima kao referentnom literaturom u svojim radovima.

Glavni urednik

Editor's Word

Dear Readers,

You are holding the second issue of the *Strategos* journal for 2024. As the year draws to a close, the *Strategos* editorial team presents its readers with new and engaging articles, once again offering a wide range of topics.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is currently a highly relevant subject, applicable to a broad spectrum of activities, including its role as one of the most integrative conceptual practices in strategy development. This field demands the capacity to address the immense complexity of the world in which we operate. The article "*Potentials and Limitations of Artificial Intelligence in Strategy Development*" aims to explore whether the use of AI in strategy development raises significant questions.

Another contribution, "*Foundations of the Theory and Practice of Strategy,*" examines how traditional military strategy theories align with contemporary challenges in national defense by comparing the views of selected strategy theorists.

The editorial team remains committed to regularly publishing articles related to the Croatian War of Independence in the journal's issues. One such work, "*Rebellion as Directed Political Violence: The Serbian Rebellion in Croatia in the 1990s,*" discusses war as a mimetic and reciprocal activity. This paper analyzes rebellion as directed political violence orchestrated by leadership, whose primary task is to sever ties between people and their government while establishing the credibility of their movement—a key tool employed by the Yugoslav leadership.

The article "*Attack by the 5th Corps of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) on Western Slavonia in the Fall of 1991*" provides insights into the role of the 5th Corps of the JNA in the strategic plan for the attack on Croatia. It outlines the tasks, intentions, and strategies of the 5th Corps commanders in Western

Slavonia. The work also explains the role of the main combat force in the 5th Corps' primary offensive direction – the 343rd "R" Brigade of the JNA – on the Lipik-Pakrac battlefield in the fall of 1991, up until the arrival of the 104th ZNG Brigade from Varaždin.

In "The Impact of Military Activities on the Environment," the authors examine the relationship between security and environmental factors, as well as the environmental impact of military activities. The constantly growing interests and increasingly complex interdependence of security trends and environmental factors result in significant and unpredictable effects on the environment.

Once again, I recommend these articles from the joint publication of the University of Defence and Security and the Croatian Military Academy to our readers. I also encourage other authors to submit works from their areas of expertise. I believe that many authors will find the featured works useful as reference literature for their own research.

Editor-in-Chief

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Potentials and Limitations of Artificial Intelligence in Strategy Development

Dražen Smiljanić, Zvonko Trzun, Dijana Gracin [1]

Abstract

As one of the most integrative conceptual practices, strategy development requires capabilities to deal with the overwhelming complexity of the world in which we operate AI tools have proven useful in today's contexts for analysing large datasets, pattern recognition, performance prediction, and resource allocation optimisation. However, to find patterns, making its application in strategy development is questionable. The article examines AI's current potential in strategy development, focusing specifically on the risk assessment of the environment. The research is based on the analysis of contemporary security threats in Europe, specifically in terms of Russian aggression against Ukraine, which has been selected as a case study. To achieve results, various AI tools have been tasked with developing the building blocks of an optimal national security strategy. Overall, this research provides insight into the current potential of AI-based tools (e.g., ChatGPT, MS Copilot, Google Gemini, etc.) for strategy development. It identifies existing capabilities and future potentials, as well as the challenges that must be overcome in order for AI to provide relevant content for strategic documents. Furthermore, the paper discusses the fundamental legal issues surrounding the ethical aspects of strategy and its subsequent implementation.

Keywords

Artificial Intelligence, AI, Complex Problems Solving, Strategy Documents, ChatGPT

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Introduction

Navigating the overwhelming complexity of our modern world, which is characterized by numerous unknowns and an overload of information, is one of the primary challenges for strategists. At one level, AI adds to the complexity, but it also has the potential to be a tool that cuts through some of the clutter. The critical question is how AI can make life easier by providing more precise, timely insights. AI is changing our world, our societies, and our industries, much like the steam engine or electricity did in the past. Due to advancements in algorithms, data availability, and processing power, artificial intelligence has emerged as one of the 21st century's most important technologies. However, AI's role in strategy development is still developing, but it has enormous potential for businesses and the strategic profession. Making strategic decisions is critical to top executives' ability to influence their businesses, second only to assembling a strong leadership team. It's remarkable how little technology is currently utilized in this process. In the future, having executives who are knowledgeable about AI applications may become increasingly important for competitive advantage. This article investigates the current capacity of AI technologies (particularly generative AI) for strategy development. While the primary purpose of this research is the application of AI in strategy development, in the area of national defense, the technology (once matured) may be equally applied in the business domain.

Methodology

We first establish a theoretical framework that examines the concept and evolution of strategy, followed by a review of achievements in AI technologies, including legal and ethical aspects of AI use, which represents an vital effort to keep AI development under control. Following the theoretical considerations, we present some findings from the use of AI in horizon scanning (in terms of the security environment). The generative AI outputs are compared to the Ministry of Defense's standard risk assessment procedures. Finally, we draw conclusions about AI's current potential in strategy development.

Theoretical framework

On strategy and strategy development

Strategy originates from the Greek *stratos agein*, depicting the commandment of an army being pushed forward. Strategy is, therefore, the art of leading an army and, more generally, the art of command. This origin implies that strategy is not static, but rather intrinsically linked to movement and change. The role of strategist first appeared in Athens in the 5th century BC. Initially, a strategist was an official function, with ten strategists (*strategoi*) – comprised of experts, and leaders on military and security affairs – that were elected to that function for a year. Polyaenus distinguishes between *strategika*, which is associated with the concept of ruse and deception (the ability to outwit an opponent), and *strategemata*, clever deeds of generals that provide commanders with examples of planning and foresight (Brodersen, 2017). This distinction is relevant for later considerations of strategy as an art and a science.

The word strategist reappears in 1721 in Trévoux's dictionary (*The Dictionnaire de Trévoux*, also entitled *Dictionnaire universel françois et latin*) in the context of commanding the troops. While military strategy only emerged as one element among many during and after World War I, strategy in its current sense saw a resurgence in the 18th century. The Soviets were the first to develop what is now known as non-military strategy during that time. In the 1920s, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart spoke of a grand strategy that aimed to assess and develop the economic and demographic resources of the nation in order to support its military (Liddell Hart, 1929; Liddell Hart, 1991). Following that, the terms economic strategy, general strategy, enlarged strategy, and global strategy will appear (Coutau-Bégarie, 2008).

Hervé Coutau-Bégarie defines strategy as the dialectic of intelligence (of the wills) in a conflict environment based on the use or threat of using force for political ends (Coutau-Bégarie, 2008). He draws the contours of strategy as a concept, category of conflict, science, method, art and system. Strategy, perceived as a concept, refers to an idea, and as a category of conflict, it allows the analyst to classify it between politics and subordinate categories

(operations and tactics). Strategy as a science allows us to trace the history of strategic thinking and, as a method, is considered an approach. Any strategy is dependent on the means at its disposal and the ability to use them effectively. However, simply having the means of force is insufficient; one must also integrate them into real politics and understand how to convert force into power.

Strategy is unique in that it is both an art (the strategist's practice) and a science (in the broadest sense), as the strategist's knowledge. Russian terminology distinguishes, within the military domain, military theory and military practice. Russian theoreticians, such as General Genrykh A. Leer (1829–1904) divided strategy into ideal and practical (Vego, 2007). Generally, each sector and level of the military field is twofold: theoretical and practical. All practical activity is conducted taking into account the laws, principles, methods and processes established by the theory, as well as the teaching (the theory) learnt through practice. As a consequence, Hervé Coutau-Bégarie recognises two qualities of the strategist, thinker and doer. The strategist "thinker" (fr. *le stratégiste*) is the one who envisions and thinks, the one who must think globally and thoroughly. That one only uses reasoning and works from the comfort of his office, with time on his side. The strategist "doer" (fr. *le stratège*) is the one who acts and must remain focused on what is imminent, often based on insufficient and uncertain information, making his working environment stressful (Coutau-Bégarie, 2008).

Therefore, the theory (on strategy) is not a collection of recipes that can be applied in all circumstances. It seeks to clarify the judgement and to facilitate the decision. It is then up to the leaders to make the best use of the situation, whether by applying scientific principles or knowingly deviating from them. The Austrian Archduke Charles (1771–1847) pointed out that "*a great captain can only be formed by long experience and intense study: neither is his own experience enough – for whose life is there sufficiently fruitful of events to render his knowledge universal?*" (Bonaparte, 2015). This makes strategy difficult to "algorithmize" [1] even when all prior knowledge can be systematized and stored in databases.

1 To convert an informal description of a process or a procedure into an algorithm.

As described above, strategy emerged from the military milieu but found application in variety of fields, including business and corporate affairs. Although applied to different areas, the strategy has preserved its original purpose. It is about surviving and progressing in a particular environment, whether security or market. It is also about engaging limited resources towards goals set in the future, which inherently involve uncertainty and risk.

Strategy development may be broadly defined as a methodology used by an organisation or individuals to shape the way forward. However, our reality is so complex, diffuse and fluid that it is challenging to construct a comprehensive picture of our environment (from the market to the battlefield) that would serve as a solid foundation for predicting the future. Therefore, our action in "shaping the future" should begin with acknowledging that everything we do is based on an assumption, on a hypothesis. This turns our strategies, operational and tactical plans into hypotheses, and carrying them out becomes a hypothesis testing exercise. In this process of "testing" different options (*de facto*, strategic choice), it is crucial to have feedback that allows us to assess to what extent the decision represents a positive force (a force that changes and shapes). Feedback should tell us to what extent our assumptions were incorrect. Above all, they should help identify the reasons that caused the differences between our initial observations and our hypothesis test. Testing that hypothesis in real space and time is associated with many risks, so using tools and methods that can, at least partially, help obtain feedback is ideal.

The development of security and defense strategies is closely related to the competencies and capacity of strategists, and the skill aspect has a significant impact on the relevance and quality of the "output product." In general, the higher the strategy is on the taxonomy scale (from military strategy, through the defense strategy, to national security strategy and grand strategy), the more the balance between art and the scientific method favours art. Thus, strategy development as a method significantly enters the space of the intuitive and, to a significant extent, depends on the "talent" of the strategist. Acknowledging this assumption raises the question of methods and techniques that can provide substantial (adequate) support to strategists (decision-makers in the field of strategic choice) when deciding on goals and means for developing

a strategy. The problem statement for this article outlines specific requirements for strategy development, as well as the qualities that strategy developers need to possess. Since it generally deals with complex systems (international relations, geopolitics, markets), strategy development is a demanding endeavour for humans, let alone the technology that should (ideally) replace and (at least) augment people's cognitive capacity.

The core issue in developing the relevant military strategy is a reluctance or failure to recognise the dialectical nature of political or military conflict, which frequently favours a "linear approach" or an "administrative" perspective on war (Wirtz, 2014). In the early 19th century, Carl von Clausewitz compared war to a duel, implying that the outcome is determined by the interaction of opposing wills, politics, policies, and military forces. However, military institutions and their political leaders frequently focus solely on their role in the conflict, disregarding the adversary's motivations and the fact that the "interaction" within the conflict greatly determines outcomes. Colin S. Gray, one of the most influential theorists of military strategy, has repeatedly underscored the dangers of this linear approach to war and, by extension, strategy. Nonetheless, this shortcoming persists among strategists, often subtly, making strategy development in national security and defense more of an art than a science.

On artificial intelligence

To assess AI's potential role in strategy development, one must first understand current AI technology and trends. It is especially important to understand some major concepts (such as convolutional neural networks and generative AI), which aid in understanding what and how AI processes data and questions.

In general, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a subfield of computer science concerned with developing systems capable of performing tasks that typically require human intelligence. One of the key tools in the field of AI is machine learning (ML), which enables computers to learn from experience without explicit programming. ML is based on the concept of algorithms that analyze data, identify patterns in that data, and use those patterns to make decisions

or predictions. Examples of ML applications span from image and speech recognition to product recommendations and data analysis (Wang and Siau, 2019).

Machine learning is characterized by its capability to automatically enhance system performance through experience. Instead of manual rule definition by programmers, ML algorithms utilize data to discern implicit patterns and regularities, then apply acquired knowledge to novel, previously unexplored situations (Janiesch, Zschech and Heinrich, 2021). There are three main types of ML: supervised learning, unsupervised learning, and reinforcement learning. In supervised learning, algorithms are trained on correctly labelled data, aiming to generalize learned patterns to new, unlabeled data. Unsupervised learning involves analysing data without labelled correct answers, with algorithms tasked with discovering hidden patterns and structures, such as clustering similar items or reducing dimensionality. In reinforcement learning, algorithms interact with the environment, adjusting their strategies based on feedback to maximize rewards or minimize penalties (Carleo *et al.*, 2019).

Deep learning (DL) is a unique and widely applicable subtype of ML, known for its ability to learn from highly complex datasets. Deep learning, like machine learning, identifies patterns in data using different techniques. Both methodologies (DL and ML) begin with training using sample data and models, during which they establish relevant connections between different data points. Following this, they undergo an optimization process to ascertain the most precise weight values for these connections and to ensure that the model matches the data as closely as possible.

The term "deep" refers to the use of artificial neural networks with multiple layers. These networks can recognize intricate patterns within data, enabling them to address highly complex tasks (Bengio, Lecun and Hinton, 2021). Rather than manually defining features or rules, deep neural networks learn implicit patterns and structures through data transformation layers. Each layer processes input data and generates output features, which then serve as input for subsequent layers, allowing for progressive abstraction and broader generalization of the data (Mu and Zeng, 2019).

Convolutional neural networks

Among the most commonly utilized neural networks are convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and recurrent neural networks (RNNs). CNNs are particularly efficient in analyzing images and video content because they use utilizing convolutional layers to extract local features and reduce the dimensionality of input data. RNNs, on the other hand, excel at dealing with sequential data such as text or time series, modeling temporal dependencies through recurrent connections between neurons (Janiesch, Zschech, and Heinrich, 2021).

CNNs have demonstrated outstanding performance in areas such as object recognition, image classification, face detection, medical diagnostics, and other domains that use visual data analysis. CNNs are distinguished by the use of convolutional layers, which are typically combined with pooling layers to reduce the model's dimensionality and computational complexity. The goal is to aggregate and summarize information from convolutional layers, allowing for more efficient feature processing and interpretation.

CNNs have the advantage of automatically learning hierarchical features from input data. In this sense, CNNs aim to simulate the functioning of living beings' central nervous systems, specifically the brain. CNNs, like biological systems, are made up of simple processing units that communicate with one another via numerous connections (Li *et al*., 2021). Instead of manually defining features or patterns, CNNs use data-driven learning through an iterative process of optimizing network weights to minimize prediction errors. An activation function (also known as a transfer function) is then used for further information transfer. Among the most common are the threshold function, piecewise linear function, and sigmoid function.

The technique of using CNNs has produced outstanding results in variety of tasks, sometimes outperforming human capabilities. It is applied in image recognition, object detection and segmentation, medical diagnostics, natural language translation, time series analysis, and many other applications, including autonomous driving through the analysis of geospatial data (Zhang *et al*., 2019).

However, it is important to emphasize that the level of accuracy and reliability of these techniques continue to vary depending on the presented data and the quality of the training process.

The following are some of the most common issues encountered by the mentioned techniques:

Data Bias: If the training dataset is not diverse or representative enough, the algorithm may learn biased patterns and produce unbalanced predictions. This phenomenon is common in real-world datasets due to natural variations or irregularities in the data collection process and can result in unfair models that favor dominant classes while ignoring or misclassifying less represented ones (Ntoutsi *et al*., 2020). The solution to this problem involves collecting a larger and more diverse dataset, along with additional data collection for less represented classes, and applying techniques such as data augmentation (generating new examples from existing data) or adjusting weights in learning algorithms to account for class imbalances in the sample (Bengio, Lecun and Hinton, 2021).

Overfitting: When a CNN becomes too tailored to the training dataset, it can lose the ability to generalize to new data. Dropout, early stopping, and gradient normalization are examples of regularization techniques used to address overfitting. Overfitting can occur for a variety of reasons, including the model's overcomplexity or having too many parameters in comparison to the amount of available data. Overfitted models have poor generalization ability to new data, resulting in poor performance in real-world applications. For example, if an overfitted model is used for image classification, incorrect predictions may occur when the model is applied to images that were not present in the training dataset (Surden, 2021). Fortunately, there are various strategies for addressing overfitting (if a larger training dataset is not available). One of the most common strategies is regularization, which involves adding additional constraints to the model to prevent overfitting.

Scarcity of Data. Acquiring a sufficient volume of data for training a CNN can be difficult in certain situations, particularly when dealing with constrained datasets such as those used in medical diagnostics, military applications, and so on. The scarcity of data can curtail CNN's capacity to learn general

patterns and structures (Janssen *et al*., 2020). An effective strategy to address this scenario involves employing transfer learning methodologies, wherein the model undergoes training on a comparable yet more expansive dataset.

Generative AI

Generative AI is an artificial intelligence technology capable of generating diverse content, including text, images, audio, and synthetic data. The current excitement surrounding generative AI stems from the ease with which new user interfaces can produce high-quality text, graphics, and videos in just seconds.

It's critical to understand that this technology isn't entirely new. The introduction of chatbots in the 1960s paved the way for generative artificial intelligence. However, it wasn't until generative adversarial networks (GANs) emerged in 2014, a machine learning algorithm, that generative AI could create highly realistic content (the text), images, videos, and audio of real people. Tools such as ChatGPT, WatsonX.ai, Bard, and Bing utilise what is known as Foundation Models to accomplish this. These are versatile and powerful language models known as Large Language Models (LLMs). LLM stands for Language Model, and it plays a crucial role in the world of generative AI. A language model is a program or algorithm trained on extensive text data, allowing it to "comprehend" language patterns and structures. It learns the statistical relationships between words and utilises that knowledge to generate coherent and contextually appropriate text.

Furthermore, Generative Pretrained Models (GPT) is a specific type of language model that has been pre-trained using large amounts of text data, such as websites, articles and books, articles, and books. GPT models are designed to generate text closely resembling natural human language, making them incredibly powerful for various applications like chatbots, language translation, and content generation. Working with pre-trained models requires a thorough understanding of the parameters required to run the model.

Legal and ethical aspects of the AI's use

Strategic decisions, as a general rule, have significant consequences. That is why, when using AI, it is critical to be transparent and understand why it is making a specific prediction and what extrapolations it makes based on which information. Following that, a user can determine whether or not they trust the prediction. They may also use artificial intelligence to track the evolution of the assumptions used to make that prediction.

NATO's Artificial Intelligence Strategy (NATO, 2021) reflects the alliance's efforts to maintain its technological edge while also emphasizing ethical, legal, and policy commitments that will govern the integration of AI into defense capabilities. The document includes explicit chapters on "Principles of Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence in Defence" and "Ensuring the Safe and Responsible Use of Allied AI". One of the key principles is lawfulness: "AI applications will be developed and used in accordance with national and international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, as applicable."

In 2018, the European Union published the Artificial Intelligence for Europe Communication, which highlights how Artificial Intelligence is already a part of our daily lives. In addition to making our lives easier, Artificial Intelligence can help us solve some of the world's most pressing problems: such as treating chronic diseases and reducing mortality rates, road accidents, combating climate change and anticipating cybersecurity threats (EUR-Lex, 2018a). This Communication presents the European Initiative on Artificial Intelligence.

The stakes in AI use are high because the way societies approach AI will define the world we live in. Amid fierce global competition, a solid European framework is needed. In that way, the European Union (EU) should have a coordinated approach to make the most of the opportunities offered by AI and to address the new challenges that it brings. The EU can lead the way in developing and using AI for good and for all, building on its values and its strengths. It can capitalize on three main points: (1) world-class researchers, labs and startups. The EU is also strong in robotics and has a world-leading industry, notably in the transport, healthcare and manufacturing sectors that should be at the forefront of AI adoption; (2) the Digital Single Market.

Common rules, for example on data protection and the free flow of data in the EU, cybersecurity and connectivity help companies to do business, scale up across borders and encourage investments; and (3) a wealth of industrial, research and public sector data which can be unlocked to feed AI systems. In parallel to this Communication, the Commission is taking action to make data sharing easier and to open up more data – the raw material for AI – for re-use. This includes data from the public sector in particular, such as on public utilities and the environment, as well as research and health data.

European leaders have placed AI at the top of their agendas. On 10 April 2018, 24 Member States and Norway agreed to collaborate on AI. Building on this strong political endorsement, it is time for significant efforts to ensure Europe's competitiveness in the AI landscape, including bold investments that match its economic weight. This is about supporting research and innovation to develop the next generation of AI technologies, as well as deployment to ensure that companies – in particular, small and medium-sized enterprises which make up 99% of business in the EU – can adopt AI. Moreover, no one is left behind in the digital transformation. AI is changing the nature of work: new jobs will be created, others will disappear, and most will be transformed, even though modernization of education, at all levels, should be a priority for governments, as well. All Europeans should have every opportunity to acquire the skills they need and talent should be nurtured, gender balance and diversity encouraged. Furthermore, new technologies are value-driven, and the General Data Protection Regulation will become a reality.

It is a major step toward establishing trust, which is essential in the long run for both individuals and companies. This is where the EU's sustainable approach to technologies creates a competitive edge, by embracing change based on the Union's values. As with any transformative technology, some AI applications may raise new ethical and legal questions, for example, related to liability or potentially biased decision-making. The EU must therefore ensure that AI is developed and applied in an appropriate framework which promotes innovation and respects the Union's values and fundamental rights as well as ethical concerns, such as accountability and transparency. This is how the EU can make a difference – by championing an approach to AI that benefits both individuals and society as a whole.

Cooperation in the field of creating the regulatory framework began with the signing of the Statement on Cooperation in the Field of Artificial Intelligence, signed by 25 EU countries, including the Republic of Croatia was joined in 2018 (Jablanov, 2023:34). Within a few months of signing the statement, a High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG) was appointed and launched the so-called AI Alliance. High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG) has 52 members from academia, civil society and industry and drafted and published in April 2019 Ethical Guidelines for Reliable Artificial Intelligence in June 2019 (Šarolić Robić, 2019).

Several documents have been adopted in recent years, such as Communication entitled "Coordinated Agenda on Artificial Intelligence" 2018 (EUR-Lex, 2018b) and Communication entitled "Building Trust in Human-Centric AI" in 2019 (EUR-Lex, 2019), various studies and reports, recommendations and working documents, as well as resolutions of which we mention here several of the most significant – European Parliament resolution (2020/2016(INI)) of 6 October 2021 on artificial intelligence in criminal law and its use by the police and judicial authorities in criminal matters (European Parliament, 2021) and European Parliament resolution (2020/2266(INI)) of 3 May 2022 on artificial intelligence in a digital age (European Parliament, 2021).

Given that artificial intelligence is based on the processing of large quantities of personal data, the right to the protection of private life and the right to the protection of personal data apply to all areas of artificial intelligence and should fully comply with the EU legal framework for data protection and privacy; The EU has already set standards, data protection for law enforcement, which form the basis for any future artificial law intelligence used in prosecution and justice. The use and processing of personal data should be lawful and fair, the purposes of the processing should be clearly stated, explicit and legitimate, and processing should be appropriate, relevant and not excessive, to the purpose for which it is carried out, it should be accurate, up-to-date and incorrect data should be corrected or deleted unless restrictions apply.

The collected data is not should be kept longer than necessary, clear and appropriate deadlines should be established for the erasure or periodic review of the need to store such data, and they should be processed safely;

It is also important to prevent the possible identifying individuals using artificial intelligence that uses data that they were previously anonymised.

At the moment, AI is making the most intense penetration in the fields of automotive industry and transport, weapons and military sector, certain areas of health and medicine, financial sector and internet use (West & Allen, 2018). Current criminological literature recognizes different areas of potential risks, some of which have a higher degree of probability of output and a high degree of danger, and in this sense, we also talk about high-risk areas (Bikeev *et al*., 2019). The existing legal norms are mostly declarative and preventive in nature, they are not sufficient, and, in our point of view, the existing legal gaps should be filled in the future by introducing new legal rules in all branches of law, in particular criminal law, but first of all, it is necessary to approach the creation and adoption of national a strategy and action plan for artificial intelligence following the example of some of the EU Member States. Finally, the development of artificial intelligence should ensure a balanced approach taking into account advanced technologies and their accelerated development and on the other hand the need to develop certain legal, ethical and sociological standards that will guarantee legal certainty.

Results and discussion

Relevance of the ChatGPT as a tool

ChatGPT is an AI chatbot that generates written content on demand, including articles, social media posts, essays, code, etc. The abbreviation GPT stands for Generative Pre-trained Transformer, which describes how ChatGPT processes requests and formulates responses. The tool is available for any number and type of questions, including complex ones. However, ChatGPT still uses what we may call "historical data", so there is no knowledge of events and data after that year (see more at DataScienceTribe, 2023; Wolfram, 2023). For example, when asked (on 11 June 2024) about the data available for questions relevant to the national security strategy, ChatGPT answered that "*the data and insights used in outlining the national security strategy are based on information available up to June 2023.* "

Some general findings on the benefits of the usage of ChatGPT are:

- It is efficient because it handles "routinely" vast amounts of data, allowing users to focus on more complex problems.
- It saves costs because it is more profitable than hiring and training additional employees.
- It can be used as a virtual teacher.
- It is fast, as it provides almost instant answers.
- It is available 0-24.
- It supports many languages, including Croatian.
- It is personalised, as it adapts to user preferences and behaviours based on past interactions.

However, there are some restrictions, such as the following:

- It cannot cope with the complexity of human language, so its responses sometimes seem shallow and lack real insight.
- Certain words in the answers are overused because they are based on the next-word prediction. Consequently, users must edit the content it offers them.
- It summarises appropriately but needs to cite sources or analyze the data it offers. Even when it gives some statistics, it must explain what those statistics mean.
- It tries to follow the criteria for its analysis used in previous questions. For example, when asked, "*Is Russia a security threat?*" the answer started with: "*Russia's role as a security threat to Croatia and the broader region is nuanced and multifaceted* …" Although the question did not specify Croatia, the previous questions related to Croatia and its national security.

It is worth understanding how ChatGPT generates the content. The chatbot begins with the default words in the questions and then generates an appropriate word-for-word follow-up. Here, "reasonable continuation" means the generation of the next word as the one we expect someone to write as the next one after comparing their previous text with the texts on billions of web pages. For example, when ChatGPT had already generated the text "*Russia is a threat*", the next word could have been (which we verified by asking it): "*to regional stability*", "*to cybersecurity*", "*through energy dependency*", "*to national sovereignty*", "*to European security*", "*via military aggression*", "*by destabilising alliances, economically and politically*". As "explained "by ChatGPT, "*the next possible words could vary based on the context and the specifics of the discussion.* "

The role of data AI in strategy development

Data availability is vital for strategy development. However, the challenge is in the availability of systematically organized performance data. Resource allocation is inevitably defined by what one believes about the future, not necessarily past performance. This is why the result can be significantly biased. AI can provide a relatively objective prediction of performance based on data from the past and some indicators for the future.

AI-powered machines cannot replace humans in strategy development at this stage of technological development. The primary reason for this is that it cannot create and apprehend "the model of the world" (LeCun, 2022).

AI still does not "think" and lacks the "model of the world" that would enable it to go beyond statistics. However, there are many facets of strategists' work where advanced analytics (based on AI) tools can add immense value and augment what Colin S. Gray described as "the timeless principles of strategy" (Gray, 2010).

Organizations should use all of the capabilities of traditional analysis while increasing strategy automation, which can free up managers' or analysts' time and gradually introduce tools that can augment human thinking.

Only 7% of respondents to the McKinsey survey (Atsmon, 2023) about using AI said they use it in strategy or financial planning. In contrast, in areas like marketing, supply chain, and service operations, it's 25 or 30 per cent. Adoption is lagging because strategy is one of the most integrative conceptual practices.

Conclusion

The current level of AI-related technologies has still not reached the level that would allow to confidently replace humans in strategy development. This is because the generative AI continues to work (learn) from the existing datasets and formulates its answers on statistics rather than on what could be called comprehensive thinking. Strategy development is extremely demanding work, which requires knowledge, experience and the capacity to think broadly across time and space. It is also an art as it frequently requires audacity. While AI is highly useful in many aspects of human life, it does not "think" and lacks the "model of the world" required to go beyond statistics.

Organizations that base their strategies on a few major decisions using limited data are likely to benefit less from AI. Similarly, organizations exposed to high volatility and external vulnerabilities may not benefit as much as those with controlled and systematic portfolios. However, such organisations may still use AI to better predict external events and determine what they can and cannot control.

The speed at which decisions must be made also influences the value of AI. Most companies update their strategies every three to five years, which aligns with their annual budgets. Viewing strategy this way restricts AI's role to potentially speeding up the analyzes that feed into the strategy. However, some companies frequently reassess significant decisions based on assumptions about the world that may have changed, impacting the projected ROI of their initiatives. These changes affect how organisations allocate talent and executive time, spend money, and prioritize sales efforts. AI becomes particularly valuable when decisions are made close to the time of resource deployment, as it can indicate when previous assumptions have changed since the plan was created.

AI can be cost-effectively integrated into strategy development, constructing the foundational elements of the strategy. Altghough it may appear tactical, the impact can be substantial. For instance, rather than directly analyzing individual companies, a leading global investment firm has begun to use AI to detect specific patterns.

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Potencijali i ograničenja umjetne inteligencije u razvoju strategije

Sažetak

Kao jedna od najintegrativnijih konceptualnih praksi, razvoj strategije zahtijeva sposobnosti za suočavanje s ogromnom složenošću svijeta u kojem djelujemo, alati umjetne inteligencije pokazali su se korisnima u današnjim kontekstima za analizu velikih skupova podataka, prepoznavanje uzoraka, predviđanje izvedbe i optimizaciju raspodjele resursa. Međutim, za pronalaženje obrazaca, njegova primjena u razvoju strategije postaje upitnom. Ovim se radom ispituje trenutačni potencijal umjetne inteligencije u razvoju strategije, posebno se fokusirajući na procjenu rizika za okoliš. Istraživanje se temelji na analizi suvremenih sigurnosnih prijetnji u Europi, konkretno u kontekstu ruske agresije na Ukrajinu, koja je odabrana kao studija slučaja. Kako bi se postigli rezultati, razni alati umjetne inteligencije zaduženi su za razvoj sastavnih dijelova optimalne strategije nacionalne sigurnosti. Sve u svemu, ovo istraživanje pruža uvid u trenutačni potencijal alata temeljenih na umjetnoj inteligenciji (npr. ChatGPT, MS Copilot, Google Gemini itd.) za razvoj strategije. Identificiraju se postojeće sposobnosti i budući potencijali, kao i izazovi koje je potrebno prevladati kako bi umjetna inteligencija pružila relevantan sadržaj za strateške dokumente. Nadalje, u radu se raspravlja o temeljnim pravnim pitanjima koja se nameću o etičkim aspektima strategije i njezinoj kasnijoj provedbi.

Ključne riječi

umjetna inteligencija; UI, rješavanje kompleksnih problema, strateški dokumenti; ChatGPT

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STRATEGOS

Basics of Strategy: Theory and Practice

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Abstract

This paper aims to examine how traditional military strategy theories align with contemporary challenges in national defense by comparing the views of selected strategy theorists. The analysis will focus on how these theorists define the features of strategy, its purpose and significance, the different levels of strategy, and the influence of these theories on decision-making. It describes the evolution of strategy as a concept and theory, offering several definitions in the field of military strategy and the field of business strategy. It also analyses eight selected features of strategy that provide a theoretical framework and describe what strategy is and what constitutes a quality strategy. Furthermore, it outlines the purpose of strategy as a planning tool and the reasons for its importance. The characteristics and distinctions between the two levels of strategy in military and political terms are analysed. Since The main purpose of a strategy is to provide a clear and focused plan for accomplishing long-term goals and objectives. It serves as a roadmap that guides decision-making, resource allocation, and actions in a way that aligns with the overall vision of an organization, business, or individual. In conclusion, the need for modern strategies is identified, and the direction they should take is discussed.

Keywords

strategy, strategic decision-making, strategy theory, strategy features, strategy development

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1. Introduction

The theory of strategy encompasses various aspects of decision-making and planning, ranging from military and political plans to business operations. This multidisciplinary approach allows for a comprehensive understanding of the fundamental principles and concepts that guide strategic thinking and action across multiple areas. While business strategy has traditionally been the focus of strategic analysis, the significance of military and political strategies cannot be overlooked, as they shape the course of history and influence the outcomes of conflicts and negotiations.

In business, the theory of strategy provides a framework that allows organizations to navigate complex, competitive environments successfully and achieve sustainable success. It involves identifying long-term goals, analysing the internal and external environment, and formulating action plans to gain an advantage. By studying and applying strategic principles, companies can enhance their ability to adapt to changing market conditions, make informed decisions, and anticipate and respond to the challenges and opportunities of a dynamic market.

However, the strategy theory extends beyond the business. It has its roots in military strategy, which has been a key aspect of warfare and conflict resolution for centuries. Military strategy deals with the planning and execution of military operations, the allocation of resources, and the use of tactics and maneuvers to achieve specific objectives. It involves assessing the enemy, exploiting vulnerabilities, and applying countermeasures to ensure victory. Understanding military strategy and the lessons derived from historical conflicts can provide valuable insights into the nature of strategic decision-making and the complexities of the human and organizational dynamics involved.

Furthermore, the field of political strategy is of exceptional importance, as it involves formulating and implementing policies and managing relationships and interactions to achieve political goals. Political strategy encompasses the art of negotiation, the use of power dynamics, and the ability to influence and persuade key stakeholders. It plays a crucial role in governing nations,

resolving conflicts, and advancing national interests. By studying political strategy, we gain a deeper understanding of the complexities of the decision-making process in this area and the potential implications for societies as a whole.

The theory of strategy encompasses a wide range of disciplines, including business, military, and political strategies. By examining the principles and concepts that underpin strategic decision-making in these fields, we can gain valuable insights into the complexities of planning, execution, and achieving desired outcomes. Understanding the theory of strategy allows us to develop a comprehensive perspective on the dynamics of strategic thinking and action, allowing us to make informed and effective decisions.

2. Development and definitions

To gain an initial understanding of the theoretical framework of strategy, it is necessary to first describe the development of the concept of strategy, specifically what it used to mean, how it evolved, and what it represents today. This chapter also provides several different definitions of strategy from various perspectives, considering the broad meaning the term has acquired over time.

2.1. Evolution of the Concept of Strategy

The strategy concept has a long and diverse history spanning several millennia. Rooted in the military, the term "strategy" gradually expanded its scope and found application in various fields, including economics, politics, and sports. Over the centuries, its meaning has evolved and broadened to encompass a broader range of areas, influencing our understanding and application of strategy in different contexts. Today, it represents a critical element of success for organizations and individuals.

The origin of the term "strategy" can be traced back to ancient Greece (i.e. *Strategos*). With their city-states and frequent warfare, the Greeks recognised the importance of developing plans and tactics to win battles. The earliest

recorded use of the term "strategy" dates back to the time of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC). The word "strategy" in more recent times came into use in discussions of military affairs in Europe during the 1770s, but it was not until the 20th century that it acquired the broad meanings that are now attributed to it and tend to be applied retrospectively to refer to past practitioners.

Sun Tzu's book *The Art of War* is one of the earliest examples of applied strategy. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the enemy, using deception, exploiting weaknesses, and meticulous planning and espionage to achieve victory. Similarly, Chanakya's works included ideas on statecraft, economics, diplomacy, and military strategy. During the Roman Empire, the concept of "strategy" spread beyond the military domain. Cicero, a Roman statesman and philosopher, used it to describe an overall plan of action that needed to be followed in political and legal matters.

Strategy has continued to evolve and find its place in various disciplines. During the Renaissance, Machiavelli (1469–1527) elaborated on the strategic principles required for political leadership, including the art of wielding and maintaining power.

Clausewitz, a Prussian general, made further contributions to the development of strategic thinking. He emphasized the central role of politics in defining military objectives and articulated the concept of the "center of gravity" as a critical factor in a nation's military success. The term *Schwerpunkt*, from which the COG concept was derived, literally means "weight (or focus) of effort." When reevaluating center of gravity as an underpinning of doctrine, it is important to observe that the original *Schwerpunkt* concept is actually closer in meaning to what the U.S. military now calls the "sector of main effort" and the "point of main attack" (defense)". (Vego, 2007)

Over time, the application of strategic thinking expanded beyond the military context and became relevant in other areas. The Industrial Revolution and the rise of capitalism in the 19th century paved the way for the emergence of strategic management in the business world. In the second half of the 20th century, strategy became an essential concept in business management. The Industrial Revolution and the subsequent rise of large corporations required executives to plan and organise activities to remain competitive.

Chandler argued that strategy developed as a response to the complexities and challenges arising from the increased volume and scope of industrial companies. (Chandler, 1962)

Academics and practitioners such as Ansoff, Porter, and Mintzberg contributed significantly to the advancement of strategic management. In the 1960s, Ansoff introduced the concept of strategic planning, emphasizing the importance of aligning a company's internal resources and capabilities with external opportunities. (Ansoff, 1988) Porter made a significant contribution to understanding strategy by emphasizing the importance of analyzing industry dynamics in order to identify sources of competitive advantage and develop effective strategies. (Porter, 1980)

Unlike Ansoff and Porter, theorist Mintzberg took a more descriptive approach to strategy, rejecting the notion of strategy as a formal, planned process. He underscored the importance of understanding how organizations develop and adapt strategies in real-world situations, introducing concepts such as "emergent strategy" and "strategy in practice" and advocating for a holistic view of strategy. (Mintzberg, 1994)

Alongside advancements in military and business strategies, the concept began to gain importance in academia. Scholars from various disciplines, such as sociology, political science, and psychology, began to investigate the concept of strategy within their respective fields, with game theory emerging as another significant domain where the term proved to be relevant. Game theory, developed in the mid-20th century by mathematicians such as Von Neumann and Morgenstern, focuses on the analysis of decision-making processes when multiple parties interact and make decisions. Schelling, a particularly influential economist and game theorist, introduced the concept of strategy to game theory. Schelling emphasized the importance of strategic thinking, decision-making, and anticipating the moves of others in order to achieve desired outcomes. Strategies play a key role in game theory because they determine optimal outcomes and helping individuals or organizations gain an advantage over competitors.

The First and Second World Wars highlighted the need for comprehensive and flexible planning in warfare. To outmanoeuvre the enemy, innovative

strategic thinking was required when using new technologies such as tanks, aircraft, and submarines. This resulted in the establishment of formal military academies, where officers received training in strategy and military operations.

In the late 20th century and early 21st century, strategy gained further prominence as the world became increasingly interconnected and globalized. With the increased complexity of organizations, it became clear that a well-defined strategy was necessary to successfully manage this new environment.

Over the centuries, the term "strategy" has evolved and broadened its meaning, now encompassing a wide range of disciplines and applications that adapt to the complexities and demands of various domains. It originated in the art of war and tactics and has since become a fundamental concept in a variety of fields, including business management, politics, sports, and even everyday decision-making. Each context brings its unique nuances and perspectives, shaping the understanding and application of strategy.

2.2. Definitions of Strategy

In theory, there are multiple definitions of strategy. Here, the definitions of prominent authors in the field of military strategy are highlighted, beginning with the classic Clausewitz. Several definitions are presented here that clearly illustrate the specifics of military strategy, as well as some differences that reflect the evolution of warfare throughout history. Furthermore, three definitions of strategy from authors in the field of business strategy are emphasized, which provide a good overview from a business perspective while also having interesting differences and, to a certain extent, even contrasting views.

Clausewitz defines strategy as the use of battles to achieve the objectives of a campaign, and, by extension, the goals of war. He emphasizes that strategy is the bridge between politics and military actions, serving as the link between a nation's political goals and the military actions required to achieve them. (Clausewitz, 1984)

Howard defines strategy as a means of achieving specific objectives in conflict or wartime. He states that strategy involves the planning and execution of military operations to attain these objectives, while taking into account the available resources and the constraints imposed by the political, economic, and social dimensions of warfare. (Howard, 1984)

Liddell Hart defines strategy as the art of distributing and applying military means to achieve political objectives. (Liddell Hart, 1991)

Rumelt defines strategy as a specific type of problem-solving procedure. He argues that a good strategy consists of three essential elements: a diagnosis of the key challenge or problem, a policy to guide the approach to that challenge, and a coherent set of actions to implement that policy. (Rumelt, 2011)

Porter offers a comprehensive definition and framework for understanding strategy. Strategy is not merely a set of goals or plans; it is a distinct and unique approach to gaining competitive advantage in a particular market or industry. (Porter, 1996)

Mintzberg defines strategy as a pattern in a series of decisions. He argues that strategy is not the result of a detailed plan or a deliberate decision-making process but rather develops over time through a series of interconnected actions and reactions within the organization. (Mintzberg, 1987)

Strategy is a pattern in a series of decisions that evolves over time as a result of actions, reactions, and adaptations. It is not a fixed plan, but rather a dynamic and evolving concept that requires continuous learning and adjustment. Understanding and analysing these patterns allows organizations to better shape and adapt their strategies to achieve the desired outcomes. (Mintzberg, 1987)

3. Features of strategy

Strategy, unlike other planning and organizational elements, has distinct characteristics that describe its nature, purpose, and development. These features can also serve as benchmarks for the quality of a strategy, helping to predict its effectiveness.

3.1. Goal-oriented

"Goal-oriented" is one of the main features of strategy that leading authors in the field have extensively discussed and researched. Strategic goals provide a clear vision and direction for an organization, directing its actions and decisions toward desired outcomes.

Porter asserts that strategy involves making choices to establish a unique and valuable position for an organization, with goals being at the heart of this decision-making process. He suggests that organizations should set clear goals to define the scope of their strategic activities and align their resources accordingly. Establishing explicit goals allows organizations to focus their efforts on achieving specific outcomes and track their progress along the way. (Porter, 1980)

Similarly, Mintzberg criticizes the traditional view of strategy as a formalized, linear process, proposing a more emergent perspective. He argues that strategies frequently result from a combination of intentions and evolving circumstances. Without clear goals, organizations risk becoming reactive and losing direction. (Mintzberg, 1994)

Drucker, another influential figure in management, emphasizes the importance of goal orientation in strategy. He argues that the main purpose of strategy is to transform an organization's potential into concrete results. Drucker suggests that organizations should have a clear understanding of what they want to achieve and establish meaningful goals that contribute to their overall mission. He emphasizes the importance of setting measurable goals that can be broken down into specific actions and responsibilities. These goals provide a sense of purpose and direction, motivating individuals and teams within the organization to collaborate on a common vision. (Drucker, 1975)

Furthermore, Rumelt argues that a good strategy is inherently goal-oriented. He emphasizes that setting clear and compelling goals is among the key components of an effective strategy. Rumelt suggests that goals must be specific, challenging, and focused on identifying and leveraging key sources of advantage. He emphasizes the importance of aligning goals with the

organization's internal capabilities and external environment, which allows for strategic coherence and long-term success. (Rumelt, 2011)

In conclusion, the concept of goal orientation is a critical feature of strategy. Establishing clear goals provides an organization with a sense of direction, guiding its actions and decisions toward the desired outcomes. Goal orientation allows organizations to effectively allocate resources, motivate their members, and adapt to changing circumstances, ultimately resulting in better implementation and long-term success.

3.2. Proactive Approach

A proactive approach is a prominent feature of strategy that has been analysed by leading authors across various fields, including business strategy, military strategy, and organizational theory. This concept entails developing effective plans and actions by anticipating future scenarios, challenges, and opportunities that exist beyond the current state of affairs. Organizations and military leaders can gain an advantage, overcome obstacles, and achieve desired results by anticipating what lies ahead.

Porter argues that a successful strategy in the business world involves predicting industry trends, technological advancements, and competitive activities before they emerge. In this way, companies can position themselves favorably in the market by staying ahead of the competition and adapting to changes in a proactive manner. According to Porter, companies must not only analyze their current market position but also foresee future industry trends in order to gain a sustainable competitive advantage. Likewise, truly effective strategy considers both the present and the future, allowing companies to shape their competitive environment proactively rather than reactively. This forward-looking mindset allows organizations to make informed decisions and efficiently allocate resources, leading to a sustainable competitive edge. (Porter, 1980)

Rumelt emphasizes the need for proactive thinking in developing effective strategies and asserts that strategy should involve identifying and capitalizing on critical opportunities in the future environment. With a

deep understanding of the external environment, potential disruptions, and emerging opportunities, leaders can steer their organizations toward success. Rumelt highlights the role of fundamental strategies that are simple, clear, and provide a comprehensive view of the organization's goals and actions for the future. (Rumelt, 2011)

The importance of a proactive approach extends beyond the business realm. Military strategists have long recognised the significance of anticipating future scenarios and planning accordingly. Clausewitz emphasized the need to account for the dynamic nature of warfare. He argued that military strategy must be based on a deep understanding of the geopolitical environment, considering not only current circumstances but also future possibilities. Commanders must be able to anticipate the moves of their adversaries and plan accordingly to gain an advantage in battle. The essence lies in the fact that war is an area of uncertainty, as three-quarters of the factors upon which actions in war are based are shrouded in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. (Clausewitz, 1984)

Another influential military strategist, Gray, stressed the need for a proactive approach in military planning, stating that strategists must anticipate and consider the future security environment, technological advancements, and geopolitical trends. By visualising future conflict scenarios, military strategists can generate a range of options, avoiding a reactive or shortsighted approach. Gray emphasized the importance of strategic foresight, explicitly linking it to the concept of a forward-looking perspective. (Gray, 1999)

Scholars in organizational theory also highlight the proactive approach and its importance in effective management and leadership of organizations. Hersey and Blanchard discussed the concept of visionary leadership, arguing that leaders should possess a future-oriented perspective to inspire and motivate their subordinates. Leaders can align and energise their teams around a common goal by expressing a compelling vision of the future, guiding them confidently through uncertainties and achieving higher levels of performance. (Hersey & Blanchard, 1988)

Hamel also argued that strategic plans should prioritize advancement rather than merely protecting existing positions. He developed the concept of

strategic intent, which emphasizes setting ambitious goals and visualising the organization's future position. Hamel highlighted the need for organizations to anticipate and capitalise on future trends, investments, and technologies to create revolutionary strategies that can disrupt industries and transform business practices. (Hamel, 1996)

Various studies and articles further affirm the importance of a proactive approach in strategy. According to Ancona and Bresman, successful strategies require the ability to anticipate and adapt to changing market conditions. Their research suggests that organizations with proactive strategies are more likely to succeed in volatile and uncertain environments. (Ancona & Bresman, 2007)

As a final point, the characteristic of a proactive approach is a fundamental feature of strategy across various fields, including business, military, and organizational theory. Organizations can gain a competitive advantage by adopting a forward-looking perspective, while military strategists can respond proactively to conflict dynamics as they evolve. Leaders across all areas can leverage the insights provided by these influential authors to adopt a future-oriented perspective and navigate the complex challenges of strategy successfully.

3.3. Comprehensiveness

A comprehensive or holistic strategy is widely regarded as one of the main features of successful strategic planning and implementation. This approach considers all relevant factors and possible scenarios to develop a multi-layered, all-encompassing strategy that maximizes the chances of achieving long-term goals. Comprehensive strategy is frequently associated with political and military contexts, where its application is critical to achieving desired outcomes in complex and dynamic environments.

Clausewitz emphasizes the importance of a comprehensive strategy in warfare. According to him, strategy is the coherent direction of military activities to achieve national political objectives. He argues that a successful strategy requires a deep understanding of the complex interplay between political,

military, and social factors. This understanding is essential for developing a comprehensive approach that encompasses all aspects of conflict. His ideas emphasize the importance of considering not only military but also political, social, and economic factors when developing a strategy. (Clausewitz, 1984)

In the political domain, a comprehensive strategy is equally important. Neustadt and May argue that comprehensive strategic planning is crucial in political decision-making. They recommend that decision-makers adopt a broad perspective that considers context, past experiences, and the potential consequences of their actions. Political decision-makers can develop strategies that anticipate challenges and adapt as needed by taking into account a variety of factors and scenarios. This approach promotes effective decision-making and increases the likelihood of success in complex political environments. (Neustadt & May, 1988)

A comprehensive strategy involves addressing long-term goals while simultaneously addressing immediate challenges. Heuser discusses the value of balancing immediate concerns with long-term objectives. A comprehensive strategy requires an understanding of the broader context and the potential implications of actions. It involves making decisions and adjustments that align with long-term goals, even if they do not provide immediate benefits. A comprehensive strategy enables decision-makers to navigate complex situations and achieve sustainable results by integrating short-term and long-term considerations. (Heuser, 2010)

Brzezinski, a political strategist, emphasized the importance of comprehensiveness in the development of effective national strategies. He argues that a comprehensive strategy must take into account multiple dimensions, such as geography, culture, history, and demographics. He highlights the need to consider regional dynamics, alliances, and potential threats when developing a coherent and integrated geopolitical strategy. (Brzezinski, 2016)

A comprehensive strategy is an essential aspect of successful strategic planning and implementation in both political and military settings. It involves considering all relevant factors and potential scenarios to develop a multi-layered, all-encompassing strategy that increases the likelihood of

achieving long-term goals. It requires a deep understanding of the complex interdependence of political, military, and social factors, as well as the integration and coordination of various elements to achieve a common objective. A comprehensive strategy combines both proactive and reactive measures, striking a balance between immediate concerns and long-term goals. Decision-makers can navigate complex environments, anticipate challenges, and increase their chances of success by taking a comprehensive approach and taking into account a wide range of variables. In today's rapidly changing world, a comprehensive strategy is crucial for achieving desired results and ensuring sustainability in the face of uncertainty.

3.4. Resource allocation

Resource allocation is one of the key factors shaping strategy and determining an organization's success or failure. It is the process of distributing resources such as time, money, personnel, and equipment to achieve the overall goals of the organization. This allocation of resources is a critical decision-making process that requires careful analysis and consideration.

Porter emphasizes the importance of resource allocation, arguing that strategy is fundamentally about making choices, with resource allocation serving as the ultimate expression of those choices. He believes that the ability to prioritise and allocate resources in a way that creates a sustainable competitive advantage is critical to a successful strategy. Porter's resource-based approach to strategy highlights the importance of aligning resources with the organization's unique capabilities in order to differentiate itself from competitors and achieve outstanding results. (Porter, 1980)

Mintzberg challenges the traditional view of strategy as a deliberate, hierarchical process and proposes a new perspective. He claims that strategy is a complex, non-hierarchical, iterative process that requires continuous resource allocation. He suggests that resource allocation is a dynamic and ongoing activity driven by the internal and external realities of the organization, as well as the actions of competitors. His perspective underscores the value of flexibility and adaptability in resource allocation, allowing organizations to respond to changing circumstances and capitalize on emerging opportunities. (Mintzberg, 1994)

Moving on to military strategy, Clausewitz offers valuable insights into the role of resource allocation in warfare. He emphasizes the significance of proper resource allocation in achieving victory in military campaigns. He argues that the allocation of resources, including troops, supplies, and intelligence, must be aligned with military objectives and the overall strategic plan. Clausewitz highlights the interconnection between resource allocation and risk assessment, stressing the need to balance potential gains with the costs and risks involved. His work underscores the criticality of resource allocation in military strategy, where the stakes are often high and the consequences of misallocation can be disastrous. (Clausewitz, 1984)

Within the discipline of political strategy, resource allocation is of utmost importance. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith provide insights into the political strategy of resource distribution. They argue that political leaders – whether dictators or democratically elected officials – prioritize allocating resources to maintain and consolidate their power. According to them, political leaders distribute resources to their key supporters and allies, ensuring their loyalty and support. Thus, resource allocation becomes a strategic tool for political leaders to sustain their power and influence. (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2012)

Machiavelli's work provides valuable insights into the role of resource allocation in political strategy, as well as an exploration of the strategies used by successful political leaders to acquire and maintain power. He argues that resource allocation, particularly in the form of patronage, is a critical tool for political leaders securing the loyalty and support of their allies and subjects. Machiavelli emphasizes the importance of political leaders carefully managing the distribution of resources, balancing the interests of various stakeholders while maintaining a perception of fairness and justice. His work illustrates the strategic implications of resource allocation in politics, where the distribution of resources can shape power dynamics and state stability. (Machiavelli, 1998)

To sum up, resource allocation is a central feature of strategy, and the perspectives of leading authors on military and political strategy provide valuable insights into the significance of this concept. The aforementioned

authors explore the role of resource allocation in the context of strategy, highlighting the need for strategic alignment of resources, flexibility in distribution, and careful resource management in achieving competitive advantage, military victory, and political power. Understanding and effectively applying resource allocation strategies can help organizations and individuals enhance their ability to achieve their goals and succeed in their respective fields.

3.5. Action-oriented

An action-oriented approach is a key feature of strategy, emphasizing the importance of taking decisive and proactive steps to achieve desired results. This approach emphasizes the importance of effectively implementing and executing strategic plans, ensuring that actions are in line with overall strategic objectives.

Boyd, a renowned military strategist, introduced the concept of the OODA loop, which stands for Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action. Boyd emphasizes the importance of swift and decisive action, arguing that the ability to quickly process and respond to changing circumstances is critical to gaining a competitive advantage. He believed that the ability to outmaneuver opponents and disrupt their decision-making processes through rapid and unpredictable actions is key to achieving victory. Boyd's OODA loop framework has since gained widespread adoption and application, not only in military strategy but also in a variety of other fields such as business and sports. (Boyd, 2018)

Liddell Hart, a military historian and theorist, emphasized the importance of assuming an indirect approach and exploiting the vulnerabilities of the opponent. He argued that the most effective strategy avoids direct, forceful confrontation and instead seeks to achieve objectives through indirect and innovative means. Instead of engaging in frontal conflicts, he believed that the key to success was to surprise and outmanoeuvre the opponent. His emphasis on the indirect approach and the importance of manoeuvring is consistent with the nature of an action-oriented strategy, as it promotes the idea of taking decisive measures to gain an advantage. (Liddell Hart, 1991)

Luttwak, a prominent political scientist and strategist, has made significant contributions to the understanding of strategy in both military and political contexts. He emphasizes the importance of an action-oriented strategy and the need to exploit opportunities and vulnerabilities to achieve desired outcomes. He argues that strategy should focus on achieving decisive and swift results rather than getting entangled in prolonged conflicts. Luttwak advocates the use of surprise, deception, and unconventional tactics to disrupt the opponent's plans and gain a strategic advantage. His approach aligns with the action-oriented nature of strategy, as it underscores the need for proactive and decisive actions to achieve success. (Luttwak, 2002)

Finally, the concept of being action-oriented is a key element of an effective strategy. Boyd, Liddell Hart, and Luttwak highlight the importance of taking decisive and proactive measures to achieve desired outcomes. Whether it is Boyd's OODA loop, Liddell Hart's indirect approach, or Luttwak's focus on exploiting opportunities, these strategists emphasize the need of responding rapidly to changing circumstances, outmanoeuvring opponents, and gaining an advantage. Action-oriented strategy is not only applicable in military contexts, but also in a variety of other fields. By effectively implementing and executing strategic plans, organizations can ensure that their actions are in line with their overall goals and objectives, thereby increasing their chances of success.

3.6. Alignment with the External Environment

Alignment with the external environment is a crucial aspect of strategy. It involves understanding and adapting to external factors that can influence the success or failure of an organization. This alignment ensures that the strategy is responsive to the dynamic and ever-changing nature of the external environment. Many leading authors on strategy have highlighted the importance of this aspect in their works.

Although Clausewitz does not specifically discuss alignment with the external environment, his principles of war and the importance of understanding the opponent's strategy can be closely related to the concept of external alignment. Clausewitz emphasizes the need for a military strategist to have a

comprehensive understanding of the external environment, terrain, political climate, and enemy motivations. Aligning military strategy with the external environment increases the chances of success on the battlefield significantly. (Clausewitz, 1984)

Politics – another important field – also emphasizes alignment with the external environment. Boin discusses the importance of a political leader's strategy in relation to the external environment. He argues that the success of a political strategy is directly linked to aligning the leader's goals and actions with the external environment. By understanding needs, aspirations, the political landscape, stakeholders, opposition, and public opinion, political leaders can develop strategies that are both responsive and effective. (Boin, 2001)

Within the domain of business strategy, authors such as Sull, Homkes, and Sull have highlighted the importance of aligning strategy with the external environment. They claim that the failure of many strategies can be attributed to a lack of alignment with the external environment. They suggest that organizations must continuously monitor and analyse external factors that can impact their operations, such as market trends, customer preferences, technological advancements, and regulatory changes. By aligning strategy with the external environment, organizations can make informed decisions, anticipate changes, and adapt quickly, thereby increasing their chances of success. (Sull et al., 2015)

Rumelt also emphasizes that a good strategy is not merely a set of lofty goals and aspirations but a coherent and realistic plan that addresses the challenges and opportunities offered by the external environment. He suggests that strategy should be based on a deep understanding of the industry, competition, customers, and broader social and economic trends. By aligning strategy with the external environment, organizations can create competitive advantages and increase the likelihood of achieving their objectives. (Rumelt, 2011)

In summary, aligning with the external environment is a fundamental element of strategy across military, political, and business domains. By thoroughly understanding, assessing, and adapting to external factors, organizations can craft strategies that are not only responsive but also effective and successful.

Prominent authors have underscored the significance of this approach, offering valuable insights and guidance for both practitioners and researchers in the field of strategy.

3.7. Flexibility and Adaptability

In the field of strategy, flexibility and adaptability are widely recognised as key elements of success. They enable individuals and organizations to navigate complex and constantly changing environments, allowing them to seize opportunities and overcome challenges.

Renowned management experts, Mintzberg and Waters emphasize the importance of flexibility in strategy, arguing that organizations must embrace a combination of deliberate and emergent strategies. Deliberate strategies are pre-planned, whereas emergent strategies are adaptive and respond to unexpected circumstances. They suggest that a flexible strategy, which blends both deliberate and emergent approaches, allows organizations to adapt and respond more effectively to changes in their external environment. (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985)

Ansoff and McDonnell highlight the significance of flexibility in strategy implementation. They emphasize the importance of an organization's ability to adapt and revise its strategies in response to new information and changing circumstances. They propose a flexible strategy implementation process that allows for adaptability and the integration of new insights. Flexibility allows organizations to align their strategies with their stakeholders' shifting needs and preferences, enhancing their competitive advantage and long-term success. (Ansoff & McDonnell, 1984)

Liddell Hart, a British military strategist, emphasizes the importance of adaptability in military strategy, claiming that the ability to adjust to changing battlefield conditions is critical to victory. He argues that rigid adherence to pre-determined plans can lead to failure, as the enemy will exploit any predictability. Instead, he advocates for flexible strategies that allow for adaptation in response to enemy actions, thereby creating opportunities for surprise and outmanoeuvring. (Liddell Hart, 1991)

Gray also emphasizes the importance of adaptability in military strategy. He asserts that the ability to quickly adjust to changing circumstances is crucial for military success. Gray highlights the need for military organizations to develop flexible strategies that enable them to exploit their opponents' weaknesses, maintain the initiative, and achieve their objectives. (Gray, 2004)

The authors Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky emphasize the role of adaptation in political strategy. They argue that political leaders must possess the ability to adapt their strategies to the evolving demands of their constituents. The significance of distinguishing between technical problems, which can be resolved with known solutions, and adaptive challenges, which require innovative and flexible strategies, is highlighted. Political leaders who embrace adaptability can more effectively address complex and dynamic issues in the political arena. (Heifetz et al., 2009)

Sartori, an Italian political scientist, explores the concept of adaptation in the context of political parties. He argues that political parties must continuously adapt their strategies to the changing political landscape to remain relevant and competitive. Sartori stresses the need for parties to be flexible and responsive to social changes, as failure to do so can lead to their decline or even extinction. The significance of strategic adaptation in maintaining the vitality and effectiveness of political parties is emphasized. (Sartori, 1975)

Finally, flexibility and adaptability are fundamental features of strategy, applicable across various domains, including management, military, and politics. The insights of the mentioned authors in these areas underscore the importance of embracing flexibility and adaptation. By adopting these approaches, individuals, organizations, and states can navigate complex and uncertain environments, seize opportunities, and effectively handle challenges, ultimately achieving long-term success and competitive advantages.

3.8. Implementation and Execution

Implementation and execution are key components of any strategy that determine whether a plan succeeds or fails. The ability to effectively translate strategic ideas into action sets successful organizations and military campaigns apart from their competitors. Several authors have investigated the importance of implementation and execution in strategy, providing useful insights into this critical aspect of strategic management.

According to Rumelt, execution is the most important aspect of strategy, and even the best strategic plans will fail if not executed properly. He emphasizes that strategy without effective implementation is merely a wish, and that execution is the bridge between strategy and results. Rumelt provides several examples from the business world to illustrate the impact of execution on strategic success, highlighting the key roles of leadership, discipline, and the ability to adapt and learn from feedback. (Rumelt, 2011)

Similarly, in a military context, Boyd, an influential military strategist, underscores the importance of execution. Boyd argues that executing the strategy is paramount in warfare, as the ability to adapt, innovate, and outmanoeuvre the enemy is often a decisive factor in victory. His concept of the OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, and act) emphasizes the need for swift and effective decision-making and implementation to gain an advantage on the battlefield. Boyd's work highlights the critical role of execution in the military, where the ability to translate strategy into action can determine the outcome of a campaign. (Boyd, 2018)

In the political arena, the execution of strategy is equally important, as political leaders must navigate complex environments and effectively implement their policies to achieve desired results. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith argue that political leaders must possess the ability to effectively execute their strategies to maintain power and advance their interests. They explore how leaders use a combination of rewards and punishments to secure their positions and maintain support, emphasizing the role of execution in political strategy. (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2012)

Furthermore, strategy implementation and execution extend beyond the

business, military, and political domains. Bossidy and Charan explore the importance of execution in a variety of organizational environments. They argue that execution is crucial for transforming strategy into tangible results. They emphasize the need for clear accountability, effective communication, and disciplined execution to achieve strategic goals. Their work provides valuable insights into the practical aspects of execution, offering a roadmap for organizations to successfully implement and execute their strategies. (Bossidy & Charan, 2013)

Overall, the implementation and execution of strategy are fundamental to the success of any plan, whether in business, military, or political domains. The authors mentioned have explored the significance of execution in their fields. Their works highlight the crucial role of execution in strategy, emphasizing the need for effective leadership, adaptability, and the ability to translate strategic ideas into action. By studying and applying the insights provided by these authors, organizations and leaders can enhance their execution capabilities and increase their chances of strategic success.

4. Purpose and importance of strategy

To fully understand strategy and how it emerges, it is essential to study its purpose and the uses for which it is employed. Gray's writings provide clear and precise insights into the purpose of strategy and the objectives it serves. This chapter also briefly describes the importance of strategy that arises from the ideas presented in this and the previous chapters.

4.1. Purpose

According to Gray, the purpose of strategy is to provide a framework for decision-making and action to achieve desired outcomes in a competitive environment. Gray explores this concept and offers insights into the nature of strategy and its relevance in modern warfare and complex environments.

Gray argues that the purpose of strategy is to bridge the gap between policy and the means to achieve it. He emphasizes the importance of aligning

desired political objectives with available resources and capabilities. By formulating a strategy, decision-makers can ensure that the limited resources at their disposal are directed toward achieving desired outcomes, whether in the context of warfare, business, or any other competitive environment. (Gray, 1999)

Gray further highlights the significance of strategy in dealing with uncertainty and complexity. He asserts that strategy serves as a tool for navigating the "fog and friction" of the operational environment, where outcomes are unpredictable and the terrain is constantly changing. According to Gray, strategy is the process by which the political and military leaders of a state or coalition attempt to create conditions that allow the state or coalition to achieve the goals that political leaders believe the state or coalition should accomplish while also protecting it from threats that political and military leaders believe the state or coalition faces. (Gray, 1999)

Gray examines the purpose of strategy in the context of the modern security landscape, characterised by increasing interconnectedness and complexity of global systems. He argues that strategy is crucial in addressing the chaos and unpredictability of this environment. According to Gray, strategy is the art of imposing order on chaos, a tool that enables the strategist to create order within the chaos of the operational environment. (Gray, 2004) He also emphasizes the need for strategic thinking and adaptability in uncertain conditions. He argues that strategy should not be understood as a rigid plan but as a flexible framework that allows for adjustments and improvisation in response to changing circumstances. Gray emphasizes that strategy is not a fixed plan but a continuous process of adaptation and adjustment. (Gray, 1999) Therefore, the purpose of strategy is not to provide a detailed trajectory but to offer guidance that enables decision-makers to make informed choices and effectively respond to unforeseen challenges. (Gray, 1999)

Moreover, he contends that strategy is essential in mitigating the potential negative impacts of decisions and enhancing the prospects for success. He believes that strategy is a means of managing uncertainty, reducing the risks of unintended consequences, and improving the chances of achieving the desired objective. By considering potential risks and adverse outcomes,

strategists can make informed choices and develop contingency plans to mitigate the negative impacts of their actions. (Gray, 2004)

In conclusion, in his books "Modern Strategy" and "Strategy for Chaos," Gray argues that the purpose of strategy is to provide a framework for guiding decisions and actions to achieve desired outcomes in a competitive and uncertain environment. He emphasizes the importance of aligning desired political goals with available resources and the need for strategic thinking and adaptability to navigate chaos and a complex operational environment. His analysis highlights the significance of strategy as a tool for managing uncertainty, reducing risk, and facilitating the achievement of desired goals.

4.2. Importance

Strategy is a key aspect of any organization or individual's decision-making process, as it provides a plan for achieving desired goals and objectives. It plays a key role in directing actions and ensuring that resources are efficiently deployed to achieve the greatest possible results.

First and foremost, a strategy helps provide clarity and direction. It enables individuals or organizations to define their goals and purposes and to identify the best approach to achieve them. By having a clear strategy, decision makers can prioritise their actions and focus their efforts on activities that are in line with their overall vision. This helps avoid wasting time, effort and resources on activities that may not contribute to the desired results.

In addition, strategy is essential for the effective deployment of resources. Organizations and individuals often have limited resources, be it financial, human or time. The strategy helps determine the most effective and efficient use of these resources by identifying the areas with the highest return on investment potential. It enables decision makers to make informed decisions about where to allocate resources, ensuring they are used in a way that maximises their impact.

Furthermore, strategy enables organizations and individuals to adapt to a dynamic and changing environment. In today's fast-paced and competitive world, it is important to be flexible and respond quickly to changing

circumstances. A well-defined strategy helps identify potential risks and opportunities and provides a framework for managing and exploiting them. It enables decision makers to anticipate and respond to changes in the world, market, industry or personal circumstances, ensuring they stay one step ahead and competitive.

The strategy also promotes alignment and coordination. In an organizational context, strategy provides a common understanding and direction to all members, ensuring that everyone is working towards the same goals. It promotes unity and coordination, enabling individuals to collaborate and pool their efforts and resources to achieve common success. Strategy also helps align the interests and actions of different departments or members within the organization, ensuring that everyone is moving in the same direction and working towards a common vision.

The result of the aforementioned is that the strategy facilitates decision-making. In the absence of a clear strategy, decision makers can be overwhelmed by numerous possibilities and options. A well-defined strategy provides a framework for decision-making, guiding individuals or organizations to make choices that are consistent with their overall goals. It helps prioritise decisions and ensure they are consistent and aligned with the broader strategy. This not only saves time and effort, but also reduces the risk of making rash or ill-informed decisions.

Ultimately, the strategy serves as a tool for evaluation and monitoring. By setting clear goals and objectives, the strategy provides a basis for measuring and evaluating performance. It helps decision makers assess whether they are on track towards their desired results and identify areas where adjustments or improvements are needed. The strategy also enables the establishment of performance measures and reference points, enabling progress to be monitored and controlled. This ensures accountability and enables decision makers to make informed decisions based on reliable and accurate information.

Finaly, strategy is extremely important both for the organization and for the individual in making decisions. It provides clarity and direction, facilitates efficient deployment of resources, enables adaptation to a changing environment, promotes alignment and coordination, facilitates decision-

making, and serves as a tool for evaluation and control. By incorporating strategy into their decision-making processes, individuals and organizations can increase the chances of achieving their goals and purposes and significantly increase their overall success.

5. Levels of strategy

In the military and military-political fields, the term strategy sometimes can have a slightly different, more traditional meaning. Namely, in order to distinguish between certain levels and the scope of planning within the framework of national security and, ultimately, participation in conflicts, two levels can be distinguished. Grand strategy and military strategy (in a narrower sense) are two related concepts that play a key role in the military and political decision-making process. Although both terms involve planning and decision-making, they differ in scope, level of analysis, and time frame.

Grand strategy, as defined by Liddell Hart, refers to "coordinating and directing all the resources of a nation or group of nations towards achieving the political goals of the state". In other words, grand strategy encompasses a comprehensive long-term plan that guides a nation or group of nations toward achieving their political goals. It involves the integration of military, economic, diplomatic and other resources and aims to align a nation's actions with its political goals. (Liddell Hart, 1991) Historian and political scientist Earle, a historian and political scientist, contends that grand strategy extends beyond the military realm, encompassing "the totality of national assets and resources, and their application to the achievement of the political goal of the state." (Earle, 1943)

On the other hand, as defined by the military strategist and philosopher Clausewitz, strategy refers to the use of battles or plans for a series of battles to achieve the goal of war. The strategy, therefore, focuses on the military dimension, the conduct of campaigns and the use of forces to achieve military and operational objectives. (Clausewitz, 1984) Liddell Hart develops the concept further, stating that strategy involves the art of allocating and deploying military means to achieve policy goals. (Liddell Hart, 1991)

The key difference between grand strategy and military strategy lies in their scope and level of analysis. Grand strategy takes a broader, more comprehensive view, taking into account political, economic and diplomatic factors (all national instruments of power, including military), while military strategy focuses on the use of military instrument of power.

In addition, a grand strategy operates over a longer period, often lasting decades, as opposed to a strategy focusing on short- and medium-term military operations and campaigns. Grand strategy considers the changing international environment, long-term threats, and the nation's core interests, while strategy focuses on achieving specific military objectives within a specific time frame.

Ultimately, grand strategy and strategy are two separate but related concepts that guide military and political decision-making. Grand strategy involves coordinating and directing all resources toward the nation's political goals, while strategy focuses on the use of forces and plans to achieve military and operational goals. The main differences can be found in their scope, level of analysis and time frame, with grand strategy taking a broader, longer-term view, while strategy focuses on the military dimension and a shorter time frame.

6. Influence on decision making

Decision-making is a key aspect of strategy formulation and implementation. The choices made by individuals and organizations have a profound impact on the effectiveness and success of strategies. The decision-making process shapes the course of action, the allocation of resources and the general direction of the strategy.

In the context of political strategy, Fukuyama's works provide valuable insights into the decision-making process and its implications for strategy. Fukuyama explores the challenges of decision-making in the political arena. He claims that successful governance requires the development and implementation of institutional strategies that are aligned with the specific needs and context of society. He emphasizes that the effectiveness of political strategy is strongly

influenced by the ability of political leaders and the institutions in which they operate to make decisions. It emphasizes the importance of decision-making in the formulation and implementation of political strategies, since the choices made by political leaders shape the direction of policies, the allocation of resources and the achievement of social goals. It emphasizes the need for decision-makers to have the necessary knowledge, expertise and ability to navigate in a complex and dynamic political environment. (Fukuyama, 2014)

Turning to military strategy, Gray delves into the details of decision-making in a military context and its impact on strategy. Gray argues that military strategy is fundamentally a product of decision making. It emphasizes the key role of decision makers in assessing the political, military and operational environment, analysing available options and finally making choices that shape the direction of military action. Gray emphasizes the importance of decision making in military strategy as it involves allocating scarce resources, assessing risks, and determining desired outcomes. He argues that the effectiveness of military strategy is ultimately determined by the quality of decisions made by military leaders. (Gray, 2016)

According to Rumelt, many so-called strategies are nothing more than wishful thinking and daydreaming, lacking in depth and analysis. He argues that strategy is more than just a plan; it is an overall approach that aligns an organization's actions, resources, and decisions toward achieving its goals. It suggests that effective strategies should be based on a clear understanding of the situation, identification of key challenges and development of coherent and executable plans. Rumelt's work highlights the importance of a systematic and analytical approach to making strategic decisions, avoiding the pitfalls of vague and unrealistic strategies. (Rumelt, 2011)

Furthermore, Dufourcq notes that there is a misconception that every decision is the result of strategy, but he believes that this is not often the case. Neither can every situation that is decided upon be foreseen by the strategy, nor should the strategy be so rigid that different decisions cannot be made. On the contrary, he claims that such decisions change the strategic environment and thus create the need to restart the strategic cycle in order to evaluate the current strategy and confirm or change it. It also points to the seriousness

of the problem of strategy implementation, that is, it calls into question the survival of that strategy by passing through the organization's hierarchy. (Dufourcq, 2017)

Decision making plays a crucial role in shaping strategy within organizations. The ability to make effective decisions can profoundly impact the success or failure of a strategy. By considering various factors such as the organization's goals, resources, external environment and potential risks, decision-makers can develop a strategy that is aligned with the organization's goals and can adapt to changing circumstances. However, decision-making is an ongoing process that necessitates constant evaluation, adaptation, and learning. Organisations that prioritise and invest in strong decision-making capabilities are more likely to develop and implement effective long-term growth strategies.

7. Conclusion

In any management, strategy denotes the highest level of goals, planning and action of an organization. Although the purpose of strategy was initially closer to today's term tactics (because a decisive battle may have had a strategic impact), today's strategy denotes the highest level of goals, planning, and action of an organization. Because of its unique position at the top of the planning and implementation hierarchy, it is used in a variety of fields, including military and warfare, politics, and business. Even today, its purpose remains the same as it was centuries ago; its features have not changed much, and the problems in strategic processes remain similar. However, the methodology for strategy development is still developing, reflecting the need for greater flexibility and faster decision-making. Modern strategies must anticipate a wide range of possible scenarios, including unpredictable ones, in order to be effective, given that due to globalisation and technology, in today's warfare and politics, the speed of decision and the speed of implementation are often just as important as their quality. Furthermore, due to the constant growth and networking of organizations, as well as the increased complexity and need for continuous decision-making, organizations find it difficult to ensure full implementation. Therefore, in addition to modern strategies, plans to ensure implementation become increasingly important.

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Temelji strategije: teorija i praksa

Sažetak

Cilj je ovoga rada ispitati kako se tradicionalne teorije vojne strategije usklađuju sa suvremenim izazovima u nacionalnoj obrani usporedbom stavova odabranih teoretičara strategije. Analiza će se usredotočiti na to kako teoretičari definiraju značajke strategije, njezinu svrhu i važnost, različite razine strategije te utjecaj njihovih teorija na donošenje odluka. U radu se opisuje razvoj strategije kao koncepta i teorije, nudeći nekoliko definicija u području vojne strategije i poslovne strategije. Također, analizira se osam odabranih značajki strategije koje pružaju teorijski okvir i opisuje se što strategija jest i što čini kvalitetnu strategiju. Nadalje, razmatra se svrha strategije kao alata za planiranje i razlozi njezine važnosti. Analizirane su karakteristike i razlike između dviju razina strategije u vojnim i političkim terminima. Glavna je svrha strategije pružiti jasan i fokusiran plan za postizanje dugoročnih ciljeva i zadataka. Ona služi kao putokaz koji usmjerava donošenje odluka, raspodjelu resursa i djelovanje na način koji je usklađen s ukupnom vizijom organizacije, poslovanja ili pojedinca. Zaključno, identificiraju se potrebe za modernim strategijama i raspravlja se o smjeru u kojem bi se trebale razvijati.

Ključne riječi

strategija, strateško odlučivanje, teorija strategije, značajke strategije, razvoj strategije

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STRATEGOS

Insurgency as directed political violence: Serbian insurgency in Croatia in the 1990s

Tin Guštin [1]

Abstract

The article examines the political violence and insurgency led by the Serbian population in Croatia during the 1990s, which developed under the influence of Slobodan Milošević and a historical, ideological framework advocating for a "Greater Serbia." This article outlines the insurgency's ideological roots in Serbian nationalism, which date back to 19th-century doctrines advocating territorial expansion and Serbian unity across the Balkans. With the dissolution of Yugoslavia imminent, Milošević leveraged Serbian grievances to incite the Serbian minority in Croatia, leading to an armed rebellion that escalated into widespread violence. The Croatian leadership, framing the conflict as a defensive struggle for national survival, mobilised against what it saw as both Serbian insurgency and broader Yugoslav military aggression. The analysis highlights how Serbian nationalists strategically used misinformation, political mobilisation, and support from the Yugoslav People's Army to escalate the conflict, ultimately destabilising the region. This work emphasises that the resulting war was rooted not merely in ethnic divisions, but also competing nationalisms and the instrumentalisation of historical narratives.

Keywords

insurgency, nationalism, Great Serbia projects, Milošević, political violence, ideology

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Introduction

The Croatian Homeland War narrative is based on the thesis of an external enemy threatening Croatian territory, which is primarily defined as the Yugoslav leadership attempting to carry out a Greater Serbian policy by inciting Croatia's Serbian population. The power to incite insurgency by the Yugoslav leadership stems from the support gained from the Serbian population in Croatia through incendiary rhetoric and calls for retribution. Serbian nationalism started to manifest prominently in the figure and actions of Slobodan Milošević, who, shortly before the outbreak of the insurgency, served as the President of the Presidency of the SR Serbia. Milošević's ability to incite insurgency is not rooted in ideological principles but rather in the interests of specific groups, which, consequently, will have devastating consequences for the Serbian population in Croatia. The Greater Serbian idea is not publicly mentioned in Milošević's (Yugoslav) narrative because it was not the driving force behind the Serbian insurgency, but rather its political goal. (Žunec, 2007).

The insurgency, which later escalates into the Serbian side's aggression against Croatia, cannot be based on the concept of "freedom of the Serbian people" because it does not require freedom. On the contrary, it undermines freedom. The rebellious side seeks acknowledgment of the fact that freedom has limits where human beings are concerned because the boundary itself is the power of insurgency of that being (Camus, 2000). On the Croatian side, the intensifying insurgency fueled patriotic sentiments, motivating them to wage a defensive war against a larger and better equipped adversary. Croatian and Serbian public opinion differed in their perception of the Croatian-Serbian conflict. Croatians identified the conflict with an individual who directly affected them, while Serbs saw it as someone else's war (Milošević). In such a case, one can theoretically trace the causes of subsequent outcomes.

The Croatian public required time to adjust to the fact that the country was at war and to define that war. Understandably, the political public was unwilling to accept the claim that it was a civil war. In the summer of 1991, President Tuđman stated that "The Republic of Serbia, through its representatives, was waging an aggressive war against the Republic of Croatia. We are

forced to fight for life or death for the survival of the Croatian people and Croatia" (Engelberg, 1991:2). Defining the war as an inter-state aggression was essential for identifying the enemy and their motives and intentions within the Croatian public and subsequently organizing defense. The nature of insurgency, in this specific case, was conditioned by the existing state of political reality, which is a result of historical changes, and it is defined as a response to the conflicting reality of the political situation, which is the reality of human coexistence.

The paper employs a descriptive method, drawing on an analysis of both foreign and domestic literature, as well as publicly available archival materials, to explore the social, cultural, and political dynamics that shaped the conflict. In addition to the descriptive method, this paper also follows the analytical method, which involves examining the underlying causes and effects of the events and actions that led to the conflict. By breaking down complex political, ideological, and historical factors, this approach helps to understand how these elements interacted and contributed to the escalation of the war.

Definition and factors of insurgency

The Croatian Parliament stated in the Conclusions at the beginning of August 1991 that "the communist authorities of the Republic of Serbia, with the help of the JNA (Yugoslav People's Army), are pursuing an aggressive and expansionist policy towards the Republic of Croatia, inciting and openly assisting terrorists and their helpers in Croatia for the purpose of conquering the territory of the Republic of Croatia." (*Conclusions*, Narodne novine 39/91, August 3, 1991). In the preamble of the Declaration on the Homeland War (Narodne novine 102/00, October 17, 2000), it is stated that "Serbia, Montenegro, and the JNA carried out an armed aggression against the Republic of Croatia, along with the armed insurgency of part of the Serbian population in the Republic of Croatia." The importance of defining the war as aggression is evident in shaping the modern Croatian national identity and defining the political criterion for determining Croatia's post-war relations with other countries, particularly with Serbia.

The insurgency's leadership constructed the perception of the situation in 1989/90 as "a state of endangerment to the political and biological existence of Serbs and as the beginning of a new genocide" (Žunec, 2008: 35). From the constructed fact that Croats posed a threat to the survival of Serbs, the solution emerged that the territory where Serbs lived needed to be occupied and separated from Croatia, while expelling all non-Serb inhabitants. During the 1980s, Serbian politics took shape under Milošević, whom Dobrica Ćosić, the father of modern Serbian nationalism, called "the most successful destroyer of Tito's state order" and "the most deserving man for leading Serbia out of half a century of subordination to the anti-Serbian coalition" (Radelić et al., 2006: 68). By the end of the 1980s, the communist governance model collapsed, and new ideological concepts based on nationalism emerged. The Serbian discourse was shaped by a nationalist ideology stating that Serbs in Croatia were unequal, subjected to years of assimilation, and deprived of their national rights, which, in effect, was an attack on the leadership in Serbia (Žunec, 2007). The Croatian leadership was perceived as nationalist, so accordingly, Serbs in Croatia should organize themselves to preserve their national identity. In this context, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) was promoted as the protector of Serbs in Croatia (Pauković, 2008).

The Serbian Democratic Party, as a key factor in the Serbian insurgency in Croatia, was founded in Knin on February 17, 1990 under the leadership of Jovan Rašković, a native of Knin. Dobrica Ćosić specifically advised that the political organization of Serbs in Croatia should be led by Rašković. The party's program nominally relied on democratization and pluralism, advocating for a federative system but opposing equality among republics by advocating the principle of "one citizen, one vote" (Radelić et al., 2006). The fact that the establishment of Serbian autonomous areas in Croatian territory and the assertion of autonomy for Serbs in Croatia were not independent decisions of Croatian Serbs is confirmed by a conversation between Borisav Jović, the President of the Presidency of the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), and Milošević on June 28, 1990, about plans for the Serbs in Croatia. In his records, Jović states:

"He (Milošević, ed.) agrees with the idea of 'cutting off' Slovenia and Croatia, but he asks me if the army wants to carry out such an order? I tell him that it must carry out the order and that I do not doubt it, but my problem is what about the Serbs in Croatia and how to secure a majority in the Presidency of the SFRY for such a decision. Sloba (Milošević's nickname) has proposed two ideas: first, that the 'cutting off' of Croatia should be carried out in such a way that the Lika-Banja and Kordun municipalities, which have formed a community, remain on our side, with the people there later deciding through a referendum whether they want to stay or leave, and secondly, that members of the Presidency of SFRJ from Slovenia and Croatia be excluded from voting on the decision because they do not represent the part of Yugoslavia that makes that decision. If the Bosnians were in favor, we will have a two-thirds majority. Sloba urges us to make that decision within a week at the latest if we want to save the country. Without Croatia and Slovenia, Yugoslavia will have approximately 17 million inhabitants, which is sufficient by European standards." (Jović, 1996: 161)".

It is evident, therefore, that the entire actions of the leadership of Croatian Serbs were in line with the plans of the Serbian leadership. Milošević openly supported the armed insurgency of Serbs in Croatia, stating, "They have formed and declared that they do not recognize the Croatian Republic. They formed the Autonomous Region of Krajina. (...) And if we need to fight, we will certainly fight. And I hope they won't be so crazy to fight with us. For, if we don't know how to work and prosper well, at least we will know how to fight." [1]

Already in the 1980s, Slobodan Milošević clearly advocated the view that a political crisis should be provoked if necessary to stop separatism in Yugoslavia (Radelić et al., 2006). Milošević gained support from the JNA as Greater Serbian nationalism grew. This was due to the fact that many JNA officers were Serbian and the JNA leadership's belief in Yugoslavia's need for a centralized state structure. Veljko Kadijević, the last Federal Secretary of People's Defense of Yugoslavia and the Chief Commander of the JNA in the

1 "Excerpts from stenographic notes from the meeting of the President of the Republic Slobodan Milošević and the Vice President of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia with the presidents of the municipalities of the Republic of Serbia, held on March 16, 1991."

aggression against Croatia, stated in his book *Moje viđenje raspada:* "For the Yugoslav army that did not want and, in my opinion, should not have acted autonomously, that is, taken power into its own hands, the biggest problem was, as I have already said several times, the lack of a real state that would conduct its part in the war and a real supreme commander in the form of the Presidency of the SFRY." (Kadijević, 1993: 53). The JNA, at the beginning of the 1990s, acted in a manner that prevented Croatian action and enabled the maintenance of the Serbian insurgency. Although the Croatian side hesitated to declare the JNA as an aggressor due to awareness of the current inferiority of its own forces and fear of open war, it is clear that from the very beginning, the Army was the most significant form of external support for the rebellious Serbs, later becoming the leader of the insurgency. Resources, training, operational, and logistical support throughout the existence of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) came precisely from Belgrade (Radelić et al., 2006).

Continuity of Greater Serbia politics

To understand the Serbian ideology during the Croatian Homeland War, it's important to understand its continuity. Vuk Karadžić's political program, *Serbs All and Everywhere*, debuted in 1836 and was published in Vienna in 1849. Karadžić refers to Štokavian Croats as Serbs of "Roman Law" because they speak the Štokavian dialect and are considered Serbs ("...and those under Roman law call themselves by the places they live in, for example, Slavonians, Bosnians (or Bosniaks), Dalmatians, Dubrovnik people, etc.") (Ćović, 1991: 83), categorizing them by regional names. In Karadžić's project, Croats and Muslims did not exist; they must gradually become Serbian because "all smart people, both from the Greek and Roman Serbs, recognize that they are one nation, it's just harder for those under Roman law to call themselves Serbs, but they will probably get used to it gradually, because if they do not consider themselves Serbs, they have no national name" (Ćović, 1991: 85).

Another one of Greater Serbia programs, *Načertanije* by Ilija Garašanin, a short document outlining Serbia's "program of external and national policies." Garašanin, who held the position of Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia from 1843, created this secret state document in 1844. The author states in

Načertanije the goal of restoring the Serbian empire based on Serbian state and historical rights, which "find their foundation and basis in the Serbian empire of the 13th and 14th centuries and in the rich and glorious Serbian history" (Ćović, 1991: 67). Garašanin's draft can be considered the first political program of Greater Serbia, a project aiming to expand Serbian state territory and assimilate the peoples living in those territories. It states: "This foundation and these bases for building the Serbian empire should, therefore, be increasingly cleansed and freed from ruins and obstructions, brought into view, and thus on such a solid and permanent historical foundation, the new construction should be undertaken and continued...Particular attention should be paid to the military state of the people and the country: their warlike spirit, the arming of the people, followed by the readiness and proper disposition of the army; where the war depots and arsenals are located..." (Ćović, 1991: 67-69). The fact that the document was created as a secret state document is indicative that the Greater Serbia program was not an isolated idea of an individual, but a collective stance of the Serbian state leadership. *Serbs All and Everywhere* and *Načertanije* emerged roughly at the same time, presenting similar ideas of expanding Serbia beyond its existing territory, indicating a common consensus within Serbian intellectual and statesman circles. The concepts outlined in these two programs would form the basis of Serbian political ideology in the 20th century (Agičić, 1994).

The next Greater Serbian program worth mentioning was published in 1891 under the name *Ethnographic Map of Serbian Lands*, aiming to illustrate the ethnic boundaries of the Serbian people to European diplomacy. The map labeled western lands as exclusive areas of "Serbian claims," stretching from the Drina and the Bay of Kotor on the Adriatic across the Croatian Adriatic ports and islands to the Raša River in Istria. It then follows the western part of Croatia to Varaždin in the north, continuing along the northern bank of the Drava River, resulting in a new border line at Baranja, Pécs, and the Tisza, encompassing the entire Bačka region, extending over the Tamiš River into Banat towards Vršac and the Danube. All the ethnic groups living in these areas were listed, except Croats, thereby denying their existence and attempting to present their territorial claims as a unification of "Serbian lands" (Nazor, 2013).

The Act on the Name and Division of the Kingdom into Administrative Areas (1929) divided Yugoslavia into nine banovinas. Croatia received two banovinas (Sava and Littoral), but lost the entire Srijem region, along with Zemun, and the entire Dubrovnik area, including Pelješac and Korčula. (Nazor, 2013).

The signing the Cvetković–Maček Agreement (1939) and the enactment of the Banovina of Croatia marked the beginning of the process of transforming the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from a unitary to a federal state. Recognizing the political and national individuality of Croats, one-fifth of the Yugoslav state territory was exempted from many central government affairs, leading some members of the ruling Yugoslav Radical Community, as well as part of the Serbian intellectuals, to interpret this event as the beginning of the breakup of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as a unique political and state entity of the Serbian people (Regan, 2007). In response to this political act, Serbs in Croatia demanded the creation of the "Krajina," a separate Serbian territorial and political unit, whose program was outlined in a directive titled "Krajina, Serbs in our northwestern provinces." The goal of such a demand was to prevent the unification of Croatian lands into a political and economic union and to hinder the establishment of the Banovina of Croatia and the formation of its central authority with the Parliament in Zagreb (Nazor, 2013: 40). According to the "Krajina" program, the capital of the new Serbian "region" was supposed to be Bihać. The directive also included a map of the "Krajina," outlining the new entity to encompass areas that were almost identical to the territories encompassed by the self-proclaimed "SAO Krajina" in the 1990s. The "Krajina" project led to a new project called "Serbs United" at the end of 1939, aiming to secede certain districts of the Banovina of Croatia and join them to Serbia (Nazor, 2013).

During World War II in Yugoslavia, two major Greater Serbian projects emerged. The first was *Homogeneous Serbia* by Stevan Moljević (1941), based on ethnic cleansing, with its main representatives being Chetniks under Draža Mihailović's leadership in collaboration with the emigrant government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in London. The central idea of the project can be summarized by the author's catchphrases –3 "Where there are Serbs, there is Serbia," and "Serbdom is in danger." Similar to the "Serbs United"

project, this one relies on the "Krajina" project (Valentić, 2010: 50-52). Milutin Nedić, a Yugoslav Royal Army general, authored *Serbs and Serbian Lands – The Ethnographic Problem of the Serbian People* (1942) and promoted it by the collaborationist Serbian government in Belgrade. It is based on the idea that the Serbian people were ethnically divided and mixed with other cultures. The author's proposed methods for reuniting Greater Serbia include violent deportations and annexation of foreign territories. (Valentić, 2010: 58-59).

According to Greater Serbian propaganda, Serbs are eternal liberators who freed Croats and other Slavic nations from Austro-Hungarian rule and liberated Yugoslavia from German-Italian occupation. After the war, Croats were accused of being fascist, while simultaneously, the creation of the the collaborationist Chetnik movement of Draža Mihailović and Kosta Pećanac serving German and Italian occupying forces were overlooked. The Serbian fascist forces (Nedic's Serbian State Guard and Serbian Volunteer Corps, Kosta Pećanac's Chetniks, and Draža Mihailović's Chetniks and gendarmerie) had about 34,000 members by late 1941, increasing to around 65,000 by late 1944 (Military Encyclopedia VI, 373-375).

In the post-war period, the Yugoslav political system rested on a party monopoly, where the factors determining the functioning of the political and legal system were rooted in the general ideological system of the communist movement (Mihaljević, 2011). With the establishment of a new government in 1945, a new legal order was created, as the previous one was considered largely unsuitable for the new social relations. Soon after, Serbian intellectual circles began "proving" how Serbia was robbed after the war, despite "Serbs bleeding in the war." As a result of these efforts, the *Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts* was created and published in 1986. The *Memorandum* emphasized the alleged endangerment of Serbs and Serbian identity in Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo and Croatia, determining the direction for solving the Serbian issue within the SFR Yugoslavia.

The Greater Serbian expansionist policy was formed over a long period, and during this process, not only the official government but also a significant portion of the intelligentsia was engaged. Under the guise of scientific research and debates, substantial amounts of books, brochures, journals,

discussions, and newspaper articles were published with the aim of building a comprehensive system of spreading misinformation, from marginalization to open denial of the cultural and ethnic peculiarities and rights of neighboring nations. Additionally, one element of spreading the idea of Greater Serbia was the action of Serbian diplomacy, particularly in France and Great Britain, attempting to convince European public opinion that their projects were just, progressive, and noble (Ćović, 1991).

Phases of insurgency

In the first half of 1990, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) began confiscating the weapons of the Territorial Defense (TO) of the Socialist Republic of Croatia due to the "excess of weapons and other military equipment, posing a serious problem for TO units and headquarters in terms of accommodation, storage, and maintenance." The directive on disarming the TO stated that "weapons and ammunition will be taken over by the rear bases of the JNA in their current condition." At the same time, the raising of combat readiness of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) commenced, with orders given to the Command of the 5th Military Region:

> *Point 1: "The General Staff of the JNA – First Administration of the GS, will update the plans Golija and Radan and by March 20, 1990, deliver them to specific commands of military regions, which will elaborate on their plans and regularly maintain the necessary readiness of units to perform their designated tasks."*
> *Point 3: "The Commands of military regions and the Air Force and Anti-Air Defense - will ensure the maximum level of combat readiness of ready battalions and special units."*

Additionally, in Serbian military circles, rhetoric began accusing the new authorities in the SR Croatia of undermining interethnic relations in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. An announcement from the Command of the 5th Military Region to the Command of the 32nd Corps regarding the political-security situation in the SR Croatia and Slovenia highlights the following:

> *"Social-political events in the Republic of Slovenia and SR Croatia are very dynamic-tumultuous and complex. In otherwise conflicting relations within the country and a difficult economic situation, these events have a very unfavorable effect on the political-security situation, generally and particularly in the area of responsibility of the 5th Military Region. The constitutional crisis deepens, and measures to resolve the severe economic situation are yielding results slowly. Simultaneously, the social vulnerability of the majority of the population is rising, and interethnic relations have been severely disrupted. Attacks by the new authorities of SRH and R Sl. on the JNA, through various forms and contents, continue, which further complicates the political-security situation and causes new tensions, suspicions, and concerns among the JNA composition."*

The document also presented predictions of future events: "Further escalation of socio-political relations, interethnic conflicts, and exacerbation of social tensions due to a severe economic situation are expected, with continued escalations of attacks on the JNA." The disarmament of the Territorial Defense of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, the increase in combat readiness of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), and the escalation of rhetoric toward Croatia and Slovenia can be considered as the prelude to the Serbian insurgency that started in August 1990 with the "log revolution."

On a political level, the formation of the Community of municipalities in northern Dalmatia and Lika can be seen as a prelude to the insurgency. The decision to secede the municipality of Knin from the Community of municipalities in Dalmatia was made during a session of the SDS held on May 21, 1990, in Knin. The new community of municipalities was supposed to include Benkovac, Donji Lapac, Gračac, Knin, Obrovac, and Titova Korenica, and the reason cited for its formation was the need for better economic and cultural integration of the Serbian population in those areas (Barić, 2005). In late July 1990, the Serbian Assembly was held in Srb, discussing the constitutional position of the Serbian people in Croatia, leading to the establishment of the Serbian National Council and the acceptance of the Declaration on the sovereignty and autonomy of the Serbian people. The declaration called for the right of the people to self-determination and secession. It also emphasized the right of the Serbian people to linguistic, educational, and cultural

autonomy, establishing the Serbian Assembly as the political representation of the Serbian people in Croatia (Daskalović, 1990; Četnik, 1990).

The onset of the Serbian insurgency in Croatia can be considered the "log revolution," which erupted in reaction to Croatia's withdrawal of weapons from the reserve police force stations in the Knin area, where the first signs of Serbian unconstitutional activities became noticeable. Soon after the withdrawal of weapons on August 17, 1990, there were mass gatherings and demonstrations of the Serbian population in the area of northern Dalmatia and Lika. Weapons from the reserve police were distributed to Serbian civilians, and Serbian-nationality policemen joined the insurgency. The placement of blockades (using stones, trees, vehicles) on roads connecting continental Croatia with Dalmatia was the first concrete subversive activities of the rebellious Serbs on Croatian territory. In response to these subversive Serbian actions, police forces, armored transports, and helicopters were sent from Zagreb to the rebel-held territory. The JNA prevented their passage to the insurgency area, openly siding with the Serbian rebels (Margetić, 1990; Luburović, 1990).

The events of August 1990 served Serbian insurgents, Serbian media, and indirectly the Serbian leadership in Belgrade to emphasize the importance of protecting Croatian Serbs from Croatian nationalism. A key method in spreading panic and inciting hatred towards Croatians was the dissemination of disinformation via Radio Knin about chemical warfare, an invasion of Knin, dozens of dead in Obrovac, and the dangers of "Ustashas behind the fence" (Jureško, 1990). At an extraordinary session of the Executive Council of the Knin municipality held the day after the outbreak of the "log revolution," conclusions were reached assessing the situation as "extremely complex with the possibility of further complications." It was further concluded that "the population in the Knin municipality stands resolutely to protect the interests and identity of the Serbian people," expressing "great concern and worry among the population about the possibility of intervention by internal security forces of the Republic of Croatia." It was considered that "the population in the municipality has self-organized in defense of their own interests, and that state organs had no influence on the overall created sentiment regarding the events that occurred." Croatians in the Knin area suddenly found themselves

in a threatened position, exposed to threats and property attacks, leading to significant distrust and tension between them and their Serbian neighbors (Bukša, 1990).

The further plans of the Serbian leadership in Croatia were presented during the meeting of the Executive Board of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Gračac on October 20, 1990. According to these plans, the Serbian people had the right to territorial autonomy in northern Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija, western Slavonia, and Baranja, in areas where the majority population resided. In the event of Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia, the Serbian people had the right to self-determination. In December, a proposal for the Statute of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (SAO Krajina) was adopted in Titova Korenica, marking the beginning of the existence of SAO Krajina. According to the proposal, SAO Krajina was defined as a territorial autonomy within Croatia and the federative Yugoslavia, consisting of municipalities from the Community of municipalities in northern Dalmatia and Lika and settlements and municipalities with a majority Serbian population that decided to join, with Knin as the capital (Barić, 2005).

In response to the Croatian Parliament's resolution on Croatia's secession from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the Serbian National Council and the Executive Council of SAO Krajina adopted the Resolution on the Separation of the Republic of Croatia and SAO Krajina on February 28, 1991. The resolution stated that "the Serbian people in SAO Krajina and Croatia have no reason to separate from the Yugoslav state" and that "SAO Krajina remains in Yugoslavia, in a joint state with the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as with the Serbian people in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and other nations and republics that accept the joint state." As a continuation of the resolution, the Executive Council of SAO Krajina adopted on April 1 the Decision on the Annexation of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina to the Republic of Serbia, making "the territory of SAO Krajina an integral part of the state territory of the Republic of Serbia." This act can be considered the end of the first phase of the Serbian insurgency in Croatia.

The initial clashes between Serbian insurgents and Croatian police signaled the beginning of the armed conflict. On March 2, 1991, an insurgency of

policemen of Serbian nationality occurred in Pakrac. (Vjesnik, March 3, 1991). Subsequently, in Plitvice on March 31, there was another clash, known as the "Bloody Easter", where the first casualties occurred: Josip Jović, a Croatian policeman, and Rajko Vukadinović, a rebel (Vjesnik, April 1, 1991). In Borovo Selo near Vukovar, on May 2, 12 Croatian policemen were killed in an attack by Serbian insurgents (Vjesnik, May 3, 1991). Although the JNA attempted to present itself as a factor preventing inter-ethnic conflicts during these clashes, it actually informally sided with the Serbian rebels, hindering the actions of the Croatian police. From Serbian side information on the events in Pakrac, we can read: "The engaged unit of the 5th Military District in Pakrac was deployed by the decision of the SFRY Presidency, and it will be there until the situation calms down, and similarly, the units of the 5th Military District will be engaged in all other cases when the situation demands it. The JNA will not allow bloodshed and a civil war" (Globus, 1991).

Goals and operational patterns of insurgency

The first event marking the beginning of political organization among the rebellious Serbs was a gathering on Petrova Gora on March 4, 1990, officially organized by the Assemblies of the municipalities of Vojnić and Vrginmost and the Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party (JSDS). According to reports, tens of thousands of people attended the assembly. Besides the official organizational committee, there was also an illegal one aiming to turn the gathering into a Serbian nationalist rally (Pauković, 2008). Dušan Pekić, a retired general and the main speaker at the event, spoke about preserving brotherhood and unity and the people's fear of nationalist parties. He emphasized, "The main actors of this tragic and dreadful policy are remnants of Ustasha, Chetnik, White Guard, and Ballist forces, as well as new national-socialist, separatist forces, who have led a great hysterical anti-communist, anti-socialist, and anti-Yugoslav campaign. They cloak their dark goals with national flags and promise national happiness in new great-national states that will expand to the borders where the last settlements of their nation reside." (Večernji list, March 10, 1990). The overall narrative of the assembly, while highlighting Yugoslavism and unity, revolved around warning about

the emergence of Croatian nationalism in the form of the HDZ and Tuđman, and the endangerment of Serbs in Croatia.

At the end of August and the beginning of September 1990, a referendum on Serbian autonomy in Croatia was held, allowing the entire adult Serbian population living in Croatia, as well as Serbs not residing in Croatia but holding its citizenship, to participate (Vjesnik, August 14, 1990). The referendum took place in 23 municipalities: Beli Manastir, Benkovac, Daruvar, Donji Lapac, Dvor na Uni, Garešnica, Glina, Gospić, Gračac, Grubišno Polje, Karlovac, Knin, Kostajnica, Obrovac, Ogulin, Otočac, Pakrac, Petrinja, Slunj, Titova Korenica, Vojnić, Vrginmost, Vukovar, and in some parts of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the Serbian National Council, 756,781 individuals participated in the referendum, with 99.96% declaring in favor of Serbian autonomy (Barić, 2005: 86). The results of the referendum were used by the insurgency's leadership as justification for declaring Serbian autonomy in Croatia, an attempt to infiltrate Croatian political structures and exploit them for their own purposes. Selective violence, intimidation of officials, and seeking electoral positions were methods employed to discredit the government and showcase the system's incapability. The armed forces of the SFRY, specifically the JNA, supported the Serbian leadership in applying these means.

The armed forces of the SFRY were composed of two components: the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and the Territorial Defense (TO). The TO fell under the jurisdiction of the republic and autonomous province leaderships, while the JNA was under the authority of the SFRY Presidency. One of the reasons for this concept of the armed forces of the SFRY was to ensure the realization of the rights guaranteed to the republics and provinces by the constitution. The unitary army leadership succeeded in 1988, through lobbying among deputies in the Federal Assembly, in pushing through amendments to the Law on National Defense of the SFRY, abolishing armies whose commands were in the republican centers and establishing military districts instead (three districts of the ground forces: Central (headquarters in Belgrade), Southeast (Niš), Northwest (Zagreb), and one military naval district (Split)). Along the command line of these military districts, they were subordinated to the Presidency of the SFRY, which, in a state of war, was also in charge of

the TO of the republics (Špegelj, 1999). The purpose of these decisions was "to mitigate the negative consequences of constitutional solutions" (Kadijević, 1993: 57), in other words, to subordinate all forms of armed forces to Belgrade.

During the Yugoslav crisis, the leadership of the JNA began to see itself as exceptionally responsible for Yugoslavia in a political and state sense, that is, for its survival in a unitary form and a return to the model that existed in the late forties and fifties, and the annulment of the 1974 Constitution (Špegelj, 1999). According to it, "Yugoslavia is defined as a federal republic of equal nations and nationalities, freely united on the principle of fraternity and unity in the realization of separate and common interests, with the right of nations to self-determination up to secession," and "the bearers of sovereignty of nations and nationalities are the republics and provinces within their constitutional competencies" (Constitution of the SFRY, 1974). With the 1974 Constitution, the Federation became an institution for harmonizing the interests of multiple nations.

According to the JNA's Armed Combat Strategy from 1983, "in a general defense war, the offensive is the basic and decisive form of strategic actions. This means that even strategic defense has an extremely offensive character. The difference between these two forms of strategic actions is more in their objectives than in the way they are carried out. Only through the offensive can the destruction, breaking, and expulsion of the aggressor's armed forces from Yugoslav territory and the final victory in the general national defense war be achieved. In conditions of unfavorable power relations, the defensive creates conditions for transitioning into the offensive" (Strategy, 1983: 221). It's notable that in this document, more space is dedicated to "offensive" actions than "defensive" ones, despite trying to create a narrative of a "general national defense war". It's also mentioned that the JNA and TO "are neither numerically nor organizationally rigid, unchanging organizations, and the almost entire capable population will occasionally be involved in the armed forces" (Strategy, 1983: 80). Civil conflicts aimed to blur the line between civilian and military participation, masking the true nature of the conflict, thereby avoiding antagonizing nationalist sentiment among the local population.

The further development of offensive operations in the "Strategy of Armed Combat of the JNA" defines the "goal of the offensive operation on the front as breaking or destroying enemy forces along a chosen direction and liberating a certain area temporarily occupied by the enemy. The operation's goal is determined depending on the conditions in which the operation is conducted, primarily its scale and the ratio of forces in the attack zone. It is most often accomplished in stages, executing a larger number of interconnected and coordinated tasks. The offensive operation on the front is usually planned and executed in two to three stages" (Strategy, 1983: 269-270).

The plan for the use of the JNA mandated tasks to be carried out in two stages: in the first, tactical counterattacks, with intense organization and preparation of Serbian insurgents in Croatia; and in the second, a unified operational-strategic offensive operation to defeat the Croatian army (Kadijević, 1993). According to Kadijević, the military objectives of the Serbian leadership were to completely block Croatia from the air and sea; direct the main forces of the JNA towards liberating Serbian regions in Croatia and JNA garrisons deep in Croatian territory, by cutting through Croatia on the Gradiška - Virovitica, Bihać - Karlovac - Zagreb, Knin - Zadar, Mostar - Split axes; liberate Eastern Slavonia with armored-mechanized units and then advance west, joining forces in Western Slavonia and progressing towards Zagreb and Varaždin, or towards the Slovenian border; block Dubrovnik from the mainland and break into the Neretva valley to connect with forces advancing along the Mostar - Split axis; after reaching certain objectives, secure and hold the border of the Serbian Krajina in Croatia, withdraw the remaining parts of the JNA from Slovenia, and then withdraw the JNA from Croatia (Kadijević, 1993: 107).

Conclusion

The political vision of "all Serbs in one state" was crucial for many Serbian political movements during the wars in Yugoslavia. Although Milošević denied the existence of that project, he created a political backdrop that implied such an ultimate goal. Indeed, Yugoslavia brought together many ethnic groups, including Serbs, but until the decentralization in the SFRY in 1974, the republics did not have complete autonomy. That constitution granted more powers to the republics, but in Serbian circles, it was perceived as a threat to Serbian interests. The borders of the republics then began to be seen as administrative, opening the possibility of demands for changing those borders. Additionally, the idea that the right to self-determination in Yugoslavia belonged to the nations, not the republics, was crucial in arguing for territorial changes.

Milošević's reform of the federation aimed to satisfy exclusively Serbian interests, strengthening central authority and the principle of "one person, one vote," and supporting an all-Yugoslav party. These reforms provided a significant advantage to Serbs, the most numerous people in Yugoslavia, over other nations, and could only be enforced through dictatorship and political violence. That exclusivist approach was a source of conflict as it worsened relations with other republics that felt neglected. The result of such an approach was extremely complex and highly problematic, as conflicts escalated into wars and ethnic cleansing that had devastating consequences for all involved parties.

Defining the nature of the Serbian insurgency on Croatian territory is a prerequisite for establishing political criteria for determining post-war relations between Croatia and Serbia. Both sides' political objectives in the war were nominally the same - avoiding the overlap of political and ethnic boundaries. However, the political nationalisms of the Serbian and Croatian sides were entirely opposite. The first was active, while the latter was reactive; Croatian political nationalism is a consequence of Serbian nationalism. Through this lens, the relationship between the leaders of the two states, Tuđman and Milošević, as they entered conflict, strengthened each other's positions in their own countries, as they validated themselves in relation to the

other. Constructing the "fact" that Croats pose a threat to the survival of Serbs, resulting in the need to separate Serbs-inhabited territories, demonstrates the rebellious nature of the Serbian movement, which is based on incitement and hostile rhetoric. This insurgency relied on spreading disinformation, armed conflict, and propagating the narrative of a civil war.

According to Serbian nationalist perspectives, the Yugoslav republic borders were merely administrative, not historical, ethnic, or political, and thus subject to change. Milošević's idea for reforming the federation was an exclusive project based on dictatorship, with main support from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). The JNA itself was based on the ideology of unitarism and integralism of the country and, in theory, differed significantly from Milošević's concept of destroying Yugoslavia and creating Greater Serbia. However, the JNA leadership was skillfully instrumentalized by demagogues like Milošević, and new ideas of reshaping ethnic borders were soon imposed on it. According to Serbian nationalism, those borders coincided with the "borders of Serbian graves", which completely irrationally represented active political goals. The goal of border correction sought its justification in the ethnic compensation of an expanded territory.

The Serbian ethnic community in Croatia accepted the war option imposed by Milošević as a choice in resolving their position in Croatian territory, failing to see that a political solution represented a peaceful resolution to the situation, not a Croatian victory. Involvement in the Greater Serbian project meant rejecting coexistence for Croatian Serbs, initiating armed insurgency supported by Milošević, and participating in the aggression of Serbia and the JNA. The rebel leadership's refusal to accept a political solution (Plan Z-4) in January 1995 demonstrates a lack of critical reflection on the purpose and meaning of the insurgency.

In Serbian political circles, justifying Serbia's rights to neighboring territories is based on the myth of rebuilding the medieval Serbian state, which is evident from the previously mentioned Greater Serbian projects. In the aftermath, Serbs in Croatia represent the greatest losers of Milošević's irrational project, as well as the entire Serbian nation, which would suffer a severe crisis in the years following the war. The fact that Milošević remained in power even

after leading a catastrophic war for the country demonstrates how social communities construct their reality and cannot be absolved as hostages of policies of certain individuals. The Serbian insurgency in Croatia precisely confirms the words of Carl von Clausewitz: "It is only aggression that calls forth defence, and war along with it. The aggressor is always peace-loving (as Bonaparte always claimed to be); he would prefer to take over our country unopposed. To prevent his doing so one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it. In other words it is the weak, those likely to need defence, who should always be armed in order not to be overwhelmed. Thus decrees the art of war." (Clausewitz, 2007: 167.)

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Pobuna kao usmjereno političko nasilje: srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990-ih

Sažetak

U radu se analizira političko nasilje i pobunu koju je tijekom 1990-ih predvodilo srpsko stanovništvo u Hrvatskoj, a koja se razvijala pod utjecajem Slobodana Miloševića i povijesnog, ideološkog okvira zagovaranja "Velike Srbije". U članku se iznose ideološki korijeni te pobune u srpskom nacionalizmu, prateći ih unatrag do doktrina iz 19. stoljeća koje su promicale teritorijalno širenje i srpsko jedinstvo na Balkanu. S približavanjem raspada Jugoslavije, Milošević je iskoristio srpske pritužbe kako bi potaknuo srpsku manjinu u Hrvatskoj, što je dovelo do oružane pobune koja je eskalirala u široko rasprostranjeno nasilje. Hrvatsko vodstvo definiralo je sukob kao obranu nacionalnog opstanka te se mobiliziralo protiv srpske pobune i jugoslavenske vojne agresije u širem smislu. Analizom se naglašava kako su srpski nacionalisti strateškom uporabom dezinformacija, političkom mobilizacijom i potporom Jugoslavenske narodne armije dodatno intenzivirali sukob, što je na kraju destabiliziralo regiju. Ovim se radom naglašava kako rat koji je uslijedio nije bio ukorijenjen samo u etničkim podjelama, nego i u sukobljenim nacionalizmima te instrumentalizaciji povijesnih narativa.

Ključne riječi:

pobuna, nacionalizam, projekt Velike Srbije, Milošević, političko nasilje, ideologija

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STRATEGOS

Impact of Military Activities on the Environment

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Abstract

Security cannot be fully understood without considering environmental factors. Due to the close relationship between military activities and the environment, military actions have a long history of causing environmental damage worldwide. With an increasing diversity of actors in the modern security landscape, their ever-growing (covert) interests, and the increasingly complex interdependence of security trends and factors, the global security environment is undergoing dynamic changes, causing significant and often unpredictable impact on the environment. Knowledge about the destructive capabilities of cutting-edge military technologies developed over the years is limited to a small number of people. Militarization can be seen as one of the most devastating human endeavors. It is particularly necessary to raise awareness about the dominance and destructiveness of unconventional military activities. The synergy between environmental protection and crisis management should aid in finding solutions and preventing the emergence of a vicious cycle linking military activities, crises, diseases, poverty, and ongoing environmental destruction.

Keywords

environment, military activities, unconventional military activities, ecological disaster

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Introduction

The ongoing destruction of the environment has raised awareness about the devastating impact of human activity on nature. The environment is a dynamically balanced interactive system of abiotic factors (land, water, air, climate, noise, etc.) and biotic factors (flora and fauna), alongside the anthropogenic environment (infrastructure, systems, and products of modern times). Negative changes to the environment pose a threat to the survival of humans, flora, and fauna on Earth. By the late 20th century, scientists increasingly recognized the ecological factor as critical to understanding new security risks and the potential for armed conflict. The concept of environmental security describes threats to political stability arising from ecological problems. Everyday human activities in production processes (industry, transportation, etc.) and their associated accidental occurrences have significantly contributed to environmental degradation. These activities consume and activate substantial amounts of pollutants and energy, leading to changes in the composition of land, water, and air, disrupting the balance of environmental factors, and consequently resulting in the extinction and disappearance of many species of flora and fauna, as well as posing risks to human health. The disruption of this balance is further influenced by activities aimed at successfully implementing military and military-political interests.

Military activities include operations conducted by states and other actors for defense and security. Due to their close relationship with the environment, military activities have had a long history of causing environmental damage globally. Among human activities, military operations are a significant and enduring contributor to environmental degradation. Therefore, researchers focusing on environmental issues approach the military mindset with significant skepticism, as there are concerns that solutions conceived in a military dimension may accelerate conflict development rather than address environmental problems or promote ecological cooperation (Rogers, 1997). Numerous studies have been conducted on the impacts of military activities on the environment, showing a clear continuity of effects ranging from very negative to very positive. However, it is notable that these studies vary significantly in methodology and content, being "limited in depth

and fragmented by discipline" (Machlis & Hanson, 2008, p. 729). There are a number of positive impacts of military activities on the environment, primarily regarding the infrastructure of training military activities (due to the fragmentation and isolation of certain base or training areas). Positive contributions of military activities are also made through various projects[1] (Brochu & Thiboutot, 2019) and programs[2]. However, military activities lead to significant exploitation of global natural and energy resources, as well as degradation of the biosphere as a whole, which consequently creates pronounced ecological effects and negative impacts (hereinafter referred to as "impacts"). A paradox emerges from the primary mission of militaries: while tasked with ensuring national defense and security, military activities often cause substantial harm to the environment. This is primarily a consequence of the irrational consumption of renewable and non-renewable natural resources, the use of conventional weapons and technologies of great destructive power, and the development of unconventional military technologies. Some military activities are contextually linked to forms of civilian activities (industry-military industry), which have a significant impact on the environment. Therefore, separating the military contribution (military industry) from the environmental impacts of civilian industry poses considerable challenges. The operation, maintenance, and exploitation of military infrastructure (bases and training grounds) have recently been significantly regulated worldwide, especially in Europe. However, unregulated military training activities from the past continue to keep contaminated sites active even today[3]. While efforts are being made to prevent contamination in bases and training grounds, the "sustainable" development of unconventional military activities on the other hand increases the environmental impacts of military operations. Although the ecologically destructive nature of warfare has a long history, the potential for creating contamination continues to grow. Modern military

1 Revolutionary insensitive, green, and healthier footwear technology with reduced harmful contamination. *(Revolutionary Insensitive, Green, and Healthier Training Technology with Reduced Adverse Contamination, RIGHTTRAC).*

2 See: https://www.serdp-estcp.org/

3 Numerous cases of environmental harm are supported by the results of laboratory analyses. *ATS-DR-a (Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry)*. See: https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/

activities have moved significantly closer to densely populated areas. There is persistent use of hazardous substances in military equipment and weaponry, as well as in industry and construction materials, which consequently and potentially creates acute and chronic risks for complex biological and ecological systems, leading to a severely contaminated environment of an ecocidal nature. From the perspective of contemporary military activities, warfare plays a major, but not exclusive, role in exacerbating environmental impacts. An additional paradox associated with military activities is that, while scientific development, including environmental science, has increased our understanding of the ecological consequences of weapon use (both conventional and unconventional), it has also enabled the development of unconventional weapons explicitly aimed at environmental destruction. Therefore, the consequences of military activities are becoming increasingly visible. Although warfare itself inherently violates international legal regulations, numerous rules of war offer potentially significant environmental protection during conflicts. These include principles such as limitation, military necessity, distinction between military and civilian targets, and prohibition of causing excessive injury or unnecessary suffering, and proportionality. From the perspective of environmental protection, the principle of proportionality is particularly incompatible with modern military activities. In addition to these customary rules, which can indirectly protect the environment, there are specific regulations for certain weapons, such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (CBRN weapons), as well as anti-personnel mines. However, in wartime activities, international legal protection of the environment[4] is still weak, and systems of accountability and environmental remediation are mostly non-existent (Paunović, 2017). The aim of this paper is to present, from a security perspective, the complex mechanism of the impact of military activities on the environment, the development of potential ecological disasters, and overall security. The

4 Official secrecy and the lack of independent scientific assessment of damage have hindered the measurement of warfare's impact on the environment. The conventions aimed at preventing environmental destruction during warfare lack detail, clarity, and authority to effectively limit ecological harm. The current international legal framework designed to prevent environmental destruction during military hostilities is ineffective. Moreover, since the terms of the treaties are ambiguous, they can easily be manipulated to ensure interpretations that align with one's own interests (Kelly, 1992, p. 921).

presentation begins by emphasizing training military activities as the most studied area. This is followed by an overview of the impact of past high- and low-intensity military conflicts, which have also been extensively examined. Finally, the paper highlights dominant and permanent unconventional forms of environmental threats. In this order, the levels of potential negative impacts on the environment are also outlined.

The Concept of Military Activities from the Perspective of Environmental Impact

Despite varying financial, developmental, technical, and personnel capacities and capabilities, most armed forces (hereinafter: military) of the world's countries are divided into three primary branches: ground forces, air forces and air defense, and naval forces. Additionally, modern militaries often include special forces, and, in major powers, space forces. However, modern forms of military activities also include both state and non-state military elements, known as paramilitary formations (hereinafter: paramilitaries[5]). Paramilitaries play a significant role in Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), which represents an abstraction of war and peace, with blurred lines between military and civilian (and the vague distinction between conventional and unconventional warfare, author's note), leading to a gradual fragmentation of warfare in the contemporary period (through the lens of military activities, author's note) (Joseph, 2017, pp. 1305-1306). The transformation of the security environment, driven by the processes of globalization, impacts modern military activities, which are often tied to the interests of non-state and supranational actors, such as industrial and military-industrial complexes, as well as multinational and transnational corporations of both military and non-military nature. Given the increasing diversity of actors in the contemporary security environment, their ever-growing (covert) interests,

5 Paramilitaries (as unconventional actors, author's note) refer to irregular military forces, private armies, private security companies and mercenaries, guerrilla groups, criminal organizations, tribal warriors, armed gangs, ethnic/religious armies, militias, religious militants, rebel groups, and groups of intelligence operatives (for conducting covert and/or clandestine actions and operations, either independently or in cooperation with special forces, author's note). (Okumu & Ukelegbe, 2010; Joseph, 2017).

and the complex interdependence of security trends and factors, the global security environment is continuously undergoing dynamic changes, which significantly and unpredictably affect the environment. These characteristics fundamentally influence the resources available for environmental protection and security. Based on various operational structures, capabilities, goals, and covert and concealed strategic interests, militaries and paramilitaries collectively, through their operational activities, contribute to military actions that impact the environment.

Military activities can be categorized as conventional[6] and unconventional[7] based on their methods of operation. From both a general perspective and in terms of environmental impact, the approaches and methods used vary depending on the forces[8] involved and the weapons[9] employed in these

6 Conventional (war) military activities are those conducted using traditional weaponry and conventional (standard) methods and tactics of operation.

7 Unconventional warfare (unconventional military activities, author's note)—in a broader sense—refers to a wide range of military and paramilitary operations, typically of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by domestic or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and led to varying degrees by an external source. This includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, etc. (JP 1–02, p. 562) (paramilitary dimension of unconventional military activities). In a narrower sense, unconventional warfare involves the use of weapons and technology for mass destruction, such as Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons and geoengineering weapons and technology (military scientific-research dimension of unconventional military activities). One of the most common (though not the only) operational manifestations of unconventional military activities is special operations (for more on special operations, see JP 1–02, 2003). According to Kilcullen (2019, p. 10), "unconventional warfare is one of the oldest, most cost-effective, and historically most successful forms of warfare."

8 Conventional forces are units and joint forces that are organized, equipped, and trained to operate under conventional conditions. Unconventional forces include Special Forces and paramilitaries (the paramilitary dimension), as well as state defense agencies (scientific-research) and those state and international agencies and actors connected to the defense sector (the military scientific-research dimension). These forces are involved in covert and clandestine operations and special operations.

9 Conventional weapons are those whose use is permitted under all international legal regulations. Unconventional weapons are those whose use (in experimental and testing phases) is prohibited by international conventions, such as CBRN weapons and technologies (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), geoengineering weapons and technologies, and those used in special operations, as well as any weapons and technologies still in the research phase (experiments and testing) whose effects may be harmful to the environment from an ecological perspective. The use of unconventional weapons is often subject to plausible deniability, meaning that their use can be convincingly denied.

activities. However, in terms of environmental impact, the distinction between conventional and unconventional military activities lies in the fact that conventional military activities of high intensity can cause large-scale environmental damage, even reaching the level of disaster, through the implementation of unconventional operations. On the other hand, unconventional military activities, even on a smaller scale, can still lead to significant levels of destruction. In military operations, actors operate either independently or jointly, in a coordinated manner at tactical, operational, and strategic levels (for more details on these levels, see JP 1-02), aligned with the requirements, effects, and contributions to achieving tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Military activities influence the environment to varying degrees through their processes, intensity, spatial dispersion, duration, scope, types, methods, and ways of applying resources, weapons, and technology. The environmental impacts of military activities manifest through direct and indirect, as well as intentional (e.g., sabotage, diversions, experiments—essentially covert operations) and unintentional (e.g., accidental/collateral destruction—not the primary goal) effects, actions, and processes.[10]

Two primary conventional military activities are military training and military exercises (hereinafter: training military activities). Conventional training military activities make up about 70% of all military activities and are conducted to develop and maintain the operational capabilities of armed forces. To ensure the effective execution of conventional military activities, they are preceded and accompanied by military development activities and military maintenance activities. Military development activities include: the construction of bases and training grounds, experimentation/testing, scientific research, the production of military equipment, weapons, technologies, and the manufacturing of explosives and explosive ordnance (hereinafter: EO). Military maintenance activities include the use (of facilities for troop accommodation, equipment for infrastructure maintenance,

Since evidence of covert and special operations is highly classified and sometimes invisible, unverifiable accusations are typically met with plausible denials.

10 Note: The terms "intentional" and "unintentional" are used in the text in such a way that when referring to unintentional actions, the term will not be explicitly stated. When intentional actions are described, the term "intentional" will be clearly emphasized to highlight the deliberate nature of those actions.

resources for maintaining infrastructure and equipment/weapons, various harmful and hazardous chemicals, fuel, etc.), transportation (of military equipment, hazardous waste, harmful and dangerous chemicals, explosives, and unexploded ordnance or UXOs), storage (of fuel, harmful and hazardous chemicals, explosives, UXOs, etc.), disposal (in land pits and in the depths of lakes, seas/oceans), destruction (by detonation and incineration) and/or dismantling of unexploded, obsolete, or damaged UXOs, and the disposal and/or destruction of military waste, written-off material, and outdated weaponry. All these activities take place within military bases, on training grounds, and in other isolated military infrastructure.[11] Although it is estimated that currently only military training grounds cover about 3% of the Earth's surface, the limited number of studies on military bases and training grounds (and therefore on the number of active, repurposed for civilian use, and inactive military bases, ranges, and other infrastructure), alongside the increasing presence of paramilitary groups globally, indicates that the total global area and distribution of bases and ranges are currently unknown. The large variations in size and operational use of military bases and ranges lead to a wide range of immediate and indirect long-term anthropogenic impacts, both in terms of type and severity, with significant consequences for the environment.

(Conventional) wartime military activities are essentially conflicts (of low and high intensity) between two or more armies in which conventional weapons are employed. However, some modern conventional military activities are taking on unconventional characteristics, involving the actions of unconventional forces and the use of unconventional weapons and methods in wartime. Therefore, in this context, this synergy is referred to simply as wartime military activities.

Unconventional military activities (of a covert and indirect nature) primarily involve the operations of unconventional forces and the use of

11 Isolated military infrastructure includes, in a broader sense, military-industrial complexes and factories/facilities whose production is tied to the development and equipping of the military and armed forces; in a narrower sense, it refers to specially designated facilities, such as warehouses and smaller or larger areas for dismantling and/or disposal, destruction, and/or demilitarization of UXOs and outdated military equipment.

unconventional weapons both in wartime (as part of conventional activities) and in "peacetime" conditions. Achieving tactical, operational, and strategic objectives (influencing decision-making), preparing for combat operations, and/or impacting the course of hostilities are the general and primary aims and operational consequences of unconventional military activities. The objectives and impacts of these activities differ when they occur as part of wartime activities versus in "peacetime" conditions. Unconventional forces often conduct their training in less familiar or undisclosed areas. These areas typically consist of covert and secretive infrastructure (laboratories, bases, and ranges), representing concealed processes whose environmental impacts remain largely unknown.

Military Activities – (Negative) Environmental Impacts

Military activities have the potential to harm the environment in multiple ways, from highly visible impacts to those whose harmful effects can only be detected through specialized detection technologies. They may cause widespread and long-term environmental disturbances, contamination, and large-scale degradation. The extent to which military activities affect the environment depends on the pre-existing environmental conditions (e.g., impacts from other sources of contamination, such as industrial activities or the general state of the environment before wartime or unconventional military activities), the nature of the disturbance (type of emergency and action or type of warfare), the sensitivity and resilience of biological and human-made systems, and the durability of the impacts. However, numerous studies have shown that the degree of impact—namely, the severity of environmental disturbance and degradation—is directly related to the intensity and scope of military activities. The fundamental fact about the environmental impacts of military activities is that they are significantly influenced by militarization (the extension of military priorities into civilian functions). Modern military activities are only feasible through extensive use of fossil fuels (oil), nuclear fuels, toxic substances, chemicals, and explosives, whether in conventional or unconventional military operations, as well as through the extensive manipulation of the environment in the case of unconventional military activities—often with minimal opportunities for control.

Military Development Activities

Contamination from heavy metals, hazardous chemicals, and explosives is among the most significant environmental issues within military infrastructure, with substantial potential to pollute surrounding areas and adjacent civilian regions. The general negative impacts associated with the construction of complex military infrastructure projects, such as bases and training grounds as part of military development activities, include habitat and soil degradation and chemical contamination. Intensive excavation processes, vegetation removal (e.g., deforestation), and soil compaction increase the likelihood of invasive species introduction (Yager et al., 2009), alter soil structure, compromise its physical integrity, and raise erosion potential. These activities also reduce water infiltration rates, increase runoff, and alter soil chemistry (Tang et al., 2005). Chemical contamination of local groundwater and surface water resources may occur due to increased wastewater runoff carrying sediments and chemicals linked to waste disposal (e.g., hazardous construction materials, paints) and accidental spills of hazardous substances (e.g., fuel and oils) during military infrastructure development, posing risks of significant environmental shifts. At test ranges (both land and water) and isolated military infrastructures (such as military-industrial sites), incidents (with high catastrophic potential), including the release of thermally polluted or wastewaters from production processes (e.g., wastewater containing high TNT explosive concentrations, known as red water) and the use and disposal of hazardous chemicals, can cause abrupt increases in water and air toxins, reduced dissolved oxygen levels, loss of biodiversity, migration of certain species, and widespread environmental contamination. Studies indicate that residues found at testing and production sites have caused serious long-term chronic contamination and environmental damage (Lewis et al., 2010). Due to hydrological connections, contamination from these sites can spread over long distances.

Military Maintenance Activities

In general, military infrastructure is subjected to mechanically, energetically, and toxically intensive activities. The environmental impacts of military maintenance activities can be divided into two main areas: operations of military infrastructure, which include the functional activities of the infrastructure itself and military exercises assigned to specific locations, and routine deployments of units at the national level, abroad, and in areas beyond national jurisdiction (Westing, 2006). Infrastructure operation and maintenance processes, as well as storage practices, result in significant quantities of various military waste, hazardous waste (e.g., medical waste, asbestos), chemicals, radioactive substances (e.g., depleted uranium used in ammunition), and explosives. Most chemicals and explosives that enter the environment accumulate in soil, plants, sediments, and water layers, migrating across soil and groundwater through both biotic and abiotic processes, entering surface waters, and spreading over large distances (Francis, 2011). Inefficient use of energy resources (e.g., the CO_2 emissions from major military forces far exceed those of many other armies combined) and chemicals, improper disposal (e.g., in land pits, deep lakes, seas, and oceans), storage, destruction (e.g., incineration), and demilitarization of UXOs (including UXOs with CBRN agents) lead to severe immediate and indirect contamination of soil, air, groundwater, and surface water. This contamination results in long-term habitat degradation for flora and fauna and long-lasting environmental impacts. Notable contamination cases in air force bases are associated with the spillage of aviation (jet) fuel and lubricating oils from aboveground and underground storage tanks (Nunes et al., 2011), and solvents like benzene; fire-fighting training involving perfluoroalkyl chemicals (PFCs), which have been used for decades in fire-fighting foams (Aqueous Film Forming Foams, AFFF), as well as perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) (Arias et al., 2015); accidental chemical container leaks and spills of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from electrical substations; maintenance of green areas using herbicides and pesticides; and atmospheric deposition (and runoff of atmospheric water) of hydrocarbons, heavy metals, PCBs, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) from jet fuel combustion around platforms and runways.

Military Training Activities

Many aspects of military training activities can have markedly different environmental impacts. The negative effects of military training on the environment can be categorized based on their level of disruption: high, medium, or low (Wang et al., 2014). High levels of environmental disruption occur with the continuous exploitation of training grounds through high-intensity training involving all branches of the military, which leads to thorough degradation and pollution of areas designated for various military functions and training activities within bases or training grounds. Some medium-level impacts from military training can become significant enough to prevent further training due to changes in the environmental characteristics necessary for effective training, such as areas heavily contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO), where the presence of UXOs and toxic substances within them poses significant hazards. Military training activities range in scale, from small groups of soldiers and equipment to large simulated battles involving thousands of personnel and extensive military hardware. Consequently, at many high-intensity training grounds for major armed forces, it is impractical to establish rest periods for environmental recovery (Zentelis et al., 2017), despite the average land ecosystem recovery time being around 22 years (Jones & Schmitz, 2009).

Infantry training, especially in basic military exercises and specialized drills, is widely dispersed and utilizes ammunition up to 20mm in caliber, along with explosives such as primary explosives found in ammunition, military pyrotechnics, propellants/powders, and high explosives (hand grenades, anti-tank weapons, 40 mm grenade launchers, etc.). Basic infantry training takes place in secure areas designated for live-fire exercises with infantry weapons (shooting ranges), explosive handling zones (representing the greatest environmental concern due to the large quantities produced and used), and training areas for using grenades, grenade launchers, and anti-tank weaponry. However, wherever ammunition and UXO are used, contamination inevitably occurs.

Environmental impacts in these areas manifest as direct contamination from explosives, propellants/powders, and unexploded ordnance (UXO)

(Chatterjee et al., 2017; Brochu & Thiboutot, 2019), as well as from heavy metals/inorganic contaminants (ammunition residues) (Migliorini et al., 2004). These impacts also include direct destruction of soil cover and vegetation, accidental killing or maiming of wildlife (due to the destructive, toxic, and thermal effects of ammunition, explosives, and explosive devices), and the immediate creation of noise (small arms fire, launch explosions, and target explosions) (Larkin et al., 2016). Most explosives and heavy metals are resistant to biological degradation or removal treatments, thus persisting in the biosphere as sources of contamination potentially harmful to the environment. Lead, as the main component of small arms ammunition, is the most significant and dangerous contaminant of shooting ranges. Other heavy metals that contaminate soil in the form of ammunition residues include mercury (Hg), tin (Sn), antimony (Sb), copper (Cu), chromium (Cr), nickel (Ni), zinc (Zn), cadmium (Cd), and manganese (Mn). The type of ammunition used during training, the quantities used, and the efficiency of its reactive components (heavy metals) in breaking down are the main factors contributing to shooting range contamination. Depending on environmental factors, particularly soil type (coarse sand, fine sand, loam, clay), lead (Pb) may initially remain inert. Under the influence of environmental factors (such as weather conditions or changes in soil conditions like pH, moisture, and organic matter), lead particles may oxidize (or transform into lead carbonate). When lead quantities exceed soil retention capacity, this results in long-term contamination of soil and aquatic ecosystems (Brochu & Thiboutot, 2019).

The training process in infantry tactics (infantry and mechanized infantry) can have a wide range of environmental impacts, primarily determined by the duration and intensity of training, as well as the number and size of infantry units, the weaponry used, the combat vehicles involved (including armored vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles—both wheeled and tracked—trucks, engineering vehicles, and off-road vehicles), and the specific nature of training requirements and processes. Tactical infantry training can result in immediate effects, such as soil stripping (e.g., from intense movement by infantry and combat vehicles), direct destruction of vegetation (e.g., camouflage needs; small arms fire, heavy machine guns from 12.7 mm to 20 mm, and cannons from 25 mm to 40 mm mounted on combat vehicles), immediate changes to

soil structure and destruction of plant and animal habitats (e.g., movement of combat vehicles, digging of shelters and trenches, placement of training anti-personnel and anti-armor mines, explosions of various explosive devices). Other impacts include the potential introduction of invasive species and increased soil erosion due to continuous use of certain locations on the training range, as well as the creation of spatially unpredictable noise (e.g., movement of combat vehicles, helicopter overflights and landings, small arms fire, projectile launches and explosions on target) that significantly impacts some fauna species (Larkin et al., 1996). In the long term, there are indirect effects of intensive destructive action from ammunition, explosives, and unexploded ordnance, as well as contamination from residues of heavy metals, explosives, and partially detonated ordnance and UXO.

Training for armored-mechanized units is designed to simulate real combat scenarios. Maneuvers by these units (tanks and combat vehicles) exert the greatest mechanical impact on soil and vegetation at training ranges. The effects of these activities manifest as mild soil compaction and minimal vegetation damage, severe soil compaction, fragmentation and displacement of surface particles, crushing and/or uprooting of vegetation, complete loss of vegetation, destruction of habitats for certain flora and fauna species (Wang et al., 2014), and the spread of invasive species. During wet periods, additional impacts include deepening of ruts, disruption of local water flows, flooding, extensive vegetation destruction, and threats to the survival of some plant species (Perkins et al., 2007). Frequent and intensive use of tanks and combat vehicles results in indirect long-term effects such as reduced plant species richness and diversity, a decrease in vegetation cover, increased soil erosion rates, changes in soil chemistry, and greater instability in groundwater and surface water systems (Quist et al., 2003). Additional impacts include the appearance of invasive foreign species and the formation of complex successional patterns due to interaction with other land use activities. Live-fire exercises (both stationary and on the move) increase direct and indirect environmental impacts. Immediate effects include more spatially pervasive and less predictable noise (from tank movement, projectile launches, and explosions on target), significant vegetation destruction, and accidental killing or maiming of wildlife. Indirect impacts include contamination from

heavy metal and explosive residues from large-caliber projectiles in soil, groundwater, and surface waters.

Some of the immediate impacts (noise from projectile launches and target explosions) and all indirect impacts of armored-mechanized units are also part of artillery training activities (weapon systems: multiple rocket launchers, cannons, howitzers, mortars, etc.). Artillery ranges typically cover vast areas with significant natural value, including sources of groundwater and surface water. When projectiles are fired from weapon systems, propellants/powders are left behind, either as a by product of firing or as residual/disposed propellant. These residues contain energetic compounds such as dinitrotoluene (DNT), nitroglycerin (NG), nitrocellulose (NC), nitroguanidine (NQ), and sometimes aluminum (Al) and lead (Pb), as well as ammonium perchlorate (AP) in rocket propellants. Residues consist of discrete solid fibers or fragments of partially burned grains or flakes of propellant. Combustion of propellant fuel leaves large amounts of unburned and carbonized particles. The concentration of these residues depends on the specific weapon system used. The destructive impact of projectiles from these weapon systems is capable of removing large quantities of soil, creating substantial habitat damage in the form of craters and initiating succession within the affected area ("bombturbation"). These highly disturbed areas may experience soil structure and quality degradation, leading to ecosystems dominated by disturbance-resistant flora and fauna species (Warren et al., 2007) or the introduction of invasive foreign species. Soil within craters is compacted and contaminated with residues of deposited explosives and fine heavy metal particles. The heavy metal content in artillery ammunition differs slightly from that of small arms ammunition, including iron (Fe), aluminum (Al), copper (Cu), chromium (Cr), tungsten (W), beryllium (Be), zinc (Zn), arsenic (As), uranium (U), and depleted uranium (DU). The ability of these heavy metals to transform into other compounds increases contamination levels, introducing contaminants that were not originally present in the ammunition. Transformation occurs during detonation or due to weathering of deposited heavy metal particles. In detonation, temperatures and pressures reach extremely high levels, often exceeding the melting points of some heavy metal compounds. This creates molten substances that readily react with other compounds to form new metal

complexes, alloys, or salts (Brochu & Thiboutot, 2019). Dispersed across the soil surface, these particles undergo chemical and physical weathering. The level of contamination in artillery ranges depends on the intensity of area usage, the efficiency of weapon systems and ammunition, and environmental factors (pH, organic matter, weather conditions, etc.). Through various mechanisms, soil contaminated with explosives contains substances in soil, sediment, and surface and/or groundwater in a wide range of concentrations. Surface explosions impact the environment by causing physical degradation (destruction of structure and loss of fertile soil), thermal degradation (heat from explosions depletes the organic soil layer), and chemical degradation (soil contamination from explosive and heavy metal residues). Indirect impacts are created by unexploded ordnance (UXO), which acts as a potential long-term, localized source of soil and/or water contamination. Meanwhile, deflagration and partial detonation (low-order detonation) release significant amounts of explosives (up to 3 kg of particles over 1 mm in size), resulting in immediate environmental impacts (Taylor et al., 2015; Brochu & Thiboutot, 2019). As much as 2% of explosive residues (by weight) from 155 mm ordnance loaded with TNT remain on the soil surface after full detonation (high-order detonation), translating to 140 g of explosive residue per round. However, studies on low-intensity artillery training in several countries have consistently shown that mortar and howitzer projectiles with high-explosive fillings (Comp. B and TNT) that fully detonate do not contaminate the impacted areas (Pichtel, 2012).

Environmental impacts associated with air force training and exercises (air combat tactics, aerial interceptions, aerobatics, low-altitude tactics, bombing and rocketing, and targeting aerial targets) include: bird strikes and fatalities during flights; bombturbation, contamination of training grounds and surrounding areas, as well as groundwater and surface water with metals, explosives, and aircraft UXO, which indirectly affects population dynamics, has long-term negative effects on terrestrial ecosystem communities, and disrupts the physical-chemical integrity of soil (Davis et al., 2007; Sanatana, 2009). Additionally, spatially predictable and unpredictable noise generation occurs (during aircraft and helicopter takeoffs/flights/landings and pre-flight preparations) from aircraft jet engines, helicopter rotor pulses, and

sonic booms (Larkin et al., 1996; Rodriguez-Seijo et al., 2019); contamination from heat and jet fuel combustion particles (including polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, ammonium perchlorate, etc.). The environmental consequences of air defense training and exercises can be compared to those of ground forces in the domain of live-fire exercises.

Environmental impacts associated with naval training and exercises (including river forces) manifest as follows: the use of sonar directly disrupts the signaling abilities of marine mammals, leading to interference with their predator detection, communication, foraging, reproductive activities, and sometimes resulting in stranding, with long-term indirect impacts. Sonar, propellers, the loading/firing/unloading of naval weapon systems, and UXO explosions create unpredictable spatial noise pollution (Sarić & Radonja, 2014). UXO detonations, whether direct (detonation) or indirect (shockwaves), can kill, cause serious internal injuries, or disrupt the abilities of marine, river, and lake fauna (Govoni et al., 2008). Direct contamination of marine environments with vessel wastewater, heavy metals, and explosives is also a significant concern. Furthermore, international military exercises can indirectly introduce invasive foreign species (through ballast water and hull fouling), which can substantially impact local biodiversity.

The potential environmental impacts of military training activities are also evident in the use of military pyrotechnics, which are employed by all branches of the armed forces. Pyrotechnics are used in various forms, including incendiary devices (such as toxic white phosphorus), sound and smoke generators (e.g., chemical and nuclear attack simulators, smoke bombs), and light producers (such as tracers in ammunition and illumination devices). These contain various heavy metals and oxidizers. Many pyrotechnic devices include perchlorate, which poses a significant contamination risk if pyrotechnics are not disposed of properly. Depending on their composition, pyrotechnic smokes may contain hexachloroethane (HC), anthracene, metals, and pyrophoric substances (such as white and red phosphorus). The quantity of metals released by pyrotechnics is typically low enough to be indistinguishable from naturally occurring levels unless training is particularly intense within a confined area.

Military maintenance activities, training exercises, and warfare are mobile systems with an international scope, driven by global military cooperation, crisis zones, and high-intensity militarization (the expansion of military priorities into civilian areas). This global scale makes contamination of military training grounds a significant international concern. High-intensity militarization, which essentially serves as preparation for warfare, escalates the environmental impact of military activities. This is reflected through increased defense industry production, the construction of new military infrastructure and maintenance of existing facilities (domestically, in other countries, and in areas outside national jurisdiction), intensified training activities, the rise of paramilitary operations (e.g., illegal logging for war purposes or chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapon deployment), unsustainable exploitation of flora and fauna by local populations for war preparedness, and the abandonment of productive land (leading to land degradation). Consequently, these cumulative activities drive significantly higher consumption of renewable energy resources (oil and gas) and non-renewable natural resources (such as aluminum, lead, copper, nickel, iron, tungsten, and zinc), primarily within military industry production processes.

Wartime Military Activities

Wartime military activities are inherently noticeable, immediate, and extremely destructive. The impacts of such activities can lead to a range of ecologically complex or catastrophic consequences due to the (potential) large-scale use of conventional weapons or catastrophic effects of an unconventional nature. This could result from the use of conventional weapons against critical industrial infrastructure containing hazardous substances or from exploiting environmental vulnerabilities as a means of threat. Wartime military activities take place in natural and urban areas, across geographically dispersed locations that may be more or less isolated from each other. In terms of their overall environmental impact, these activities have the potential to affect large spatial areas, often linked by natural features (lakes, rivers, seas/oceans) and sensitive infrastructure (industrial sites with hazardous materials

or secret laboratories for CBRN research) worldwide. The use of natural and synthetic contaminants in wartime activities can lead to severe environmental degradation and contamination on a catastrophic scale, typically associated exclusively with unconventional military activities. Unlike conventional training exercises or military development and maintenance activities, environmental damage is inevitable in wartime. Wartime military activities are not (in practice) subject to regulations, oversight, or process management aimed at environmental protection.

The primary concern of those engaged in wartime military activities is the unconditional achievement of tactical, operational, and/or strategic goals, often at the expense of the environment. The environmental impact of conventional military training activities, depending on their intensity and scope, represents a minimal baseline for the environmental impact of actual wartime military activities. The manifestation of wartime activities through potentially high-intensity and large-scale conflicts across vast areas affected by war, with potentially unrestricted use of both conventional and unconventional (CBRN) weapons, significantly increases the risk of destroying critical industrial infrastructure. Additionally, this can lead to extensive degradation and contamination of large land and water areas, and a considerably longer duration of environmental impact, potentially resulting in far greater degradation, contamination, and multidimensional indirect and long-term impacts on the environment compared to conventional training exercises and standard military development and maintenance activities. The potentially greater intensity and scope of environmental impact from wartime military activities is further intensified by:

- the direct increase in the number of affected biological hotspots containing endemic and endangered plant and animal species, including national parks as cultural heritage;
- the direct introduction of invasive foreign species through combat vehicles;
- the consumption of vast quantities of fuel (oil), leading to high CO_2 emissions;
- unintentional and intentional direct environmental destruction, such

as flooding land, triggering landslides, causing massive fires, and indirect effects, such as the construction of makeshift shelters and refugee camps due to sieges or displacement, as well as the urgent search for food and water sources;

- direct land degradation, destruction of flora and fauna, and contamination of groundwater and surface water due to the placement and detonation of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and intensive bombing, rocketing, and shelling (indirect effects on biodiversity due to contamination from explosives, land rendered unusable for agriculture, and disrupted integrity from demining efforts);
- direct destruction of cultural heritage;
- the direct sinking of ships containing hazardous substances (and CBRN weapons), resulting in oil spills and long-term decomposition impacts of hazardous materials.
- direct destruction of military equipment (such as tanks and combat vehicles) due to intense conflicts, generating military waste (releasing a range of harmful and hazardous chemicals, heavy metals, and hazardous substances into soil, water, and air);
- direct destruction of residential areas, large (and smaller private) industrial facilities, storage sites, power installations, and illegal improvised factories for IEDs and CBRN weapons due to intense urban conflicts. The resulting waste (e.g., toxic dust, asbestos, PVC, household and medical waste, various harmful and hazardous chemicals) can ignite, creating a large toxic cloud that spreads contamination. The disposal of this waste during wartime poses both a short-term and long-term environmental challenge;
- as unconventional tactics (using "scorched earth" methods to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives and influence decision-making and the course of the conflict), intentional contamination of land, air, and water through the use of known and improvised (unknown) chemical, biological, and radiological agents is employed

to modify the environment for tactical purposes[12] (chemical modification) and incapacitate enemy forces (chemical and biological) as well as for covert experimentation (chemical, biological, and radiological). Environmental Modification in Wartime Activities involves large-scale, disruptive techniques aimed at depriving the adversary of any conditions that provide shelter, cover, food, etc. (e.g., deforestation, destruction of vegetation and land using herbicides and pesticides, physical alteration of the natural landscape) (Westing, 2006). Disruptive actions may also trigger large-scale "natural" forces (e.g., inducing heavy rainfall). A further long-term issue associated with the use of pesticides and herbicides is bioaccumulation and the prolonged persistence of these chemical agents in the environment, resulting in chronic impacts on ecosystems. Agents like mustard gas (HD) and lewisite (L) (blister agents), as well as VX, tabun (GA), soman (GD), and sarin (GB) (nerve agents), are generally not highly persistent, but their degradation products remain significantly stable in the environment, with some retaining high toxicity. Sarin (GB) is one of the most dangerous nerve agents, as it is difficult to detect; being soluble, it poses a significant threat to the environment, especially to water resources, while nerve agents in general are expected to have lethal impacts on soil biota. Biological weapons, used either for covert experimentation or to achieve tactical-operational advantages, can be applied in various ways: as a broad operation, seemingly overt (with concealed intentions), deployed strategically over large areas of the attacked country; as an open action for tactical purposes (e.g., targeting tactical strongholds); as a covert operation, poisoning food or destroying food resources in a small, confined area (e.g., a city, island, or closed facility). Artificial Cobweb is one substance suspected of being linked to covert chemical-biological experiments during wartime. Studies suggest that due to its properties, artificial

12 "Environmental Modification Techniques" refer to any technique used to alter, through the intentional manipulation of natural processes, the dynamics, composition, or structure of Earth (Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 1976, ENMOD Convention). The ENMOD Convention prohibits only the use of such techniques in warfare, but not the research behind them. Therefore, the continuous development of methods for environmental modification remains permitted.

cobwebs could be considered a military-tactical combat system capable of carrying various pathogenic microorganisms or chemical agents (Furić & Orehovec, 2001; Vučemilović, 2010). However, its environmental impact remains unknown.

- by paramilitary forces, the deliberate destruction of fields, forests, crops, water supplies, fauna, residential and healthcare infrastructure, etc., and forced displacement of populations, to deny the opponent the environmental advantages or for criminal purposes. This often occurs when corporate actors engage paramilitary forces in wartime activities. In many cases, humanitarian crises are intentionally orchestrated to achieve the deliberate destruction of environmental resources;
- direct environmental contamination (of soil, water, air, flora, and fauna) resulting from artillery and air strikes targeting critical industrial infrastructure (such as petrochemical plants, oil facilities, pharmaceutical factories, warehouses, and wastewater treatment systems) containing harmful and hazardous chemicals and substances (e.g., ammonia, sulfur dioxide, sulfuric acid) with residual environmental impacts. These activities pose local, national, and regional environmental risks, and frequently have an ecocidal impact (Eifried, 1998; Orehovec et al., 2004). Often, the immediate effects of contaminants are relatively short-term (e.g., mass die-off of aquatic life), while long-term contamination is expected in areas like ponds, lakes, and coastal zones, primarily through heavy metal pollution. Burning oil and chemicals results in significant air contamination (e.g., polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, dioxins, sulfur dioxide). Depending on the extent and nature of air contamination and the prevailing topographic and atmospheric conditions in the area, this can lead to contamination spreading via acid rain and deposition, with serious environmental impacts as a consequence.
- direct contamination from the heat generated by explosions (producing nitric acid), military pyrotechnics, fires in damaged structures and critical industrial infrastructure, and from the intense operations of military aircraft. These activities release large amounts of heat into the already warm air, along with toxic byproducts from

explosions and fires, significantly affecting air quality, natural air currents, and local flora and fauna (Protopsaltis, 2012).

The overall indirect and long-term consequences of warfare activities (including a significant proportion of unconventional paramilitary and military scientific-research actions) on the environment can vary in scale. The cumulative indirect effects of warfare that contribute to total wartime damage and environmental security changes can be observed through: displacement of populations (due to mines, unexploded ordnance, CBRN weapons, and physically and chemically contaminated and degraded environments), which leads to an accumulation of refugees in areas previously unburdened by human presence, creating an added strain on the environment; increased illegal hunting by paramilitary groups (impacting protected animal species); unsustainable exploitation of natural resources to sustain wartime economies; additional contamination and costs in post-war recovery processes, demilitarization, and demining; and, with or without occupation, the disruption and reduction of infrastructural and institutional capacities (healthcare, social, economic, and administrative) for environmental management (particularly regarding waste management). In the context of potential long-term ecocidal impacts (unconventional activities), warfare may lead to altered natural conditions, impact extreme weather patterns, and contribute to species extinction and/or biodiversity loss. A significant period is required for the partial recovery of damaged ecosystems, while some habitats may be permanently destroyed.

Alongside environmental contamination caused by conventional military activities, extreme weather changes are an inevitable aspect of contemporary military operations. Most findings to date indicate that the amount of energy produced by humans (i.e., human activities, including military activities) by burning various organic fuels would lead to minor changes in Earth's thermal balance, thus causing only very limited climate change (Stajić & Vujić, 2012). However, unconventional military activities, weapons, and technologies are considered to have a significant impact on increasing environmental contamination (to a greater extent than conventional military activities as a whole) and on climate change. The role of military activities in climate change is substantial, yet they are excluded from discussions and concerns regarding climate change. Thus, climate change discussions are not geared toward

climate and environmental protection, but rather toward military activities and strategic-defense objectives.

Unconventional Military Activities

Unconventional military activities (the paramilitary and scientific-research dimensions) conducted during "peacetime" involve unexpected possibilities for the organized, covert, and highly aggressive use of unconventional weaponry aimed at concealing it (secret disposal), achieving strategic goals (terrorist actions), deterrence, preparation for warfare, and various covert military experiments (e.g., chemical and biological experiments) and operations. These activities often have transnational and global implications.

Known cases of chemical weapon disposal in seas and oceans have typically taken place decades ago, conferring upon them a status of long-term (potential) contamination of catastrophic proportions (Albright, 2012). Due to the larger-scale, covert nature of these disposals, the exact locations and quantities of the chemical weapons remain practically unknown. Although research is underway to assess the environmental impacts of these chemical disposals, their inherent properties regarding physical, chemical, and long-term toxicity for humans and the environment remain unclear, though risks are evident. Long-term environmental impacts of incidents at nuclear facilities and of sunken (nuclear-powered) submarines are fundamentally unknown or insufficiently studied. Similarly, ecological issues tied to the illegal disposal of radioactive materials and waste resulting from global nuclear weapons and energy development programs cannot be resolved with the current level of technology, to which unconventional military activities significantly contribute.

Compared to the use and secret experimentation with chemical, and particularly biological, weapons (e.g., so-called "ethnic weapons"), unconventional activities involving the development (testing) and deployment of nuclear bombs and warheads are better known. However, although the effects of nuclear warhead testing and use are still felt in some parts of the world today, precise data on their long-term environmental impacts remain insufficiently researched. Nuclear explosions leave a substantial environmental impact

through the release of heat, kinetic, and radioactive energy (Prãvãlie, 2014). Ultimately, a significant environmental impact of nuclear explosions lies in their potential to activate and expand existing fault lines, which can consequently lead to major earthquakes.

Around the world, numerous accidents at critical infrastructure sites have occurred, resulting in catastrophic environmental impacts. The circumstances and timing of these disasters have often raised suspicions about intentional causes, potentially aimed at conducting or concealing military experiments and/or destabilizing a state or region. Such suspicions regarding unconventional military activities are further supported by the widespread use of radioactive materials in energy production and the excessive use of pesticides and fertilizers in agriculture, which lead to significant levels of "natural" or "unintentional" environmental contamination. Distinguishing between an accident and intentional action can be challenging. Among potential CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) agents intended for unconventional military activities, significant effects are anticipated, as these agents can be effectively weaponized to meet numerous operational and strategic requirements. Compared to conventional weapons and CBRN weapons that are overtly or covertly used in military operations, these agents offer substantial advantages in effectiveness and in the ability to "erase" traces of their use. Consequently, due to these advantages and insufficiently researched cases, their environmental impact remains largely unknown. During past wars (particularly the Vietnam War), it became evident that climate and weather conditions, as well as the state of water bodies and soil, significantly influence combat operations. Likewise, natural disasters often result in high casualty rates. Both of these factors spurred efforts, which later led to successful attempts, to exploit these phenomena for unconventional warfare purposes, essentially turning the environment into a tool of warfare (Environmental Warfare). This "weapon" is especially suitable for covert or secret operations under ostensibly "peacetime" conditions. Unconventional military activities using geoengineering weaponry involve the intentional application of tools and methods for military and intelligence purposes, as well as for experimentation (military-scientific research), which can induce harmful effects and changes in the biosphere (House et al., 1996).

These small-scale changes to Earth's systems may have profound global impacts. Military geoengineering includes the application of a range of interrelated technologies and activities. Although research and development in these technologies, often initially intended for military use (and only later for civilian applications), have long reached massive proportions, two "fundamental" methods from the unconventional geoengineering arsenal affecting the environment are HAARP (High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program), either alone or in combination with chemical trails (chemtrails) produced by aerosol releases from civilian and military aircraft and drones. Originally military projects, their use is formally intended for strategic military objectives, including climate control, and scientific research. Although this application alone is sufficient to degrade the environment significantly, their use for any purposes beyond these stated ones is consistently denied. Unconventional military activities are designed to make the intentional actions appear as natural weather disasters, using plausible deniability to mask their effects within the broader ecological chaos. The results become noticeable only after some time, making it challenging to trace them back to geoengineering activities. Analysis of chemical trails, conducted by both institutional and independent scientists worldwide, reveals that they contain a combination of polymer nanoparticles resembling spider webs, metallic aerosol nanoparticles (arsenic, lead, cadmium, beryllium, barium, manganese, zinc, iron, etc.), various compounds (methylmercury, iron oxides and hydroxides), and agents from the arsenal of biological and chemical weaponry. The impacts of unconventional geoengineering weaponry (within the military scientific-research dimension) on the environment, as studied so far, manifest in the following ways: frequent occurrences of "natural" disasters (floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes); disruptions in atmospheric circulation; disturbances in stable weather patterns (precipitation inhibition) and habitats; damage to the ozone layer, which protects the biosphere from lethal ultraviolet solar radiation; severe harm to agricultural crops and flora due to extreme weather (untimely rainfalls, acid rain, decreased or increased humidity, prolonged droughts or severe floods, elevated nighttime and winter temperatures), etc. While geoengineering technologies and weapons of mass destruction (CBRN) differ in many ways, both serve as instruments

of power that lack precise targeting capability. Moreover, geoengineering, which relies on shared global resources, is unlikely to be effective unless tested or deployed on a global scale, adding another layer of ecological uncertainty to each attempt to minimize collateral damage (Chalecki & Ferrari, 2018). The potential benefits of geoengineering for civilian purposes, ostensibly aimed at mitigating climate change, are often outweighed by negative impacts on different regions and societies. In reality, its application often serves military objectives (House et al., 1996). In this context, geoengineering exacerbates several core issues related to climate change, as described above, all of which are potential sources of conflict.

Military Activities as a Potential Environmental Disaster (Crisis)

Modern military activities have left, and continue to leave, a substantial negative legacy with a multidimensional impact on the environment. The distinctions between the environmental impacts of conventional and unconventional military activities are increasingly blurred, with almost complete overlap, as illustrated in Figure 1.



Figure 1. **Relationship and Scale of Environmental Impact from Conventional (C), Unconventional as Part of Conventional (U/C), and Unconventional Military Activities (U)**

The entirety of military activities with a high potential for ecological disaster is presented in Table 1, which provides a summarized overview of the preceding text. The table complements Figure 1, reinforcing the dominance and potential for ecological catastrophe with an emphasis on the unconventional dimension of military activities.

MILITARY ACTIVITIES			POTENTIALS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CATASTROPHE	
MILITARY DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES	Production; Testing; Experiments	C	UNINTENTIONALLY	ACCIDENTS IN PRODUCTION PLANTS
		U	UNINTENTIONALLY	ACCIDENTS IN THE PRODUCTION OF CBRN WEAPONS IN LABORATORIES
			INTENTIONAL	EXPERIMENTS AND TESTING OF CBRN WEAPONS; GEO ENGINEERING
MILITARY MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES	Storage; Disposal; Transport	C	UNINTENTIONALLY	ACCIDENTS IN WAREHOUSES; ACCIDENTS IN TRANSPORT
		U	INTENTIONAL	DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS NUCLEAR WASTE, AMMUNITION; CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISPOSED IN SEAS/OCEANS AND ABANDONED IN MILITARY STORAGE; TERRORIST ACTS AND SABOTAGE (STORAGE AND TRANSPORT)
TRAINING MILITARY ACTIVITIES	Training	C	UNINTENTIONALLY	HIGH INTENSITY TRAINING
WAR ACTIVITIES	Conflicts	U/C	(UN)INTENTIONALLY	HIGH INTENSITY OF CONFLICT AND USE OF A LARGE QUANTITY OF EO
		C	(UN)INTENTIONALLY	DESTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WITH DANGEROUS CHEMICALS; GEOENGINEERING
		U	INTENTIONAL	
UNCONVENTIONAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES	Preparation for war; Terrorist activities ("peace"); Open secret and covert actions	U	INTENTIONAL	DESTRUCTION OF CRITICAL INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE; USE OF CBRN WEAPONS; GEOENGINEERING

***Table 1*. Potential Environmental Disaster Risks**

Despite the specific characteristics of unconventional military activities (such as indirectness, secrecy, and plausible deniability), military operations as a whole, in terms of environmental impact, display both predictable and unpredictable aspects of disasters akin to visible technological and natural hazards. To a large extent, they are part of peacetime and can make a difference, influencing the reduction of the military footprint on the environment, primarily through an understanding of military activities as a crisis in their entirety. Conventional military development activities (e.g., the military industry) and maintenance activities (such as global military infrastructure) are among the leading factors impacting the environment, especially when compared to civilian sectors (e.g., industrial or transportation). Predictability in these activities relates to preventive measures (during the potential crisis phase) in implementation (acceptable risks, protective measures, safety measures, standard operating procedures). Disruptions resulting from training exercises (often intensive) are predictable and thus amenable to management, minimizing and mitigating impacts. Consequently, military training range managers, acting as crisis managers, often face conflicting demands in balancing the primary military mission with legal requirements to protect soil quality, water resources, and endangered species.

Unpredictability, with an aspect of partial predictability, in military activities is primarily associated with warfare and unconventional military activities (such as the development of new military technologies and/or technologies with potential military applications, e.g., biotechnology; covert paramilitary operations). Predictability and/or the determination that disruptions are directly or indirectly caused by warfare can be challenging due to the multiple interactions between conventional and unconventional activities, particularly considering the hidden impacts of unconventional military activities that may arise. Predictability and/or environmental impact assessments, which typically focus on a limited set of indicators, cannot encompass the full range of concealed and "enigmatic impacts" on the environment from unconventional military activities. This challenge is compounded by the inherently unpredictable nature of ecological systems. Like other dimensions (social, political, economic) that influence warfare and unconventional military activities, ecological impacts often exhibit nonlinear

behavior, where minor changes can lead to amplified reactions that are nearly (if not entirely) impossible to predict. In such cases, the characteristics of modern military activities as crises and their environmental impacts reflect the synergy of certain features of contemporary (and future) crises. This synergy manifests as phenomenologically new, long-lasting occurrences (various types of hazards) that introduce novel, generative problems with significant consequences and unconventional impacts on vital resources, rendering traditional crisis management systems ineffective. It is evident that crises associated with military activities require preparation through strategies based on anticipation.

Conclusion

From a military perspective, a true peacetime period for the environment hardly exists. Military development, maintenance, and training activities (excluding the unconventional dimension of these activities) can often be monitored, with potential for minimizing and mitigating environmental impacts. However, since military forces focus on maintaining operational capability rather than environmental protection, these "opportunities" are frequently underutilized, particularly in the militaries of less-developed countries and in paramilitary groups. On a global scale, the intervals between wars tend to last longer than individual conflicts, leading to a significant impact on the environment from ongoing military development, maintenance, and training activities during these extended peacetime periods, particularly among major powers and large armies, but also from unconventional military activities. Secrecy, a fundamental aspect of all military operations, suggests that in the context of military development and maintenance, the diversity and volume of waste generated, along with practices surrounding the handling, storage, and use of hazardous chemicals and explosives, as well as disposal and destruction practices, may have substantial environmental impacts that remain largely unknown and insufficiently researched. Due to the highly classified nature of developmental, wartime, and unconventional military activities, only a small group of individuals possesses knowledge of the destructive capacities of the most advanced war technologies developed

over many years. Militarization can therefore be viewed as the single most ecologically destructive human endeavor. Often depicted as a casualty of military conflict, the environment can nonetheless become a catalyst for unconventional military actions when sufficiently exploited. Environmental protection, the assessment of the environmental impacts of military activities, and the capability to foresee destructive military operations with potential for catastrophic outcomes deserve greater and more genuine international attention. In addition to integrating all known "peacetime" conventional military activities into research processes, it is essential to include—and particularly to foster awareness of—the dominance and destructiveness of unconventional military activities. It is clear that military intelligence will not invent a 'weapon for environmental protection.' The synergy between environmental protection and crisis management should aid in developing solutions and in preventing the formation of a vicious cycle linking military activities, crises, diseases, poverty, and ongoing environmental destruction. The failure to grasp the environmental harms of military activities may, in fact, pose one of the greatest threats to international stability.

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Utjecaj vojnih djelovanja na okoliš

Sažetak

Sigurnost se ne može u potpunosti razumjeti bez uzimanja u obzir čimbenika vezanih uz okoliš. Zbog bliske povezanosti vojnih djelovanja i okoliša, vojne akcije imaju dugu povijest uzrokovanja štete na okoliš diljem svijeta. S obzirom na sve veću raznolikost aktera u suvremenom sigurnosnom okružju, njihove sve veće (prikrivene) interese te sve složeniju međuovisnost sigurnosnih trendova i čimbenika, globalno sigurnosno okružje prolazi kroz dinamične promjene koje dovode do znatnih i nepredvidivih utjecaja na okoliš. Znanje o razornim sposobnostima najmodernijih vojnih tehnologija razvijenih tijekom godina ograničeno je na mali broj ljudi. Militarizacija se može smatrati jednim od najrazornijih ljudskih pothvata. Posebno je potrebno podići svijest o dominaciji i destruktivnosti nekonvencionalnih vojnih djelovanja. Sinergija zaštite okoliša i upravljanja krizama trebala bi pomoći u pronalaženju rješenja i sprječavanju nastanka začaranog kruga koji povezuje vojna djelovanja, krize, bolesti, siromaštvo i trenutačno uništavanje okoliša.

Ključne riječi

okoliš, vojne aktivnosti, nekonvencionalne vojne aktivnosti, ekološka katastrofa

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STRATEGOS

Napad 5. korpusa JNA na zapadnu Slavoniju u jesen 1991.

Marijan Kostanjevac, Ivan Benković, Marijan Kretić [1]

Sažetak

U strateškom planu napada Jugoslavenske narodne armije (JNA) na Hrvatsku 1991. najvažnija uloga dodijeljena je 5. (banjalučkom) korpusu JNA. Zadaća mu je bila, osloncem na pobunjeno i naoružano srpsko stanovništvo u zapadnoj Slavoniji, napasti Hrvatsku iz sjeverozapadne Bosne smjerom Gradiška – Pakrac – Virovitica, odvojiti Slavoniju od središnje Hrvatske i prekinuti logističku potporu hrvatskim snagama koje su branile istočnu Slavoniju kako bi se jugoslavenskoj vojsci olakšao prodor iz Srbije prema Zagrebu i Varaždinu, sve do granice sa Slovenijom. Izlaskom 5. korpusa na mađarsku granicu Hrvatska bi izgubila rat i bila prisiljena zatražiti primirje. Bio je to nož koji je trebao presuditi Hrvatskoj. Bitka za Slavoniju kulminirala je u zapadnoj Slavoniji. Napore 5. korpusa JNA da „okruži, razbije i razoruža hrvatske snage i probije se do Virovitice te prekine svu komunikaciju istočne Slavonije" s ostatkom Hrvatske zaustavile su hrvatske snage u zapadnoj Slavoniji.

U uvodnom dijelu radu pojašnjava se uloga 5. korpusa JNA u strateškom planu napada JNA na Hrvatsku. U nastavku navode se zadaća, namjera i zamisao zapovjednika 5. korpusa JNA Nikole Uzelca kako je mislio okružiti, razbiti i razoružati hrvatske snage na području zapadne Slavonije. Rad je usmjeren na pojašnjenje nositelja borbenih djelovanja na glavnom smjeru napada 5. korpusa JNA, 343. brigade „R" JNA na lipičko-pakračkom bojištu u jesen 1991., do dolaska 104. brigade ZNG-a Varaždin.

Ključne riječi

uloga 5. korpusa (banjalučkog) JNA u planu napada na Hrvatsku 1991.; zadaća, namjera i zamisao zapovjednika 5. korpusa JNA, lipičko-pakračko bojište, 343. mtbr. JNA

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Uvod

Pohod Jugoslavenske narodne armije (JNA) na Hrvatsku 1991. uopće nije bio planiran kao rat; trebala je to biti 15-dnevna oružana i psihološka napadna operacija koja je imala cilj utjerati strah u kosti hrvatskom narodu, uspostaviti marionetski režim, a državu Hrvatsku vratiti natrag u novu tvorevinu, *skraćenu Jugoslaviju* pod dominacijom Srbije. Međutim, JNA je naišla na odlučnog protivnika s jakim borbenim moralom i nije imala dovoljno snage poraziti hrvatsku vojsku u nastajanju niti prisiliti Hrvatsku na kapitulaciju.

Prema strateškom planu JNA je planirala napasti na nekoliko ključnih smjerova i primorati Hrvatsku na kapitulaciju. JNA je glavni napor u pohodu na Hrvatsku u jesen 1991. usmjerila na Slavoniju. Zapovjedništvo 1. vojne oblasti JNA u Beogradu odlučilo je s dvije velike vojne grupacije napasti istočnu Slavoniju iz Srbije. Novosadska vojna grupacija, odnosno 12. korpus JNA s ojačanjima napao je podravskim smjerom, a 1. proleterska gardijska mehanizirana divizija (1. pgmd.), poznatija kao Titova elitna divizija, napala je posavskim smjerom. Zadaća ovih snaga JNA bila je spojiti se sa snagama 5. korpusa (banjalučkog) JNA u zapadnoj Slavoniji, a zatim produžiti napade radi deblokiranja vojarni 10. i 32. korpusa JNA u Zagrebu i Varaždinu.

Najvažnija uloga u porazu Hrvatske dodijeljena je 5. korpusu JNA. Zadaća mu je bila da uz pomoć pobunjenog i naoružanog srpskog stanovništva u zapadnoj Slavoniji napadne Hrvatsku iz sjeverozapadne Bosne smjerom Gradiška – Pakrac – Virovitica, presiječe hrvatski teritorij i prekine svaku komunikaciju sa stanovnicima Slavonije i hrvatskim snagama koje su branile istočnu Slavoniju kako bi se olakšao prodor jugoslavenskoj vojsci prema Zagrebu i Varaždinu, sve do granice sa Slovenijom.

Bitka za Slavoniju kulminirala je u zapadnoj Slavoniji. Hrvatske snage zaustavile su napade zapovjednika 5. korpusa JNA Nikole Uzelca kojima je namjeravao *okružiti, razbiti i razoružati* hrvatske snage na području zapadne Slavonije, probiti se do Virovitice i prekinuti svu komunikaciju Slavonije s ostatkom Hrvatske.

Rad je usmjeren na pojašnjenje zaustavljanja nositelja borbenih djelovanja na glavnom smjeru napada 5. korpusa, 343. brigade JNA, na lipičko-pakračkom

bojištu u jesen 1991., do dolaska 104. brigade ZNG-a.

Rad je namijenjen široj javnosti kako bi bila bolje upoznata o navedenim događanjima, posebice o tome kako je obrana (zapadne) Slavonije bila ključna za opstanak Hrvatske na početku Domovinskog rata. Stručna javnost i pripadnici OSRH-a steći će bolji pregled događaja u jesen 1991. koji su bili presudni za opstanak Hrvatske.

Napad 5. korpusa JNA na zapadnu Slavoniju – nož koji je trebao presuditi Hrvatskoj

JNA je 20. rujna 1991. pokrenula veliku napadnu operaciju na Slavoniju. Iz Srbije u napad su krenule dvije velike grupacije snaga kopnene vojske: 1. proleterska gardijska mehanizirana divizija (1. pgmd.) i 12. novosadski korpus. S područja Bosne i Hercegovine, iz smjera Banja Luke, napale su snage 5. korpusa JNA.

U Kadijevićevu strateškom planu pohoda na Hrvatsku napad 5. korpusa JNA na zapadnu Slavoniju pravcem *Gradiška – Pakrac – Virovitica trebao je imati presudan utjecaj na cijelu napadnu operaciju i brzi završetak rata. „Dejstva u zapadnoj Slavoniji na pravcu Gradiška – Pakrac – Virovitica predviđena su kao vrlo značajna za cjelokupnu ideju manevra sa zadatkom presijecanja odstupnice hrvatskim snagama iz istočne i srednje Slavonije i omogućavanja brzoga prodora ka Zagrebu i Varaždinu." (Kadijević, 1993., str. 109.).*

Slika 1. **Ključni ljudi u hijerarhiji ratnog zrakoplovstva JNA, koji su nanijeli zlo hrvatskom narodu .**

S lijeva: Slijeva: major Ivan Baralić, zapovjednik 238. eskadrile, general-major Zvonko Jurjević, zapovjednik zrakoplovstva JNA,[1] pukovnik Ljubomir Bajić, iza Jurjevića u maskirnoj kapi na glavi, general-major Nikola Uzelac, zapovjednik 5. korpusa JNA (ljeto 1991.)

Izvor: Aleksandar Radić, The Yugoslav Air Force, Helion & Company, 2020., str. 47.

1 Umirovljeni general Zvonko Jurjević s obitelji danas živi u Beogradu, ali ima hrvatsko državljanstvo. Riječ je o osobi koja je osumnjičena za teške ratne zločine. *(https://www.maxportal.hr od 10. svibnja 2022.)*

Dolaskom neprijateljskih snaga do linije *Virovitica – Okučani* završila bi druga etapa napadne operacije 1. vojne oblasti JNA. Iako je bilo u planu provoditi napadne aktivnosti sve do granice Slovenije, osnovni cilj bio bi ostvaren, definirala bi se zapadna granica *Velike Srbije*, odnosno osigurala granica srpske Krajine. Napadna operacija 1. vojne oblasti JNA (1. VO) trebala je kulminirati na zapadnoslavonskom bojištu spajanjem snaga 5. korpusa JNA i pobunjenih Srba sa snagama 12. (novosadskog) korpusa i 1. pgmd. JNA. U operativnom planu pohoda JNA na Hrvatsku napad 5. korpusa u zapadnoj Slavoniji trebao je biti nož koji će imati presudnu ulogu u slamanju obrane Hrvatske. Zbog toga su na početku Domovinskog rata vođene žestoke borbe na području zapadne Slavonije. Zapadnoslavonsko područje postalo je jedno od najtežih i najkrvavijih bojišta na hrvatskom ratištu (*Balkan Battlegrounds* II, str. 218.). Borbene aktivnosti prestale su tek potpisivanjem Sarajevskog primirja 3. siječnja 1992. godine.

Kakvo bi značenje imalo odvajanje Slavonije od središnje Hrvatske pojasnio je u jednom intervju dr. Andrija Hebrang, tadašnji ministar zdravstva u Vladi Republike Hrvatske, kada je po odluci predsjednika RH dr. Franje Tuđmana morao putovati u Osijek. *„Pitao sam predsjednika Tuđmana, što ako srbočetničke snage izađu na Viroviticu i presijeku Hrvatsku? Onda smo izgubili rat, rekao mi je predsjednik Tuđman. Onda se preko Mađarske vrati u Zagreb, idemo zajedno poginuti na bojištu, Hrvati neće imati svoju državu, imat će još jednog Zrinskog."* Dodao i kako je *„očuvanje zapadne Slavonije preduvjet za priznanje Hrvatske od međunarodne zajednice."* (A. Hebrang, Intervju).

Sukobi hrvatskih snaga sa snagama 5. kupusa JNA počeli su nakon proglašenja *„Srpske autonomne oblasti (SAO) zapadna Slavonija"* 12. kolovoza 1991. godine. Sutradan su predstavnici 329. oklopne brigade JNA, smještene na području Bosanske Gradiške, tražili od hrvatske policije da ukloni prepreke koje su bile postavljene na mostu na rijeci Savi koji vodi prema Staroj Gradiški.

Zahtjev za prelazak snaga 5. korpusa JNA u Hrvatsku obrazložen je ovako: *„angažiranje snaga 1. vojne oblasti i jedinica Banjalučkog korpusa na sprečavanju međunacionalnih sukoba u svojoj zoni odgovornosti. Stoga bilo kakve optužbe za upotrebu snaga „sa strane" nemaju značajnijeg osnova, ponajprije zato što snage armijskih i korpusnih sastava JNA nemaju zone djelovanja u okviru republičkih granica."* (Narodna armija, 1991.).



***Slika* 2. Zapovjednik 5. korpusa JNA gp Nikola Uzelac i zona odgovornosti 5. korpusa JNA**

Autori: GIS, I. Benković i M. Kretić (2024.)

Jedna od karakteristika vojnog plana JNA *„Jedinstvo"* podjela je područja Jugoslavije na tri vojne oblasti, odnosno 17 korpusnih zona kopnene vojske. U vojno-teritorijalnoj podjeli 1987. nisu se uzimale u obzir republičke granice. Istočni dio Hrvatske i zapadna Slavonija ulaze u sastav 1. vojne oblasti, koja je bila pod zapovjedništvom u Beogradu. Prema prosudbi vojnih planera JNA zona odgovornosti 1. vojne oblasti (1. VO) je središnji prostor bivše države na kojoj će se voditi najvažnije vojne operacije i mora biti neposredno pod nadzorom Beograda. Možemo uočiti kako se zapadne granice 1. vojne oblasti i 5. korpusa u Hrvatskoj podudaraju sa zapadnim granicama *„Velike Srbije"*. Velikosrpski krugovi u bivšoj JNA već su tada počeli s preustrojavanjem jugoslavenske vojske prema granicama nove države. *(Slika 2)*

Prema već uobičajenom obrascu, kao što se 12. novosadski korpus uključio u *„smirivanje"* situacije u Baranji, tako se i 5. korpus JNA pokušao uključiti u *„zaštitu srpskog naroda u zapadnoj Slavoniji"*.

Pripadnici Zbora narodne garde i hrvatske policije 14. kolovoza 1991. zaposjeli su područje Okučana kako bi spriječili teritorijalno povezivanje srbočetničkih snage iz zapadne Slavonije s Bosanskom krajinom. Srpski pobunjenici 15. i 16. kolovoza 1991. napali su hrvatske snage u Okučanima i okolici, koje su nadzirale željezničku postaju na komunikaciju Zagreb – Beograd pješačkom vatrom, minobacačima i vojnim transporterom. U pomoć hrvatskim snagama u Okučanima krenule su postrojbe hrvatske policije i garde s novljanske strane, ali su bile zaustavljene i morale se povući prema Novskoj (Martinić, 2014., str. 53). Pod krinkom smirivanja situacije 17. kolovoza 1991. u područje sukoba upućena je borbena grupa iz 265. mtbr. 32. korpusa JNA iz Bjelovara, sastavljena od 235 vojnika, tri tenka T-55, devet oklopnih transportera, tri samohodne haubice 122 mm „Gvozdika", dva KOT-a, jedan BTR-50, tri ZSU-57 i 15 motornih vozila. (Dimitrijević, *Srpski oklop*). Borbenu grupu JNA vodio je zamjenik zapovjednika 265. brigade pukovnik Milan Čeleketić[2], prijašnji zapovjednik JNA u Koprivnici. Ona je zaposjela željezničku stanicu

2 Nakon pogibije zapovjednika 16. ptrb. potpukovnika Sime Marjanovića 13. listopada 1991. Čeleketić postaje novi zapovjednik 16. ptbr. Tijekom rata postaje i komandant tzv. Srpske vojske Krajine. Hrvatska traži njegovo izručenje radi suđenja zbog toga što je zapovjedio raketiranje sustavima „Orkan" gradova Samobora, Karlovca i Jastrebarskog u rujnu 1993., a nakon operacije Bljesak, 1. i 2. svibnja 1995., i Zagreb. Čeleketić danas živi u Subotici i Srbija ga odbija izručiti.

u Okučanima kako bi osigurala prolaz vojnim konvojima oružja i opreme jedinica JNA koje su se povlačile iz Slovenije. Nakon „slovenskog rata" (od 27. lipnja do 6. srpnja 1991.) JNA je dio snaga povukla u Bosnu i Hercegovinu, koje su kasnije sudjelovale na zapadnoslavonskom bojištu. Oklopni bataljun s tenkovima M 84 iz Vrhnike bio je uveden u sastav 329. oklopne brigade. (D. Marijan, 2012.).

U sukob se tada uključila i 329. oklopna brigada 5. korpusa (banjalučkog) JNA. Borbena grupa sastava iz 329. oklopne brigade uz potporu zrakoplovstva oko 3:00 sata 18. kolovoza 1991. napala je hrvatske snage na mostu i prešla rijeku Savu između Bosanske i Stare Gradiške. U *Ratnom dnevniku 5. korpusa JNA* navodi se kako je 16. kolovoza 1991. „po usmenoj zapovijedi Komande 1. VO u 17:00 sati u područje Bosanske Gradiške upućena borbena grupa od 14 tenkova T-55, pet oklopnih transportera M-60, bitnica haubica 122 mm D30 (šest komada) s motornim vozilima (114 vojnika)". Sljedećeg dana dolazi do sukoba s hrvatskim snagama kada su pripadnici JNA pokušali maknuti barikade. U pomoć je pozvano i zrakoplovstvo JNA koje je *djelovalo po zgradi KP doma Stara Gradiška, a po zapovijedi 5. korpusa.* (Dimitrijević, 2004., str. 34).

Hrvatske snage pružale su jak otpor, ali su morale napustiti Staru Gradišku i pri povlačenju su srušile most na kanalu Nova Sava (kanal Strug). Okučani su tako *„zaštićeni i pretvoreni u tampon-zonu"* od strane 5. korpusa JNA. Oko Stare Gradiške uspostavljen je mostobran preko kojeg su dolazile snage JNA i pružale logističku potporu srbočetničkim snagama u zapadnoj Slavoniji (Marijan, 2016., str. 105). Zaposjedanjem područja do autoceste od strane 329. okbr. JNA i spajanjem sa snagama borbene grupe 265. mtbr. JNA 4. rujna 1991. teritorijalno i logistički su povezane snage pobunjenih Srba TO-a iz zapadne Slavonije sa snagama 5. banjalučkog korpusa JNA iz Bosanske krajine (Monografija, 2022., str. 159).

Hrvatske snage pokušale su povratiti položaje i deblokirati auto cestu, ali su snage pobunjenih Srba i JNA uspjele zadržati područje oko Vrbovljana. Oklopni bataljun iz 329. brigade napao je 5. rujna 1991. hrvatske snage na naplatnoj rampi autoceste južno od Okučana i ubrzo je stavio pod nadzor tako da deblokada autoputa nije uspjela (Martinić, 2014., str. 53). JNA je nastavila s borbenim aktivnostima i širila teritorij (mostobran) u zapadnu Slavoniju pred početak vojnog pohoda JNA na Hrvatsku[3]. Na ostalom teritoriju

3 Ratni dnevnik 5. korpusa JNA, dana 17. 9. 1991.

samoproglašene „SAO zapadna Slavonija" pobunjeni Srbi su uz potporu JNA napadali hrvatska naselja, pripadnike hrvatskih snaga i provodili teror nad hrvatskim stanovništvom, pljačkajući im imovinu i tjerajući ih u progonstvo.

JNA je 19./20. rujna 1991. počela s vojnom pohodom na Hrvatsku. Nakon donošenja *Direktive komandanta 1. VO za operaciju u Slavoniji*, 19. rujna 1991., zapovjednik 5. korpusa JNA general Nikola Uzelac sa sjedištem u Banja Luci 20. rujna 1991. donosi odluku o napadu 5. korpusa JNA na zapadnu Slavoniju (Monografija, 2022.):



Због све сложеније ситуације у Хрватској, Команда 1. Војне области је 19. септембра 1992. године донела следећу Одлуку:

„Завршити са мобилизацијом, довести јединице и енергично прећи у напад главним снагама у међуречју Драва – Сава, а помоћним (5. корпус) Окучани-Пакрац-Вировитица и Окучани-Кутина са задатком уз авио и арт. Подршку и садејство са јединицама ТО окружити и разбити снаге Републике Хрватске у Зап. Славонији, деблокирати јединице и војне објекте, избити на линију Нашице – Славонски Брод и бити у готовости за продужење напада ка Копривници и Окучанима."

Izvod iz Direktive 1. VO od 19. rujna 1991.

Zbog sve složenije situacije u Hrvatskoj komanda 1. vojne oblasti je 19. rujna 1991. donijela sljedeću odluku:

„Završiti s mobilizacijom, dovesti jedinice i energično prijeći u napad glavnim snagama u međurječju Drava – Sava, a pomoćnim (5. korpus) Okučani – Pakrac – Virovitica i Okučani – Kutina sa zadatkom uz avio i artiljerijsku podršku i sadejstvo TO-a okružiti i razbiti snage Republike Hrvatske u zapadnoj Slavoniji, deblokirati jedinice i vojne objekte, izbiti na liniju Našice – Slavonski Brod i biti u gotovosti za produženje napada ka Koprivnici i Okučanima."



„5. корпус (без 10. Парт.д) са 130. и 544. мтбр изводи нападну операцију правцем Окучани-Дарувар-Вировитица, а помоћним снагама правцем Окучани-Кутина, са задатком: одсећи Славонију и у садејству са 12. К и 1. Пгмд разбити и разоружати паравојне формације и повратити заузете војне објекте."

Odluka (Misija) zapovjednika 5. korpusa JNA prema Direktivi 1. VO za napad na zapadnu Slavoniju

„5 korpus (bez 10. part.d) sa 130. i 544. mtbr. izvodi napadnu operaciju pravcem Okučani – Daruvar – Virovitica, a pomoćnim snagama pravcem Okučani – Kutina, sa zadatkom: odsjeći Slavoniju i u sadejstvu s 12. korpusom i 1. pgmd. razbiti i razoružati paravojne formacije i povratiti zauzete vojne objekte."



На основу извршене процјене ситуације, командант 5. корпуса 20.09.1991. године је донио,

ОДЛУКУ:

По завршеном довођењу и развоју јединица у садејству са снагама 1.пгмд 12. К, ОкШТО Бања Лука и ОпШТО Окучани обезбеђују се са лијевог бока из правца Новска, уз снажну авио и артиљеријску подршку енергично прећи у напад групишући главне снаге на правцу: Окучани - Пакрац - Дарувар - Велика Трнова, а помоћне снаге на правцу: Окучани - Кутина и Окучани - Нова Градишка, са циљем: окружити, разбити и разоружати снаге Републике Хрватске до линије: Велики Грђевац - Ковачица Славонска - Мала Чиновица - Костањевац Беречки - Петковача - М. Бршљаница - Кутинске Чаире - Кутина, где на достигнутој линији прећи у одбрану и бити у готовости за даља дејства.

Операцију извести у двије етапе у трајању од 4 - 6 дана.

1. етапи, у трајању од 2 - 3 дана избити на линију: Шупља Липа - Стражанац - Соколовац - Храстовац - Пољана Пакрачка - Липовљани и уз извршавање основних задатака истовремено створити услове за извођење 2. борбеног ешалона (б/е), а већа насељена мјеста (Пакрац, Новска) блокирати одговарајућим снагама.

2. етапи, у трајању од 2 - 3 дана, енергично продужити са извођењем нападних б/д и што прије избити на линију: Ковачица Славонска - Г. Трновитица - Гајеви - Кутинске Чаире - Кутина при чему Дарувар и Кутину блокирати јачим снагама одакле бити у готовости за даља дејства.

Namjera zapovjednika 5. korpusa JNA bila je

Na osnovi izvršene procjene situacije komandant 5. korpusa 20. 9. 1991. godine donio je

ODLUKU:

„Po završenom dovođenju i razvoju jedinica u sadejstvo sa snagama 1. pgmd., 12 K, Op ŠTO Banja Luka i Op ŠTO Okučani obezbeđuju se sa lijevog boka iz pravca Novske uz snažnu avio i artiljerijsku podršku energično prijeđe u napad grupirajući glavne snage na pravcu: Okučani – Pakrac – Daruvar – Velika Trnova, a pomoćne snage na pravcu: Okučani – Kutina i Okučani – Nova Gradiška, s ciljem okružiti, razbiti i razoružati snage Republike Hrvatske do linije: Veliki Grđevac – Kovačica Slavonska – Mala Činovica – Kostanjevac Berečki – Petkovača – M. Bršljanica – Kutinske Čaire – Kutina, gdje na dostignutoj liniji prijeći u obranu i biti u gotovosti za daljnja dejstva."

„Operaciju izvesti u dvije etape u trajanju od 4 do 6 dana.

U 1. etapi, u trajanju od 2 do 3 dana izbiti na liniju: Šuplja Lipa – Stražanac – Sokolovac – Hrastova – Poljana Pakračka – Lipovljani i uz izvršavanje osnovnih zadataka istovremeno stvoriti uvjete za uvođenje 2. borbenog ešalona (b/e), a veća naseljena mjesta (Pakrac, Novska) blokirati odgovarajućim snagama.

U 2. etapi, u trajanju od 2 do 3 dana, energično produžiti s izvođenjem napadnih b/d i što prije izbiti na liniju: Kovačica Slavonska – G. Trnovitica – Gajevi – Kutinske Čaire – Kutina, pri čemu Daruvar i Kutinu blokirati jačim snagama odakle biti u gotovosti za daljna dejstva."

Izvod iz Odluke komandanta 5. korpusa za napadnu operaciju u zapadnoj Slavoniji (Monografija, 2022., str. 160)

Zapovjedništvo 5. korpusa JNA namjeravalo je napadnu operaciju provesti u dvije faze (etape) u trajanju od 4 do 6 dana. U tom vremenu planirali su poraziti hrvatske snage u zapadnoj Slavoniji, odsjeći Slavoniju od središnje Hrvatske duž osi *Okučani – Pakrac – Daruvar* – Virovitica, osigurati granicu na rijeci Ilovi i dočekati snage JNA koje su se posavskim i podravskim koridorom trebale probiti iz Srbije.



Slika 3. **Plan napada komandanta 5. korpusa JNA na zapadnu Slavoniju**

Izradili M. Kretić i I. Benković, HVU, 2024.

Zamisao napadne operacije 5. korpusa JNA

- *U skladu s Direktivom 1. vojne oblasti zapovjednik 5. korpusa JNA general M. Uzelac odredio je nositelje i smjerove napada na zapadnu Slavoniju (Slika 3):*
- *na glavnom smjeru napada 5. korpusa JNA: Okučani – Pakrac – Daruvar – Velika Trnova, nositelj napada je 343. motorizirana brigada (343. mtbr.)*
- *na pomoćnom smjeru: Okučani – Kutina, nositelj napada je 16. motorizirana brigada*
- *na pomoćnom smjeru: Okučani – Nova Gradiška, nositelj napada je 329. oklopna brigada*
- *na jasenovačkom području nositelj napada je 11. partizanska brigada 10. partizanske divizije*
- *za pričuvu 5. korpusa JNA određena je 5. kozarska brigada, a njezino uvođenje u napadna djelovanja planirano je na smjeru prema Lipiku i dalje do linije Slovinska – Kovačica.*

Po zapovijedi zapovjednika 5. korpusa JNA 5. partbr. TO (kozarska) razmješta se u širem rajonu Laminca u ulozi dijela snaga opšte rezerve 5. K. Po odobrenju komandanta 5. K uvodi se u izvođenje napadnih b/d opštim pravcem Brestovača – Bos. Gradiška – Okučani – Lipik i s linije Imsovac – Stražanac u sadejstvu sa 2. b/e 343. mtbr. ovladava linijom: Slovinska – Kovačica, gdje prelazi u odbranu (Monografija, 2022., 161).

Provedba operacije

Za izvršenje ove operacije bilo je potrebno provesti mobilizaciju snaga iz područja sjeverozapadne Bosne. *„Peti korpus, početkom borbenih dejstava u Z. Slavoniji imao je 1400 aktivnih vojnika i oko 100 starješina"* (gen. Talić, 2019.). S mobilizacijom postrojbi zapovjedništvo 5. korpusa JNA sa sjedištem u Banja Luci počelo je 14. rujna 1991. mobiliziranjem 16. mtbr. „R" i 343. mtbr. „R" brigada, a zatim i ostalih jedinica u sastavu 5. korpusa *JNA (Ratni dnevnik 5. k. JNA).*

Po jugoslavenskoj doktrini postrojbe JNA klasificirale su se ovako: „A" klasa bile su popunjene od 60 do 100 % po ratnom ustroju i takve su bile spremne za brzu uporabu i bez provedene mobilizacije, postrojbe „B" bile su popunjene od 15 do 60 % i postrojbe „R" do 15 % (D. Marijan, 2012.). Klasifikaciju „A" imala je 329. okb. brigada u kojoj su bili vojnici na redovitom služenju vojnog roka.

Međutim, uslijed narušenih međunacionalnih odnosa i izgubljenog povjerenja u JNA na području sjeverozapadne Bosne mobilizaciji su se uglavnom odazvali samo srpski vojni obveznici. Hrvatski i bošnjački vojni obveznici nisu se odazvali, za što su imali i potporu najvećih političkih stranka tih dvaju naroda, HDZ-a i SDA-a. U Općini Prijedor na vlasti je bila koalicija SDA-a koja je odbila provesti mobilizaciju jer je vlasti Republike BiH nisu odobrile.

U Općini Prijedor, odakle se mobilizirala 343. brigada, 1991. živjelo je 113 000 stanovnika. Muslimana je bilo 49 000, Srba 47 000, Hrvata 6 000, Jugoslavena 6 000 i ostalih 5 000. Nacionalni sastav brigade odgovarao je nacionalnoj strukturi stanovništva (Bošnjaka 41,2 %, Srba 38,8 %, Hrvata 6 %, Jugoslavena 10 % i ostalih 2 %). Po popisu brojno stanje 343. „R" mtbr. bilo je 4 474, a mobilizaciji se odazvalo 32 %, odnosno oko 1 430 obveznika.

Neuspjela mobilizacija u Bosni Hercegovini i nedolazak planiranih snaga stvorili su u zapovjedništvu 5. korpusa JNA dvojbu o tome kako izvršiti dodijeljenu zadaću i kako rasporediti raspoložive snage. Kojim brigadama i s koliko snaga napasti na glavnom smjeru prema Virovitici, a s kojim snagama osigurati bokove prema Novskoj i Novoj Gradiški? Ako bi se većina snaga uputila prema Virovitici, postojala je opasnost da hrvatske snage napadnu

bokove i odsijeku glavne snage 5. korpusa JNA. (Upravo se to dogodilo u operaciji Bljesak 1995. – *„Zapadna Slavonija je pala greškom, a ta greška pripisana je generalu Čeleketiću"*, Nilsen, 247). Zbog toga je većina snaga 5. korpusa JNA usmjerena na bokove *Novska – Okučani i Okučani – Nova Gradiška*, što je značilo i veće angažiranje hrvatskih snaga na tim smjerovima. Zapovjednik 5. korpusa JNA odlučio je sa slabijim snagama s osloncem na pobunjene Srbe napasti prema Pakracu i Daruvaru, vjerujući kako će hrvatske snage u istočnoj Slavoniji biti brzo pregažene od 12. novosadskog korpusa i 1. proleterske gardijske mehanizirane divizije (1. pgmd.) JNA.

Od pristiglih ojačanja 5. korpusu 23. rujna 1991. stigla je bitnica višecijevnih lansera raketa 128 mm M-77 Oganj iz Vranja (55 vojnika , četiri lansera s dva b/k – 480 raketa), dok se 130. motorizirana brigada iz Smederevske Palanke svela na 280 ljudi koji su se odbili boriti, 29. rujna 1991. razoružani su i vraćeni kućama. Na Banovini je 544. motorizirana brigada pridodana Prvoj operativnoj grupi (OG-1). Jedino ojačanje koje je Banjalučki korpus dobio za zapadnu Slavoniju bila je 10. partizanska divizija (11. i 6. partizanske brigade), koja se bez jedne brigade vratila u sastav korpusa jer se vojnici nisu željeli boriti na Kordunu u sastavu 5. vojne oblasti (D. Marijan, 2012.). U ratnom dnevniku 5. korpusa JNA navedeni su brojni primjeri samovoljnog napuštanja položaja, slab moral kod nekih postrojbi i odbijanje zapovijedi zapovjednika.

Nakon što je 329. oklopna mehanizirana brigada „A" klase (329. okbr.) JNA osigurala mostobran i stvorila uvjete ostalim snagama 5. banjalučkog korpusa za prelazak u zapadnu Slavoniju, zapovjednik 5. korpusa JNA usmjerio je njezine borbene aktivnosti prema Novoj Gradiški. Nedostajao im je jedan oklopni bataljun, koji se nalazio na području Plitvičkih jezera. Napadajući šire područje autoceste Zagreb – Beograd u području Nove Gradiške, brigada je planirala brzim prodorom probiti obranu hrvatskih snaga i spojiti se s nadolazećim snagama 1. gardijske divizije JNA iz istočne Slavonije. U dva tjedna teških borbi s hrvatskim snagama 329. okbr. zaustavljena je na crti *Pivare – Gorica – Medari – Cernička Šagovina*, pet kilometara od Nove Gradiške.

Napadi 16. mtrb. JNA ojačane oklopnim bataljunom (bilo je i 17 tenkova T-34 iz II. svjetskog rata), s jednim bataljunom 2. partizanske brigade TO-a iz Banja Luke bili su usmjereni na proširenje koridora prema Novskoj i Kutini i zaštiti

lijevog boka snagama na glavnom smjeru napadu prema Daruvaru. Hrvatske snage zaustavile s napade ove brigadne skupine na crti *selo Paklenica – motel „Jug" na autocesti. Crta dodira snaga dalje se protezala u područje napada 10. partizanske divizije: selo Bročice – kanal Strug – Jasenovac.*

Na glavnom smjeru napada 5. korpusa JNA prema Pakracu i Daruvaru upućena je 343. mtbr. „R" brigada, mobilizirana s 32 % vojnih obveznika pretežno srpske nacionalnosti iz općine Prijedor i šireg područja Potkozarja. Brigada je prešla rijeku Savu 20. rujna 1991. i nakon dva dana preuzela položaje TO-a srpskih pobunjenih snaga od sela *Dereza – Kusonje – Šeovica – Bjelanovac – Subocka – Jagma – Bujavica do sala Bair* u širini od 34 kilometra i tu se bila zaustavila. U potpori 343. „R" brigadi JNA nalazila se borbena grupa stacionirana u Okučanima iz sastava 265. mbrg. (235 vojnika) Bjelovar te treći bataljun 5. kozarske brigade iz Turjaka, koji je bio u potpori 343. brigade.

Ukupne snage 5. korpusa JNA na početku napadne operacije procjenjuju se na oko 10 000 vojnika mobiliziranih s područja Bosanske krajine. Na glavnome smjeru napada jačina tih snaga nije mogla biti veća od 3 000 vojnika.

Slika 4. **Komunikacija preko pontonskog mosta na kanalu Strug**
Iz filma Komšije: Lipik, Pakrac, Novska

Za potporu napadnoj operaciji iskorišten je cjelokupni gospodarski i politički potencijal sjeverne Bosne kako bi se snagama snaga 5. korpusa JNA omogućila borbena djelovanja i opskrba pobunjenog srpskog stanovništva u zapadnoj Slavoniji. Najvažnija komunikacija kojom su opskrbljivane snage 5. korpusa vodila je preko pontonskog mosta preko kanala Strug – Nova Sava na pravcu prema Novoj Varoši – Gradiška i Banja Luka.

Možda zvuči nevjerojatno, ali u knjizi generala Rudija Stipčića iz 1996. *Napokon smo krenuli* uopće se ne spominje 343. motorizirana brigada „R" JNA, koja je bila nositelj napada 5. korpusa prema Pakracu i Lipiku, odnosno prema Daruvaru. Zajednički nazivnik za sve snage na tom smjeru napada je 5. pješačka brigada (kozaračka), iako je samo 3. bataljun uspio biti mobiliziran i nalazio se u potpori 343. mtbr. JNA. Slično navodi i Andrić u *Raščlamba*, 2000.: „sastav neprijateljskih snaga: 5. prb iz 5. K, 1. bojna četnika dobrovoljaca „Beli orlovi", 2 bojne TO domaćih četnika, 1/12 br TO Bučje i cca 1 ojačana brigada iz sastava 5. K u tijeku 11. i 12. mjeseca 1991".

Zbrka nastaje i kod čitanja D. Marijana (str. 106) *Organizacije i djelovanje JNA i pobunjenih Srba u Zapadnoj Slavoniji,* kao i V. Vrbanac *Strategijska obrambena operacija*, 2021., str. 396, u razumijevanju snaga i ciljeva na glavnom smjeru napada 5. korpusa JNA. U početnom dijelu napada 5. korpusa JNA navodi se 14. partizanska brigada iz Vojvodine, što je netočno. U ratnom dnevniku 5. korpusa JNA navedeno je „24. listopada 1991. na područje zapadne Slavonije stigla 14. partbr. sa 1259 vojnika i 92 motorna vozila iz Zrenjanina i Kikinde. Brigada nije bila pripremljena za provođenje borbenih zadaća: *„sporo formirana, ljudstvo se nedovoljno poznaje, iz ravničarskog je predjela, nije u potpunosti završen ciklus obuke, nedostaje naoružanja, sredstva veze i dr."* Zapovjednik 14. brigade JNA molio je nadređenog za razumijevanje prilikom dodjele borbenih zadaća i zatražio je pomoć u obuci."

Zastoj napada 5. korpusa JNA na smjeru Pakrac – Daruvar – Virovitica nakon 22. rujna 1991. nastao je kao posljedica kolapsa glavnih snaga JNA na posavskom koridoru, na smjeru napada 1. gardijske proleterske mehanizirane divizije. Nakon raspada 2. gardijske brigade na posavskom koridoru (Lucić, 2015.) vojnom vrhu JNA postalo je jasno da se snage JNA za tjedan dana ne mogu probiti do Okučana, kao što se ni snage 12. novosadskog korpusa neće

moći spojiti s pobunjenim srpskim snagama na području Papuka. Uz to, do 22. rujna 1991. predajom 32. korpusa JNA u Varaždinu hrvatske snage došle su u posjed goleme količine opreme, oružja i teškog naoružanja 32. korpusa (varaždinskog) JNA.

Iako je vojni vrh JNA situaciju na lipičko-pakračkom bojištu smatrao povoljnom jer *je „prodor prema Pakracu za Hrvatsku kost u grlu"* (Jović, Dnevnik, 28. septembar 1991.), 5. korpus JNA nije imao dovoljno snaga i sposobnosti realizirati planirane ciljeve – *uništenje hrvatskih snaga u zapadnoj Slavoniji i presijecanje Hrvatske.* Nakon što su se 29. rujna 1991. predale i preostale snage 32. korpusa u Bjelovaru i Križevcima, koje su trebale biti u potpori snagama 5. banjalučkog korpusa, postalo je jasno da se zadaća dodijeljena 5. korpusu JNA u Direktivi 1. VO ne može izvršiti, odnosno da je propao i taj dio strategijskog plana JNA o presijecanju Hrvatske kod Virovitice. Kako je masovna mobilizacija vojnih postrojbi u Srbiji podbacila, što je bila katastrofa za JNA, a na posavskom koridoru raspale su se snage glavnog napora, daljnje angažiranje 5. korpusa JNA prema dodijeljenoj zadaći više se nije moglo provoditi. Vojnom vrhu postalo je jasno da JNA više nema snage prisiliti Hrvatsku na kapitulaciju te se odlučio za korigiranje strateškog planu napada JNA na Hrvatsku.

Plan Milana Uzelca, zapovjednika 5. korpusa JNA, *da okruži, razbije i razoruža hrvatske snage* ovisio je o napredovanju glavnih snaga iz Srbije, u prvom redu o napredovanju 1. pgmd. *posavskim koridorom*. Kolaps glavnih snaga 1. VO (vojne oblasti) JNA u istočnoj Slavoniji osujetio je i daljnje napadno djelovanje 5. korpusa JNA u zapadnoj Slavoniji. Tako dobro isplanirani vojni pohod propao je i na području zapadne Slavonije. Koji su novi ciljevi 5. korpusa? Što dalje?

U odnosu na velike snage koje je JNA koncentrirala u istočnoj Slavoniji, u zapadnoj Slavoniji na, početku operacije zbog neodazivanja mobilizaciji, 5. korpus JNA nije imao dostatne snage, a time ni sposobnosti provesti tako veliku i zahtjevnu napadnu operaciju dodijeljenu u Direktivi 1. VO-a. Snage 5. korpusa JNA jedva su imale snage držati trokut Novska – Pakrac – Nova Gradiška, a nepregledna brdovita područja sjeverno od Pakraca ostala su u zoni odgovornosti Teritorijalne obrane (TO) zapadne Slavonije i raznih

četničkih skupina pristiglih iz Srbije i Bosne i Hercegovine. I sam Kadijević kasnije priznaje: *„Nigdje se neuspjeh mobilizacije o kome sam govorio nije tako negativno odrazio kao na situaciju u Zapadnoj Slavoniji, od planiranih pet brigada, dobilo se samo ekvivalent jedne i po brigade, s tim što su i oni koji su stigli na front, u toku borbi ga napuštali."* (Kadijević, str. 109).

Na *„strategijski važnom sastanku"*, održanom u Beogradu 30. rujna 1991., Štaba Vrhovne komande JNA i glavnih zapovjednika skupina (OG 1-5) koji su provodili napadne operacije odustalo se od prodora oklopno-mehaniziranih snaga u dubinu Hrvatske, od smjenjivanja legalno izabrane vlasti Republike Hrvatske i od vojnog poraza oružanih snaga novostvorene hrvatske države. Odlučili su se nastaviti rat radi stvaranja kompaktnih cjelina prostora na kojima Srbi čine većinu ili su bili u većem broju. Novi ciljevi bili su*: „poraziti ustaške snage u Dalmaciji i Slavoniji, a zatim avio i raketnim vatrenim udarima po vitalnim objektima Hrvatske prisiliti vrhovništvo da omogući izvlačenje snaga (JNA) na liniji koja je omeđena ugroženim narodima. Sa snagama 5. korpusa (banjalučkog) na sadašnjim položajima organizirati duboku odbranu i spriječiti daljnje prodore ustaša, a zatim, osloncem na Krajinu, preći u ofanzivna dejstva. Od Štaba vrhovne komande je zatraženo ojačavanje 5. korpusa s novim snagama JNA."* (Cokić, 2008., str. 258–268).

S novim, korigiranim planom, nastalim deset dana nakon donošenja Direktive 1. VO-a 5. korpus JNA izdvojen je iz sastava zapovijedanja 1. VO-a (vojne oblasti) i stavljen pod neposredno zapovijedanje Štaba Vrhovne komande JNA. Nakon smjena u zapovjedništvu 1. VO-a (Spirkovski, Silić) Štab Vrhovne komande JNA preuzeo je daljnje planiranje i vođenje napadnih aktivnosti u zapadnoj Slavoniji. Budući da spajanje 5. banjalučkog korpusa JNA sa snagama JNA iz istočne Slavonije više nije bilo moguće, težište borbenih aktivnosti usmjereno je na širenje i zaokruživanje okupiranih područja, etničko čišćenje područja od Hrvata i drugih nesrba iz „srpske zemlje", koju će pripojiti novoj srpskoj državi. U zapadnoj Slavoniji težište borbenih djelovanja bilo je na širenju okupiranih područja, odnosno osvajanju Pakraca, Lipika i Jasenovca te prelazak u obranu ispred Novske i Nove Gradiške. Novi napadi počeli su 3. listopada 1991. zauzimanjem sela Čaglića, stvarajući tako povoljniji oslonac za napad na Lipik (Monografija, 2022., str. 112).


„Извршити напад на правцу: Окучани-Новска, Пакрац-Новска и Бос. Дубица – Јасеновац са циљем: нанети усташама што веће губитке и очистити насељена места Пакрац, Липик и Јасеновац, заузети повољне положаје за одбрану и дејство, учврстити се на достигнутим линијама и не дозволити продор усташама."

Komandant 5. korpusa Uzelac 4. listopada 1991. u 10:00 sati donosi odluku:

„Izvršiti napad na pravcu: Okučani – Novska, Pakrac – Novska i Bosanska Dubica – Jasenovac sa ciljem: nanijeti ustašama što veće gubitke i očistiti naseljena mjesta Pakrac, Lipik i Jasenovac, zauzeti povoljne položaje za odbranu i dejstvo, učvrstiti se na dostignutim linijama i ne dozvoliti prodor ustašama."
(isto, u Ratnom dnevniku 5. korpusa JNA za 5. 10. 1991.)

Zadaće postrojbama za napad, Ratni dnevnik 5. korpusa od 5. listopada 1991.:

- *329. okbr.; ovladati linijom selo Medari – selo Dragalić – Gorice*
- *343. mtbr.; izvršiti zauzimanje i čišćenje rajona Lipik i Pakrac u sadejstvu snaga TO-a i zauzeti povoljne položaje zapadno od Pakraca i Lipika*
- *16. mtbr.; izbiti na liniju sela Teljige – selo Vočarica i obezbediti se s pravca Kričko brdo, na koji uputiti dio snaga*
- *10 partd.; u toku dana zauzeti Jasenovac, dijelom snaga obezbediti most na kanalu Strug*
- *6. partbr.; angažira se između 11. i 16. pmtbr., a dejstvuje prema Jasenovcu i Novskoj s juga*
- *KAG (Korpusna art. grupa); težište podrške imati na pravcima sela Gornji Rajić i Novska i po zahtevu komandanta.*

U ratnom dnevniku navedena je zapovijed zapovjednika 5. korpusa o bombardiranju Novske kasetnim bombama s dva do četiri aviona, a nakon toga prema procjeni 16. mtbr. ponoviti avionski napad. U tim avionapadima smrtno je stradalo 11, a ranjena su 23 branitelja.[4]

Nakon desetak dana žestokih borbi s hrvatskim snagama snage 5. korpusa JNA zauzele su 8. listopada 1991. područje Jasenovca (11. i 6. partizanska brigada), a 12. listopada 1991. dvije trećine Lipika i ušle u dio Pakraca. Hrvatske snage su do sredine listopada uspjele zaustaviti napredovanja neprijatelja, a krajem listopada počele su s napadima na neprijatelja koji prelazi u obranu.

Iako su neprijateljske snage imale golemu prednost u vatrenoj moći (u topništvu, oklopnim snagama, u zračnoj podršci), bosanski Srbi nisu uspjeli

4 Grad Novska, Komemorativni skup u sjećanje na žrtve 4. listopada 1991. godine.

ostvariti svoj prvi postavljeni operativni cilj – poraziti hrvatsku vojsku na području zapadne Slavonije i izbiti na mađarsku granicu. Isto tako ni u reduciranom planu nisu uspjeli zaokružiti područje SAO zapadna Slavonija i zauzeti pakračko-lipičko područje. Planovi o granici „Velike Srbije" u zapadnoj Slavoniji na rijeci Ilovi su propali. Krajem listopada 1991. hrvatske snage preuzimaju taktičku inicijativu, započinju s operacijama oslobađanja zapadne Slavonije i potiskivanja 5. korpusa JNA sa zapadnoslavonskog područja.

U analizama koje su uslijedile vojni vrh JNA uzroke neuspjele operacije presijecanja Hrvatske u zapadnoj Slavoniji vidio je u nedovoljnoj mobilizaciji, nedostatku morala i lošem operativnom djelovanju 5. korpusa JNA koji je samo *djelomično izvršio svoju zadaću* (Kadijević, 1993., str. 159). Međutim M. Talić, načelnik stožera 5. korpusa JNA, smatrao kako *je „krivnja ipak na glavnim snagama u istočnoj Slavoniji, jer one nisu izvršile svoju zadaću. Da je na vrijeme 12. korpus (novosadski) JNA, izvršio svoj zadatak i izbio u Daruvar, a 1. gardijska divizija u blizinu Nove Gradiške, ne bi bilo tako dugog, tako krvavog rata. A baš takve naredbe su postojale."* (Krajiški vojnik od 6. 6. 1996., str. 7)[5]

Uzroci neučinkovitog operativnog djelovanja 5. korpusa JNA u provođenju napadne operacije presijecanja Hrvatske u zapadnoj Slavoniji mnogobrojni su: nedostatak planiranih postrojbi, odnosno neodazivanje hrvatskih i bošnjačkih vojnih obveznika pozivu za mobilizaciju u sjeverozapadnoj Bosni, nizak moral mobiliziranih postrojbi, samovolja i napuštanje položaja, zaoštravanja međunacionalnih odnosa u Bosanskoj Krajini, neusklađenost sustava zapovijedanja s teritorijalnom obranom (Monografija, 2022., str. 159), sve do dolaska novih mobiliziranih hrvatskih postrojbi nakon zauzimanja skladišta oružja i opreme 32. korpusa JNA (varaždinskog), koje su ojačale hrvatsku obranu na zapadnoslavonskom bojištu. Iako su snage 5. korpusa JNA krajem prosinca 1991. narasle na oko 20 000 vojnika (Marijan, 2016., str. 103) s 90 tenkova, 75 oklopnih borbenih vozila, više od 100 topova preko 100 mm i oko 70 teških minobacača 120 mm te desetak višecijevnih raketnih bacača (VBR) i uz zračnu potporu, hrvatske snage uspjele su prisiliti 5. korpus JNA na obranu i povlačenje.

5 Momir Talić u vrijeme napada na zapadnu Slavoniju bio je na dužnosti načelnika Štaba i zamjenik komandanta 5. korpusa JNA, a poslije postaje komandant tog korpusa. Haški sud (ICTY) optužio ga je za genocid, zločine protiv čovječnosti i ratne zločine u BiH.

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Zauzimanje skladišta opreme i teškog naoružanja 32. korpusa JNA na području Varaždina i Međimurja utjecalo je na osvajanje vojarni u Koprivnici i Bjelovaru kao i u drugim krajevima Hrvatske, što je bilo presudno za opstanak i obranu Hrvatske u tom trenutku. Učinak te pobjede imao je velik odjek, a utjecao je na jačanje borbenog morala i spremnost ljudi za obranu Hrvatske.

Varaždinski 32. korpus, mobiliziran sa 100 % vojnih obveznika, imao bi 31 572 vojnika: stalni sastav činio je 16 % odnosno 5 117, a pričuvni sastav 84 %, odnosno 26 455 vojnih obveznika (*organizacijska struktura 32. korpusa JNA*). Toliko se ljudi moglo naoružati i opremiti iz njegovih skladišta. Na papiru 32. (varaždinski) korpus djelovao je vrlo moćno. Ono što nije završilo u hrvatskim rukama bili su vojni poligon Gakovo u grubišnopoljskoj općini, koji je oslobođen početkom studenog 1991., i oružje i oprema borbene grupe 265. mehanizirane brigade iz Bjelovara koja je s 235 pripadnika, 22 borbena vozila i tenkova 17. kolovoza 1991. bila je upućena u Okučane.

Dug je popis oružja i opreme koje se navodi u „Optužnici" za osmoricu zapovjednika 32. korpusa bivše JNA u Varaždinu, koju je Vojni tužitelj uputio Vojnom sudu JNA u Beogradu 30. siječnja 1992.

U „Optužnici" se navodi da je u vojarnama i skladištima samo u Varaždinu zarobljeno je 7 834 komada pušaka, 391 puškomitraljez, 76 mitraljeza, 23 000 ručnih bombi, 4 858 000 komada streljiva za pješačko naoružanje, 74 tenka T 55, desetak tenkova za posebne namjene (laki amfibijski tenkovi PT-76, tenkovi nosači mostova, tenkovi za izvlačenje), 71 oklopni transporter, sedam samohodnih haubica 122 mm „Gvozdika", 12 samohodnih topova 90 mm, 12 top-haubica 125 mm, 18 haubica 155 mm, 12 haubica „NORA" od 152 mm s potrebnim prijevoznim sredstvima, 4 VBR „OGANJ" i četiri „Plamen", oko 180 topova kalibra manjeg od 100 mm, više bitnica minobacača od 60, 82 i 120 mm i mnoštvo drugog teškog naoružanja s pripadajućim streljivom i protuoklopnih i protuavionskih raketnih sustava, mina, eksploziva i razne opreme korpusa. U skladištu Barutana, Nova Ves, nalazila su se dva i pol kompleta tenkovskog streljiva za 32. „A" oklopnu mehaniziranu brigadu kojom je zapovijedao pukovnik Popov i oružje sa streljivom TO-a Varaždin.

U povijesti Domovinskog rata varaždinska pobjeda bila je jedna manja bitka. Međutim, učinak te pobjede za Hrvatsku i njezin opstanak bio je od presudnog značenja. Hrvatska je tada bila u velikoj opasnosti od presijecanja teritorija od strane srbočetničkih snaga i jugoslavenske armije, što bi značilo poraz,

kapitulaciju, pregovore i gubitak teritorija. Oružje i oprema varaždinskog 32. korpusa JNA bili su ključni za opremanje postojećih postrojbi na bojištima širom Hrvatske i za zaustavljanje napada srbočetničkih snaga. U trenutku pada varaždinskog 32. korpusa JNA hrvatske su snage imale samo jedan donekle ispravan tenk zarobljen u Gospiću. *„Oružje i oprema koje je na tom području zauzeto omogućilo je sljedeće: razvoj hrvatske vojske je ubrzan, mi smo u narednih deset dana formirali novih 14 brigada, a postojeću 21 brigadu koje su uglavnom bile s jednom bojnom i neopremljene razvili smo na bojištu, jer smo mogli dati oružje ljudima."* (gen. A. Tus – film „5 godina na braniku domovine"). I srpski analitičari priznaju*: „Najveći uspeh hrvatske strane je blokada i osvajanje garnizona 32. korpusa u Varaždinu, jednog od najopremljenijih u JNA."* (Dimitrijević, 2011.).

Napadna djelovanja 343. brigade 5. korpusa JNA na glavnome smjeru napada - lipičko-pakračko bojište

U skladu s Direktivom 1. Vojne oblasti, za operaciju u zapadnoj Slavoniji od 20. rujna 1991. zapovjednik 5. korpusa JNA M. Uzelac dodijelio je zadaću 343. motoriziranoj brigada JNA na glavnome smjeru napada 5. korpusa JNA:


„... 343. мтбр са 1/265 мтбр. и 3/5. Парт.бр ТО и 2.од.ТО „Север" напада на делу фронта: Ново Село - Рајићи правцима: Рогуљи - Пакрац - Даруварр - В. Трнова и Липик - Гај - Гарешница. У ближем задатку у садејству са 16.мтбр разбити непријатеља на правцима: Рогуљи - Пакрац и Липик-Гај. Пакрац блокирати одговарајућим снагама. У следећем задатку енергично продужити напад додељеним правцима и овладати са рејонима Торањ, Уљаник, Благоводовац и Гарешница, разбити непријатеља на правцима напада и што пре овладати са линијом: Грбовац, Велика Трнова - Гарешнички Брестовац - Гарешница - Капелица, обезбеђујући се село Рогожа. Делом снага блокирати Даруварр. Подржавати КАГ - 5 и авијацију - по захтеву. Граница десно: Ново Село - Пиљаница, лево Медановаџ - Рогож. За спој одговоран командант 343.мтбр. КМ у Бијела Стијена а затим по мери напредовања".

„... 343 mtrb sa 1/265 mtrb. i 3/5 part.br TO i 2. odredom TO „ Sever" napadaju na dijelu fronta: Novo Selo – Rajići pravcima: ***Rogulji – Pakrac – Daruvar – V. Trnova i Lipik – Gaj – Garešnica.***

U bližem zadatku u sadejstvu sa 16. mtbr razbiti neprijatelja na pravcima Rogulji – Pakrac i Lipik – Gaj. Pakrac blokirati odgovarajućim snagama.

U sljedećem zadatku energično produžiti napad dodijeljenim pravcima i ovladati sa rejonima Toranj, Uljanik, Blagorodovac i Garešnica, razbiti neprijatelja na pravcima napada i što prije ovladati sa linijom: Grbavac, Velika Trnova – Garešnički Brestovac – Garešnica – Kapelica, obezbeđujući se sa sela Rogoža. Delom snaga blokirati Daruvar. Podržavati će ih KAG - 5 i avijacija – po zahtjevu.

Granica desno: Novo Selo – Piljanica, levo: Medanovac – Rogož.

Za spoj odgovoran je komandant 343. mtbr. Komandno mjesto u Bijela Stijena, a zatim po meri napredovanja."[6]

6 Monografija prijedorskih ratnih jedinica u odbrambenom – otadžbinskom ratu (1991. – 1995.), Prijedor, 2022., str. 111.

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Nakon što se do 19. rujna 1991. završilo s mobilizacijom u Bosanskoj krajini zapovjednik 5. korpusa JNA general Uzelac za nositelja napada 5. korpusa na glavnome smjeru napada Okučani – Pakrac – Daruvar i osvajanje naselja Velika Trnava odredio je 343. brigadu „R". Brigada (343. mtbr. „R") ojačana je 3. bataljunom 5. kozarske brigade (5. part.br TO), borbenom skupinom iz sastava 265. mtbr. i lokalnim odredom TO „Sever" [7] iz Okučana. Brojno stanje tih snaga na glavnom smjeru napada 5. korpusa JNA nije bilo veće od 3 000 vojnika pretežno srpske nacionalnosti mobiliziranih s kozaračkog područja.

Zadaća im je bila da u suradnji sa snagama 16. mtbr. JNA, koje su napadale u području Novske i zajedno s lokalnim srbočetničkim snagama uz potporu zrakoplovstva JNA u brzom napadu u trajanju od četiri do šest dana okruže, razbiju i razoružaju hrvatske snage u središnjem dijelu zapadne Slavonije.

Glavni cilj napada 343. mtbr. JNA bio je izaći na buduću granicu, odnosno osvajanje područja Velika Trnava i razmještanje snaga na liniji Grbavac – Velika Trnova – Garešnički Brestovac – Garešnica – Kapelica. Iz sustava teritorijalne obrane BiH izmještena je 5. kozarska brigada i pridodana 5. korpusu JNA. Njezino uvođenje u borbu planirano je u drugom dijelu operacije na području sela Imsovac – Stražanac, gdje bi u suradnji s 343. mtbr. pripremila obranu u području sela Slovinska – Kovačica.

Na glavnom smjeru napada 5. korpusa JNA nalazile su postrojbe mobilizirane od pretežno srpskog stanovništva iz Potkozarja, a najviše iz općine Prijedor: 343. motorizirana brigada i 3. bataljun 5. kozarske brigade.

U mobiliziranoj 343. mtbr. „R" brigadi na dan početka operacije bilo je 1 438 rezervista, odnosno 32 % od ukupno 4 474 vojnih obveznika. Sastav brigada uključivao je zapovjedništvo brigade sa stožernim postrojbama, četiri motorizirana bataljuna, divizion haubica 105 mm, laki divizion protuzračne obrane, mješoviti protuoklopni divizion, inženjerski bataljun, četu veze, vod ABKO i pozadinski bataljun (Monografija, 101). U 2. i 4. bataljunu odaziv mobilizaciji bio je 44 %, a na raspolaganju bilo je samo 33 % potrebnih motornih vozila. Nacionalni sastav brigade koji je krenuo u zapadnu Slavoniju: Srbi 74,7 %; Hrvati 10,4 %; Bošnjaci 9,6 % i ostali 5,3 %. Oko 20 % sastava brigade činili su nesrbi: Bošnjaci i Hrvati pokupljeni što na silu s radnih mjesta ili namamljeni na vojnu vježbu – rečeno im je da idu na

7 Marijan, Domovinski rat, Despot Infinitus, Zagreb, 2016., str. 112.

granicu Republike Hrvatske. Nakon godinu dana mnogi od njih stradali su u etničkom čišćenju na prijedorskom području od strane srbočetničkih snaga. (Dosije, 2021.). Brigadom je zapovijedao pukovnik Vladimir Arsić, a zamjenik i načelnik stožera bio je major Radmilo Zeljaja.[8] Sa zapadnoslavonskog bojišta 343. brigada povlači se 30. listopada 1991. i ponovno je vraćena 8. studenog 1991. U novoj smjeni odaziv mobiliziranih Bošnjaka i Hrvata je „opao, jer se 99 % vojnih obveznika nije vratilo s odmora. Brigadi je pristupilo 516 dobrovoljaca srpske nacionalnosti." (Monografija, 109). Porazi naneseni od strane hrvatskih snaga u prosinca 1991. utjecali su na još veće osipanje brojnog stanja, dezertiranja i pada borbenog morala brigade. Do tada su imali 30 mrtvih i više od 250 ranjenih, što je više od 10 %. Vojni stručnjaci smatraju[9] kada stopa žrtava dostigne 10 %, uključujući mrtve i ranjene u postrojbi, to postrojbu čini nesposobnom za daljnje izvršavanje borbenih zadataka (NYT, 2022.).

5. kozarska brigada (5 part.br TO) mobilizirala se 18. rujna 1991., a izdvojena je iz sustava TO Bosne i Hercegovine i pridodana 5. korpusu JNA kao pričuva. Do 20. rujna 1991. odaziv vojnih obveznika mobilizaciji u 5. kozarskoj brigadi bio je 30 % uglavnom srpske nacionalnosti (Monografija, 177). Brigada se sastojala od tri pješačka bataljuna (bojne), bitnice od 82 mm, bitnice od 120 mm i postrojbe za potporu. Zbog slabog odaziva mobilizaciji brojno stanje 1. i 2. pješačkog bataljuna bilo je na razini satnije. Ukupno se mobilizaciji odazvalo oko 800 rezervista u rujnu 1991., koji su upućeni u zapadnu Slavoniju. *„Brigada se okupila 18. 9. 1991. uz dosta problema. Muslimani su odbijali pozive za mobilizaciju i da idu preko Save…"* (Kozarski vjesnik od 25. lipnja 1994.). U zapovjedništvu te brigade ostali su samo oficiri srpske nacionalnosti. Brigadom je zapovijedao pukovnik Pero Čolić.

U početku napadne operacije na zapadnu Slavoniju tehnička opremljenost i obučenost 5. kozarske brigade nije osiguravala ni minimum uvjeta za vođenje borbenih aktivnosti. Kako je JNA dovlačila tehniku i borbena sredstava u područja pod nadzorom bosanskih Srba, tako se i 5. kozarska brigada

8 Fond za humanitarno pravo 2021. protiv njih je podnio kaznenu prijavu za počinjenje ratnih zločina u Prijedoru, koje su počinili pripadnici 343. mtbr. 1992. Po masovnosti to je drugi najveći masakr u ratu u Bosni, nakon genocida u Srebrenici.

9 The New York Times reports. „Pentagon officials say a 10 percent casualty rate, including dead and wounded, for a single unit renders it unable to carry out combat-related tasks."

opremala naoružanjem i provodila obuku. Bez 3. bataljuna ostatci te brigade u Hrvatsku ulaze 5. listopada 1991. na područje sela Bodegraj. Prvi bataljun, u stvarnosti jakosti jedne satnije, sudjeluje u napadima sa 16. mtbr. JNA na selo Stari Grabovac.

Nakon dolaska u zapadnu Slavoniju do 25. rujna 1991. godine 343. brigada JNA zaposjeda komunikaciju Okučani – *Bijele Stijene* i položaje koji su već bili pod kontrolom TO-a „SAO zapadna Slavonija": od sela Dereza – Kusonje – Šeovica – Bjelanovac – Subocka – Jagma – Bujavica do sela Bair u dužini od 34 km (Monografija, 85): 1. bataljun u području Šeovice prema Pakracu, 2. bataljun na pravcu Bair – Trokut – Lovska – Kukunjevac, 3. bataljun bio je razmješten u području Dereza do 17. listopada 1991. kada su njegovi pripadnici napustili položaje i otišli u Prijedor i 4. bataljun bio je razmješten u širem području Subocke. U Donjoj Subocki nalazio se i haubički divizion 105 mm, a u Kovačevcu Čagliškom laki divizion protuzračne obrane. Zapovjedno mjesto 343. brigade JNA nalazilo se u motelu Bijele Stijene u istome naselju uz prometnicu Okučani – Pakrac. Brojno stanje bataljuna bilo je 300 – 350 vojnika.

U sastavu 343. brigade kao pričuva 5. korpusa JNA nalazio se 3. bataljun 5. kozarske brigade angažiran na smjeru selo Benkovac – Bair – Lovska – Trokut – Korita – Lipik. Ostatak te brigade rijeku Savu prešao je 4. listopada 1991. U napadu na selo Stari Grabrovac i Novsku sudjelovao je prvi bataljun (jačine satnije) uz potporu bitnice 120 mm smještene u području sela Vočarice pod zapovjedništvom 16. mtbr. JNA, a drugi bataljun (jačine satnije) nalazio se u selu D. Bogićevci u zoni obrane 329. okbg. Zapovjedništvo 5. pješačke (kozarske) brigade bilo je smješteno u Okučanima.

Na pakračkom bojištu, na glavnome smjeru napada 5. korpusa JNA, nalazile su se snage pobunjenih Srba općinskog štaba TO-a Pakrac s ukupno 1 730 ljudi, organiziranih u tri bataljuna: 1. pješački bataljun (sastava četiri pješačke satnije, ukupno 540 ljudi), 2. pješački bataljun (sastava pet pješačkih satnija, ukupno 740 ljudi) i 3. pješački bataljun (sastava četiri pješačke satnije, ukupno 450 ljudi) (Werhas M., 2021.).

Dolazak neprijateljskih snaga iz Bosanske krajine na lipičko-pakračko bojište dao je novi zamah neprijateljskim napadima. Od 24. do 26. rujna 1991. snage pakračkog odreda TO-a i snage 343. mtbr. JNA krenule su u napad na Pakrac i Lipik te blokirale izlaze iz grada. Blokiranje prometnica bilo je u Kukunjevcu,

Tornju, Batinjanima i Gornjoj Obriježi, a potpuna blokada prometnice bila je u području šume Zukava prema Daruvaru. Policijske snage iz Bjelovara uz pomoć domaćih postrojbi uspjele su iz smjera Daruvara, na potezu sela Badljevina – Pakrac, ukloniti kamene prepreke kod šume Zukva i istjerati četnike kako bi se oslobodila prometnica i evakuirali bolesnici i bolničko osoblje iz pakračke bolnice.[10] S njima je u Pakrac stigao i pukovnik Dragutin Andrić, koji je po zapovijedi načelnika Glavnog stožera HV-a od 28. rujna 1991. organizirao obranu Pakraca i Lipika, odnosno sektora Pakrac. Pakrac i Lipik 28. rujna branilo je oko 220 policajaca i satnija ZNG-a iz Pakraca. U zadnjim danima rujna hrvatske snage pojačane su s deset haubica, četiri tenka T 55 i dva borbena oklopna vozila. (Marijan D., 2016.).

Zapovjednik obrane grada Pakraca D. Andrić u *Raščlambi* od 29. rujna 1991. navodi: „Napadi na pakrački kraj od strane bivše JNA i pobunjenih Srba traju već peti dan. Tek su povremeno kratkotrajna zatišja, a osim Pakraca razaraju se Prekopakra, Filipovac, Lipik, Dobrovac, tj. mjesta iz kojih ZNG i hrvatska policija pružaju otpor četničkim pješačkim napadima. Neprijateljski tenkovi preko Brusnika stižu i na sjeverozapadnu stranu Pakračke gore, kod sela Omanovac, i ugrožavaju Badljevinu i Daruvar." (*Raščlamba*, Andrić).

Šire područje Lipika i Pakraca branile su manje postrojbe sastavljene od lokalnog stanovništva iz okolnih mjesta i čuvale komunikacije važne za opskrbu i obranu Lipika i Pakraca. Do 30. rujna 1991. branitelji ZNG-a Pakrac bili su ustrojeni kako slijedi – vod Badljevina oko 40; dva voda u Prekopakri oko 80; vod ZNG-a Lipik – 25, vod ZNG-a Dobrovac – 20; vod Poljana – 30 branitelja. Ove snage uz policijske snage u Pakracu čine okosnicu obrane općine Pakrac (*Raščlamba*, str. 11). Prohodne su bile samo komunikacije koje su vodile iz Prekopakre preko Batinjana prema Omanovcu i dalje prema Daruvaru, i od sela Batinjani – Ploštine – Brekinska – Gaj – Antunovac – Uljanik prema Kutini ili Bjelovaru.

U razdoblju od 1. do 3. listopada 1991. (nakon zauzimanja vojarni JNA u Bjelovaru) obrana Pakraca ojačala se sa šest tenkova T 55 i bitnicom MB 120

10 Najhumanija akcija u Domovinskom ratu: u noći 29. i 30. rujna 1991. godine spašeno oko 270 pacijenata sa psihijatrijskog odjela pakračke bolnice, od kojih je 30 bilo nepokretnih. Bez ozljede je izvučeno iz bolnice i 20 liječnika i ostalog medicinskog osoblja koje je s bolesnicima provelo šest dana bez vode, hrane i lijekova pod stalnom topničkom paljbom. Navedenu akciju organizirali su i izveli pripadnici ZNG-a Prekopakra i interventnog voda ZNG-a Pakrac.

mm te drugim sredstvima potpore, što je obranu učinilo žilavijom i spremnom uzvraćati vatru po neprijatelju (*Raščlamba*, Andrić). Ovo je također značilo i moralnu potporu, ali je imalo i učinak u borbi s neprijateljskim oklopom i artiljerijskim snagama.

Na smjeru glavnog napada 5. korpusa JNA područje Lipika i Pakraca našlo se poput klina uvučeno u borbeni raspored neprijateljskih snaga. Neprijateljske snage planirale su okružiti hrvatske snage u Lipiku i Pakracu, presjeći im komunikacije, a zatim ih uništiti. Sudbina Vukovara nadvila se i nad ovim prostorima. Pakrac je u planovima lokalnih Srba trebao postati i glavno sjedište „SAO zapadne Slavonije".

Pripremajući se za osvajanje Lipika, 3. listopada 1991. jedinice 343. mtbr. JNA zauzimaju selo Čaglić na prometnici Okučani – Lipik, u neposrednoj blizini Lipika. Zapovjednik 5. korpusa JNA Nikola Uzelac donosi 4. listopada 1991. odluku da u suradnji sa snagama TO-a Pakrac 343. mtbr. JNA napadne i zauzme Lipik i Pakrac:


08,45 – 343. mtbr: Izvršiti zauzimanje i čišćenje rejona Lipik i Pakrac u sadejstvu sa snagama TO, zauzeti povoljne položaje zapadno od Pakraca i Lipika. Početak napada 10,00 č.

Naređenje načelnika 5. korpusa o osvajanju Lipika i Pakraca

343.mtbr.: izvršiti zauzimanje i čišćenje rejona Lipik i Pakrac u sadejstvu sa snagama TO, zauzeti povoljne položaje zapadno od Pakraca i Lipika. Početak napada 10:00 časova.[11]

–U jutarnjim satima 5. listopada 1991. snage policijske postaje Garešnica i Zbora narodne garde (oko 70 sudionika) krenule u čišćenje sela Toranj do Gornje Obriježi i dalje do Prekopakre. U toj borbenoj akciji probili su blokade na cesti i protjerali četnike iz sela Toranj. Postrojbe su nastavile s akcijom do Gornje Obriježi, a dio je nastavio prema Prekopakri. Zbog prekopane ceste u šumi kod Prekopakre dio postrojbe s oklopnim vozilima nije mogao nastaviti dalje i vozila su se vratila u selo Toranj. U večernjim satima postrojba

11 Ratni dnevnik 5. korpusa JNA od 5. listopada 1991.

se povukla u svoju bazu (Čajsa, 66–67). Zapovjednik Čajsa navodi kako je sa zapovjedništvom obrane Pakraca imao dogovor da selo Toranj treba zaposjesti varaždinska bojna i osigurati ovo područje, ali se nije pojavila. Vjerojatno je u pitanju bila neka druga postrojba. Glavni stožer OSRH uputio je tek 25. listopada 1991. zapovijed 104. brigadi HV-a da pristupi osnivanju i opremanju jedne postrojbe veličine bojne koja bi mogla duže boraviti na bojištu u području Pakraca.

Međutim, u noći s 5. na 6. listopada 1991. srbočetničke snage TO-a Pakrac i pripadnici 343. brigade JNA (2. bataljun) počinju s napadima okruživanja i uništenja hrvatskih branitelja u Lipiku i Pakracu. U Monografiji na 11. stranici navodi se: *„Po donijetoj odluci prešlo se u napad i već 5. listopada 1991. 343. mtbr. s odredom TO Pakrac zauzela je selo Batinjane i došla do centra Pakraca."* U jutarnjim satima 6. listopada 1991. zaposjedaju selo Toranj i blokiraju jedinu prolaznu cestu kod sela Batinjani, cestu spasa, jedini slobodni put koji je vodio iz okruženog Pakraca. Područje Lipika i Pakraca našlo u okruženju.

Ujutro 6. listopada 1991. neprijateljske snage (dva voda) na cesti u selu Batinjanima prema Kutini, koja je do tada bila prohodna, u zasjedi su ubili više ljudi koji su se vozili tom komunikacijom. Malobrojne snage s pakračkog područja krenule su u deblokadu te ceste. U pokušaju deblokiranja komunikacije poginuo je zapovjednik ZNG-a Pakrac Stjepan Širac i dvadeset drugih pakračkih branitelja (Horvat H., *U vihoru rata*).

Isti dan se iz Bjelovara upućuju policijske snage kako bi zajedno s braniteljima deblokirale grad. Prvi pokušaj deblokade u selu Gornja Obrije zaustavljen je zbog istodobnog općeg napada srpskih snaga na Pakrac, Daruvar i Grubišno Polje. Zbog toga su se snage za deblokadu morale prebaciti na ta krizna žarišta (Zbornik radova, str. 181). U početku se smatralo da je riječ o skupini domaćih pobunjenih Srba koji su se vratili iz svojih baza u šumi Turkovača, iskoristili napuštanje položaja od dijela hrvatskih snaga i ponovno ih zaposjeli. Braniteljima je postalo jasno da je neprijatelj krenuo u napad širih razmjera.

I dok se malobrojne snage branitelja bore za očuvanje prolaza *cestom spasa* u Batinjanima, neprijateljske snage ojačane tenkovima uz topničku i zračnu potporu počinju napad na Pakrac i Lipik, probijaju obranu na više mjesta i dolaze do centra Pakraca s ciljem potpunog okruženja i uništenja snaga branitelja (Martinić, str. 63). Od 6. do 9. listopada 1991. neprijateljske snage blokirale su područje Pakraca i Lipika sa svih strana.

U Ratnom dnevniku 5. korpusa JNA od 7. listopada 1991. navodi se kako je Pakrac pao, a Lipik je pred osvajanjem. Zapovjednik 5. korpusa JNA bio je uvjeren da je obrana grada slomljena, pa prepušta lokalnim jedinicama TO-a Pakrac nastavak napada, odnosno čišćenje grada uz potporu Korpusne artiljerijske grupe (KAG) 5. korpusa i zrakoplovstva JNA. U protunapadu hrvatske snage su uspjele potjerati četnike iz grada.



Slika 5. **Napadi na Pakrac i crta dodira snaga**

Izradili M. Kretić i I. Benković, HVU, 2024.

U Pakračku Poljanu 7. listopada 1991. tada dolazi pričuvna postrojba MUP-a, koju je predvodio Tomislav Merčep, sastavljena od izbjeglih Pakračana, Lipičana i dragovoljaca iz drugih krajeva Hrvatske. Postrojba jačine jedne satnije iz sela Antunovca kreće u pomoć braniteljima u Lipik i Pakrac i 8. listopada 1991. ulaze u Kukunjevac, ali se zbog neprekidne neprijateljske topničke paljbe i nemogućnosti prolaza čistine od ergele do staklenika kontrolira paljbom iz neprijateljskih uporišta u Jagmi i Subocki, vraća u

Poljanu. Tada neprijatelj ponovno zaposjeda Kukunjevac. Dana 9. listopada 1991. počeo je novi napad hrvatskih snaga kako bi se prekinulo okruženje pakračkog područja. Uz potporu dva tenka T-55 iz smjera Brekinska policijske snage iz Bjelovara probijaju barikadu na prometnici prema selu Toranj. U poslijepodnevnim satima borbi se priključuje i postrojba pričuvne policije pod vodstvom Tomislava Merčepa i uz potporu tenkova razbija se pobunjenička crta i blokada na sjeverozapadnom dijelu Pakraca. Pobunjeni Srbi povukli su se u pravcu Dereze i Kukunjevca (Zbornik radova, 181). U protunapadu hrvatske snage uspijevaju osloboditi sela Toranj, Batinjane, Mali Banovac i Gornju Obriježˇ, doći do Pakraca i prekinuti okruženje, a pričuvne snage pojačale su obranu grada.

Daljnje oslobađanje pakračkog okruženja nastavljeno je 16. listopada 1991. kada su postrojbe 76. samostalnog bataljuna potisnule srpske snage iz mjesta Omanovac (Martinić, 63). U ovom protunapadu hrvatske snage uspjele su spriječiti opkoljavanje i okupaciju pakračkog područja, koji bi vjerojatno doživio sudbinu sličnu onoj grada Vukovara.



Slika 6: **Područje Lipika i Pakraca u okruženju od 6. do 9. listopada 1991.**

Izradili M. Kretić i I. Benković, HVU, 2024.

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Dana 11. listopada 1991. branitelji Lipika uočili su dovođenje novih neprijateljskih snaga iz smjera Bijelih Stijena – Čaglić. Neprijatelj je 11. listopada 1991. premostio rijeku Pakru na ulazu u Lipik, na mjestu mosta koji su branitelji minirali nekoliko dana prije kako bi spriječili ulazak neprijateljskim tenkovima. Neprijateljski napad na Pakrac započinje iz smjera Kraguj – Japaga – Šeovica, a na Lipik iz smjera Čaglića i Donje Subocke uz potporu topništva.

U ranim jutarnjim satima 12. listopada neprijatelj zauzima dio Lipika južno od pruge. Oko 6 sati kolona tenkova i pješaštvo prelazi prugu i kreće se Ulicom Marije Terezije prema centru. Branitelji u hotelu „Lipik" otvaraju vatru i zaustavljaju jedan dio kolone. Dio kolone koja se probila do centra sukobio se u žestokoj borbi s hrvatskim braniteljima, a dio kolone koja je zaustavljena kod hotela krenuo je Slavonskom ulicom i dolazi do benzinske pumpe na glavnoj prometnici.

„Žestoki sukobi oko Lipika i Pakraca. Naše snage imaju poginulih i više ranjenih. Odmetničke i četničke snage izvodile su napade uz podršku tenkova. Oštećen je jedan naš BVP, a drugi je onesposobljen. Četničke snage su dovožene prema Čagliću autobusima. U popodnevnim satima vodile su se ulične borbe u Lipiku. Uputili smo pomoć specijalne jedinice i 4 BVP. Dvije haubice 122 iz Daruvara podržavaju snage u Pakracu. Naša 4 tenka i 2 bvp u večernjim satima izbili su u Prekopakru i preko Obriježa." [12]

Pobunjeni Srbi i JNA s tenkovima okupirali su veći dio Lipika, južno od prometnice Filipovac, i zauzeli selo Dobrovac. Branitelji hotela odolijevali su neprijatelju cijeli dan i noću se povlače na Tabor. Pred sam pad cijelog Lipika, navečer 11. listopada 1991., u pomoć braniteljima stiže skupina od tridesetak branitelja. Ponovno se vraćaju u neokupirani dio Lipika i organiziraju otporne točke, punktove od 5 do 6 branitelja uzduž glavne ulice. Sutradan JNA provodi dotad najjači napad na Lipik i probija se do centra grada, ali je uslijed pretrpljenih gubitaka neprijatelj zaustavljen (Skender B., YouTube).

Dana 12. listopada 1991. neprijatelj s pješaštvom i tenkovima ulazi u Lipik i zaustavlja se nakon cjelodnevne bitke i protuudara domaćih branitelja usred Lipika. Branitelji Lipika imali su četiri mrtva i nekoliko teško ranjenih. Neprijatelj je imao oko deset mrtvih, jedan uništeni tenk i još dva oštećena

12 SVO, Zagreb, DOI OZ Bjelovar, Miroslav Jezerčić od 11. listopada 1991.

te jedan oštećeni oklopni transporter i uništeno zapovjedno vozilo. Zbog tih gubitaka stali su i nisu nastavili prema Filipovcu i Prekopakri te Pakracu. (Križan B.)

O žestini borbi neprijateljski komandant 343. mtbr. izvješćuje 12. listopada 1991. nadređeno zapovjedništvo: *„... tuku me sa svih strana, u selu Batinjani je probijena obrana, u Lipiku se vode borbe prsa o prsa ... ako zadržimo Lipik, to će biti veliki uspjeh ... tražim potporu avijacije, tražim 3-4 tenka radi rušenja robne kuće i hotela u kojem se nalaze pripadnici ZNG..."*[13]

U vremenu od 6. do 13. listopada 1991. vođene su dotad najteže borbe na lipičko-pakračkom bojištu kojima je cilj bio spriječiti okruženje i uništenje branitelja. Tih dana vodila se odlučujuća bitka za obranu Pakraca i Lipika, bila je to borba za život ili smrt. Spriječena je sudbina Vukovara prije Vukovara.

Crta dodira s neprijateljskim snagama (*Slika 7*) ostala je do 28. studenog 1991., kada započinje konačna operacija hrvatskih snaga za oslobađanje Lipika.



Slika 7: **Neprijateljski napadi na Lipik**

13 Ratni dnevnik 5. korpusa od 10. do 13. listopada 1991.

Selo Omanovac sjeverno od Pakraca oslobođeno je zajedničkim akcijama badljevačkog voda ZNG-a i novopridošle križevačke 3. bojne 117. brigade od 13. do 16. listopada 1991., koja je zaposjela oslobođene položaje. Nakon ovih borbenih djelovanja uspostavljena je nova crta dodira s 343. mtbr. od sela Dereza – Pakrac (*brdo Kalvarija*) – Lipik – Kukunjevac – Bujavica – Blanuše (Monografija, 112).

Obrana Pakraca pojačana je sa svime što je Operativna zona Bjelovar mogla posl ati u pomoć. Mobilizirana je 12. listopada 1991. i 105. brigada iz Bjelovara, a 13./14. listopada dovedena je satnija iz 117. brigade HV-a

Robna kuća ***Robna kuća***

Slike 17. i 18.

(Marijan D., 2016., str. 113), dio 54. samostalnog bataljuna iz Čakovca[14] te druge postrojbe iz šireg područja.

Teške borbe i veliki gubitci utjecali su na moral i koheziju neprijateljskih snaga. *„Sve do kraja mjeseca listopada 1991. 343. brigada JNA je svaki dan vodila ogorčene borbe sa pojačanim ustaškim snagama koje na sve načine pokušavaju da vrate Lipik, Pakrac i položaj na dominantnim kotama u rejonu Lovske, Trokuta, Baira i Bujavice. Moral jedinica sve više slabi, naročito u 3. bataljunu."* (Monografija, 114).

14 Ratni dnevnik Vinka Horvata, poslije zapovjednika 54. Sb ZNG-a Čakovec. Na pakračko bojište u izviđanje 15. listopada 1991. otišao je jedan vod, a kasnije, po zapovijedi Andrića iz OZ Bjelovar, upućena je prva skupina 54. samostalne bojne ZNG-a Čakovec s ukupno 178 pripadnika. Borbena skupina je po Andrićevoj zapovijedi razmještena u području Gornji Obrijež – Batinjani – Mali Banovac sa zadaćom izviđanja i napada na Mali Banovac i selo Toranj. Dana 27. listopada 1991. 54. Sb. ZNG-a Čakovec sudjeluje u napadu na selo Toranj, uz podršku dvaju tenkova 105. brigade iz Bjelovara.

Dana 17. listopada 3. bataljun 343. brigade s oko 300 vojnika napustio je svoje položaje u Derezi i otišao prema Prijedoru. Kasnije je 3. bataljun rasformiran. Vjerojatno ih je napad hrvatskih snaga 16. listopada 1991. iz Badljevine i Donje Obriježi u selu Omanovac natjerao na povlačenje prema Derezi, nanijevši im teške gubitke (*Raščlamba b/d,* 2000., str. 14). Borbe vođene na lipičko-pakračkom bojištu u rujnu i listopadu 1991. učinile su ga jednim od najtežih bojišta na hrvatskom ratištu (*Battlegrounds*, sv. II, str. 218).

Pogoršavanje međunacionalnih odnosa u Općini Prijedor, defetizam i bojkot odlaska u borbu (npr. 20 vojnika odbilo se boriti u Lipiku) nagrizli su moral brigade i doveli u pitanje njezinu učinkovitost. U to vrijeme još se oko 20 % Bošnjaka i Hrvata nalazilo u sastavu brigade. Zapovjedništvo 5. korpusa JNA odlučilo je krajem listopada 1991. zamijeniti 343. mtbr. i 5. kozaračku brigadu pristiglom 14. prtb. JNA iz Zrenjanina i Kikinde (Monografija, 2022., str. 114).

Međutim, nakon oslobođenja tih područja nije bilo dostatnih hrvatskih snaga koje bi ga zaposjele i nadzirale. Područje Pakračkog gorja između sela Kukunjevca i sela Dereza i Kusonja šumovito je i brdovito, prostorno obuhvaća oko 40 km2. Za nadzor i obranu tako velikog oslobođenog teritorija hrvatski branitelji nisu imali dovoljno snaga, a u prazna mjesta (selo Kukunjevac, Toranj) ponovno su ušle srbočetničke snage i opet prijetile okruženjem Pakraca i Lipika. Kroz to nenaseljeno, šumovito i brdovito područje postojao je koridor kojim su se služili pobunjenici između jakih pobunjeničkih uporišta sela Dereza i Kukunjevca, koji je vodio preko sela Gornja Obriježˇ, Batinjani i Toranj. Krajem listopada i početkom studenog 1991. na to područje dolazi mobilizirana 104. brigada ZNG-a iz Varaždina s više od tisuću mobiliziranih branitelja. Time je područje stavljeno pod nadzor hrvatskih snaga, koridor je prekinut i prestala je opasnost od opkoljavanja Pakraca.

Dolaskom zime boravak branitelja na položajima postajao je sve teži, a vremenski uvjeti su se počeli pogoršavati. Noći su postale hladnije, a temperature su se spuštale ispod nule. Položaji za obranu s objektima za preživljavanje uređivani su uz stalne topničke napade neprijatelja. Domicilne hrvatske snage koncentrirale su se na obranu Lipika i Pakraca, a pristigle postrojbe kontrolirale su prometnice i provodile nadzor šireg područja.

Dolaskom i razmještanjem novih postrojbi iz drugih područja Hrvatske s

jačim i suvremenijim oružjem u zaleđu prvih borbenih linija 76. bataljuna i pakračke policije započele su i pripreme za napade na neprijatelja.

Glavni stožer HV-a, uvidjevši da su neprijateljske snage na zapadnoslavonskom bojištu sastavljene od većeg broja rezervista i raznih četničkih dobrovoljačkih skupina ipak slabije u odnosu na snage u istočnoj Slavoniji, donosi odluku o pokretanju oslobađanja zapadne Slavonije. *„Vojna operacija oslobađanja zapadne Slavonije je planirana i pripremana sredinom listopada u zapovjednom centru Operativne grupe Posavina kao dio plana Glavnog stožera za oslobađanje zapadne Slavonije. Plan je predočen meni, kao načelniku Glavnog stožera, 25. listopada 1991. i odobren."* (A. Tus, str. 62). Zaustavljanje snaga JNA u području Vukovar – Vinkovci – Osijek omogućilo je oslobađanje zapadne Slavonije.

Napadna operacija hrvatskih snaga *ORKAN-91* započela je u 6:00 sati 28. listopada 1991. i provodila se neprekidno u nekoliko faza sve do stupanja na snagu Sarajevskog primirja 3. siječnja 1992. U sklopu ove opće operacije oslobađanja zapadne Slavonije slijedile su manje napadne operacije po pojedinom područjima nazvane *Otkos-10, Papuk-91, Orada, Maslačak, Alfa...*

„Prva uspješna oslobodilačka operacija Oružanih snaga Republike Hrvatske u Domovinskom ratu bila je na pakračko-lipičkoj bojišnici, a izvedena je 30. listopada 1991. kada su snage 2. satnije 1. bojne (varaždinske) 104. brigade ZNG-a i tenkovskog voda 105. brigade ponovno zaposjele selo Toranj i time zaštitile prometnicu „cestu spasa" koja je iz Pakraca kroz Prekopakru i Omanovac vodila prema Daruvaru, odnosno iz Pakraca što je vodila kroz sela Batinjani, Ploštine, Brekinska, Gaj, Antunovac prema Kutini i Bjelovaru. Iako su branitelji na položajima u selu Toranj, slobodnom dijelu Lipika i Pakraca bili izloženi svakodnevnim napadima i granatiranju iz okolnih brda i naselja pod kontrolom četnika i JNA, crta obrane više se nije pomaknula." (Mijatović A., str. 249).

U operaciju oslobađanja zapadne Slavonije načelnik GS HV-a Antun Tus uključio je i varaždinsku 104. brigadu ZNG-a. Nakon što je iz Glavnog stožera HV-a 25. listopada 1991. upućena zapovijed 104. brigadi HV-a da *pristupi osnivanju i opremanju jedne postrojbe veličine bojne koja bi mogla duže vrijeme boraviti na bojištu u području Pakraca,* dana 31. listopada 1991. zapovjedništvo brigade primilo je novu zapovijed o mobiliziranju cijele brigade i da ona

zaposjedne šire područje Pakraca.[15]

Zapovijed o upućivanju 104. brigade na pakračko bojište

Zapovjednik 104. brigade 4. studenog od zapovjednika obrane sektora Pakrac pukovnika Dragutina Andrića dobiva zadaću koja naselja treba zaposjesti. U isto vrijeme provodi se mobilizacija vojnih obveznika na području Novog Marofa, Ivanca i Varaždina.

Dana 5. studenog 1991. varaždinska 104. brigada s više od 1 200 mobiliziranih branitelja razmjestila se na širem području Lipika i Pakraca. Tako je šumovito i brdovito područje Pakračkog gorja između sela Kukunjevca i sela Dereza i Kusonja, koje prostorno obuhvaća oko 40 km2, stavljeno pod nadzor 104. brigade ZNG-a. Širina zone odgovornosti brigade bila je 8 do 10 kilometara, a po dubini 3 do 5 kilometara. Koridor između jakih pobunjeničkih uporišta sela Dereza i Kukunjevca, kojim su se služile četničke snage kako bi blokirale prometnice, terorizirale stanovništvo i postavljale zasjede, a koji je vodio preko sela Gornja Obriježˇ, Batinjani i Toranj, zaposjele su hrvatske snage. Opasnosti od opkoljavanja područja Lipika i Pakraca više nije bilo.



ZAPOVJEDNIŠTVO OZ
B J E L O V A R
Op. br. 2/1-1
Bjelovar, 03.11.1991.

VOJNA TAJNA
STROGO POVJERLJIVO

Zapovjed za upotrebu
brigade.-

ZAPOVJEDNIKU 104. brigade

Na osnovu ukazane potrebe za borbeno djelovanje u rejonu Pakraca,s u cilju pravilnog i uspješnog izvršenja zadatka

Z A P O V I J E D A M :

1. Dana 05.11.1991. godine sa mobiliziranim dijelom 104. brigade izvršiti marš pravcem: Varaždin - Bjelovar - Garešnica - s. Antunovac - s. Pakračka Poljana s. Brđanjska, gdje dostići marševski cilj do 10,00 sati.

Pohitanju na marševski cilj zapovjednik 104. brigade javiće se zapovjedniku sektora Pakrac radi prijema zadatka u s. Donji Obriješ.

2. Po dobijanju zadatku izvršiti poništenje rejona upotrebe i izvršavanja zadataka po zapovjedima zapovjednika sektora Pakrac.1/104. brigade, koji je već angažiran u rejonu Pakraca na zadatku, uključiti u sastav brigade i preuzeti komandovanje sa njim.

3. Za vrijeme marša osigurati propisanog razmaka u koloni i u vrijeme poništenja rejona upotrebe primjeniti rastresit raspored, kako bi se u slučaju napada iz zraka eventualni gubici sveli na najmanju mogaću mjeru.

Poduzeti sve ostale potrebne mjere zaštite tajnosti i sigurnosti, a sa dobivenim zadatkom upoznati samo lica koja učestvuju u njegovom izvršenju.

4. Logističku podršku vršiti oslonom na vlastite snage i teritoriju,a za rješavanje pitanja koja ne možete riješiti vlastitim snagama i sredstvima tražiti pomoć od sektora logistike ovog zapovjedništva.

ZAPOVJEDNIK
Pukovnik
Miroslav Jarnjević

Zapovijed o upućivanju 104. brigade na pakračko bojište

Zapovijed za izmještanje 104. brigade ZNG-a od 5. studenog 1991

„Snage 104. brg. Varaždin u toku dana 5. 11. 1991. pripremiti za pokret. Gotovi bataljun (s dijelom zapovjedništva brigade) u toku noći 5./6. 11. 1991. organizirano prebaciti na područje Valpova, Donjeg Miholjca, Našica i razmjestiti u područje s. Črnkovci, s. Marijanci, s. Radikovci. Ostali dio brigade također ubrzano dovesti na to područje i staviti pod zapovijedanje OZ Osijek. Naredno zapovjedno mjesto 104. brg. u području s. Kučanci."

Međutim, Glavni stožer HV-a odlučio je izmjestiti varaždinsku 104. brigadu 5. studenog 1991. u istočnu Slavoniju. Zapovjednik Operativne zone Bjelovar

15 Monografija 104. brigade HV-a, 1994., str. 28.

brigadir Jerzečić odmah je zatražio od načelnika Glavnog stožera HV-a ostanak varaždinske brigade jer *bi „… odlazak 104. brigade imao za posljedicu gubitak Lipika i Pakraca, jer nema drugih snaga koje bi je mogle zamijeniti, a o bilo kakvim ofanzivnim aktivnostima izlišno je govoriti, jer su sve snage već vezane u djelovanjima s nadmoćnim neprijateljem."*[16] Zadržavanje 104. brigade na pakračko-lipičkom bojištu poslije se pokazalo kao dobra odluka.

U tim presudnim trenutcima za opstanak Hrvatske na područje zapadne Slavonije u jesen i zimu 1991./1992. mobilizirano je oko 7 000 branitelja iz varaždinskog kraja koji su u smjenama dolazili i sudjelovali s drugim hrvatskim snagama u zaustavljanju i potiskivanju neprijateljskih snaga iz zapadne Slavonije. Time su i pripadnici 104. brigade ZNG-a iz varaždinskog kraja dali svoj doprinos u porazu srbočetničkih snaga i slomu velikosrpske politike (VTV Televizija, 2006.).

16 Dopis Miroslava Jerzečića od 6. studenoga 1991. načelniku GS HV-a Antunu Tusu.

Zaključak

U Kadijevićevu strateškom planu pohoda JNA na Hrvatsku u jesen 1991. zauzimanje Slavonije bilo je presudno za slamanje i prisiljavanje Hrvatske na pregovore kao poražene strane. Ključno područje koje je JNA željela što prije zauzeti u početnom dijelu napadne operacije bilo je osvajanje zapadne Slavonije. Napad 5. korpusa JNA na zapadnu Slavoniju pravcem Gradiška – Pakrac – Virovitica i izlazak na mađarsku granicu imao bi presudni utjecaj na cijelu napadnu operaciju i brzi završetak rata, odnosno vojni i moralni poraz Hrvatske.

Prije pokretanja velike napadne operacije velikosrpskih ideolozi, emisari iz Srbije i JNA u ljeto 1991. na području zapadne Slavonije uspjeli su potaknuti pobunu srpskog stanovništva koja je eskalirala u otvoreni oružani sukob protiv hrvatske države. JNA ih je opremila i naoružala kako bi se mogli suprotstaviti hrvatskim snagama do dolaska jedinica JNA. Vojni vrh JNA povjerio je 5. korpusu sa sjedištem u Banja Luci zauzimanje zapadne Slavonije.

Zadaća 5. korpusa JNA bila je napasti Slavoniju iz smjera Banja Luke, preko Nove Gradiške i Okučana u suradnji sa snagama pobunjenih Srba, zauzeti područje Pakraca, Daruvara, Virovitice i izići na granicu Mađarske, odnosno odvojiti Slavoniju od središnje Hrvatske. Presijecajući teritorij Hrvatske prekinula bi se i logistička potpora hrvatskim snagama u istočnoj Slavoniji, olakšavajući time prodor jugoslavenskoj vojsci iz Srbije prema Zagrebu i Varaždinu, sve do granice sa Slovenijom.

Vojni zapovjednici JNA i ratni huškači poticali su Srbe u Bosanskoj krajini na odlazak u zapadnu Slavoniju. Vojnim obveznicima govorili su: *„Mi idemo u borbu za zaštitu srpskog naroda u Slavoniji.", „Prijedor se brani u zapadnoj Slavoniji."*… Mobilizirani pripadnici 5. korpusa JNA s područja Bosanske krajine došli su u zapadnu Slavoniju protjerati, ubijati i oružano se obračunati s Hrvatima na njihovoj zemlji, otimati im imovinu kako bi *obranili ugroženi srpski narod i očistili Lipik i Pakrac od hrvatske paravojske*. Zadojeni mržnjom prema svemu hrvatskom, kao da su bili izašli iz vremena Drugog svjetskog rata, nazivali su Hrvate ustašama i poručivali kako za branitelje nema milosti, kako ih čeka duboka jama, činili su zločine koje je teško opisati i nemoguće razumjeti. Teške borbe u zapadnoj Slavoniji ostavile su dubok i

trajan ožiljak na odnosima Srba i Hrvata. Bitka za Slavoniju kulminirala je u zapadnoj Slavoniji. Na glavnom naporu 5. (banjalučkog) korpusa JNA, na lipičko-pakračkom bojištu, hrvatskim snagama prijetila je sudbina Vukovara prije Vukovara. Hrabrost i odlučnost malobrojnih hrvatskih snaga, a poslije pristiglih novih mobiliziranih postrojbi iz sjeverozapadnog dijela Hrvatske, uspjelo se zaustaviti napade 5. korpusa (banjalučkog) JNA i spriječiti osvajanje Pakraca, Daruvara i proboj do Virovitice, odnosno presijecanje Hrvatske i odvajanja Slavonije od središnje Hrvatske. Iako su neprijateljske snage imale golemu prednost u vatrenoj moći – oklopnim snagama, topništvu i zračnoj potpori – pripadnici 5. korpusa JNA, uglavnom bosanski Srbi, angažirajući cjelokupni gospodarski i politički potencijal sjeverne Bosne, nisu imali dovoljno snaga ostvariti postavljeni operativni cilj – *poraziti hrvatsku vojsku na području zapadne Slavonije i izbiti na mađarsku granicu*. Isto tako ni u reduciranom planu snage JNA i pobunjeni Srbi iz zapadne Slavonije nisu uspjeli zaokružiti područje srpske *„SAO zapadne Slavonije"* i poraziti hrvatske snage na lipičko-pakračkom bojištu. Planovi o granici *„Velike Srbije"* na rijeci Ilovi propali su u zapadnoj Slavoniji.

U to teško vrijeme borbe za opstanak Hrvatske, u uvjetima embarga, kada nije nam bilo dopušteno kupiti suvremeno oružje za obranu, Hrvatska je ostala sama, a njezin opstanak ovisio je o osvajanju skladišta oružja i opreme JNA na teritoriju pod hrvatskom kontrolom.

Predaja hrvatskim snagama varaždinskog 32. korpusa JNA, kao jednog od najopremljenijih, s kompletnom opremom i oružjem, podigao je moral branitelja i spremnost za obranu Hrvatske.

Napore 5. (banjalučkog) korpusa JNA da presiječe Hrvatsku od Save sve do mađarske granice, kako bi se osigurala kontrola nad Slavonijom, osujetile su hrvatske snage herojskim otporom na glavnom smjeru napada 5. korpusa JNA, na lipičko-pakračkom bojištu, s oružjem i opremom koje je osvojeno u vojarnama 32. (varaždinskog) korpusa JNA.

Oružje i oprema iz skladišta omogućila je mobiliziranje novih postrojbi hrvatske vojske, koje su ojačale obranu, a zatim preuzele taktičku inicijativu i počele s operacijama oslobađanja i potiskivanja 5. korpusa JNA sa zapadnoslavonskog područja.

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The attack of the 5th JNA Corps on Western Slavonia in the autumn of 1991.

Abstract

In the strategic plan of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) attack on Croatia in 1991, the most important role was assigned to the 5th (Banja Luka) JNA Corps. Its task was – relying on the rebel and armed Serbian population in Western Slavonia – to attack Croatia from northwestern Bosnia in the direction of Gradiška–Pakrac–Virovitica, to separate Slavonia from central Croatia and to cut off logistical support to the Croatian forces defending Eastern Slavonia in order to facilitate the Yugoslav army's breakthrough from Serbia towards Zagreb and Varaždin, all the way to the border with Slovenia. Had the 5th Corps reached the Hungarian border, Croatia would have lost the war and be forced to ask for an armistice. It would have been the final cut that would have decided Croatia's fate. The Battle for Slavonia culminated in Western Slavonia. The efforts of the 5th JNA Corps to "encircle, defeat and disarm the Croatian forces and break through to Virovitica and cut off all communication between Eastern Slavonia and the rest of Croatia" were stopped by Croatian forces in Western Slavonia.

The introductory part of the paper explains the role of the 5th JNA Corps in the strategic plan of the JNA attack on Croatia. The following section describes the task, intention and idea of the commander of the 5th JNA Corps, Nikola Uzelac, as he intended to surround, defeat and disarm the Croatian forces in the area of Western Slavonia. The paper focuses on clarifying the bearers of combat operations on the main direction of the attack of the 5th JNA Corps, the 343rd Brigade "R" of the JNA on the Lipica-Pakrac battlefield in the autumn of 1991, until the arrival of the 104th Brigade of the ZNG Varaždin.

Keywords

the role of the 5th JNA Corps (Banja Luka) in the plan of the attack on Croatia in 1991; task, intention and idea of the commander of the 5th JNA Corps, Lipica–Pakrac battlefield, 343rd mtbr JNA

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